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PREFACE 
 
THE present volume is an attempt to bring together, in systematic and generalized form, 
the main outlines of a conceptual scheme for the analysis of the structure and processes 
of social systems. In the nature of the case, within the frame of reference of action, such a 
conceptual scheme must focus on the delineation of the system of institutionalized roles 
and the motivational processes organized about them. Because of this focus and the very 
elementary treatment of processes of economic exchange and of the organization of 
political power, the book should be regarded as a statement of general sociological 
theory, since this is here interpreted to be that part of the theory of the social system 
which is centered on the phenomena of the institutionalization of patterns of value-
orientation in roles. 
The title, The Social System, goes back, more than to any other source, to the 
insistence of the late Professor L.J.Henderson on the extreme importance of the concept 
of system in scientific theory, and his clear realization that the attempt to delineate the 
social system as a system was the most important contribution of Pareto’s great work.1 
This book therefore is an attempt to carry out Pareto’s intention, using an approach, the 
“structural-functional” level of analysis, which is quite different from that of Pareto, and, 
of course, taking advantage of the very considerable advances in our knowledge at many 
points, which have accumulated in the generation since Pareto wrote. 
For the reader’s orientation it is important to relate the present book both to the 
author’s previously published work and to his nearly simultaneously appearing 
contribution to the volume Toward  
1 Cf. L.J.Henderson, Pareto’s General Sociology. 
a General Theory of Action by members of the Harvard University Department of Social 
Relations and their collaborators. 
The author’s Structure of Social Action was not a study in sociological theory in a 
strict sense, but an analysis, in relation to the work of a group of authors, of the nature 
and implications of the action frame of reference. Since its publication in 1937 there has 
been gradually taking shape a formulation of a systematic approach to the narrower tasks 
of sociological theory as such, stimulated by empirical work in a variety of fields and by 
the writings of other authors, particularly Merton.2 Various steps in this development are 
documented in the papers published in thc collection Essays in Sociological Theory. 
For some years I have intended, when opportunity offered and the time seemed ripe, to 
attempt to pull these strands of thought together in a general book. In the fall of 1947 I 
held at Harvard a seminar on the Theory of Social Systems. The clarification of thought 
achieved there was documented in exceedingly condensed form in the paper The Position 
of Sociological Theory (Essays, Chapter I). Then an invitation to deliver the University 
Lectures in Sociology at the University of London in January-February 1949 provided an 
occasion for further systematic consideration of the problem. In a rather rough sense 
those lectures, which were not published as such, constituted the outline of the present 
book. Then in connection with a collaborative attempt to clarify some of the theoretical 
fundamentals of the whole field involved in sociology, social anthropology and social 
psychology, I was given leave of absence from Harvard teaching for the fall term of 
1949–50. Starting in the summer of 1949, and continuing in the fall while group 
discussions were proceeding, I made it my principal contribution to the early phase of 
this project to work on the first draft of the long projected book. 
The work of this broader project, particularly since it proceeded in such a stimulating 
atmosphere of group discussion, entailed reappraisal of many of the fundamentals of the 
action frame of reference as they underlay, not only sociological theory, but the other 
disciplines of the social relations field. Late in November of 1949 this rethinking of the 
underlying frame of reference reached a culmination out of which the volume to be 
published as the most direct  
2 See esp. Social Theory and Social Structure. 
result of the broader theoretical project mentioned above took shape. My principal 
personal contribution to that, the monograph written together with Edward Shils under 
the title Values, Motives and Systems of Action constitutes essentially a new and extended 
statement of the theoretical subject matter of the Structure of Social Action. Indeed, if that 
title had not already been preempted it might have been the most appropriate for the 
monograph. 
The work which has resulted in the writing of the general monograph on systems of 
action thus bears a critically important relation to the present volume. In the first place it 
has necessitated far more extensive revision of the first draft of the present book (more 
than three fourths of what had been projected stood in first draft) than would ordinarily 
have been the case. As a result this is a greatly different and I think a far better book than 
it would have been. The monograph also provides, in readily accessible form, a careful 
and systematic analysis of many of the methodological problems, and general problems 
of the theory of action and of its personality and cultural phases, which underlie or are 
intimately related to the subject of this book at many points. It thus relieves this volume 
of a serious burden and frees it for concentration on its central problems. In a sense this 
book should, therefore, be treated as a second volume of a systematic treatise on the 
theory of action of which the monograph would serve as the first. 
The body of the monograph consists of four long chapters. The first outlines the 
fundamentals of the general conceptual scheme of action, the other three spelling it out 
for each of the three modes of systematization of action, Personality, Cultural Systems 
with special reference to systems of Value-orientation, and Social Systems. Thus in a 
sense the present volume is to be regarded as an expansion of the chapter on the Social 
System in the monograph, though it also impinges on other important parts of the latter. 
When an author is involved in two such closely related and nearly simultaneous 
publications, each of which is designed to be read independently, it would seem that a 
certain amount of overlapping is inevitable. An attempt, however, has been made to 
minimize this. The first chapter of the present book contains a condensed statement of the 
essentials of the structure of action and of action systems, and of the basic interrelations 
of personality, culture and social systems. The reader who finds this statement overly 
condensed will find the problems much more extensively discussed in the monograph. 
Obviously, further, much of the content of the chapter in the monograph on the Social 
System finds its place in this volume also, but this time in greatly expanded form, and 
with much more illustrative material. Finally, a special attempt has been made in this 
volume to deal systematically with the interrelations of the social system both with 
personality and with culture. Here the main difference from the monograph lies in the 
consistent maintenance of the perspective of relevance to the structure and functioning of 
social systems wherever personality and culture are discussed. A complete treatment of 
the theory of basic social science as here conceived would require two further volumes 
parallel to the present one. 
Another difference between the two publications lies in the fact that most of the 
material of the present book was, in its final form, written somewhat later than the text of 
the monograph. The development of theoretical ideas has been proceeding so rapidly that 
a difference of a few months or even weeks in time may lead to important changes, so 
there are some differences in the positions taken in the two publications. Indeed this 
process of development is such that it inevitably affects even the internal consistency of 
the present book. It is not possible to work intensively on one part without implications of 
the changes introduced arising for other points; the process of revision thus never fully 
catches up with itself. In general the reader may expect to find some of this less than 
perfect consistency. I have thought it better to run this risk and get the book published, 
rather than to work it over and over for too long. It can then get the benefit of critical 
discussion, and then, within a relatively short time, a revision may be attempted. It is 
fully expected that such a revision in, say, about five years, will lead to substantial 
changes. The field is in a process of such rapid development as to make this inevitable. 
A volume produced under the circumstances just outlined owes more than the usual 
debt to others. My heaviest direct obligation is to Edward Shils, co-author of the 
monograph on Values, Motives and Systems of Action. It is quite impossible to 
disentangle our individual contributions to the monograph and much of this joint thinking 
has spilled over into the present volume. Also very important is the debt to Edward 
Tolman in the many long discussions we had during the collaborative project, and to 
Richard Sheldon who participated in many of them. 
In the background of course lies the immense influence of the great founders of 
modern social science, of whom the three major figures of my previous studies, Pareto, 
Durkheim and Max Weber, stand out, and in addition to them especially Freud. Over the 
years there has been an outstandingly important influence of association with colleagues, 
especially with Clyde and Florence Kluckhohn, in the problems of culture and its relation 
to society and of Henry A. Murray and Gordon W.Allport in relation to personality and 
social psychology. In the more centrally sociological field many discussions with Samuel 
A.Stouffer, Robert K.Merton, Florence Kluckhohn, and Robert Freed Bales and Francis 
X.Sutton in particular have been most fruitful. 
Not least important have been many discussions with a succession of able students—
these are too numerous for more than a few to be mentioned, but a sub-committee of a 
seminar on Social Structure which included François Bourricaud, René Fox, Miriam 
Massey, Rev. John V.Martin, Robert N.Wilson and Dr. Lyman Wynne may be especially 
singled out, since as a group we canvassed together many of the problems of motivational 
process in the social system. 
A considerable part of the work of this volume was done as part of the general project 
on the theoretical foundations of the field of Social Relations in connection with which 
Professors Tolman and Shils were brought to Harvard. It therefore shared the benefits of 
the financial support given to that project by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and 
the Harvard Laboratory of Social Relations. This help is hereby gratefully acknowledged. 
Finally, the secretary of the Department of Social Relations, Miss Weymouth Yelle, 
competently supervised the clerical work involved in processing of the manuscript, the 
actual processing being done by Mr. Seymour Katz and Mrs. Norman F.Geer. The index 
was prepared by Mr. Stuart Cleveland. The author’s gratitude foreffective performance of 
these indispensable services is hereby recorded. 
TALCOTT PARSONS. 
Cambridge, Mass.  
February, 1951  
PREFACE TO THE NEW EDITION 
 
INTRODUCTION: INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTIES 
THE general problem of The Social System is that it is both one of the most influential 
and systematic textbooks of modern sociology, and one of the most ferociously criticized 
books. Naturally its author has had a rather similar career. Parsons’ first major 
publication—The Structure of Social Action (1937a)—has proved in the long run to have 
been one of the most coherent and profound attacks on utilitarian theories of social action 
in the social sciences, thereby establishing Parsons as, among other intellectual roles, a 
leading contributor to the analytical problems of economic theory. His next major book 
The Social System (1951a), along with Toward General Theory of Action (Parsons and 
Shils 1951b), established Parsons as the central figure in so-called structural-
functionalism, which, as a style of theoretical work, has been generally condemned as 
hyper-abstract, logically faulted, and conservative. One paradox in the life of Parsons is, 
therefore, that here we find an author of two major contributions to modern sociology 
which are held to be mutually exclusive positions. This contradiction also partly explains 
why, despite Parsons’ very obvious stature as a modern thinker, “the conventional 
attitude towards his theory is one of critical aloofness” (Munch 1981:710). 
The purpose of this introductory commentary on Parsons’ The Social System is to see 
whether this contradiction or tension in fact exists and whether it can be resolved in any 
way. Because Parsons’ prose (especially in his later work) is notoriously dense and 
cumber-some, my aim here is also to facilitate the reader’s access to the text. One of 
Parsons’ severest critics once wrote that Parsons’ work is “full of sham scientific slang 
devoid of clear meaning, precision and elementary elegance” (Sorokin 1966:56). While I 
do not share that view of Parsons’ work, it would be misleading to pretend The Social 
System is an exciting piece of prose or an elementary introduction to sociology. Part of 
the task of this essay is, therefore, to answer the question: why read Parsons? 
Those who are already familiar with Parsons’ work will note the irony of this question. 
Parsons’ The Structure of Social Action starts with the notorious question, adopted from 
Crane Brinton’s English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century: “who now reads 
Herbert Spencer?” The answer was of course, nobody, but, since Parsons’ subsequent 
work had at least some resemblance to Spencer’s functionalism (Peel 1971), Parsons’ 
own question was ironically prescient. Fortunately, the answer to the question “who now 
reads Parsons?” is very definitely not nobody. As we will see shortly, there has been, 
since Parsons’ death in Munich in 1979, a major revival of interest in Parsons’ work, not 
only in his own culture (Alexander 1984; 1987), but also in Germany (Habermas 1987; 
Luhmann 1982; Munch 1987), in England (Hamilton 1983; Savage 1981), and in many 
other societies (Bourricaud 1981; Buxton 1985; Holton and Turner 1986; Robertson and 
Turner 1989). Indeed, for some commentators on the current sociological theory scene, 
the reevaluation of Parsons is part of a broader revitalization of sociology, which has 
been dubbed either “neofunctionalism” (Alexander 1985) or “the new theoretical 
movement” (Alexander 1988). 
However, my question is not whether Parsons is still the focus of attention, but “why 
read Parsons?” Partly anticipating a fuller answer to this question in this essay, there are 
broadly speaking three components to my defence of Parsons’ work in general and The 
Social System in particular. First, it is literally impossible to understand the mainstream 
debates of modern sociology without some comprehension of Parsonian sociology, 
because Parsons’ treatment of the notions of social action, social structure, function, 
culture, and social system shaped, directly or indirectly, many subsequent developments 
in sociology, both in America and Europe. Of course, it was often in opposition to 
Parsons that these developments took place. For example, Anthony Giddens’ 
“structuration theory” (Giddens 1968; 1976) was typically developed against Parsons’ 
views of power, system, and action. Second, Parsons’ approach to theory provides us 
with a powerful model of systemic social theory, which is addressed to the fundamental 
problems of the social sciences as such. While many sociologists work in splendid 
isolation from other social sciences, Parsons’ sociology is overtly intended to engage 
with analytical issues in “adjacent” social sciences such as the cultural anthropology of 
Clyde Kluckhohn, the “institutional economics” which was developed in opposition to 
much conventional economics, and the psychoanalytic tradition of Freud (Parsons 1953b; 
1961d). Although Parsons was highly sympathetic towards interdisciplinarity (partly 
because of his involvement in the Harvard Department of Social Relations), The Social 
System also provides a powerful and interesting defence of sociology as an autonomous 
discipline. Third, sociology, like other social sciences, often occupies an unstable and 
uncertain location between smallscale descriptive and empirical research which has little 
general significance, and large-scale theoretical research, which has little obvious 
implications for applied investigations, but enjoys general relevance. Parsons’ sociology, 
I want to argue, goes a long way to bridging this gap between theoretical and empirical 
sociology. 
TALCOTT PARSONS: HIS LIFE AND TIMES 
Parsons’ life (1902–79), which was frankly uneventful in historically significant terms, 
has been sketched often enough (Parsons 1970g), although we do not as yet possess a full 
intellectual biography, comparable to, for example, Reinhard Bendix’s intellectual 
biography of Weber (1969). I shall not attempt to present a biography of Parsons at this 
stage. The intention here is to comment on aspects of Parsons’ intellectual development 
in order to throw some light on the issues that engaged Parsons in writing The Social 
System, which can only be understood in the context of Parsons’ entire oeuvre. Three 
broad intellectual forces influenced Parsons’ sociological approach from his early student 
days at Amherst College until his death in Munich over half a century later. 
The first of these was the reformist Protestantism of the Parsons’ household to which 
we can trace his abiding concern for the problem of human values in western society. 
This interest in values was not simply an historical interest, because Parsons wanted to 
argue that the problem of value-orientation was actually fundamental to the very structure 
of social action (hence the title of his masterpiece on the problems of utilitarian social 
thought). Parsons remained committed to the idea that human values were essential for 
sociological analysis (Parsons 1935b). From Protestantism, Parsons took the basic idea 
that human action could not be understood scientifically without recourse to value 
analysis. In this respect, it is interesting to compare Parsons and Weber, since Weber was 
also fundamentally influenced in his world-view by Protestantism, especially the 
reformist philosophy of W.E.Channing (Mayer 1944:24ff). Weber’s idea of personality 
as a general plan for one’s life was derived directly from his liberal Protestant 
background, and continued to shape his attitude towards human action as value-directed 
(Holton and Turner 1989). 
Locating Parsons within a broader tradition of classical sociology, we should note that 
Parsons, like Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, was particularly exercised by two questions. 
The first was “what has been the contribution of Christianity, by comparison with Greek, 
Roman and, to a lesser extent, Islamic culture to the evolution of European civilization?” 
The second question was “to what extent has the influence of Christian values diminished 
with the growing dominance of capitalist institutions since the end of the sixteenth 
century?” For Parsons, Christianity had fundamentally shaped western capitalist 
civilization through its emphasis on individual responsibility, asceticism, rationalism, and 
its separation of politics and spirituality. In that regard, Parsons defmitely followed the 
lead provided by Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism which 
Parsons had translated. However, Parsons differed from Weber in arguing that 
Christianity and capitalism were not necessary incompatible. Parsons, for example, 
regarded many aspects of secular America (such as cultural pluralism) as the fulfilment 
of Christian values (such as tolerance) (Robertson 1982). Weber’s sociology was 
dominated by themes of fatalism and pessimism (Turner 1981); Parsons’ sociology, and 
for this he was severely criticized by left-wing opponents, was shot through with what we 
might call American triumphalism. By comparison, Weber’s overt nationalism with 
regard to Germany has passed with little comment. 
Second, Parsons’ biography and his sociological views were strongly influenced by 
his admiration for professional medicine as a secular calling. Parsons’ intention had been 
to study biology and philosophy, and to follow medicine as a career. Although Parsons 
became “diverted” by sociology, the interest in medical issues remained an enduring 
aspect of his sociological ideas. For example, the medical profession and the so-called 
“sick role” are key issues in The Social System where medical values represent a central 
illustration of social action which is not dominated by utilitarian values of self-interest. A 
professional person is expected to be altruistic, oriented towards community service and 
regulated by professional ethics, not short-term market considerations. Parsons also 
became increasingly influenced by psychoanalytic theory, especially by the theories and 
therapeutic techniques of Freud. Parsons used Freudian ideas about transference to 
explain the social relationships between doctor and patient; he also used Freud’s ideas 
about the Oedipus complex to explain the social functions of the incest taboo in the 
organization of the modern family (Parsons 1954d). 
However, while Parsons’ conception of social action was influenced by the notion of 
regulation by professional ethics, he also adopted medical, and more specifically, 
biological ideas in developing his views on the social system. There is a tension here 
between his interest in medical practice as a model of how values shape social action, and 
his interest in the biology of organic systems as a model of how social system parts 
(institutions) function to improve the adaptive capacities of the social system in relation 
to its environment. 
Here, then, is a critical issue in the interpretation of Talcott Parsons to which I have 
already alluded by counterposing the relationship between The Structure of Social Action 
(1937a) and The Social System (1951a). Should we regard Parsons’ sociology as 
primarily a contribution to the analysis of (what Parsons called) a voluntaristic theory of 
action, or a contribution to the deterministic theory of the structure of social systems? In 
the first type of theory, the agency of the social actor appears to assume a primary theore-
tical position, whereas in the second case it is the structure of social relations which has 
primacy. This dilemma is the (by now) classic set of dichotomies between idealism and 
determinism, idealism and materialism, and agency and structure. We can adopt two 
positions with regard to Parsons’ version of these contradictions. In the first position, we 
can argue that Parsons was irredeemably trapped by these theoretical problems, and 
offered no final solution to these issues (Dawe 1970; Giddens 1984). If we adopt this 
argument, then we are claiming that ultimately Parsons’ general theory as a whole (but 
not necessarily parts of it) is logically inconsistent and incoherent. Parsons’ theory has 
therefore finally to be rejected. For example, Habermas argues that Parsons’ theory 
cannot ultimately cope with the communicative nature of social interaction, and 
continued to treat culture as an objective system part. Parsons’ early action theory was 
overwhelmed by his subsequent systems theory (Habermas 1987:203). 
A second position would be to deny that in general terms Parsons’ sociology is caught 
in a cleft stick between agency and structure, and that his theory goes a long way towards 
reconciling those ancient contradictions. In this respect, we would have to argue that 
Parsons’ theory is strictly speaking neither a theory of action nor a theory of systems; it is 
in fact an action-systems theory. This second position would not argue in some absolute 
sense that Parsons had overcome these difficulties, but (i) that his theory is not hopelessly 
locked into or trapped by these dilemmas, and (ii) that as a result it is possible to develop 
Parsons’ work in ways which remain fruitful for the future development of sociology. 
Parsons’ theory is capable of repair (Holton and Turner 1986). This orientation to 
Parsons’ sociology appears to be the position adopted by what has come to be known as 
“neofunctionism” (Alexander 1985), which accepts many of the criticisms traditionally 
made against Parsons, but wants to defend the general aims of Parsonian sociology 
through repairing the Parsonian legacy. In this particular introduction to Parsons’ The 
Social System, I shall in general terms adopt the theoretical spirit of neofunctionalism for 
one simple reason. In sociology, we have been so deeply involved in self-criticism that 
we are in danger of self-destruction. In order to see if the tree is still growing, we 
constantly take it up by the roots to see if all is well. To continue the analogy, this 
introduction to Parsons adopts a strategy of theoretical pruning rather than extensive 
cutting. Before turning to this exercise, we need to examine Parsons’ involvement with 
the biological sciences more closely. 
In social theory, employing analogies and metaphors from biological sciences has 
been a common strategy in the development of theoretical frameworks on social systems. 
This strategy was basic to the “organic analogy” which was common to social Darwinism 
and to Spencer’s evolutionary sociology. Parsons’ views on the systemic qualities of 
social relations was influenced at Harvard by L.J.Henderson’s study group on V.Pareto, 
by Walter B.Cannon’s The Wisdom of the Body, and by Claude Bernard. It was from 
these influences that Parsons came to see social change in terms of an evolutionary 
adaptation of a social system to its environment, especially in terms of the structural 
differentiation of the parts of a system. The idea of homeostasis also came to assume an 
importance in Parsons’ work, namely the tendency of “disturbances” of the system to 
result in a new level of equilibrium. The major assumptions of this type of theory are 
therefore (i) all social systems are defined in terms of the relations between their 
“internal” parts, and between the system and its environment; (ii) the notion of functional 
contribution is essential in understanding the continuity of various parts of a system, and 
sociology is directed primarily to the analysis of the functional significance of institutions 
in the survival of social systems; and (iii) it is the social system and not its social parts or 
institutions which is the referent of functional significance (Haines 1987). In common-
sense terms, the task of sociology is to discover how various institutions (such as the 
family, the school, or the church) function, that is how they contribute to the continuity 
and survival of society as a whole. In his later work, this concern for continuity and 
change in social systems was extended and developed by an interest in the new science of 
cybernetics, that is how social systems are directed and regulated by the storage and 
transmission of information. 
So far we have seen that Parsons’ early sociology was significantly influenced by two 
major issues: religious values, and biological sciences. Against Marxism, Parsons argued 
that capitalist society could not be understood in exclusively economic (or materialistic) 
terms. Like Weber and Durkheim, Parsons was acutely interested in the impact of 
religious values on political and economic issues. We can see this influence in the whole 
contents of The Social System which is a study of the value-orientations which are 
fundamental to social interaction, and which provide the normative structuring of social 
relationships. Second, Parsons’ interest in biological sciences involved him in a life-long 
concern for the scientific interrelationship between the natural and the social sciences. 
The third major influence on his early development was the nature of economics as a 
science. 
The importance of economic theory for the development of Parsons’ sociology has for 
a long time been seriously neglected (Holton and Turner 1986). Partly because Parsons 
was criticized for his idealism—namely his persistent interest in the role of values—it has 
not occurred to his critics to look to economic analysis as a central theme of Parsonian 
sociology. Where did this interest in economic theory come from? First, Parsons had 
come under the influence of Walter Hamilton, who taught institutional economics at 
Amherst, but this intellectual concern was greatly reinforced when Parsons came, after a 
brief period at the London School of Economics, to spend a scholarship at Heidelberg 
(1925–6). In Germany, Parsons wrote a dissertation on the concept of capitalism in 
German social-science literature, from which Parsons published two short articles 
(Parsons 1928; 1929), but these studies laid the basis for many of his subsequent 
contributions to economic sociology, not only in his critique of utilitarian economic ideas 
in The Structure of Social Action, but also in his translations from Weber and in many 
occasional papers on economic ideas and theorists. However, it has to be borne in mind 
that this engagement with economic theory and economic history was not merely a 
passing phase in Parsons’ intellectual development. Parsons continued to write on 
economic sociology with, for example, Neil Smelser (Parsons and Smelser 1956a), but he 
was also an economics tutor at Harvard in 1931 and was the Marshall lecturer in 
economics at Cambridge University, England in 1953. 
However, even these details disguise the real importance of economics in Parsons’ 
intellectual career. This influence took two forms. The first issue was that Parsons took 
economics to be the most developed of the action theories within the social sciences and 
thus a model of how sociology might evolve towards a more mature status with the 
university curriculum. Parsons came to develop a four sub-system model of the social 
system around four “tasks” facing a social system in relation to its environment. These 
four subsystems (the GAIL system) were goal-attainment (the polity), adaptation (the 
economy), integration (cultural system of general values which is concerned with law and 
social control), and latency (the normative problem of motivation to fulfil positions in the 
social system). There are, as we will see, definite problems with this model, but at this 
stage we can note that Parsons thought that economics was a science of econonomizing 
action with special reference to questions of adaptation between the environment and the 
social system; economics was particularly about the allocation of scarce resources. The 
first continuous influence of economics as a discipline was thus in terms of Parsons’ 
general concern for sociology as a discipline, its relationship to other disciplines and the 
problem of curriculum reform within the university (Parsons and Platt 1973b). 
The second form in which economics influenced Parsons’ thought was as a model of 
social exchange in general. Conventional demand-and-supply economics has been 
concerned to comprehend the nature of maximizing behaviour in the exchange of 
commodities between individuals in a market. These exchange relations are typically 
undertaken, not in terms of a material exchange of commodities, but symbolically in 
terms of money as a medium of exchange. The capitalist buys labour power, not by 
providing the worker directly with the means of existence (clothing and food), but in 
terms of a wage in the form of money. However, money is itself only a symbol of value, 
because in principle the worker could be paid in terms of precious shells, postage stamps, 
a cheque, or other tokens. Georg Simmel, whose work significantly influenced Parsons, 
despite the fact that Simmel did not appear in The Structure of Social Action (Levine 
1980), argued in The Philosophy of Money (Simmel 1978) that money as a symbol of the 
value of exchange was a measure of trust, and hence a measure of the extent of 
trustworthy social interactions. Parsons took money to be a generalized medium of 
exchange and by analogy argued that there may be a number of such media in society. In 
particular, he looked at power, influence, and commitment as circulating media of 
exchange which permit social actors to achieve desirable objectives. These media of 
exchange relate back to Parsons’ model of the four sub-systems (GAIL). Money is the 
medium of exchange between the adaptive sub-system and its boundaries; power is the 
generalized medium of the polity; influence of the integrative sub-system; and 
commitment of thc latency sub-system. As we shall see, Parsons’ predilection for 
argument by analogy, his view of power as a medium of exchange, and his particular 
approach to money have all been criticized (Ganssman 1988). At this stage, I am not 
directly concerned with this criticism; my purpose has been simply to establish the 
influence of economic theorizing on Parsons’ intellectual development. 
FROM STRUCTURE TO SYSTEM 
Secondary commentary on the major texts of sociology should never be substituted for 
reading the texts themselves. However, in this introductory essay to Parsons’ The Social 
System, there is a strong warrant for offering a sympathetic reading of Parsons’ major 
works, in the context of the hostile reception of his systems theory in the 1960s and 
1970s. Furthermore, since Parsons is often accused of inconsistency, perhaps there is also 
some justification for reading Parsons’ work sequentially. It is certainly the case that it is 
difficult to understand The Social System without some grasp of The Structure of Social 
Action. 
In The Structure of Social Action, Parsons developed three interconnected arguments. 
The first was that classical social theory was unable to provide an account of action, in 
terms of a rationalistic and positivistic epistemology, and an explanation of social order 
without contradicting its own premises. For example, classical economics assumes that 
economic actors are rational and egoistic. They satisfy their needs by egoistically 
attempting, through exchange, to maximize their competitive advantage. Parsons argued 
that such theories cannot then explain social order, because it is perfectly rational for 
economic actors to use force and fraud to achieve their individual goals. The society 
implied by economic theory is atomistic, unstable and possibly violent. Parsons argued, 
following Hobbes’ famous description of such a socicty as “nasty, brutish and short”, that 
an atomistic society of this character would involve a war of all against all. 
Classical economic theory in fact “solved” this problem by importing certain residual 
assumptions about common sentiment, human co-operation and “the hidden hand” of 
history to explain how society was possible at all, but these supporting assumptions are 
not compatible with or deduceable from rational, utilitarian assumptions. Parsons 
invented the idea of the “residual category” to criticize these illicit theoretical strategies. 
But, one might object, does not social contract theory in Hobbes, Locke and Spinoza 
solve the issue of order and preserve the notion of egoistic rationality? If actors form 
contractual agreements to keep the peace, then social order can be obtained by rational 
actors, who continue to behave competitively. Parsons’ argument against these 
assumptions, following Durkheim’s notion of the “noncontractual element of contract”, is 
that the enforcement of contracts depends upon shared agreements (values) about the 
importance of contracts which make these agreements morally enforceable. In short, most 
rationalistic accounts of action and order are either incoherent or they are compelled to 
introduce some notion of coercive force to achieve a stable social order. 
The second feature of Parsons’ argument was that, through an examination of four 
major social theorists (Marshall, Pareto, Weber, and Durkheim), we can detect a 
theoretical convergence towards what Parsons called a voluntaristic theory of action. This 
convergence took place precisely because their rationalistic and positivistic theories could 
not simultaneously explain social order and rational action without recourse to residual 
categories. One special difficulty with these theories is that, because they defined rational 
as that which is compatible with experimental natural science, they could not arrive at a 
satisfactory theory of values, culture and meaning. From a positivistic perspective, all 
religious beliefs and practices appear to be irrational. Against these reductionist views, 
Parsons argued that religious symbols, for example, were neither rational nor irrational; 
they were simply nonrational. Religious symbols stand for experiences of ultimate 
reality, about which natural science has little or nothing to say. Without an adequate 
theory of the nonrational aspects of action, sociology would never develop a satisfactory 
understanding of the meanings which actors attach to social action. 
The third major theme of The Structure of Social Action was that the development of a 
sociology of values is an essential task of sociology as a social science, if we are to grasp 
how the meaning of social action for the individual and the integrative functions of 
common values for the social system are necessarily linked. Social order is possible if 
social actors share a culture of common values, which unites them together to share and 
perform co-operative activities. It is these general values which determined the ultimate 
goals of action and which structure the norms by which the means of action are selected. 
These general values, or what Parsons was to call the cultural system, store up, as it were, 
the collective meaning of action and society for the whole collectivity. Action is 
meaningful because rational actors have available to them common values which define 
action, and social order is possible because these general values bind social actors 
together into social systems in such a way as to permit (without guaranteeing) a peaceful 
resolution of social conflicts. 
Thus, the idea of a realm of relatively autonomous social values which cannot be 
reduced to material interests or environment was an essential feature of The Structure of 
Social Action. In this respect, The Social System can also be seen as an attempt to develop 
a general sociology of values. The aim of Parsons’ book is, therefore, to derive the 
principal components of a social system from the structure of social action. His argument 
as a result focuses principally on the idea of what he calls “value-orientations” and 
cultural patterns of action, and their relationship to the motivational aspects of social 
processes. 
In The Social System, Parsons adopted a mode of theoretical activity based on a quest 
for symmetry and pattern, which characteristically involved either three-fold or four-fold 
diagrams or boxes. Thus, a system of social action can be divided into three principal 
components: the cultural, social and personality systems. 
The modes of motivational orientation of action are cognitive, cathetic, and evaluative; 
similarly there are cognitive, appreciative and moral value-orientations of a social actor 
towards the action situation; cultural patterns and institutions are also organized around 
belief systems (which give some emphasis to knowledge and cognition), expressive-
symbolic systems (which correspond to the cathetic principal), and finally there are 
systems of value-orientation (which embody moral obligations, corresponding to 
evaluative activities). 
For many critics of Parsons, this use of parallels, analogies and symmetrical relations, 
often in a rigid 2×2 box, become the most unattractive and implausible aspect of Parsons’ 
version of social system theory. For example, it was argued that Parsons’ model of 
cognitive, cathetic and evaluative orientations was no more than a common-sense claim 
that, when acting, human beings are either knowing, feeling or judging things. In defence 
of Parsons, it could be pointed out that many philosophical accounts of ethics, for 
example Aristotle and Kant, are based on such a tripartite system of action. Furthermore, 
Parsons came to use the idea of expressive symbols very creatively when he saw aspects 
of modern social movements as an “expressive revolution”. These theoretical models 
should be treated as heuristic devices to develop sociological theory, rather than as rigid, 
permanent features of Parsonian sociology (Adriaansens 1989). 
Another feature of Parsons’ development of sociological theory was the introduction 
of the pattern variables. These patterns refer to the structure of role-definitions which are 
claimed to confront action as a system of conflicting choices. To take one example which 
is central to Parsons, a doctor, while following a professional-ethical code in the 
examination of a child, treats the child in a universalistic, neutral, and specific fashion. 
The doctor is, in principle, indifferent to the child’s particular social characteristics 
(lower class, white, Catholic), because the doctor is guided by a professional interest in 
the child’s symptoms. The child’s mother, by contrast, is characterized by her 
particularistic, emotional and diffuse relation to the child. Parsons wants therefore to 
indicate in terms of values and actions the very signiflcant differences between the family 
and the professional situation. They exhibit very different pattern variables, which in fact 
are related to the famous distinction between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft, which were 
first systematically described by Tönnies (1912). The pattern variables are claimed to be 
universal and inescapable: they are affectivity v. affective neutrality; self v. collective 
orientation; universalism v. particularism; achievement v. ascription; specificity v. 
diffuseness. 
These apparently formalistic accounts of value-orientations, cultural institutions and 
pattern variables are in fact directly related to Parsons’ early analyses of voluntaristic 
action and social order in two ways. First, Parsons wanted to show that the interchange 
between personality and cultural systems had important implications for the stability of 
the social system. Where social actors have “internalized” values through socialization in 
the family, then in terms of personality they receive gratification in conforming to the 
dominant pattern of values in the social system. There is a double contingency between 
actor and culture. The cultural system is reinforced by actions which conform to the 
dominant culture; the social actor receives gratifications to personality as a consequence 
of carrying out actions which are compatible with dominant values. Social order is 
maintained because social actors are rewarded for their support. It is for this reason that 
much of The Social System is given over to the discussion of deviance. 
The second relation is that in his account of the pattern variables Parsons is once more 
addressing the question of the Hobbesian problem of order. Social relations work in the 
sense that they are not random but structured by fundamental value patterns which 
morally coerce action. Furthermore, in his description of the universalistic, affectively 
neutral, collective, specific and achievement-oriented action, Parsons was giving an 
account of social action which is contrasted strongly with market-oriented (capitalistic) 
actions. We can see Parsons’ vision of society as thus a clear alternative to a society 
dominated by “possessive individualism” (Macpherson 1962). It is thus crucial to see that 
the pattern variables are at the heart, not only of Parsons’ view of modern professional 
behavior, but of sociology itself. In fact, Parsons, towards the conclusion of his study, 
actually argues that sociological theory is “that aspect of the theory of social systems 
which is concerned with the phenomena of the institutionalization of patterns of value-
orientation in the social system” (Parsons 1951a:552). 
This issue is particularly marked in Parsons’ analysis of the professions, which is an 
issue closely associated in The Social System with the analysis of the sick role, but its 
influence is far more wide-spread in Parsons’ work as a whole. In fact, this issue is 
sufficiently important for me to want to claim that the key to The Social System is to be 
found in the pages (428ff) where Parsons discusses how the pattern variables shape the 
relationship between doctor and patient. For Parsons, being sick is a social condition, 
because it involves entry into a social role. There are important expectations surrounding 
being sick, namely being sick involves normative expectations on the part of doctor and 
patient whose social relationships constitute a social system. In particular, Parsons 
emphasized the importance of universalistic, neutral and collective orientations on the 
part of the professional doctor. 
Parsons was, however, also concerned to set the sick role within the broader context of 
general social values. Given the achievement and activistic values of individualistic 
American culture, being sick was, in an important sense, being deviant. Sickness 
typically involves withdrawal from work and passivity. Sickness involving a temporary, 
passive withdrawal from work is potentially a threat to the values of the whole system. 
Hence, the doctor emerges in Parsonian sociology as very much the guardian of the 
established order, as the gate-keeper of deviance, and as the embodiment of the “sacred” 
order of normality. The pattern variables in this context (especially affective-neutrality) 
permit the doctor to function as the disinterested guardian of the society as a whole. 
The Social System is a diverse and complex text, but I hope I have already suggested 
certain ways of reading Parsons which show the relevance of his approach to 
contemporary concerns. For example, Parsons’ views on the symbolic importance of 
medical power is particularly important in the context of social responses to AIDS, IVF 
programmes, to chronic illness and ageing, and to the human dangers of the medical-
industrial complex. Although Parsons’ medical sociology has often been criticized, it is 
one aspect of his work where the charge of empirical irrelevance cannot be sustained. 
Furthermore, Parsons’ awareness of the cultural and symbolic significance of medical 
authority anticipated many contemporary, radical paradigms which take medical power 
and medical knowledge as their starting point (Turner 1987).  
PARSONS AND AMERICAN SOCIOLOGY 
Critics of the influence of Parsons’ structural-functional often overlook the fact that his 
personal influence in American professional sociology was both limited and short term. 
For example, J.Goudsblom’s suggestion (1988) that, by comparison with the lack of 
institutional power on the part of Norbert Elias, the success of Parsonian sociology is 
partly explained by Parsons’ dominance of organized sociology in America is wide of the 
mark. Parsons’ early work on European theory was slow to gain recognition (Camic 
1989). In retrospect, we can now see how important Parsons was in introducing classical 
European sociology (especially Weber and Durkheim) to American academic life, but at 
the time Parsons was somewhat remote from mainstream American sociology, which 
continued to be dominated by American academics such as Robert Park, Charles Cooley, 
Franklin Giddings, Albion Small, William Sumner, William Thomas and Lester Ward. 
Parsons’ theoretical interests appeared peripheral to the local, applied, and empirical 
orientation of the Chicago School. 
It was not until the 1950s that Parsons’ influence began to have some general impact, 
partly through his postgraduate students, who included Bernard Barber, Kingsley Davis, 
Robert Merton, Wilbert Moore and Robin Williams. Parsons had also been elected 
president of the American Sociological Association in 1949. Parsons was also literally 
pouring out an apparently endless and effortless number of volumes and articles on a 
wide diversity of topics. However, while Parsons’ sociology was becoming influential, 
his approach to sociology was also coming under sustained and often antagonistic 
criticism. 
There were, so to speak, three waves of critical opposition to Parsonian sociology, or 
more specifically what had become known as “structural-functionalism” (Alexander 
1987). There was the ethnomethodological critique of the followers of Harold Garfinkel, 
who argued that social order was grounded in the taken-for-granted practical rules over 
everyday life which was sustained by the ongoing practices of knowledgeable members. 
Second, symbolic interactionists, following the work of Erving Goffman, also argued 
against what they took to be Parsons’ functionalist account of social order. For symbolic 
interactionists, order was an emergent property of micro-social interaction, which could 
only be sustained by cooperative negotiation between social actors. The point was that 
social stability was inherently precarious. 
It was, however, the criticisms of what can be broadly called conflict theory which 
proved in the long term to be the most troublesome and thorough-going critique of 
Parsons. He was held to be a conservative thinker, whose social theory could not explain 
social change or social conflict, partly because he denied or neglected material interests, 
which in turn were linked to fundamental cleavages in the social structure (such as social 
class). These criticisms were presented in a wealth of critical volumes which were in 
direct opposition to Parsons’ approach to the explanation of social order. These 
influential critical works included: R.Dahrendorf “Out of Utopia” (1958); A.Giddens 
“‘Power’ in the recent writings of Talcott Parsons” (1968)’ Alvin Gouldner The Coming 
Crisis of Western Sociology (1971); D.Lockwood “Some remarks on the social system” 
(1956); C.Wright Mills The Sociological Imagination (1959); J.Rex Key Problems in 
Sociological Theory (1961). 
The Social System in particular came under sharp attack. The emphasis on values and 
norms was held to preclude any proper understanding of the role of material forces, 
technology and social class in shaping the social structure. Hence, Parsons had difficulty 
explaining violent social change (for example, revolutions), and could only conceptualize 
change in evolutionary terms as the internal differentiation of social systems as an 
adaptive adjustment to the environment. It was further held that, because of this 
difficulty, Parsons could only explain opposition in society in terms of deviation from a 
set of central norms. As such, Parsons’ sociology depended on a version of the dominant 
ideology thesis (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1980), because it could not conceptualize 
a situation where a social system might have several competing systemsofvalues. 
Conflict theorists also argued that there were also a number of technical problems in 
Parsons’ analytical scheme which compounded these problems. We can mention three of 
these issues. First, there was the conventional problem that Parsons found it difficult to 
reconcile an action perspective (as in The Structure of Social Action) and a system 
perspective (as in The Social System) (Scott 1963). Second, it is in fact difficult to 
identify a “social system”, and to define a “social system” in relation to a “society”. 
Parsons treated the social relations between two social actors (a doctor and a patient) as a 
social system, but clearly Great Britain is also a social system, which is composed of 
several societies (England, Scotland and Wales). Is the nation-state (France for instance) 
a society or several societies? Because the legitimate existence of the nation-state is 
typically contested (for example, the status of Lithuania in the Soviet Union), there can 
be no na’ive equation of nation-state, society or social system. Third, Parsons’ theory of 
the social system (and more generally structural-functionalism) has difficulty in 
identifying the sources of social change, and this objection is really to ask a question 
about the relationship between sociological and historical explanations. Parsons often 
referred to “social strains” (1963b) as explanations of social change (as in his well-known 
writings on McCarthyism), or in his essays on Fascism he saw the legacy of the German 
class system in relation to the military bureaucracy as an explanation for the rise of 
national socialism (Parsons 1942e; 1942f). However, it is not clear how these events and 
circumstances can be reconciled with the very general nature of his sociology of the 
social system. In part, this problem was an aspect of Norbert Elias’s critique (1978) of 
Parsons’ lack of any sense of historical contingency. 
These objections clearly represent a formidable critical reception of Parsons’ 
sociology. I shall return to a modest defence of Parsons shortly. However, I want to 
suggest that behind these critical comments there are two more basic, but often unstated, 
attacks on Parsons. The first is that his work almost entirely neglected the contributions 
of Karl Marx to social science. The second is that his work represents, often overtly, a 
defence of American civilization as the cutting edge of modern progress. These two 
issues are clearly interrelated. 
From the vantage point of having lived through the revolutions of 1989, it is now 
increasingly difficult to understand, or empathize with the dominance of structuralist 
Marxism in sociology in the 1960s and early 1970s. The events of 1968 were associated 
with a period of remarkable Marxist theoretical developments, especially in Germany 
around critical theory, and in France around structuralist Marxism. While these 
intellectual movements had little impact on American social theory, there were strong 
radical student movements in the USA, which were, at least for a time, influenced by 
critical theory through the work of Herbert Marcuse. Parsons had rather little sympathy 
for such student movements on campus (Parsons and Platt, 1973b). While Marx was 
enjoying a major revival in university lecture halls around the world, Parsons’ general 
theory was almost entirely closed to the influence of Marxist theory. Marx was very 
briefly considered in The Structure of Social Action, where he was dismissed as merely a 
variant of utilitarian economic theory. Parsons sustained this view of Marx as a utilitarian 
for the remainder of his intellectual career (Gould 1989). Parsons also wrote almost 
nothing specifically about Marx or Marxism. This neglect of Marxist social theory during 
the radical decades of the post-war period further reinforced the view that Parsons’ 
sociology was ideologically conservative. 
Parsons’ refusal to engage with contemporary Marxist theory was related to Parsons’ 
view of the role of America in post-war reconstruction. Parsons took the view that the 
defeat of German and Italian fascism was a triumph of liberal, pluralist politics and for 
capitalism as an economic system. America was the illustration of successful and 
“progressive” social evolution which, despite the problems of racism, urban violence, 
organized crime and class inequalities, offered the most promising alternative to 
Stalinism and international communism. Parsons acknowledged many of the social 
achievements of Russian society, but remained sceptical about its adaptive capacities 
(Parsons 1965a). Parsons did not therefore accept the radical criticisms of American 
society which were common in the 1960s (Lidz 1989). Parsons felt that the critical 
positions adopted in The Lonely Crowd (Riesman 1950), The Power Elite (Mills 1956), 
The Sane Society (Fromm 1956), America as a Civilization (Lerner 1957) and The 
Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al 1950) were superficial and, behind the smoke 
screen of academic neutrality, merely vented old ideological slogans. Parsons’ intention 
was to write a general study of American society as a reply to these critics, which was to 
be called The American Societal Community, but vcry little of this work was fmally 
completed. What remains is a collection of (largely unpublished) manuscripts (Parsons 
1989). The critical objection to Parsons was, therefore, not only that his sociology was 
flawed by a range of technical problems, but that, in addition to his critique of Marxism, 
his analysis of values was by intention a defence of American civilization against right-
wing social movements (such as McCarthyism) and against power blocs in the world-
system of politics (such as Russian communism), which threatened the future of cultural 
pluralism. 
A DEFENCE OF PARSONS 
One problem with the criticism of Parsons in the 1960s was that it typically focused on a 
narrow range of Parsons’ own work, specifically The Social System. The revival of 
interest in Parsons in the 1980s has been characterized by its focus on the work of 
Parsons as a whole. What emerges from this more complete overview is an appreciation 
of its theoretical comprehensiveness (Sciulli and Gerstein 1985). In addition, there is a 
growing appreciation of the applied and empirical virtues of Parsons’ framework (Holton 
and Turner 1986). As a result of these contemporary evaluations of Parsons’ complete 
contribution to sociology, many of the conventional objections to Parsons no longer 
appear so compelling or convincing. It is also important to point out (as a moral 
evaluation of Parsons as a person) that Parsons attempted to reply systematically to his 
critics. For example, Parsons provided replies to the objection that he was operating with 
an “oversocialized conception of man” (Parsons 1962c), to the criticism that he had no 
theory of power (Parsons 1963f), to the claim that his work was conservative (Parsons 
1971f), and to the notion that he had totally misrepresented the sociology of Weber 
(Parsons 1975g). 
A modest defence of Parsons would include the following observations. Against the 
conventional view of Parsons as a conservative, it is now more than ever clear that 
Parsons was in fact a New Deal liberal, who attempted to defend progressive political 
changes, such as full citizenship rights for American blacks (Parsons 1965b). It is not 
valid, furthermore, to argue that Parsons’ sociology neglected questions about broad 
historical changes; Parsons was specifically concerned, like Weber, with the general 
pattern of western development out of Christian and Greco-Roman civilizations (Parsons 
1971a; 1977a). It is also possible to defend Parsons against the idea that his Grand 
Theory had little to do with the understanding of empirical problems. For example, 
Parsons’ essays on the German social structure (Parsons 1942e), on intellectuals (Parsons 
1959d), or his various articles on the professions are clear illustrations of his ability to 
write about specific issues and empirical problems. Although Parsons correctly described 
himself in the dedication of The Social System as “an incurable theorist”, he also retained 
clear and specific political interests in contemporary issues such as university curriculum 
development, or race relations, or American foreign policy issues. 
Although these comments are reasonable and appropriate, they are hardly original or 
compelling. Returning to my observations at the beginning of this essay, there are three 
broad areas of defence which we should address in more detail. The first is that Parsons’ 
sociology established many of the broad parameters of contemporary debate in sociology; 
these parameters include (i) how is social order to be explained, and how important are 
shared values in such an explanation? (ii) what is the nature of social action, and how can 
we best defend the idea of voluntaristic action against various forms of utilitarianism? 
(iii) what are the essential characteristics of a modern society in terms of its values and 
social structure, and how much of this “modernity” is the product of capitalistic economic 
development? and, finally (iv) how can sociology contribute to understanding and 
fostering progressive social relations, that is relations which exist without recourse to 
forms of authoritarian compulsion? These questions, which were central to Parsons’ 
sociology, have remained crucial to mainstream sociology and are even central to the 
sociological alternatives presented by Parsons’ critics. 
Although Parsons was blind to many current issues—gender, feminist theory, the 
analysis of symbolic exchange at the micro level, the negative features of American 
foreign policy, the repression brought about by western imperialism, the devastation of 
aboriginal cultures by westernization, and the possibilities of “underdevelopment” as a 
necessary consequence of so-called western development—two features of Parsonian 
sociology continue to dominate contemporary sociology. 
The first is the growing recognition that classical sociology failed to develop an 
adequate perspective on culture, and that various forms of development of modern 
capitalism have made cultural issues more rather than less prominent in “post-industrial” 
society. Given Parsons’ preoccupation with cultural anthropology, his tripartite 
theoretical model of society, culture and personality, and his predilection for value 
analysis, Parsons’ contribution to cultural sociology is a crucial feature of his general 
sociology. This aspect of work has yet to receive adequate attention (Robertson 1988). 
The second thematic issue in Parsons’ sociology was its antinostalgic stance towards 
modernity (Holton and Turner 1986). While mainstream sociology, which has followed 
Marx and Weber, has in practice been a sociology of capitalist society, Parsons has been 
unambiguously a theorist and protagonist of modernity. Classical sociology retained an 
often unspoken nostalgia for the conservative values of a stable rural community; the 
basic unit-ideas of sociology (such as the sacred, community, authority, and status) 
reflect this undercurrent of commitment to the world represented by pre-industrial 
agrarian communities (Nisbet 1967). While writing about gesellschaft, sociologists have 
often embraced a set of values which are more relevant to gemeinschaft (Holton and 
Turner 1989). Parsons, by contrast, was unambiguously modernist in his acceptance of 
secularization, differentiation, pluralism of values, bureaucratization of administration, 
urban cultures and modern forms of citizenship. There is nothing in Parsons’ sociology to 
compare with the constant angst which Weber exhibited towards modernity and towards 
the problem of discovering a scientific or political calling in post-religious society 
(Lassman and Velody 1989). Given the current debate about modernity and 
postmodernity, it is not a risky prediction to assume that Parsons may well be revived as 
the spokes-person of modernity, and that this revival may (with considerable irony) put 
Parsons in the same camp as Habermas in wishing to complete the project of rational 
modernity. 
The second major defence of Parsons is that his theoretical endeavours over half a 
century represented a sustained and systematic attempt to develop a single coherent 
approach to sociology, replacing the legacy of rationalistic utilitarian social theory with a 
voluntaristic theory of action. Parsons’ critics have recently paid tribute to this serious 
quest for analytic coherence. Thus Habermas (1987:199) has written that Parsons has left 
a body of theory which is “without equal in its level of abstraction and differentiation, its 
social-theoretical scope and systematic quality.” This action theory would (i) take into 
account the centrality of norms and values in the choice of the ends of action and the 
regulation of means to ends, and (ii) would maintain a view of the social actor as a 
rational being who is also motivated by feelings and by evaluations. Parsons’ sociology 
thus attempted to provide a coherent overview of the domain of sociological enquiry 
which would systematically integrate, following Weber’s account of action, social action 
and social relationship, a voluntaristic theory of action with what we might call a 
culturalist theory of the social system. 
Although many critics of Parsons have argued that there is a hiatus between his action 
theory and his social systems theory (and therefore that Parsons does not provide us with 
a systematic general theory of sociology), by calling Parsons’ theory of social systems a 
culturalist theory, we can recognize the strong connection between the importance of 
values in his action theory and the pattern of cultural orientations in his systems theory. 
Some aspects of this relation were outlined in a neglected study of Parsonian theory—
Chazel La theorie analytique de la societe dans l’oeuvre de Talcott Parsons (1974). As 
Chazel points out, there is a direct line of theoretical development from the idea of action 
orientation in the unit act in The Structure of Social Action, the emergence of the pattern 
variables in The Social System, and the final development of the four-system (GAIL) 
model of his later systems theory. This development, in fact, was an attempt to spell out 
the implications of classical sociology—especially Tönnies’ distinction between 
gemeinschaft and gesellschaft—for the analysis of modern societies. 
The pattern variables remained a constant theme in Parsons’ sociology and they 
therefore indicate, against his critics, an important feature of the continuity of his work. 
While some commentators have suggested that they were abandoned in Parsons’ later 
work, this is not the case. The pattern variables represented for Parsons, not simply a 
theoretical framework, but a moral code as well. We have seen this implicit moral theory 
in his treatment of the importance of professional ethics in guiding the doctors’ 
relationship to the (subordinate and often helpless) patient. On a larger canvas, if we treat 
Parsons’ work as whole as the quest for a sociological and historical account of the 
origins of (what I shall call) “progressive social systems”, then the continuity of the 
pattern variables becomes obvious. Progressive social systems are characterized by their 
pluralism, their tolerance of value-diversity, their structural differentiation, their capacity 
to solve system problems without recourse to totalitarian violence, and thus their 
institutionalization of universalism, achievement-orientation and altruism. On these 
grounds, there would be scope for extensive criticism of the failure of America to achieve 
these universalistic norms. The race relations issue in American society would be one 
prominent illustration. Parsons was keenly aware of these criticisms, but he thought that 
the institutionalization of citizenship norms would eventually reduce such forms of 
discrimination, without necessarily eradicating racism (Parsons and Clark 1966c), and 
that these changes would permit sufficient social solidarity for the American community 
to avoid civil war. 
As I have noted, this vision of modern society was Parsons’ translation of Weber’s 
Protestant ethic thesis into contemporary sociological theory, which Parsons then 
combined with the idea that, at this particular point in history, American society most 
successfully embodied the Weberian Protestant ethic (Robertson, 1982). Therefore, 
America is at the cutting edge of the process of modernization. This thesis first emerges 
in The Social System and then is fully developed in Societies and The System of Modern 
Societies; it also underpinned the whole incomplete project of The American Societal 
Community. These volumes argued that the historical origins of western liberalism lay in 
the institutionalization of democracy in the Greek polis and in the individualism which 
was an important feature of Christian doctrine. In these studies, Parsons adopted an 
optimistic and modernist view of historical change, not as an evolutionary development 
towards a social paradise, but as a process which allowed human beings some grounds 
for hope that (to use Weber’s pessimistic metaphor) the iron cage was not the only 
possible outcome of collective endeavour. 
The fmal defence of Parsons’ sociology would centre around his vision of sociology 
itself. Throughout the post-war university boom, sociology was regularly the target of 
public criticism. From the left, it was regarded as a bourgeois defence of capitalism, 
masquerading as an objective science. From the right, it was regarded as a thinly 
disguised academic version of Marxism, dressed up in the language of an objective 
academic discipline. Both sides agreed that sociology had to go. Of course, this situation 
is not new. Simmel’s lectures on sociology at Berlin were regarded as subversive. At 
other times, sociology has been dismissed by anti-semites as a “Jewish Science”. For 
those sociologists who, following Weber’s idea of a calling in science, are passionately 
committed to their discipline, Parsons’ sociology provides an unrestrained and 
unrepentent defence of sociology as a vital science of social action, whose special area of 
focus is the integrative role of common values, especially the maintenance of the pattern 
variables. Although anthropology and sociology were for Parsons closely connected, 
anthropology was rapidly becoming a theory of culture. Sociology and anthropology 
were specifically regarded as an alternative to a utilitarian theory of rational action, 
because their province lay primarily with phenomena which were nonrational. 
There are very good grounds for seeing the task of sociology in a wider context. 
Parsons’ account of the nature of sociology is ambiguous. While allocating sociology to 
the study of the integrative sub-system, Pasrons also tends to see sociology as a general 
theory of action, for which political, economic and psychological phenomena are 
significant. In short, it is not clear whether sociology is a special discipline concerned 
with the institutionalization of value-patterns or whether it is a general science of the 
social. In this discussion of sociology as a science, it is important to keep in mind that, at 
least in the German context, the use of the word “science” (Wissenschaft) has a much 
wider terrain than in an Anglo-Saxon context, where “science” is reserved for positivistic, 
experimental, natural sciences. Because Parsons was steeped in German scientific 
culture, he felt less anxious than most in employing “science” in his description of those 
disciplines which study action. 
Whether or not one agrees with Parsons’ version of sociology, I believe we have to 
respect Parsons as a committed scientist, whose own life was also shaped by the pattern 
variables he sought to describe in The Social System. Weber is reputed to have said that 
“much of what is sailing under the name of sociology is a swindle” (Mayer 1944:87). In 
the case of Parsons, as with Durkheim, we are confronted by a man for whom sociology 
is a calling. With Parsons’ sociology we are offered not a swindle, but the genuine article.  
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I  
THE ACTION FRAME OF REFERENCE 
AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF 
ACTION SYSTEMS: CULTURE, 
PERSONALITY AND THE PLACE OF 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
 
THE subject of this volume is the exposition and illustration of a conceptual scheme for 
the analysis of social systems in terms of the action frame of reference. It is intended as a 
theoretical work in a strict sense. Its direct concern will be neither with empirical 
generalization as such nor with methodology, though of course it will contain a 
considerable amount of both. Naturally the value of the conceptual scheme here put 
forward is ultimately to be tested in terms of its usefulness in empirical research. But this 
is not an attempt to set forth a systematic account of our empirical knowledge, as would 
be necessary in a work on general sociology. The focus is on a theoretical scheme. The 
systematic treatment of its empirical uses will have to be undertaken separately. 
The fundamental starting point is the concept of social systems of action. The 
interaction of individual actors, that is, takes place under such conditions that it is 
possible to treat such a process of interaction as a system in the scientific sense and 
subject it to the same order of theoretical analysis which has been successfully applied to 
other types of systems in other sciences. 
The fundamentals of the action frame of reference have been extensively dealt with 
elsewhere and need only to be briefly sum-marized here.1 The frame of reference 
concerns the “orientation” of one or more actors—in the fundamental individual case 
biological organisms—to a situation, which includes other actors. The scheme, that is, 
relative to the units of action and interaction, is a relational scheme. It analyzes the 
structure and processes of the systems built up by the relations of such units to their 
situations, including other units. It is not as such concerned with the internal structure of 
the units except so far as this directly bears on the relational system. 
1 Cf. especially Parsons and Shils, Values, Motives and Systems of Action in Toward a General 
Theory of Action. Also Parsons, Structure of Social Action, and Essays in Sociological Theory, and, 
of course, Weber, Theory of Social and Economic Organization. 
 
The situation is defined as consisting of objects of orientation, so that the orientation 
of a given actor is differentiated relative to the different objects and classes of them of 
which his situation is composed. It is convenient in action terms to classify the object 
world as composed of the three classes of “social,” “physical,” and “cultural” objects. A 
social object is an actor, which may in turn be any given other individual actor (alter), the 
actor who is taken as a point of reference himself (ego), or a collectivity which is treated 
as a unit for purposes of the analysis of orientation. Physical objects are empirical entities 
which do not “interact” with or “respond” to ego. They are means and conditions of his 
action. Cultural objects are symbolic elements of the cultural tradition, ideas or beliefs, 
expressive symbols or value patterns so far as they are treated as situational objects by 
ego and are not “internalized” as constitutive elements of the structure of his personality. 
“Action” is a process in the actor-situation system which has motivational significance 
to the individual actor, or, in the case of a collectivity, its component individuals. This 
means that the orientation of the corresponding action processes has a bearing on the 
attainment of gratifications or the avoidance of deprivations of the relevant actor, 
whatever concretely in the light of the relevant personality structures these may be. Only 
in so far as his reladon to the situation is in this sense motivationally relevant will it be 
treated in this work as action in a technical sense. It is presumed that the ultimate source 
of the energy or “effort” factor of action processes is derived from the organism, and 
correspondingly that in some sense all gratification and deprivation have an organic 
significance. But though it is rooted in them the concrete organization of motivation 
cannot for purposes of action theoty be analyzed in terms of the organic needs of the 
organism. This organization of action elements is, for purposes of the theory of action, 
above all a function of the reladon of the actor to his situation and the history of that 
relation, in this sense of “experience.” 
It is a fundamental property of action thus defined that it does not consist only of ad 
hoc “responses” to particular situational “stimuli” but that the actor develops a system of 
“expectations” relative to the various objects of the situation. These may be structured 
only relative to his own need-dispositions and the probabilities of gratification or 
deprivation contingent on the various alternatives of action which he may undertake. But 
in the case of interaction with social objects a further dimension is added. Part of ego’s 
expectation, in many cases the most crucial part, consists in the probable reaction of alter 
to ego’s possible action, a reaction which comes to be anticipated in advance and thus to 
affect ego’s own choices. 
On both levels, however, various elements of the situation come to have special 
“meanings” for ego as “signs” or “symbols” which become relevant to the organization 
of his expectation system. Especially where there is social interaction, signs and symbols 
acquire common meanings and serve as media of communication between actors. When 
symbolic systems which can mediate communication have emerged we may speak of the 
beginnings of a “culture” which becomes part of the action systems of the relevant actors. 
It is only with systems of interaction which have become differentiated to a cultural 
level that we are here concerned. Though the term social system may be used in a more 
elementary sense, for present purposes this possibility can be ignored and attention 
confined to systems of interaction of a plurality of individual actors oriented to a situation 
and where the system includes a commonly understood system of cultural symbols. 
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Reduced to the simplest possible terms, then, a social system consists in a plurality of 
individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which has at least a physical or 
environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to the 
“optimization of gratification” and whose relation to their situations, including each 
other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of cukurally structured and shared 
symbols. 
Thus conceived, a social system is only one of three aspects of the structuring of a 
completely concrete system of social action. The other two are the personality systems of 
the individual actors and the cultural system which is built into their action. Each of the 
three must be considered to be an independent focus of the organization of the elements 
of the action system in the sense that no one of them is theoretically reducible to terms of 
one or a combination of the other two. Each is indispensable to the other two in the sense 
that without personalities and culture there would be no social system and so on around 
the roster of logical possibilities. But this interdependence and interpenetration is a very 
different matter from reducibility, which would mean that the important properties and 
processes of one class of system could be theoretically derived from our theoretical 
knowledge of one or both of the other two. The action frame of reference is common to 
all three and this fact makes certain “transformations” between them possible. But on the 
level of theory here attempted they do not constitute a single system, however this might 
turn out to be on some other theoretical level. 
Almost another way of making this point is to say that on the present level of 
theoretical systematization our dynamic knowledge of action-processes is fragmentary. 
Because of this we are forced to use these types of empirical system, descriptively 
presented in terms of a frame of reference, as an indispensable point of reference. In 
relation to this point of reference we conceive dynamic processes as “mechanisms”2 
which influence the “functioning” of the system. The descriptive presentation of the 
empirical system must be made in terms of a set of “structural” categories, into which the 
appropriate “motivational” constructs necessary to constitute a usablc knowledge of 
mechanisms are fitted. 
Before going further into some of these broad methodological problems of the analysis 
of systems of action with special reference to the social system, it is advisable to say 
something more about the more elementary components of action in general. In the most 
general sense the “need-disposition” system of the individual actor seems to have two 
most primary or elementary aspects which may be called the “gratificational” aspect and 
the “orientational” aspect. The first concerns the “content” of his interchange with the 
object world, “what” he gets out of his interaction with it, and what its “costs” to him are. 
The second concerns the “how” of his relation to the object world, the patterns or ways in 
which his relations to it are organized. 
Emphasizing the relational aspect we may refer to the former as “cathectic” 
orientation which means the significance of ego’s relation to the object or objects in 
question for the gratification-deprivation balance of his personality. The most elementary 
and fundamental “orientational” category on the other hand, seems to be the “cognitive”  
 
2 A mechanism as the term will here be used is an empirical generalization about motivational 
processes stated in terms of its relevance to the functional problems of an action system. See below, 
Chapter VI. 
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which in its most general sense may be treated as the “dennition” of the relevant 
aspects of the situation in their relevance to the actor’s “interests.” This is then the 
cognitive orientation aspect, or cognitive mapping in Tolman’s sense.3 Both these aspects 
must be present in anything which could be considered a unit of an action system, a “unit 
act.” 
But acts do not occur singly and discretely, they are organized in systems. The 
moment even the most elementary system-level is brought under consideration a 
component of “system imegration” must enter in. In terms of the action frame of 
reference again this integration is a selective ordering among the possibilities of 
orientation. Gratification needs have alternatively possible objects presented in the 
situation. Cognitive mapping has alternatives of judgment or interpretation as to what 
objects are or what they “mean.” There must be ordered selection among such 
alternatives. The term “evaluation” will be given to this process of ordered selection. 
There is, therefore, an evaluative aspect of all concrete action orientation. The most 
elementary components of any action system then may be reduced to the actor and his 
situation. With regard to the actor our interest is organized about the cognitive, cathectic 
and evaluative modes of his orientation; with regard to the situation, to its differentiation 
into objects and classes of them. 
The three basic modes of motivational orientation along with the conception of an 
object system categorize the elements of action on the broadest level. They are all three 
implicated in the structure of what has been called “expectation.” Besides cathectic 
interests, cognitive definition of the situation and evaluative selection, an expectation has, 
as the term suggests, a time aspect in the orientation to future development of the actor-
situation system and to the memory of past actions. Orientation to the situation is 
structured, that is, with reference to its developmental patterns. The actor acquires an 
“investment” in certain possibilities of that development. It matters to him how it occurs, 
that some possibilities should be realized rather than others. 
This temporal dimension of the actor’s concern with the development of the situation 
may be differentiated along an activitypassivity coordinate. The actor may at one extreme 
simply “await developments” and not actively attempt to “do anything about it,” or he 
may actively attempt to control the situation in conformity with his wishes or interests. A 
future state of the actor-situation system in which the actor takes merely a passive 
interest, may be called an “anticipation,” while a future state which he attempts actively 
to bring about (including the prevention of events he does not want to happen) may be 
called a “goal.” The goal-directedness of action is, as we shall see, particularly when the 
bases of normative orientation have been discussed, a fundamental property of all action-
systems. Analytically, however, it seems to stand on the next level “down” from the 
concept of expectations because of the logical possibility of passively anticipatory 
orientation. Both types must be clearly custinguished from “stimulus-response” in that 
the latter does not make the orientation to the future development of the situation explicit. 
The stimulus may be conceived that is, as coming completely “out of the blue” without 
affecting the theoretical analysis. 
3 Cf. E.C.Tolman, Purposive Behavior in Animals and Men. 
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The fundamental concept of the “instrumental” aspects of action is applicable only to 
cases where the action is positively goal-oriented. It formulates those considerations 
about the situation and the actor’s relations to it, the alternatives open to him and their 
probable consequences, which are relevant to the attainment of a goal.4  
A word may be said about the problem of the ultimate structuring of “gratification-
needs.” A general theory of action will, of course, cventually have to come to decisions 
about the unity or the qualitative plurality of the ultimate genetically given needs and 
their classification and organization. Particularly, however, for a work concerned with the 
social system level of action theory it is highly advisable scrupulously to observe the rule 
of parsimony in such controversial areas. It is, however, necessary to assume an ultimale 
polarity of this need structure which is incorporated in the concept of the gratification-
deprivation balance, and has its derivatives in such antitheses as attraction-aversion. 
Beyond this, however, and certain general statements about the relations of need-
gratification and the other aspects of action it does not, for our purposes, seem necessary 
to go in highly general terms. 
The major reason for this is that in their sociologically relevant forms, “motivations” 
come to us as organized on the personality level. We deal, that is, with more concrete 
structures which are conceived as products of the interaction of genetically given need-
components with social experience. It is the uniformities on this level which are 
empirically significant for sociological problems. To make use of knowledge of such 
uniformities it is generally not necessary to unravel the genetic and the experiential 
components underlying them. The principal exception to this statement arises in 
connection with problems of the limits of social variability in the structure of social 
systems which may be imposed by the biological constitution of the relevant population. 
Of course when such problems arise it is necessary to mobilize all the available evidence 
to form a judgment about more specific gratification needs. 
A related problem is that of the relevance not only of gratification needs, but of capacities 
or abilities. Every empirical analysis of action presumes biologically given capacities. 
We know that these are highly differentiated as between individuals. But for the most 
general theoretical purposes the same rule of parsimony may be applied. The sounoness 
of this procedure is confirmed by the knowledge that individual variations are by and 
large more important than those between large populations so that it is relatively unlikely 
that the most important differences of large-scale social systems are primarily determined 
by biological differences in the capacities of their populations. For most sociological 
purposes the resultant of the genes and life experience is adequate without attempting to 
segregate out the factors. 
4 In The Structure of Social Action, the exposition of the action fiame of reference was made largely 
on the level of goal-direction and thus an “end” as it 
was there called, was made an essential component of the “unit act.” It seems that it is necessary to 
push the analysis to a still more elementary level especially in order to clarify the place in which 
many of the problems of motivation as analyzed in terxns of modern psychology must be fitted in. 
However, no fundamental change has been made. The analysis has simply been carried to a more 
generalized level. The unit act of The Structure of Social Action is a special case of the unit of 
action as portrayed here and in Values, Motives, and Systems of Action. 
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It was pointed out that even the most elementary orientation of action on animal levels 
involves signs which are at least the beginning of symbolization. This is inherent in the 
concept of expectation which involves some sort of “generalization” from the 
particularities of an immediately current stimulus-situation. Without signs the whole 
“orientational” aspect of action would be meaningless, including the conceptions of 
“selection” and underlying it, of “alternatives.” On the human level certainly the step is 
taken from sign-orientation to true symbolization. This is the necessary condition for the 
emergence of culture. 
In the basic scheme of action, symbolization is clearly involved both in cognitive 
orientation and in the concept of evaluation. Further elaboration of the role and structure 
of symbol systems in action involves considerations of differentiation in relation to the 
various aspects of the action system, and the aspect of sharing and its relation to 
communication and to culture. The latter may be dealt with first. 
Whatever the importance of neurological prerequisites may be, it seems probable that 
true symbolization as distinguished from the use of signs, cannot arise or function 
without the interaction of actors, and that the individual actor can acquire symbolic 
systems only through interaction with social objects. It is at least suggestive that this fact 
may well be connected with the element of “double contingency” involved in the 
interaction process. In the classical animal learning situations the animal has alternatives 
between which he makes a selection and develops expectations which can be “triggered” 
by certain signs or “cues.” But the sign is part of a situation which is stable independently 
of what the animal does; the only “problem” presented to him is whether he can 
“interpret” it correctly, e.g., that the black panel means food, the white one no food. But 
in social interaction alter’s possible “reactions” may cover a considerable range, selection 
within which is contingent on ego’s actions. Thus for the interaction process to become 
structured, the meaning of a sign must be further abstracted from the particularity of the 
situation. Its meaning, that is, must be stable through a mucn wider range of “ifs,” which 
covers the contingent alternatives not only of ego’s action, but of alter’s and the possible 
permutations and combinations of the relation between them. 
Whatever may be the origins and processes of development of symbol systems it is 
quite clear that the high elaboradon of human action systems is not possible without 
relatively stable symbolic systems where meaning is not predominantly contingent on 
highly particularized situations. The most important single implication of this 
generalization is perhaps the possibility of communication, because the situations of two 
actors are never identical and without the capacity to abstract meaning from the most 
particular situations communication would be impossible. But in turn this stability of a 
symbol system, a stability which must extend between individuals and over time, could 
probably not be maintained unless it functioned in a communication process in the 
interaction of a plurality of actors. It is such a shared symbolic system which functions in 
interaction which will here be called a cultural tradition. 
There is a fundamental relation between this aspect and the “normative orientation” of 
action as it is often called. A symbolic system of meanings is an element of order 
“imposed” as it were on the realistic situation. Even the most elementary communication 
is not possible without some degree of conformity to the “conventions” of the symbolic 
system. Put a little differendy, the mutuality of expectations is oriented to the shared 
order of symbolic meanings. In so far as ego’s gratifications become dependent on the 
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reactions of alter, a conditional standard comes to be set up of what conditions will and 
what will not call forth the “gratifying” reactions, and the relation between these 
conditions and the reactions becomes as such part of the meaning system of ego’s 
orientation to the situation. The orientation to a normative order, and the mutual 
interlocking of expectations and sanctions which will be fundamental to our anal-ysis of 
social systems is rooted, therefore, in the deepest fundamentals of the action frame of 
reference. 
This fundamental relationship is also common to all types and modes of interactional 
orientation. But nevertheless it is important to work out certain differentiations in terms 
of the relative primacies of the three modal elements, the cathectic, the cognitive and the 
evaluative, which have been outlined above. An element of a shared symbolic system 
which serves as a criterion or standard for selection among the alternatives of orientation 
which are intrinsically open in a situation may be called a value. 
In one sense “motivation” consists in orientation to improvement of the gratification-
deprivation balance of the actor. But since action without cognitive and evaluative 
components in its orientation is inconceivable within the action frame of reference, the 
term motivation will here be used to include all three aspects, not only the cathectic. But 
from this motivational orientation aspect of the totality of action it is, in view of the role 
of symbolic systems, necessary to distinguish a “value-orientation” aspect. This aspect 
concerns, not the meaning of the expected state of affairs to the actor in terms of his 
gratification-deprivation balance but the content of the selective standards themselves. 
The concept of value-orientations in this sense is thus the logical device for formulating 
one central aspect of the articulation of cultural traditions into the action system. 
It follows from the derivation of normative orientation and the role of values in action 
as stated above, that all values involve what may be called a social reference. In so far as 
they are cultural rather than purely personal they are in fact shared. Even if idiosyncratic 
to the individual they are still by virtue of the circumstances of their genesis, defined in 
relation to a shared cultural tradition; their idiosyncrasies consist in specifiable departures 
from the shared tradition and are dcfined in this way. 
However, along with this social reference, value standards may also be differentiated 
in terms of their functional relations to the action of the individual. The social reference 
implies, from the motivational side, an evaluative significance for all value standards. But 
still the primary relevance of a standard may be to cognitive definitions of the situation, 
to cathectic “expressions” or to the inte-gration of the action system as a system or of 
some part of it. Hence on the value-orientation side we may repeat the three-fold 
classification of “modes” of orientation as cognitive standards, appreciative standards 
and moral standards of value-orientation. 
A word of explanation of these terms is in order. The classification, as noted, 
corresponds to that of the modes of motivational orientation. In the cognitive case there is 
not much difficulty. On the motivational side the concern is with the cognitive interest in 
the situation and its objects, the motivation to define the situation cognitively. On the 
value-orientation side, on the other hand, concern is with the standards by which the 
validity of cognitive judgments is assessed. Some of these, like the most elementary 
standards of logic or correctness of observation may be cultural universals, while other 
elements are culturally variable. In any case it is a matter of selective evaluation, of 
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standards of preference between alternative solutions of cognitive problems, or 
alternative interpretations of phenomena and objects. 
The normative aspect of cognitive orientation is readily taken for granted. In the case 
of cathexes this is not so obvious. There is of course a sense in which the actor’s relation 
to an object just is or is not gratifying in a given way. But it must not be forgotten that 
gratification takes place as part of an action system where actors are in general 
normatively oriented. It is out or the question that this one aspect should be exempted 
from the relevance of normative standards of valuation. There is always a question of the 
rightness and the propriety of the orientation in this respect, in terms of choice of object, 
and of attitude toward the object. This, therefore, also involves standards by which 
selections among the possibilities of cathectic significance can be made. 
Finally the evaluative aspect of motivational orientation also has its value-orientation 
counterpart. Evaluation is concerned with the problem of integrating the elements of an 
action system, fundamentally the “you can’t eat your cake and have it” problem. Both 
cognitive and appreciative value standards are of course relevant to this. But every act 
has both cognitive and cathectic aspects. A primacy of cognitive interests, therefore, still 
leaves the problem of integrating the concrete action in terms of the relevance of 
cathectic interests and vice versa. There must, therefore, in an action system, be a 
paramount focus of evaluative standards which are neither cognitive as such nor 
appreciative as such, but involve a synthesis of both aspects. It has seemed appropriate to 
call these moral standards. In a sense they constitute the standards in terms of which more 
particular evaluations are themselves evaluated. 
It should also be clear from the general character of action systems that moral 
standards in this sense have peculiarly a social relevance. This is because every action 
system, concretely is in one aspect a social system, even though the focus on personality 
is very important for certain purposes. The moral reference is by no means exclusively 
social, but without the social reference it is impossible to conceive a concrete action 
system as integrated in an overall sense. In particular from the point of view of any given 
actor, the definition of the patterns of mutual rights and obligations, and of the standards 
goveming them in his interaction with others, is a crucial aspect of his general orientation 
to his situation. Because of this special relevance to the social system, moral standards 
become that aspect of value-orientation which is of greatest direct importance to the 
sociologist. We shall have much to say about them in the chapters which follow. 
Though there is a direct parallel between this classification of value-orientation 
patterns and the classification of motivational orientations it is very important to be clear 
that these two basic aspects, or components of the action system are logically 
independent, not in the sense that both are not essential, but in the sense that the content 
under the two classifications may be independently variable. From the fact of a given 
“psychological” cathectic significance of an object one cannot infer the specific 
appreciative standards according to which the object is evaluated or vice versa. The 
classification of the modes of motivational orientation provides essentially a framework 
for analyzing the “problems” in which the actor has an “interest.” Value-orientation, on 
the other hand, provides the standards of what constitute satisfactory “solutions” of these 
problems. The clear recognition of the independent variability of these two basic modes 
or levels of orientation is at the very basis of a satisfactory theory in the field of “culture 
and personality.” Indeed it can be said that failure to recognize this independent 
The social system     8
variability has underlain much of the difficulty in this field, par-ticularly the unstable 
tendency of much social science to oscillate between “psychological determinism” and 
“cultural determinism.” Indeed, it may be said that this independent variability is the 
logical foundation of the independent significance of the theory of the social system vis-
à-vis that of personality on the one hand and of culture on the other. 
Perhaps the point may first be discussed briefly in relation to the problem of culture. 
In anthropological theory there is not what could be called close agreement on the 
definition of the concept of culture. But for present purposes three prominent keynotes of 
the discussion may be picked out: first, that culture is transmitted, it constitutes a heritage 
or a social tradition; secondly, that it is learned, it is not a manifestation, in particular 
content, of man’s genetic constitution; and third, that it is shared. Culture, that is, is on 
the one hand the product of, on the other hand a determinant of, systems of human social 
interaction. 
The first point, transmissibility, serves as a most important criterion for distinguishing 
culture from the social system, because culture can be diffused from one social system to 
another. Relative to the particular social system it is a “pattern” element which is both 
analytically and empirically abstractable from that particular social system. There is 
crucially important interdependence between cultural patterns and the other elements of 
the social system, but these other elements are not completely “pattern-integrated” with 
culture or with each other. 
On the basis of the approach to culture taken above, the broad reasons for this 
complication are not far to seek. A symbolic system has modes of integration of its own, 
which may be called “pattern consistency.” The most familiar example is the logical 
consistency of a cognitive system, but art styles and systems of value-orientation are 
subject to the same kind of criteria of integration as a system in pattern terms. Examples 
of such symbolic systems are, of course, empirically familiar as in a philosophical treatise 
or a work of art. 
But as an integral part of a concrete system of social iriteraction this norm of pattern-
consistent integration of a cultural system can only be approximately realized, because of 
strains arising out of the imperatives of interdependence with the situational and 
motivational elements of concrete action. This problem may be approached through 
certain considerations having to do with the “learning” of a culture pattern. 
This very common expression in anthropological literature seems to derive originally 
from the modcl of the learning of intellectual content. But it has been extended to become 
the common tcrm for the process by which the requisite integration of an element of 
culture in the concrete action of an individual comes to be motivated. One can in these 
terms learn to read a language, to solve mathematical problcms by use of the differential 
calculus. But one also learns to conform with a norm of behavior or to value an art style. 
Learning in this broad sense, then, means the incorporation of cultural pattern elements 
into the action-systems of individual actors. 
The analysis of capacity to learn then comes up against the problem of the place the 
cultural item in question can assume in the personality system. One aspect of this 
problem is its compatibility with the other elements of culture which the same individual 
has already learned or is expected to learn. But there are others. Each individual actor is a 
biological organism acting in an environment. Both the genetic constitution of the 
organism and the nonsocio-cultural environment set limits to this learning, though these 
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limits are very difficult to specify. And finally each individual actor is subject to the 
exigencies of interaction in a social system. This last consideration is peculiarly 
important to the problem of culture because of the shared aspect of a cultural tradition. 
Such a tradition must be “borne” by one or more concrete social systems and can only be 
said to “function” when it is part of their actual action systems. 
In action terms this problem may be summed up as that of whether a completely 
pattern-consistent cultural system can be related to the exigencies both of personalities 
and of the social system in such a way that complete “conformity” with its standards can 
be adequately motivated among all the individual actors in the social system. Here it may 
be merely asserted without any attempt to demonstrate, that such a limiting case is 
incompatible with the fundamental functional imperatives both of personalities and of 
social systems. The integration of the total action system, partial and incomplete as it is; 
is a kind of “compromise” between the “strains to consistency” of its personality, social 
and cultural components respectively, in such a way that no one of them closely 
approaches “perfect” integration. With respect to the relation between culture and the 
social system this problem will have to be discussed in some detail below. The crucial 
point for the present is that the “learning” and the “living” of a system of cultural patterns 
by the actors in a social system, cannot be understood without the analysis of motivation 
in relation to concrete situations, not only on the level of personality theory, but on the 
level of the mechanisms of the social system. 
There is a certain element of logical symnietry in the relations of the social system to 
culture on the one hand and to personality on the other, but its implications must not be 
pressed too far. The deeper symmetry lies in the fact that both personalities and social 
systems are types of empirical action system in which both motivational and cultural 
elements or components are combined, and are thus in a sense parallel to each other. The 
basis of integration of the cultural system is, as has been noted, pattern-consistency. But 
that of personality is its structural pattern-consistency pltts functional adequacy of 
motivational balance in a concrete situation. A cultural system does not “function” except 
as part of a concrete action system, it just “is.” 
It should be made quite clear that the relevance of interaction is not what distinguishes 
the social system from that of personality. Most emphatically interaction is just as much 
constitutive of personality as it is or a social system. It is rather the functional focus of 
organization and integration which is the basis of the difference between personalities 
and social systems. Personality is the relational system of a living organism interacting 
with a situation. Its integrative focus is the organism-personality unit as an empirical 
entity. The mechanisms of the personality must be understood and formulated relative to 
the functional problems of this unit. The system of social relationships in which the actor 
is involved is not merely of situational significance, but is directly constitutive of the 
personality itself. But even where these relationships are socially structured in a uniform 
way for a group of individuals, it does not follow that the ways in which these uniform 
“roles” are structured are constitutive of each of the different personalities in the same 
way. Each is integrated into a different personality system, and therefore does not in a 
precise sense “mean the same thing” to any two of them. The relation of personality to a 
uniform role structure is one of interdependence and interpenetration but not one of 
“inclusion” where the properties of the personality system are constituted by the roles of 
which it is allegedly “made up.” 
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There are, as we shall see, important homologies between the personality and the 
social system. But these are homologies, not a macrocosm-microcosm relationship—the 
distinction is fundamental. Indeed, failure to take account of these considerations has lain 
at the basis of much of the theoretical difficulty of social psychology, especially where it 
has attempted to “extrapolate” from the psychology of the individual to the motivational 
interpretation of mass phenomena, or conversely has postulated a “group mind.” 
It follows from these considerations that both the structure of social systems and the 
motivational mechanisms of their functioning must be categorized on a level independent 
both of personality and of culture. Roughly stated, tempting though such a procedure is, 
trouble arises from the attempt either to treat social structure as a part of culture or to 
treat “social motivation” as applied psychology in the sense that it is a direct application 
of personality theory. 
The correct formula is different. It is that the fundamental building stones of the theory 
of social systems, like those of personality and culture theory, are common to all the 
sciences of action. This is true not of some of them but of all of them. But the ways in 
which these conceptual materials are to be built into theoretical structures is not the same 
in the cases of the three major foci of action theory. Psychology, as the science of 
personality, is thus not the “foundation” of the theory of social systems, but one main 
branch of the great tree of action theory of whicb the theory of social systems is another. 
The common foundation is not the theory of the individual as the unit of society, but of 
action as the “stuff” out of which both personality systems and social systems are built 
up. It will be the task of later chapters to document this statement from the special point 
of view of analyzing certain aspects of the interdependence of social systems both with 
personalities and with cultural systems. 
The focus of this work, then, is, within the action frame of reference as just outlined, 
on the theory of social systems. It is concerned both with personality and with culture, 
but not for their own sakes, rather in their bearing on the structure and functioning of 
social systems. Within systems of action the social system is, as has been noted, an 
independent focus both of realistic empirical organization of action and of theoretical 
analysis. 
Because empirical organization of the system is a fundamental focus, the norm, as it 
were, must be the conception of an empirically self-subsistent social system. If we add 
the consideration of duration sufficiently long to transcend the life span of the normal 
human individual, recruitment by biological reproduction and socialization of the 
oncoming generation become essential aspects of such a social system. A social system 
of this type, which meets all the essential functional prerequisites of long term 
persistence’from within its own resources, will be called a society. It is not essential to 
the concept of a society that it should not be in any way empirically interdependent with 
other societies, but only that it should contain all the structural and functional 
fundamentals of an independently subsisting system. 
Any other social system will be called a “partial” social system. Obviously most 
empirical sociological studies are concerned with partial social systems rather than with 
societies as wholes. This is entirely legitimate. But using the society as a “norm” in the 
theory of social systems ensures that a conceptual scheme will be developed for explicitly 
and systematically placing the partial social system in question in the setting of the 
society of which it is a part. It thereby becomes much more unlikely that the investigator 
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will overlook essential features of the society outside the partial social system which are 
prerequisites of the properties of the latter. It goes almost without saying that it is always 
of the greatest importance to specify what the system is which is being used as the object 
for a sociological analysis, whether or not it is a society, and if not, just how this 
particular partial social system is located in the society of which it is a part. 
It has been remarked several times above that we are not in a position to develop a 
complete dynamic theory in the action field and that, therefore, the systematization of 
theory in the present state of knowledge must be in “structural-functional” terms. A brief 
elucidation of the meaning and implications of this proposition is advisable before 
turning to the substantive analysis. 
It may be taken for granted that all scientific theory is concerned with the analysis of 
elements of uniformity in empirical processes. This is what is ordinarily meant by the 
“dynamic” interest of theory. The essential question is how far the state of theory is 
developed to the point of permitting deductive transitions from one aspect or state of a 
system to another, so that it is possible to say that if the facts in A sector are W and X, 
those in B sector must be Y and Z. In some parts of physics and chemistry it is possible to 
extend the empirical coverage of such a deductive system quite widely. But in the 
sciences of action dynamic knowledge of this character is highly fragmentary, though by 
no means absent. 
In this situation there is danger of losing all the advantages of systematic theory. But it 
is possible to retain some of them and at the same time provide a framework for the 
orderly growth of dynamic knowledge. It is as such a second best type or theory that the 
structural-functional level of theoretical systematization is here conceived and employed. 
In the first place completely raw empiricism is overcome by describing phenomena as 
parts of or processes within systematically conceived empirical systems. The set of 
descriptive categories employed is neither ad hoc nor sheer common sense but is a 
carefully and critically worked out system of concepts which are capable of application to 
all relevant parts or aspects of a concrete system in a conerent way. This makes 
comparability and transition from one part and/or state of the system to another, and from 
system to system, possible. It is of the greatest importance that this set of descriptive 
categories should be such that the dynamic generalizations which will explain processes 
are directly a part of the theoretical system. This essentially is what the “motivational” 
aspect of the action frame of reference accomplishes. By conceiving the processes of the 
social system as action processes in the technical sense of the above discussion, it 
becomes possible to articulate with the established knowledge of motivation which has 
been developed in modern psychology and thereby, as it were, to tap an enormous 
reservoir of knowledge. 
A particularly important aspect of our system of categories is the “structural” aspect. 
We simply are not in a position to “catch” the uniformities of dynamic process in the 
social system except here and there. But in order to give those we can catch a setting and 
to be in the most advantageous position to extend our dynamic knowledge we must have 
a “picture” of the system within which they fit, of the given relationships of its parts in a 
given state of the system, and, where changes take place, of what changes into what 
through what order of intermediate stages. The system of structural categories is the 
conceptual scheme which gives this setting for dynamic analysis. As dynamic knowledge 
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is extended the independent explanatory significance of structural categories evaporates. 
But their scientific function is nonetheless crucial. 
Therefore, one primary concern of this work must be with the categorization of the 
structure of social systems, the modes of structural differentiation within such systems, 
and the ranges of variability with reference to each structural category between systems. 
Precisely because of the fragmentary character of our dynamic knowledge, careful and 
systematic attention to these problems is of the highest urgency to sociology. But at the 
same time it should be made quite clear that this morphological interest is not an end in 
itself, but its products constitute an indispensable tool for other purposes. 
If we have a sufficiently generalized system of categories for the systematic 
description and comparison of the structure of systems, then we have a setting within 
which we can mobilize our dynamic knowledge of motivational processes to maximum 
effect. But precisely relative to the problems which are of significance in social system 
terms, the knowledge we possess is both fragmentary and of very uneven and unequal 
analytical status. The most effective way of organizing it for our purposes is to bring it 
into relation to a scheme of points of reference relative to the social system. This is where 
the much-discussed concept of “function” comes in. We must, of course, “place” a 
dynamic process structurally in the social system. But beyond that we must have a test of 
the significance of generalizations relative to it. That test of significance takes the form of 
the “functional” relevance of the process. The test is to ask the question, what would be 
the differential consequences for the system of two or more alternative outcomes of a 
dynamic process? Such consequences will be found to fit into the terms of maintenance 
of stability or production of change, of integration or disruption of the system in some 
sense. 
It is placing dynamic motivational processes in this context of functional significance 
for the system which provides the basis for the formulation of the concept mechanism as 
introduced above. Motivational dynamics in sociological theory, then, must take the form 
in the first instance of the formulation of mechanisms which “account for” the 
functioning of social systems, for the maintenance or breakdown of given structural 
patterns, for a typical process of transition from one structural pattern to another. 
Such a mechanism is always an empirical generalization about the operation of 
motivational “forces” under the conditions stated. The analytical basis of such 
generalizations may, however, be extremely variable. Sometimes we may just know 
empirically that it goes this way, in other cases there may be deeper roundations for the 
generalization as in application of established laws of learning or operation of the 
mechanisms of defense on the personality level. But the formulation of the motivational 
problem in mechanism terms is essential to establish the relevance of whatever level of 
motivational knowledge may be available to the problems of functioning of a social 
system. For the scientific fruitfulness of a generalization this problem of relevance is just 
as important as is that of the soundness of the generalization itself. 
We may now outline the organization of the volume. Following the very brief 
presentation in the present chapter of the fundamentals of the frame of reference of 
action, the next chapter will take up the most essential components and points of 
reference for analysis of social systems as such, and will show the most general way in 
which these components come to be organized through the institutionalization of roles. 
There will then follow three chapters on the structure of social systems. The first of these 
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will be concerned with the principal types of subsystem which enter into more complex 
social systems while the second and third will attempt to analyze the modes of 
differentiation and the ranges of structural variation of societies. 
When this framework for the analysis of social process in relation to the structure of 
social systems and their variability has been laid down, attention will be turned to the 
analysis of process itself. This analysis will occupy two chapters, of which the first will 
be on the mechanisms of socialization, that is, the learning of patterns of orientation in 
social roles. The second of the two will then turn to the analysis of tendencies to deviant 
behavior, and of the mechanisms of social control which tend to counteract them. 
Chapters VI and VII will thus be concerned with the motivational aspects of social 
behavior. The two chapters which follow these will turn to the cultural aspects. Patterns 
of value-orientation are so fundamental to the social system that they will have been dealt 
with throughout the general analysis of social structure. But to complete the analysis of 
the relations of culture to the social system it is necessary to discuss explicitly the place 
of the other two principal components of a cultural tradition, systjems of beliefs or ideas, 
and systems of expressive symbols. These will be the subject-matter of Chapters VIII and 
IX respectively. There is a certain arbitrariness in the decision of whether the 
motivational or the cultural aspect should be treated first. The choice taken here is 
primarily dictated by the fact that in dealing with social structure value-orientation 
patterns had already been extensively analyzed. Before carrying the analysis of the 
relations of culture to the social system farther, it seemed advisable to give explicit 
attention to motivational process in order to make the significance of these other two 
classes of culture pattern for action clearer. 
At this point a pause will be taken in the high level of sustained abstract analysis, to 
illustrate what has gone before in terms of a kind of case study, the analysis of certain 
highlights of modern medical practice considered as a partial social system. After this the 
last major theoretical task will be undertaken, the analysis of the problem of social 
change, with some illustrations of types of processes of such change. 
The book will close with a very brief methodological stock-taking which will be 
concerned primarily with consideration of a definition of the scope of sociological theory 
and its relations to other conceptual schemes among the sciences of the action field.  
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II 
THE MAJOR POINTS OF REFERENCE 
AND STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF 
THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 
 
AS WE have seen in the preceding chapter, a social system is a mode of organization of 
action elements relative to the persistence or ordered processes of change of the 
interactive patterns of a plurality of individual actors. Regardless of the enormous 
variability in degrees of stability and structural integration of these interaction patterns, of 
their static character or involvement in processes of structural development or change, it 
is necessary for the present type of theoretical analysis to develop a scheme for the 
explicit analysis of the structure of such systems. This scheme must provide a 
fundamental set of points of reference for the analysis of motivational processes. 
In the preceding chapter we outlined the general character of systems of action and 
their major components. Now we must undertake the specific spelling out of the theory of 
action in relation to social systems as such. The present chapter will focus on the general 
problems of the constitution of social systems and the bases of their structure, while those 
which follow it will deal with the problems of structural differentiation and variability. 
First a word should be said about the units of social systems. In the most elementary 
sense the unit is the act. This is of course true, as was shown in the last chapter, of any 
system of action. The act then becomes a unit in a social system so far as it is part of a 
process of interaction between its author and other actors.  
Secondly, for most purposes of the more macroscopic analysis of social systems, 
however, it is convenient to make use of a higher order unit than the act, namely the 
status-role as it will here be called. Since a social system is a system of processes of 
interaction between actors, it is the structure of the relations between the actors as 
involved in the interactive process which is essentially the structure of the social system. 
The system is a network of such relationships. 
Each individual actor is involved in a plurality of such interactive relationships each 
with one or more partners in the complementary role. Hence it is the participation of an 
actor in a patterned interactive relationship which is for many purposes the most 
significant unit of the social system. 
This participation in turn has two principal aspects. On the one hand there is the 
positional aspect—that of where the actor in question is “located” in the social system 
relative to other actors. This is what we will call his status, which is his place in the 
relationship system considered as a structure, that is a patterned system of parts. On the 
other hand there is the processual aspect, that of what the actor does in his relations with 
others seen in the context of its functional significance for the social system. It is this 
which we shall call his role. 
The distinction between status and role is at the root very closely related to that 
between the two reciprocal perspectives inherent in interaction. On the one hand each 
actor is an object of orientation for otlier actors (and for himself). In so far as this object-
significance derives from his position in the social relationship system, it is a status 
significance. On the other hand each actor is oriented to other actors. In this capacity he is 
acting, not serving as an object—this is what we mean by his playing a role. 
It should be made quite clear that statuses and roles, or the status-role bundle, are not 
in general attributes of the actor, but are units of the social system, though having a given 
status may sometimes be treated as an attribute. But the status-role is analogous to the 
particle of mechanics, not to mass or velocity. 
Third, a word should be said about the sense in which the actor himself is a unit of the 
social system. As a point of reference, as he who holds a status or performs a role, the 
individual actor is always a significant unit which, however, for purposes of the analysis 
of social systems is to be treated as a higher order unit than the statusrole. The actor in 
this sense is a composite bundle of statuses and roles. But this social actor must be 
distinguished from the personality as itself a system of action. This distinction derives 
from the mutual irreducibility of personality and social systems as discussed in the last 
chapter. 
We have, then, three different units of social systems referable to the individual actor 
ranging from the most elementary to the most composite. The first is the social act, 
performed by an actor and oriented to one or more actors as objects. The second is the 
status-role as the organized sub-system of acts of the actor or actors occupying given 
reciprocal statuses and acting toward each other in terms of given reciprocal orientations. 
The third is the actor himself as a social unit, the organized system of all the statuses and 
roles referable to him as a social object and as the “author” of a system of role-activities. 
Finally, cutting across the individual actor as a composite unit is the collectivity as 
actor and as object. Here the particular sectors of the action-systems of the relevant 
individual actors are abstracted from their other status-roles and treated together. Part of 
the significance of the status-role as a unit derives from the fact that it is the unit which is 
a unit both for the action system of the individual and for that of the collectivity. It thus 
serves to articulate the two cross-cutting modes of organization of social systems. 
It is naturally extremely important to be clear which of these four units is meant when 
a social structure is broken down into units. 
§ THE FUNCTIONAL PREREQUISITES OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS1 
INTERACTIVE relationships analyzed in terms of statuses and roles occur as we have 
seen in systems. If such a system is to  
1 On the general problem of functional prerequisites of the social systern see Aberle, Cohen, Davis, 
Levy, Sutton, “The Functional Prerequisites of a Society,” Ethics, IX (January, 1950), 100–111. 
The present treatment is indebted to their paper but departs from it rather radically. 
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constitute a persistent order or to undergo an orderly2 process of developmental change, 
certain functional prerequisites must be met. A brief discussion of these functional 
prerequisites is in order because it provides the setting for a more extended analysis of 
the points of reference for analyzing the structure of social systems.  
The problem of functional prerequisites is a protean problem because of the variety of 
different levels on which it may be approached. What we propose here is to start on the 
most general and therefore formal level of action theory and proceed to introduce 
specifications step by step. It should be possible to do this in a sufficiently orderly 
fashion. 
The broadest framework of such an analysis is directly deducible from the 
considerations about action in general which were put forward in the last chapter. The 
basis of this is the insight that action systems are structured about three integrative foci, 
the individual actor, the interactive system, and a system of cultural patterning.3 Each 
implies the others and therefore the variability of any one is limited by its compatibility 
with the minimum conditions of functioning of each of the other two. 
Looked at from the perspective of any one integrate of action such as the social system 
there are in turn two aspects of this reciprocal interrelation with each of the others. First, 
a social system cannot be so structured as to be radically incompatible with the conditions 
of functioning of its component individual actors as biological organisms and as 
personalities, or of the relatively stable integration of a cultural system. Secondly, in turn 
the social system, on both fronts, depends on the requisite minimum of “support” from 
each of the other systems. It must, that is, have a sufficient proportion of its component 
actors adequately motivated to act in accordance with the requirements of its role system, 
positively in the fulfillment of expectations and negatively in abstention from too much 
disruptive, i.e., deviant, behavior. It must on the other hand avoid commitment to cultural 
patterns which either fail to and acceptance of war is sometimes a condition of survival of 
a social system as a distinctive system. 
The elements of this class of functional prerequisites may be said to begin with the 
biological prerequisites of individual life, like nutrition and physical safety. They go on 
to the subtler problems of the conditions of minimum stability of personality. It seems to 
be reasonably well established that there are minimum conditions of socialization with 
respect for instance to the relation between affectional support and security, without 
which a functioning personality cannot be built up. The present task is not to attempt to 
analyze these borderline problems, but only to make clear where they fit in relation to the 
theory of the social system. These minimum needs of individual actors constitute a set or 
conditions to which the social system must be adapted. If the variation of the latter goes 
too far in a given direction this will tend to set up repercussions which will in turn tend to 
produce deviant behavior in the actors in question, behavior which is either positively 
disruptive or involves withdrawal from functionally important activities. Such a need, as 
a functional prerequisite, may be likened to a spring. The less adequately it is met, the 
2 An orderly piocess in this sense is contrasted with the disintegration of a system. Disintegration in 
this sense means disappearance of the bounoaries of the system relative to its environment. Cf. 
Values, Motives, and Systems of Action, Chapter I. 
3 And also in a different sense about the non-action environment, the physical aspects of the 
situation. 
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more “pressure” it will take to realize certain patterns of social action in the face of it, 
and hence the less energy will be available for other purposes. At certain points for 
certain individuals or classes of them then the pressure may become too great and the 
spring may break—such persons no longer participate in the interactive system of 
personality and social system.4 
The obverse of the functional prerequisite of meeting a minimum proportion of the 
needs of the individual actors, is the need to secure adequate participation of a sufficient 
proportion of these actors in the social system, that is to motivate them adequately to the 
performances which may be necessary if the social system in question is to persist or 
develop. Indeed it is because it is a condition of this that the need to satisfy minimum 
needs of actors is a prerequisite at all. 
The prerequisite of adequate motivation in turn subdivides into two main aspects, a 
negative and a positive. The negative is that of a minimum of control over potentially 
disruptive behavior. This means action which interferes with the action of others in their 
roles in the social system. It may involve either aggressive action toward others or merely 
action which has deleterious consequences for others or for an aspect of the system, 
without aggressive intent 
The field is highly complex but perhaps one particular aspect of it may be singled out 
for special mention. This is that in terms of functional significance relative to the social 
system, the significance of an action or class of them is to be understood not directly and 
primarily in terms of its motivation but of its actual or probable consequences for the 
system. In this sense the pursuit of “private interests” may be highly disruptive under 
certain circumstances even though the content of the interests, for example in religious 
terms, may be such as to be rather generally ethically approved. Similarly conflict as such 
may be highly disruptive. If it becomes sufficiently severe the functional problem for the 
system becomes the control of the conflict as such. In such a case the merits of the “case” 
of one or the other of the parties may become of quite secondary importance. 
In general terms the functional problem for a social system of minimizing potentially 
disruptive benavior and the motivation to it, may be cafied the “motivational problem of 
order.” Because of certain further features of social systems which will be analyzed in the 
following chapters the present discussion should lead up to consideration of certain 
relatively specific classes of potential disruption, notably the problem of opportunity, the 
problem of prestige allocation, and the problem of power. There is, that is to say, an 
4 It is, of course, highly important not to invent ad hoc generalizations about these prerequisites 
which allegedly explain certain classes of concrete social phenomena. This procedure is especially 
tempting because such an ad hoc hypothesis can serve to absolve the investigator from the difficult 
analysis of the internal balances and processes of the social system itself. In its cruder forms this 
procedure has played a very prominent part in the history of social thought, as in the currency of 
theories that virtually all social phenomena were determined by the genetic constitution of 
populations or their geographical environments. It is an index of the increasing maturity of our 
science that such sweeping formulae are no longer considered to merit even serious discussion. 
Both the positive role of such conditioning factors and of internal social processes are in general 
terms fully established. But the general formulae do not solve the specific problems. The task is to 
unravel the complex patterns of interaction between the two classes of factors. 
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immense variety of particular acts which are disruptive in that they interfere with the 
role-performance of one or more other actors. So long, however, as they remain nearly 
randomly distributed they may reduce the efficiency of the system by depressing levels of 
role performance, but still not constitute a threat to its stability. This latter may develop 
when disruptive tendencies become organized as a sub-system in such a way as to 
impinge on strategic points in the social system itself. It is as such strategic points that the 
problems of opportunity, prestige and power will be treated below.5 
The distinction between the negative and the positive aspects of the problem of 
adequate motivation is relative and gradual. Both present functional problems in terms of 
the operation of the social system, which focus attendon on the mechanisms which fit 
into the relevant context. But in spite of this relativity there is an important distinction 
between action which is positively disruptive of a going system of social relationships, 
and simple withdrawal of the individual from performance of his obligations. The 
principal criterion would be that in the latter case the only interference with others would 
consist in forcing them to do without the benefits expected from a person’s actions. The 
possibility of withdrawal in fact defines one of the most important directions of deviant 
behavior, and enters as we shall see in most important ways into the structure of the 
problems and mechanisms of social control Illness is for example one of the most 
important types of withdrawal behavior in our society, which will be extensively 
discussed below. 
Again in relation to withdrawal as a type of failure to be motivated to adequate role 
performance, it must be made clear that the negative aspect of withdrawal is not defined 
in motivational terms but in functional terms relative to the social system. Precisely 
because people are dependent on each other’s performances, simple withdrawal from 
fulfillment of expectations may, motivationaily speaking, be a highly aggressive act, and 
may in fact injure the other severely. But in part precisely because it does not correspond 
to the motivational distinction the functional distinction is highly significant as will 
become evident. It provides a point of reference for the analysis of the directions of 
deviant benavior and hence places such behavior in relation to problems of the 
mechanisms of operation of the social system. 
The prerequisite of adequate motivation gives us one of the primary starting points for 
building up to the concepts of role and of institutionalization. Fundamentally the problem 
is, will the personalities developed within a social system, at whatever stage in the life 
cycle, “spontaneously” act in such ways as to fulfill the functional prerequisites of the 
social systems of which they are parts, or is it necessary to look for relatively specific 
mechanisms, that is, modes of organization of the motivational systems of personalities, 
which can be understood in direct relation to the socially structured level or role 
behavior? The older “psychological” view that societies are resultants of the 
independently determined “traits” of individuals would take the first alternative. The 
modern sociological view tends to emphasize the second. 
5 It is in this kind of a context that the distinction between manifest and latent function becomes 
significant. In general only within limited ranges and to a limited extent are the consequences 
which the sociologist takes as his standard for the analysis of the systemic significance of actions 
explicitly intended by the actor, individual or collective. It is these unintended consequences which 
constitute the latent functions or dysfunctions of the actions. Cf. Robert K.Merton, Social Theory 
and Social Structure, Chapter I. 
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Statement of the problem of adequate motivation not only poses in general the 
problems of the mechanisms of socialization and of social control and their relation to the 
dynamics of the social system, but it provides the setting for an approach to the analysis 
of the relevant mechanisms. Personality psychology, as we have seen, is becoming highly 
oriented to the actor’s relational system, that is, his orientation to objects. When this fact 
is combined with the fundamental place of the concept of expectations in the theory of 
action, it becomes clear that one central aspect of the general and especially the cathectic 
orientation of the actor is his set of need-dispositions toward the fulfillment of role 
expectations, in the first place those of other significant actors but also his own. There is, 
in the personality structure of the individual actor a “conformityalienation” dimension in 
the sense of a disposition to conform with the expectations of others or to be alienated 
from them. When these relevant expectations are those relative to the fulfillment of role-
obligations, this conformity-alienation balance, in general or in particular role contexts, 
becomes a central focus of the articulation of the motivational system of the personality 
wifh the structure of the social system. 
It is furthermore in the present context of the problem of adequate motivation of role-
expectation fulfillment that the basic significance for the social system of two 
fundamental properties of biological “human nature” may best be briefly brought to 
attention. The first of these is the much discussed “plasticity” of the human organism, its 
capacity to learn any one of a large number of alternative patterns of behavior instead of 
being bound by its genetic constitution to a very limited range of alternatives. It is of 
course within the limits of this plasticity that the independent determinant significance of 
cultural and social factors in action must be sought The clear demonstration of 
determination in terms of the genes automatically narrows the range of relevance of the 
factors which are of theoretical interest in the sciences of action, except for their possible 
bearing on the problems of assortative mating which influence the processes of 
combination and recombination of genetic strains. The limits of plasticity are for the most 
part still unknown.6  
The second characteristic of human nature in the biological sense is what may be 
called “sensitivity.” By this is meant the accessibility of the human individual to 
influence by the attitudes of others in the social interaction process, and the resulting 
dependence on receiving relatively particular and specific reactions. What this provides 
essentially is the motivational basis for accessibility to influence in the learning process. 
Thus the attitudes of others are probably of first rate importance in all human learning, 
but are particularly crucial in motivating the acceptance of value-orientation patterns, 
with their legitimation of the renunciations which are essential to the achievement of a 
disciplined integration of personality. Without this discipline the stability of expectations 
in relation to their fulfillment which is essential for a functioning social system would not 
be possible. It is highly probable that one of the principal limitations on the social 
6 From the point of view of action theory and specifically that of the social system it may be said 
that the burden of proof rests upon him who would assert that what has been considered an action 
theory problem is adequately solved by invoking the role of such sub-action determinants of 
behavior. This will often turn out to be the case, but resort to ad hoc hypotheses on this level which 
have failed to stand up under criticism and further investigation, has been so prominent in the 
history of social science that we must insist on this burden of proof maxim. 
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potentialities of animals on other than an instinct basis, lies in the absence or weakness 
of this lever. The physiological dependency of the human infant is associated with its 
capacity for developing emotional dependency which in turn is an essential condidon of 
much of social learning. 
It has not been common in discussions of the functional prerequisites of social systems 
to include explicit treatment of cultural prerequisites, but the need to do so seems to 
follow directly from the major premises of action theory as set forth above. The 
integration of cultural patterns as well as their specific content involve factors which at 
any given time are independent of the other elements for the action system and yet must 
be articulated with them. Such integration imposes “imperatives” on the other elements 
just as truly as is the case the other way around. This major functional problem area of 
the social system may be subdivided along the same lines as in the case of the 
motivational problem. 
In the first place there are minimum social conditions necessary for the production, 
maintenance and development of cultural systems in general and of particular types of 
cultural system. It may be presumed that disruption of the communication system of a 
society is ultimately just as dangerous as disruption of its system of order in the above 
sense of motivational integration. This is an aspect of “anomie” which deserves much 
more explicit analysis than it has received. Perhaps the most obvious specific example is 
provided by 
the role of language. We know quite definitely that the individual does not develop 
language spontaneously without undergoing a socially structured learning process in 
relation to others. It is quite definite that this process must be part of a system of social 
relations which is orderly within certain limits, however difficult it may be to specify the 
limits in detail. It is altogether probable that many protohuman groups failed to make the 
transition to the human sociocultural level of action because of failure to fulfill the 
prerequisites of the emergence of language or of some other functionally essential aspects 
of culture. 
Thus a social system in the present sense is not possible without language, and without 
certain other minimum patterns of culture, such as empirical knowledge necessary to 
cope with situational exigencies, and sufficiently integrated patterns of expressive 
symbolism and of value orientation. A social system which leads to too drastic disruption 
of its culture, for example through blocking the processes of its acquisition, would be 
exposed to social as well as cultural disintegration. 
We do not accurately know the cultural limits of “human society,” so exactly what the 
above limits may be remains to be determined. With respect to certain more specific 
types of cultural pattern, however, we have relatively detailed knowledge—we shall, for 
example, discuss modern science from this point of view below. In any case the 
determination of these conditions is an important field of sociological research. 
One final remark in orientation to the general problem. Culture may of course be 
“embodied” in physical form independendy of particular actors, e.g., knowledge in 
books, but it is a cardinal principle of the theory of action that culture is not merely 
“situational” relative to action but becomes directly constitutive of personalities as such 
through what personality psychologists now tend to call “internalization.” The minimum 
cultural prerequisites of a social system may thus be said to operate at least in part 
through the functions of culture for personality. Without the requisite cultural resources 
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to be assimilated through internalization it is not possible for a human level of personality 
to emerge and hence for a human type of social system to develop. 
The other aspect of the problem of prerequisites on the cultural side is that of adequate 
cultural resources and organization for the maintenance of the social system. This has 
already been touched upon in the discussions above, but a few additional remarks may be 
made. Perhaps the most obvious type of case is instrumental knowledge. Without a 
minimum of tecnnical lore which makes it possible to deal with the physical environment 
and with other human beings no human society would be possible, This in turn 
presupposes language. But similar considerations also apply to the other departments of 
culture, to non-empirical existential ideas, to expressive symbol systems and above all to 
patterns of value-orientation about which much will have to be said in what follows. 
It was pointed out above that tendencies to deviant behavior on the part of the 
component actors pose functional “problems” for the social system in the sense that they 
must be counteracted by “mechanisms of control” unless dysfunctional consequences are 
to ensue. The parallel on the cultural side is the case where the maintenance of certain 
cultural patterns as integral parts of the going system of action imposes certain strains. 
This may be true both on the personality and the social system levels. The most obvious 
cases are those of a value-orientation pattern and of cognitive beliefs which are 
motivationally difficult to conform with. Such difficulty might be attributable to a 
conflict with reality, Thus within the area covered by well established medical science the 
maintenance of and action upon some beliefs of Christian Science may impose a serious 
strain on the actor especially where he cannot escape knowing the medical views. Or it 
may be a matter of difficulty in attaining conformative motivation, as in the case where 
certain types of socialization tend to generate deeply anti-authoritarian sentiments so that 
at least some kinds of authority cannot be tolerated by some people. In particular a 
utopian ideal if accepted and institutionalized imposes strains on the social system. 
Though the limits in this as in the other cases are in general not known, it is safe to say 
not only that the social system must be able to keep a minimum or culture going, but vice 
versa, any given culture must be compatible with a social system to a minimum degree if 
its patterns are not to become extinct, and if the latter is to continue functioning 
unchanged. Analysis of the mediating mechanisms between the cultural patterns and the 
concrete action systems in its motivational aspect constitutes one of the most important 
problem areas of action theory and specifically of the theory of social systems. This 
subject will be further explored in Chapters VIII and IX below. 
§ THE INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION OF ACTION ELEMENTS 
A CONCRETE action system is an integrated7 structure of action elements in relation to 
a situation. This means essentially integration of motivational and cultural or symbolic 
elements, brought together in a certain kind of ordered system. 
The analysis of the general features of action in the previous chapter, combined with 
the immediately preceding analysis of the functional prerequisites of social systems, yield 
certain specifications which can guide us to strategic features of this ordered structure. 
It is inherent in an action system that action is, to use one phrase, “normatively 
oriented.” This follows, as was shown, from the concept of expectadons and its place in 
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Expectations then, in combination with the “double contingency” of the process of 
interaction as it has been called, create a crucially imperative problem of order. Two 
aspects of this problem of order may in turn be distinguished, order in the symbolic 
systems which make communication possible, and order in the mutuality of motivational 
orientation to the normative aspect of expectations, the “Hobbesian” problem of order. 
The problem of order, and thus of the nature of the integration of stable systems of social 
interaction, that is, of social structure, thus focuses on the integration of the motivation of 
actors with the normative cultural standards which integrate the action system, in our 
context interpersonally. These standards are, in the terms used in the preceding chapter, 
patterns of value-orientation, and as such are a particularly crucial part of the cultural 
tradition of the social system.8 
The orientation of one actor to the contingent action of another inherently involves 
evaluative orientation, because the element of contingency implies the relevance of a 
system of alternatives. Stability of interaction in turn depends on the condition that the 
particular acts of evaluation on both sides should be oriented to common standards since 
only in terms of such standards is “order” in either the communication or the motivational 
contexts possible. 
There is a range of possible modes of orientation in the motivational sense to a value-
standard. Perhaps the most important distinction is between the attitude of “expediency” 
at one pole, where conformity or non-conformity is a function of the instrumental 
interests of the actor, and at the other pole the “introjection” or internalization of the 
standard so that to act in conformity with it becomes a need-disposition in the actor’s 
own personality structure, relatively independently of any instrumentally significant 
consequences of that conformity. The latter is to be treated as the basic type of integration 
of motivation with a normative pattern-structure of values. 
In order to justify this last proposition it is necessary to go somewhat further into the 
nature of the interaction process. In the case of a given actor, ego, there is soon built up a 
system of expectations relative to a given other, alter. With respect to alter’s action- this 
implies for ego hopes and anxieties, that is, some of alter’s possible reactions will be 
favorable from ego’s point of view and others unfavorable. By and large we are on 
psycnological grounds justified in saying ego’s orientation will on balance tena to be 
oriented to stimulating the favorable, gratification-producing reactions and avoiding 
provocations for the unfavorable, deprivation-producing reactions. 
Generally, in so far as the normative standards in terms of which ego and alter are 
interacting are shared and clear, favorable reactions on the part of alter will tend to be 
7 We are here concerned with what has been called the “boundary-maintaining” type of system 
(Values, Motives, and Systems of Action, op. cit.). For this type of system, as noted there, the 
concept integration has a double reference: a) to the compatibility of the components of the system 
with each other so that change is not necessitated before equilibrium can be reached, and b) to the 
maintenance of the conditions of the distinctiveness of the system within its boundaries over 
against its environment. Integration may be relative to a moving equilibrium, i.e., an orderly 
process of change of the system, as well as to a static equilibrium. 
8 The other components of the cultural tradition pose somewhat different problems which will be 
taken up in the following section. 
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 deviating from them (and vice versa of course). The result of this circumstance is the 
tendency for the conformity-deviation dimension and the favorable-unfavorable or the 
gratification-deprivation dimension to coincide. In other words the basic condition on 
which an interaction system can be stabilized is for the interests of the actors to be bound 
to conformity with a shared system of value-orientation standards. 
There is in turn a two-fold structure of this “binding in.” In the first place, by virtue of 
internalization of the standard, conformity with it tends to be of personal, expressive 
and/or instrumental significance to ego. In the second place, the structuring of the 
reactions of alter to ego’s action as sanctions is a function of his conformity with the 
standard. Therefore conformity as a direct mode of the fulfillment of his own need-
dispositions tends to coincide with conformity as a condition of eliciting the favorable 
and avoiding the unfavorable reactions of others. In so far as, relative to the actions of a 
plurality of actors, conformity with a value-orientation standard meets both these criteria, 
that is from the point of view of any given actor in the system, it is both a mode of the 
fulfillment of his own need-dispositions and a condition of “optimizing” the reactions of 
other significant actors, that standard will be said to be “institutionalized.” 
A value pattern in this sense is always institutionalized in an interaction context. 
Therefore there is always a double aspect of the expectation system which is integrated in 
relation to it. On the one hand there are the expectations which concern and in part set 
standards for the behavior of the actor, ego, who is taken as the point of reference; these 
are his “role-expectations.” On the other hand, from his point of view there is a set of 
expectations relative to the contingently probable reactions of others (alters)—these will 
be called “sanctions,” which in turn may be subdivided into positive and negative 
according to whether they are felt by ego to be gratification-promoting or depriving. The 
relation between role-expectations and sanctions then is clearly reciprocal. What are 
sanctions to ego are role-expectations to alter and vice versa. 
A role then is a sector of the total orientation system of an individual actor which is 
organized about expectations in relation to a particular interaction context, that is 
integrated with a particular set of value-standards which govern interaction with one or 
more alters in the appropriate complementary roles. These alters need not be a defined 
group of individuals, but can involve any alter if and when he comes into a particular 
complementary interaction relationship with ego which involves a reciprocity of 
expectations with reference to common standards of value-orientation. 
The institutionalization of a set of role-expectations and of the corresponding 
sanctions is clearly a matter of degree. This degree is a function of two sets of variables; 
on the one hand those affecting the actual sharedness of the value-orientation patterns, on 
the other those determining the motivational orientation or commitment to the fulfillment 
of the relevant expectations. As we shall see a variety of factors can influence this degree 
of institutionalization through each of these channels. The polar antithesis of full 
institutionalization is, however, anomie, the absence of structured complementarity of the 
interaction process or, what is the same thing, the complete breakdown of normative 
order in both senses. This is, however, a limiting concept which is never descriptive of a 
concrete social system. Just as there are degrees of institutionalization so are there also 
degrees of anomie. The one is the obverse of the other. 
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An institution will be said to be a complex of institutionalized role integrates9 which is 
of strategic structural significance in the social system in question. The institution should 
be considered to be a higher order unit of social structure than the role, and indeed it is 
made up of a plurality of interdependent role-patterns or components of them. Thus when 
we speak of the “institution of property” in a social system we bring together those 
aspects of the roles of the component actors which have to do with the integration of 
action-expectations with the value-patterns governing the definition of rights in 
“possessions” and obligations relative to them. An institution in this sense should be 
clearly distinguished from a collectivity. A collectivity is a system of concretely 
interactive specific roles. An institution on the other hand is a complex of patterned 
elements in role-expectations which may apply to an indefinite number of collectivities. 
Conversely, a collectivity may be the focus of a whole series of institutions. Thus the 
institutions of marriage and of par-enthood are both constitutive of a particular family as 
a collectivity. 
It is now necessary to go back to certain aspects of the integration of action elements 
in institutionalized roles. The stardng point is the crucial significance of interaction and 
the corresponding complementarity of expectations. What are expectations to ego are 
sanctions to alter and vice versa, for among the expectations of any role, indeed the 
central part of them, are definitions of how its incumbent should act toward others, and 
these definitions are structured along the conformity-deviance dimension. The question 
of how far sanctions are intended by the actor who imposes them to influence the 
behavior of the other, or to “reward” his conformity and to “punish” his deviance, may 
remain an open question for the moment. The important point is that such intention is not 
a criterion of the concept of sanctions as here used. The criterion is merely that they are 
meaningful reactions of alter to what ego does. 
Certain empirical generalizations seem to be established which can carry us somewhat 
farther in interpreting the dynamic significance of this reciprocal integration of role-
expectations. The first derives from what was above called the “sensitivity” of the human 
personality to the attitudes of others. From this it follows that only in limiting cases will 
the significance of sanctions be purely instrumental, that is, will the probability of a given 
reaction be significant only as a set of expected conditions of the situation which 
influence the probability of successful attainment of a particular goal or the probable cost 
of its attainment. Conformity with role-expectations will always to a greater or less 
degree involve motivational elements of the character referred to in psychological 
discussions as composing the “ego-ideal” or the superego, elements of “self-respect,” 
adequacy or “security” in the psychological sense. Such elements are not of course 
necessarily central for every concrete actor in every concrete situation which is connected 
with a set of institutionalized role-expectations. A particular individual or class of them 
may well become involved in an interaction situation in which their own “sentiments” are 
only very peripherally involved. But in a general sense in social situations, the 
circumstances of socialization and other factors preclude that this should be the 
predominant situation in permanent social systems which involve the major motivational 
interests of the participant actors. The focal case is that where the actor “cares” how 
others react to him in much more than a purely instrumental sense. 
9 Or status-relationships. There are no roles without corresponding statuses and vice versa, 
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Considering that we are talking about the conditions of relatively stable interaction in 
social systems, it follows from this that the value-standards which define institutionalized 
role-expectations assume to a greater or less degree a moral significance. Conformity 
with them becomes, that is, to some degree a matter of the fulfillment of obligations 
which ego carries relative to the interests of the larger action system in which he is 
involved, that is a social system. The sharing of such common value patterns, entailing a 
sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of ooligations, then creates a solidarity among 
those mutually oriented to the common values. The actors concerned will be said to 
constitute, within the area of relevance of these values, a collectivity. 
For some classes of participants the significance of collectivity membership may be 
predominantly its usefulness in an instrumental context to their “private” goals. But such 
an orientation cannot be constitutive of the collectivity itself, and so far as it 
predominates, tends to disrupt the solidarity of the collectivity. This is most emphatically 
not to say that participation in a solidary collectivity tends in general to interfere with the 
attainment of the individual’s private goals, but that without the attachment to the 
constitutive common values the collectivity tends to dissolve. If this attachment is given, 
there is room for much fulfillment of private interests. 
Attachment to common values means, motivationally considered, that the actors have 
common “sentiments”10 in support of the value patterns, which may be defined as 
meaning that conformity with the relevant expectations is treated as a “good thing” 
relatively independently of any specific instrumental “advantage” to be gained from such 
conformity, e.g., in the avoidance of negative sanctions. Furthermore, this attachment to 
common values, while it may fit the immediate gratificational needs of the actor, always 
has also a “moral” aspect in that to some degree this conformity defines the 
“responsibilities” of the actor in the wider, that is, social action system in which he 
participates. Obviously the specific focus of re-sponsibility is the collectivity which is 
constituted by a particular common value-orientation. 
Finally, it is quite clear that the “sentiments” which support such common values are 
not ordinarily in their specific structure the manifestation of constitutionally given 
propensities of the organism. They are in general learned or acquired. Furthermore, the 
part they play in the orientation of action is not predominantly that of cultural objects 
which are cognized and “adapted to” but the culture patterns have come to be 
internalized; they constitute part of the structure of the personality system of the actor 
itself. Such sentiments or “value-attitudes” as they may be called, are therefore genuine 
need-dispositions of the personality. It is only by virtue of internalization or 
institutionalized values that a genuine motivational integration of behavior in the social 
structure takes place, that the “deeper” layers of motivation become harnessed to the 
fulfillment of role-expectations. It is only when this has taken place to a high degree that 
it is possible to say that a social system is highly integrated, and that the interests of the  
10 The term “sentiments” is here used to denote culturally organized cathectic and/or evaluative 
modes or patterns of orientation toward particular objects or classes of objects. A sentiment thus 
involves the internalization of cultural patterns. 
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collectivity and the private interests of its constituent members can be said to 
approach11 coincidence. 
This integration of a set of common value patterns with the internalized need-
disposition structure of the constituent personalities is the core phenomenon of the 
dynamics of social systems. That the stability of any social system except the most 
evanescent interaction process is dependent on a degree of such integration may be said 
to be the fundamental dynamic theorem of sociology. It is the major point of reference for 
all analysis which may claim to be a dynamic analysis of social process. 
It is the significance of institutional integration in this sense which lies at the basis of 
the place of specifically sociological theory in the sciences of action and the reasons why 
economic theory and other versions of the conceptual schemes which give predominance 
to rational instrumental goal-orientation cannot provide an adequate model for the 
dynamic analysis of the social system in general terms.  
It has been repeatedly shown that reduction of motivational dynamics to rational 
instrumental terms leads straight to the Hobbesian thesis, which is a reduction ad 
absurdum of the concept of a social system. This reductio was carried out in classic form 
by Durkheim in his Division of Labor. But Durkheim’s excellent functional analysis has 
since been enormously reinforced by the implications of modern psychological 
knowledge with reference to the conditions of socialization and the bases of 
psychological security and the stability of personality, as well as much further empirical 
and theoretical analysis of social systems as such. 
The theory of institutional behavior, which is essentially sociological theory, is 
precisely of the highest significance in social science because by setting the problems of 
social dynamics in a context of institutional structure and drawing the implications of the 
theorem of institutional integration which has just been stated, this theory is enabled to 
exploit and extend the knowledge of modern psychology about the non- and irrational 
aspects of motivation in order to analyze social processes. It follows also that any 
conceptual scheme which utilizes only the motivational elements of rational instrumental 
goal-orientation can be an adequate theory only of certain relatively specialized processes 
within the framework of an institutionally structured social system. 
The basic theorem of institutional integration like all such basic theorems, explains 
very little in detail. It provides rather a point of reference in relation to which it is 
possible in an orderly fashion to introduce successively the more detailed distinctions 
which are necessary before an adequate analysis of complex behavioral processes can be 
approached. The present exposition has chosen the deductive approach. Hence it should 
be clearly understood that empirical applications of the conceptual scheme will be 
possible only after a much more advanced stage of elaboration has been reached. 
There are above all two main directions in which this further elaboration must be 
carried out. In the first place institutionalized role behavior has been defined as behavior 
oriented to a value-orientation pattern or system of them. But there are many different 
kinds of such patterns and many different ways in which role-expectations may be  
 
11 Exact coincidence should be regarded as a limiting case like the famous frictionless machine. 
Though complete integration of a social system of motivation with a fully consistent set of cultural 
patterns is empirically unknown, the conception of such an integrated social system is of high 
theoretical significance. 
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structured relative to them. In place of this extremely general formula then it is necessary 
to put a differentiated account of at least some of the most important of these 
differentiated possibilities. Secondly, the oversimplified “ideal case” depicts complete 
motivational integration with a given value-pattern in the sense that this pattern as 
internalized is conceived to produce a need-disposition for conformity with it which 
insures adequate motivation for conforming behavior. This is obviously a nighly 
simplified model. Before approaching realistic levels it is essential to analyze the 
complications involved in the possibilities of alienative as well as conformative need-
dispositions, of conflicts and ambivalence and the like. An introduction to the elaboration 
of the cultural aspects of this problem will constitute the remainder of the present chapter. 
Before embarking on these considerations, however, a brief discussion is in order of 
the implications of this theorem of institutional integration for the articulation of social 
role structure with personality structure. The starting point is that stated above, that the 
role expectation is structured around a specific interaction context. To whatever extent 
adequate motivation for the fulfillment of such expectations is achieved, where a set of 
expectations for those playing the “same” role is uniform there is every reason why in 
personality terms the motivational significance of this uniform behavior cannot be the 
same for all the personalities concerned. Three crucial reasons for this may be cited. First, 
the role in question is only one of several in which each individual is involved. Though 
the expectations for each may be identical with respect to this role, the total role systems 
would only in a limiting case be identical. In each case then the particular role must fit 
into a different total system of role expectations. Since all the different roles in w hich an 
individual is involved are interdependent in his motivational system, the combination of 
motivational elements which produces the uniform behavior will be different for different 
personalities. 
Secondly, role-involvements do not exhaust the orientation or interest system of any 
personality. He has internal or “narcissistic” and individually creative foci of interest, and 
orientations to nonsocial aspects of his situation. Again for two different personalities 
only in a limiting case would these non-social aspects of the total orientation system be 
identical. Since this non-social sector of his personality is interdependent with the social 
sector, differences in this realm would have repercussions in the field of social 
motivation. Finally third, there is every reason to believe that it is strictly impossible for 
the distribution of constitutional differences in the population of a complex social system 
to correspond directly with the distribution of roles. Therefore the relation between the 
constitutional basis of role-behavior and the overt behavior will be different with 
different individuals in the same role. Fulfillment of a given set of expectations will 
impose a greater “strain” on one actor than on another. 
For all these reasons and possibly others, it is not possible to infer directly back and 
forth from personality structure to role behavior. The uniformities of role behavior as 
well as their differentiations are problematical even given the personality constitutions of 
the participants in the social system. Analysis of the motivational dynamics of role 
behavior therefore implies the formulation of mechanisms specific to the sociological 
problem level. It is not possible simply to “extrapolate” from the personality mechanisms 
of the one to those of the many as participants in the social system. This circumstance 
introduces frightful complications into the task of the sociologist, but unfortunately its 
implications cannot be evaded. 
The social system     28
These considerations should not, however, give the impression that what are ordinarily 
called “psychological” concepts have no relevance to sociological theory. Just what the 
scope of the term psychological should be is a question discussion of which may be 
deferred to the final chapter. But it is of the greatest importance that motivational 
categories should play a central role in sociological theory. Essentially the dynamic 
elements of personalities and of social systems are made up of the same “stuff,” This 
material must, however, conceptually be differently organized for the purposes of 
analysis of the two types of system. 
§ THE POINTS OF REFERENCE FOR THE CLASSIFICATION OF 
INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS 
SO FAR in this chapter we have accomplished two important things. The first section 
outlined the basic functional problems of an ordered system of social relationships. This 
defined a set of “imperatives” which are imposed on the variability of social systems if 
the minimum conditions of stability are to be fulfilled. They will be of the first 
importance in setting the stage for analyzing the ranges of variation of social structures 
and the bases of their internal differentiation. Secondly, in the foregoing section we 
analyzed the nature of the most important structural unit of the social system, the status-
role, and showed the nature of the integration of the elementary components of action 
which was involved in it. 
The next step is to begin to lay the groundwork for dealing systematically with the 
differentiation of roles. This involves careful analysis of the points of reference with 
respect to which they become differentiated. For only with a systematic analysis of these 
points of reference is any orderly derivation of the bases and ranges of such 
differentiation possible. The analysis of such points of reference will have to proceed 
through several stages in the development of this and the following two chapters. 
It should be evident from the nature of the role as a unit that a most crucial structural 
focus of differentiation of role types is to be found in differentiations among the cultural 
patterns which are institutionalized in roles. But the classification of cultural patterns in 
the relevant respects cannot be carried out without relating it to the general system of 
points of reference which is inherent in the structure of action. Hence the present section 
will be concerned with that general system of points of reference in its relevance to the 
structuring of roles, that is, of social relationships. When this groundwork has been laid 
the analysis will proceed to consider the relevant differentiations between types of culture 
patterns themselves. Finally, from this will be derived a classification of general role- or 
institutionalization types, general, that is, in that it will distinguish components which 
enter into the role structure of any social system, but will not attempt to approach the 
problem of the determinants of the specific combinations in which they are put together 
to form a particular system, or type of system. 
First, as we saw in Chapter I, what we have called the primary points of reference for 
the organization of action-orientations, consist on the one hand of the three modes of 
motivational orientation, cognitive, cathectic and evaluative, and the basic 
differentiations in the structure of the situation. Of the latter the most important for 
present purposes is the distinction between social and non-social objects, the social being 
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those with which ego is in mteraction in the specifically social sense. In the non-social 
sphere, the case which is at present important is that of physical objects, since the cultural 
will presently be “pulled out” as it were and placed in a special position. The fundamental 
reason for this special treatment is that culture patterns have a dual relation to action, they 
may be objects of the situation or they may be internalized to become components of the 
actor’s orientation pattern. This peculiarity of culture is indeed the main basis for treating 
it in a special category, and for dealing with actor, situation and culture pattern, not only 
the first two. 
Since culture patterns may become internalized as part of the actor’s orientation 
system, the first basis of their differentiation which is relevant here is that according to 
their relation to the three basic orientation modes. There are those culture patterns which 
function primarily as symbolic forms for the organization of the actor’s cognitive 
orientation, those which serve a similar function in relation to the cathectic aspect of this 
orientation and finally those which mediate or structure his evaluative orientations. It 
should be remembered that these are analytically distinguished modes, all three of which 
are found in all concrete orientations to all objects. There is no such thing as a “purely” 
cognitive or cathectic orientation in the sense that in the first case there is no cathexis of 
an object or in the second no cognitive definition of the situation. 
However, there is such a thing as relative primacy of the different modes. Indeed in a 
structural sense the cultural aspect of this primacy is crucial because it defines the order 
of priorities in the relevance of the selective criteria in each primary type of orientation. 
This basis of classification yields three primary types of orientation, as distinguished 
from the modal aspects of all orientations. In the first type cognitive interests are primary, 
the salient orientation problem is a cognitive problem, and cathexes and evaluations are 
secondary to this cognitive interest. “Gratification” consists in a solution of the cognitive 
problem, in coming to fewow. In the second type cathectic interests are primary, the 
problem is one of “adjustment,” of attaining the appropriate gratificatory relation to the 
object. Cognitive and evaluative considerations are secondary and instrumental. 
Gratification is measured in affective or “emotional” terms. Finally in the third type 
evaluative interests have primacy. The problem here is the integration of the cognitive 
and cathectic factors involved. Gratification consists in the achievement of an integration 
which resolves or minimizes conflict, actual or anticipated. 
What defines each type is the combination of the primacy of one of the three modes of 
motivational orientation and the primacy of one type of culture pattern. Therefore from 
the same fundamental roots we derive both a typology of action orientations or interests 
and a typology of culture patterns. The three types on the cultural level are: 1) systems of 
cognitive ideas or beliefs; 2) systems of adjustive patterns or expressive symbols; and 3) 
systems of integrative patterns or value-orientation standards. 
The objects toward which any of the three types of interest is oriented, and in relation 
to which the corresponding types of culture pattern “define the situation” may be of any 
class, including the cultural. All three basic classes of objects present cognitive problems 
for solution, constitute basic possibilities for cathexis with selective problems of the 
patterning of the corresponding adjustments, and present problems for evaluation. Social 
objects are, however, particularly strategic in this respect because of the complementary 
character of the orientation process and patterning. Perhaps this special significance of 
social objects can be put in terms of the paramount significance of evaluation and hence 
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of the evaluative primacy which is present in both motivational orientation and culture in 
the context or social relationships. This in turn derives from the double contingency of 
interaction which has been discussed above. Essentially this double contingency 
introduces an extra hazard of conflict which makes adherence to relatively specific 
evaluative standards a paramount condition of order. 
A further differentiation of the organization of action occurs when the time dimension 
is taken into account. Action may be oriented to the achievement of a goal which is an 
anticipated future state of affairs, the attainment of which is felt to promise gratification; 
a state of affairs which will not come about without the intervention of the actor in the 
course of events. Such instrumental or goal-orientation introduces an element of 
discipline, the renunciation of certain immediately potential gratifications, including that 
to be derived from passively “letting things slide” and awaiting the outcome. Such 
immediate gratifications are renounced in the inter-est of the prospectively larger gains to 
be derived from the attainment of the goal, an attainment which is felt to be contingent on 
fulfillment of certain conditions at intermediate stages of the process. 
In these terms instrumental orientation may be interpreted to be aspecial case of 
evaluative primacy and therefore such action belongs to the third type of action-
orientation. It involves the givenness of a goal, but given the goal, the evaluative 
selection gives primacy to cognitive considerations; that is, knowledge of the conditions 
necessary to attain the goal over immediate cathectic interests, defined as interests in 
taking advantage of the immediately available gratification opportunities in the 
meantime, even though they might interfere with the attainment of the goal. But in spite 
of the cognitive primacy of instrumental orientation, this differs from the case of the 
primacy of the cognitive interest as such in that in addition to the cognitive interest itself, 
there is the interest in the attainment of the given goal. 
There is a corresponding type on the adjustive side which may be called expressive 
orientation. Here the primary orientation is not to the attainment of a goal anticipated for 
the future, but the organization of the “flow” of gratifications (and of course the warding 
off of threatened deprivations). This also is a version of evaluative primacy, but with the 
relationship of the two elementary components reversed. Given the cognitive definition of 
the situation the primacy is cathectic. The “burden of proof” is on the side of the 
contention that a given gratification will upset the expressive order whereas in the 
instxumental case it is the other way around, the burden of proof is on the side that a 
given gratification will not interfere with attainment of the goal. This secondary type 
differs from the type of primacy of cathectic interests as such in the primary classification 
in that the orientation is not to the specific adjustment problem as such, but on a higher 
level of the organization of action, to an evaluative order among gratification-
potentialities. 
Hence just as there may be an authentic system of instrumental values, so there may in 
this sense be an authentic system of expressive values, that is, the definition of an order in 
which gratification-interests have primacy, but nevertheless an order which organizes the 
different components of action-orientation in determinate relations to each other.  
There is a third logical possibility of the structuring of order, namely that in which 
neither cognitive nor cathectic but evaluative interests themselves have primacy. In so far 
as this is the case, the focus is on the system of order itself, not on the goals transcendent 
to it nor on the gratification-interests of the actor. This may be called the “moral” aspect 
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of the ordering of action and the cultural values which have primacy in relation to it, 
moral values. This integrative focus may be relative to the integrative problems of any 
system or sub-system of action. In general terms, however, it is important to distinguish 
the two principal foci, the integrative aspects of personality and those of social systems. 
The social system focus (including of course any sub-system, i.e., collectivity) may be 
called the “relational” orientation of action while that to the integration of personality 
may be called the “ego-integrative.” This is of course of paramount significance in 
relation to the system of social relationships because of the very special importance of the 
element of order which has several times been mentioned. 
Indeed it is this, in a sense “derivative,” element of evaluation and of cultural value-
patterns which is brought into play with institutionalization. Institutionalization 
contributes a “superadded” element in addition to the primary value-orientations of the 
actors, which is integrative for a specifically social aspect of the ordering of action. For, 
because of the complementarity of expectations, the significance of an actor’s action can 
never be evaluated solely in terms of his “personal” values independently of the relational 
system in which he is implicated. His action orientations, that is, the selections he makes 
among alternatives, inevitably impinge on the “personal” interests of the other actors with 
whom he is in interaction, and of the collectivities of which he is a member, so far as 
these interests cannot be distributively discriminated. To the extent to which his 
“responsibility” for these other and collectivity defined interests is evaluated, the actor is 
concerned with a “moral” problem. The value-orientation patterns which define his 
orientation are moral values. The type of action where moral considerations have primacy 
in the social context is that where the actor is in a role of specific responsibility for the 
interests of a collectivity. But even where this is not the case the moral aspect is a highly 
important aspect or component of the orientation of actors in social roles gen-erally, 
because it defines the institutional limits of permissiveness for action. 
§ TYPES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION RELATIVE TO THE 
SOCIAL SYSTEM 
THERE are, as we have seen, certain common features of the phenomenon of 
institutionalization of cultural patterns wherever it occurs, by virtue of which these 
patterns become integrated with the motivational interests of individual actors. The 
distinctions which have been made in the preceding section, however, give us a basis for 
differentiating three different modes or types of institutionalization in terms of their 
different relationships to the structure of the social system itself. 
It has been made clear above that institutionalization itself is in the nature of the case 
an evaluative phenomenon, a mode of the organization of the system of action. Therefore 
the patterns which are institutionalized in the nature of the case involve an element of 
value-orientation on the social system level, that is, they involve moral commitments on 
the part of the actors in the socialintegrative as distinguished from the ego-integrative 
sense. But institutionalized value-patterns may still be classified in terms of different 
modes of relation of the commitments in question to the social relationship system itself. 
The social system is, as we have seen, essentially a network of interactive 
relationships. The most central institutions therefore are those directly constitutive of the 
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patterning of these relationships themselves through the definition of the statuses and 
roles of the parties to the interactive process. This first category will hence be called 
relational institutions. Secondly, particular actors, individual or collective, act in terms of 
interests which may to a greater or less degree be independent of the moral-integrative 
patterning of the social system, i.e., the overall collectivity itself. Hence in terms of 
collectivity-integration the functional problem in social system terms is regulation of the 
pursuit of these interests rather than constitutive definition of the goals and means. 
Instrumental, expressive and ego-integrative interests may be involved in any 
combination. But there are distinct problems of institutionalization in this area. This class 
of institutions will be called regulative. Finally there is a third class, still more peripheral 
to the social relationship structure as such. This is the case wnere the content of the 
institutions concerned consists only of patterns of cultural orientation as such, not directly 
of commitments to overt action. It is a question of beliefs, of particular systems of 
expressive symbols, or even of patterns of moral value-orientation when only 
“acceptance” rather than commitment in action is involved. These will be called cultural 
institutions. Each of the three classes will be briefly commented upon. 
The nature and significance of relational institutions must be understood in terms of 
the fundamental paradigm of social interaction, and the way in which the theorem of 
institutional integration has been derived from that. We have seen that such institutional 
integration in terms of the internalization of common value-patterns is a condition of the 
stability of the interaction process. But further specification of this condition leads us to 
see that the content of the common patterns of value-orientation must be such that the 
reciprocal orientations of the interacting actors will mesh with each other. There is a 
variety of different patterns according to which such meshing is conceivable, but in any 
given system of interactive relationships the patterns must have been selected from 
among these possibilities in such a way as to be compatible with the stability of the 
interaction process. 
The content of these value-orientation patterns will be discussed in the following 
section. They center about the fundamental possibilities of organizing the mutual 
attitudes of actors to each other, which means essentially selection from among the 
inherent possibilities of mutual orientation. 
These relational institutions are of course differentiated both for different roles within 
the same social system and for different social systems; these differentiations will be 
analyzed in subsequent chapters. But essentially they constitute the structural core of the 
social system, and the institutionalization of the value-orientation patterns concerned is 
the primary mechanism of the stabilization of the social system itself. 
By virtue of the internalization of these primary value-orientation patterns, certain 
fundamental components of the need-disposition structure and hence of the interests of 
the actors in a social system are determined. But these need-dispositions most directly 
integrated with the relational structure are not exhaustive of the needs and interests of 
individual actors. The latter have interests which within limits may vary independently of 
the relational structure as such, with respect to whicn the basic institutional patterns of 
the social system are conditional rather than constitutive. This is, as noted above, true of 
all the basic types of interests, the instrumental, the expressive and the ego-integrative. 
The obverse of the conditional significance of such patterns for the action of the 
individual (and the sub-collectivity) is their regulative significance from the point of view 
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of the social system. There are two primary aspects of this regulative function of 
institutions. First they concern the definition of the value-standards according to which 
the directions of acceptable activity in pursuit of “private” interests are defined. They 
constitute an element in the definition of goal orientations. Secondly, they concern 
definition of the limits to the acceptable choice of means or other action procedures in 
pursuit of the realization of the goals and values in question. 
This may first be illustrated for the instrumental case. In contemporary American 
society the pursuit of financial profit is sanctioned as a type of goal appropriate for either 
an individual, or a certain type of collectivity, for example, a “business firm,” to pursue. 
On the other hand according to the values of socialism this is not treated as a legitimate 
direction of pursuit of interests, or at least only within much narrower limits. But even 
within our own “business economy” there is specification in value-terms of the technical 
production goals with which the profit interest may legitimately be tused. Many things 
for which there might well be a market may either not be produced at all for profit, for 
example, certain types of morally censorable entertainment, or only under varying 
degrees of strictness of regulation, as in the case of weapons or certain public utility 
services. Thus in the sense of selection of goals within the sphere of “private” interest-
oriented activity, there is a set of institutionalized limitations of the pursuit of goals and 
of the conditions under which they may be pursued. Essentially the same type of 
considerations is involved in relation to the selection of means with respect to the pursuit 
of private interests. Most notable are the limitations placed on the choice of means as 
they involve the interests of others. The most general formula concerns the exclusion or 
strict regulation of attaining a goal by the exercise of force or fraud upon others. But in 
many societies there are still more radical limitations on individual “freedom” imposed, 
for example in our own, the prohibition that anyone should by contract infringe not only 
the personal freedom of others but his own; no matter how advantageous the “bargain” 
offered, a man may not sell himself into slavery. 
There is a similar set of regulative institutions relative to expressive interests. 
Expressive activities are, as we shall see, not cast directly into the means-end form as is 
the case with the instrumental. Hence the distinction between goals and means is not so 
important. But in part such institutions regulate expressive activities by specifying the 
legitimate relationships and contexts for them. Thus with respect to erotic activities, 
incest and homosexuality are drastically tabooed in most societies, and normal 
heterosexual activity is regulated both by selection of partner (e.g., within marriage) and 
by occasion (e.g., the requirement of privacy). Similarly aggressive feeling toward others 
may in general be expressed only within strictly defined limits, and many types of 
aggression are almost wholly tabooed. Obviously the killing of members of the in-group 
must be forbidden and drastically punished in every society, except under very special 
conditions. 
Essentially the same, finally, is true of ego-integrative orientations. One of the most 
familiar examples is the fact that, in our society, the institutions of religious toferation 
regulate the pursuit of religiously founded moral interests so far as they are not 
commonly shared in the society as a whole. The members of denominational groups may 
act upon their religious convictions only so far as they do not infringe the regulative 
norms in other respects (e.g., norms defining standards of decency—hence the difficulty 
of tolerating the Dokhubors) and so far as they do not infringe on the rights of others to 
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their share of religious freedom, for example by using the role of teacher in a public 
school to attempt to indoctrinate children with a special religious point of view. 
There is in a social system a gradual transition between its relational and its regulative 
institutions rather than a rigid line. All social action involves relationships and mutuality 
of orientation. Furthermore it is a functional requirement of the culturally integrative 
aspect of the social system that there should be a degree of consistency in the value-
patterns which have been institutionalized in both spheres. The distinction is essentially 
in terms of the functional relation to the integration of the social system, The greater the 
degree to which interests acquire independence relative to the main institutionalized 
value system, the greater the importance of the regulative functions of the institutional 
structure. This distinction between spheres of permissiveness for private interests and of 
collectivity-obligations is of such fundamental importance that it must be conceptualized 
as part of the fundamental value-pattern system itself. The place of the distinction will be 
brought out in the following section. Regulative institutions are of particular significance 
wnere private interests become “ecologically” structured in market systems and power 
systems. These will be further analyzed in Chapters III, IV and V below. 
The distinction between patterns of value-orientation and the other components of the 
cultural tradition is in part one of degrees of commitment to the implications of the 
pattern for action. Evaluation is the integration of the components of orientation in a 
functioning whole. This functioning whole must include overt action. This is an essential 
part of the significance of what, in the last section, we have called the evaluative level of 
the organization of the components of action orientation, the types of action. Of the 
requisite levels of such evaluative integration, however, the highest is, as we have seen, 
the moral, because the scope of the evaluative integration is the broadest in that case. 
Short of this moral level of integration, however, there may be a mode of evaluative 
interest in cultural patterns which we may call that of acceptance as distinguished from 
commitment. This is perhaps most evident in the case of belief systems. We may accept a 
belief as “true” without it becoming integrated in the system of action in any other 
respect. This would be the case for example of the popularization of much of scientific 
knowledge for those who are not “professionally” involved with it, either as scientists, or 
as having special commitments in fields of its application. The same is true with respect 
to patterns of expressive symbolism We may assent to the validity of certain canons of 
taste without making a commitment to make conformity with them part of our own way 
of life. Thus we may “appreciate” works of art in this sense. The absence of commitment 
in this field is signalized by the possibility of being appreciative of different kinds of 
works of art which comply with incompatible standards. 
A more special case is that of the uninstitutionalized acceptance of moral standards. 
The essential point would seem to be that these standards are thereby put into the sphere 
of socially sanctioned (in the sense of permissible) “personal” morality. The most notable 
case is that of what may be called the “utopian” standards which are often current in a 
society. For example, in countries with a Christian tradition the ethic of the Sermon on 
the Mount is in this sense socially accepted. It is rather generally felt to be a higher 
standard than that currently institutionalized and anyone who actually lived up to it would 
be admired, though certainly not unanimously or without ambivalence. But clearly it is 
not institutionalized in the sense that literal conformity is expected in everyday affairs, 
and that he who does not “turn the other cheek” but resists aggression against him, is not 
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stigmatized by negative sanction, so long as his resistance is within certain limits. Indeed, 
the acceptance of this pattern is in conflict with other elements of our value system such 
as the obligation to “stand up for one’s rights,” so the situation is far from simple. But it 
is important to note the possibility of such acceptance of moral value-patterns without 
full institutionalization. 
The relations between belief systems and expressive symbols and the social system 
will be more fully discussed in Chapters VIII and IX below. Here it is sufficient to note 
that, though by itself acceptance of them does not necessarily involve direct 
commitments to action, in certain circumstances through institutionalization such a 
commitment may arise. The most familiar example is the institutionalization of belief, so 
that subscription to a system of belief becomes a criterion of loyalty to a collectivity, such 
as a religious group, There is room for wide variations in the extent to which, and the 
ways in which, this occurs. At one pole we may have the enforcement of detailed 
doctrinal conformity on pain of expulsion from the collectivity as in the case of the 
Catholic Church. At the other is the situation of “liberal” society where no specific 
beliefs are institutionalized. But here there are still institutionalized values relative to the 
belief system. There is an obligation to approach as closely as possible to rationality of 
belief, to be open-minded toward evidence and the like. It is not acceptable within the 
national collectivity to believe “anything one pleases.” For example, the prestige of 
educa-tion would not be understandable without this institutionalized attitude toward 
beliefs. 
The situation is similar with respect to expressive symbols. In some social systems, 
highly specific expressive symbols are positively institutionalized only within sub-
collectivities, such as specific rituals in specific denominational groups, and specific 
aesthetic commitments in specific circles of artistic enthusiasts. But in spite of the lack of 
institutionalization on a broad level of specific expressive symbols in our society, there 
are still broadly accepted canons of “good taste” which are integrated with the general 
system of expressive symbolism, and hence the reward system. 
Hence the cultural institutions of a social system are always present, though they are 
much more specifically defined and rigorously enforced in some social systems than in 
others. The distinction of these three main functional references of institutionalization 
will be used throughout the subsequent analysis. 
The series of distinctions of levels of commitments and their relation to integration 
and institutionalization which has been reviewed in the last two sections is rather 
complex. Hence an outline of the main categories is presented for convenience of 
reference. 
Outline of Modes and Types of Action-Orientation, Culture Patterns and 
Institutions 
A. Modes of Motivational Orientation of Action. 
1. Cognitive. 
2. Cathectic. 
3. Evaluative. 
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B. Modes of Value-Orientation of Action. 
1. Cognitive. 
2. Appreciative. 
3. Moral (system-integrative). 
a. Ego-integrative (personal). 
b. Collectivity-integrative (social-relational). 
C. Types of Culture Pattern. 
1. Belief Systems (primacy of cognitive significance). 
2. Systems of Expressive Symbolism (Cathectic primacy). 
3. Systems of Value-orientation Standards (Evaluative primacy). 
D. Types of Action-Interests (Primacy of one motivational mode combined with the 
corresponding type of culture pattern). 
1. Cognitive interests (in “knowing”).  
2. Adjustive interests (in securing gratification from objects). 
3. Integrative interests (in minimizing and resolving conflicts). 
E. Types of Evaluative Action-Orientation (Evaluative or integrative synthesis with 
primacy of one type of interest).  
1. Instrumental (given cathexis of a goal, cognitive primacy). 
a. Investigative (cognitive problem solution as the goal). 
b. Creative (new expressive symbolic forms as the goal). 
c. Applied (use of knowledge—hence primacy of cognitive in terest, in interest of 
any goal not defined under a or b). 
2. Expressive (“acting out” of a need-disposition in terms of a pattern of expressive 
symbolism). 
3. Moral. 
a. Ego-integrative. 
b. Collectivity-integrative 
F. Types of Institution, embodying value-orientation patterns. 
1. Relational institutions (defining reciprocal role-expectations as such, independent of 
interest content). 
2. Regulative institutions (defining limits of the legitimacy of“private” interest-pursuit 
with respect to goals and means).  
a. Instrumental (integration of private goals with common values, and definition 
of legitimate means). 
b. Expressive (regulating permissible expressive actions, situations, persons, 
occasions, and canons of taste). 
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c. Moral (defining permissible areas of moral responsibility to personal code or 
sub-collectivity). 
3. Cultural institutions (defining obligations to acceptance of culture patterns—
converting private acceptance into institutionalized commitment). 
a. Cognitive beliefs. 
b. Systems of expressive symbols. 
c. Private moral obligations. 
§ THE PATTERN-ALTERNATIVES OF VALUE-ORIENTATION AS 
DEFINITIONS OF RELATIONAL ROLE-EXPECTATION PATTERNS 
THE role-partner in a social relationship is a social object. To develop a systematic 
scheme of points of reference for the analysis of orientations in roles it is then essential 
first to analyze those basic alternatives of selection which are particularly significant in 
defining the character of relations to such a social object, and which are constitutive of 
the character of the relationship pattern itself rather than of its “content” in interest terms, 
its cultural or motivational aspects in any sense other than as constitutive of relational 
patterns. In other words the analysis of the differentiation of a social structure must start 
with the patterns which enter into its relational institutions. The following discussion is 
posited on the view that there is on a given level of generality a strictly limited and 
defined set of such alternatives, and that the relative primacies given to choices between 
them can be treated as constitutive of the pattern-ing of relational institutions.12 
It should be made as clear as possible exactly what the following discussion is 
attempting to do. We are concerned with the patterning of the collectivity-integrative sub-
type of the moral type of evaluative action-orientation (E-3-b in the outline). Within this 
we are concerned with analyzing the structure of an actor’s relations to social objects in 
order to identify the points of reference which define the strategically significant limits of 
variability of this category of orientations. We will bring out a limited number of such 
ranges which, in their simplest form, can be defined as polar alternatives of possible 
orientation-selection. These alternatives will be defined in terms of relative primacies 
among the types of orientation possibilities which have been discussed in previous 
sections. 
It should again be emphasized that we are here dealing with the foci for the patterning 
of relational institutions. We are therefore concerned with primacy relations among the 
possibilities of evaluative action-orientations and the correlative modes of value-
orientation, not with the types of interest or with culture-pattern types as such. The first 
problem then is that of primacy relations as between instrumental, expressive and moral 
orientations (including the sub-types of the latter). In motivational terms it may be 
presumed that the “ultimate” interest of any actor is in the optimization of gratification.  
 
12 A more extensive discussion of thc following conceptual scheme will be found in Values, 
Motives, and Systems of Action, Chapter I. 
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The most direct path to gratification in an organized action system is through 
expressive orientations; hence relative to the expressive, both the instrumental and the 
moral modes of orientation impose renunciations or discipline. The social object is 
always actually and potentially to some degree an object of cathexis.  
Hence in patterning the orientation to that object it is always a problem whether, in 
certain relevant respects, expressive orientation in terms of relatively immediate 
gratification interests is permissible, or is to be renounced in favor of instrumental or 
moral, that is certain types of evaluative interests. The first alternative may be defined as 
that of “affectivity,” the second of “affective neutrality.” This basic alternative is 
grounded in the nature of action systems. No actor can subsist without gratifications, 
while at the same time no action system can be organized or integrated without the 
renunciation of some gratifications which are available in the given situation. The 
polarity of affectivity-neutrality formulates the patterning out of action with respect to 
this basic alternative, in direct orientations to the social objects with whom an actor 
interacts in a role, and in its relevance to the structure of the expectations of his action in 
that role. 
This first alternative-pair focuses on the permissibility or non-permissibility of 
gratifying the actor’s immediate adjustive interests by expressive activity. The second 
concerns the same intrinsic problem approached from the other end, as it were, namely 
the permissibility of his pursuing any interests “private” to himself13 as distinguished 
from those snared with the other members of the collectivity in which he plays a role. 
Thus not only his expressive, but his instrumental and ego-integrative orientations and 
the corresponding interests are defined as “private” in so far as they do not coincide with 
those recognized as collective by the collectivity. A role, then, may define certain areas 
of pursuit of private interests as legitimate, and in other areas obligate the actor to pursuit 
of the common interests of the collectivity. The primacy of the former alternative may be 
called “self-orientation,” that of the latter, “collectivity-orientation.” 
Both these alternative-pairs raise an important problem of interpretation. It may rightly 
be said that just as every actor must both have immediate gratifications and accept 
discipline, so must every role both provide for pursuit of private interests and ensure the 
interests of the collectivity. This circumstance is not a paradox, because, defined as a 
matter of orientation-primacy in role-expectations these alternatives apply to specifically 
relevant selection-contexts, not necessarily to every specific act within the role. Thus 
where effective instrumental pursuit of a certain class of goals is institutionalized as part 
of the role, only the gratification of expressive interests whicn might interfere with the 
attainment of these goals must be subordinated; the role is defined in affectively neutral 
terms in this context but not necessarily in all others. In the relevant choice-dilemma one 
alternative is prescribed. But this prescription is always relative to a specified context in 
which the dilemma arises. Similarly we would only speak of a role as collectivity-
oriented if the pursuit of certain private interests which were relevant possibilities in the 
given type of situation was subordinated to the collective interest. Thus the public official 
has an interest in his own financial well-being, 
13 This includes the interests of a sub-collectivity as actor relative to a more indusive collectivity. 
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which for example he may take into account in deciding between jobs, but he is expected 
not to take this into consideration in his specific decisions respecting public policy where 
the two potentially conflict. This is the subordination of an instrumental (or ego-
integrative) personal value. 
The first two alternative pairs have been concerned with the expression-discipline 
problem which confronts all action systems on two levels: first, the obligation to 
acceptance of discipline by the individual actor vis-à-vis his expressive interests, the 
gratification of which would, in this role context, be felt to be disruptive; second the same 
dilemma reappears in relation to the pursuit of any sort of private interests, no matter how 
highly disciplined in a personality sense vis-à-vis the definition of obligations to the 
collectivity. Indeed, in this context often the most highly disciplined pursuit of private 
interests may be the most dysfunctional in collectivity terms. The third alternative pair 
concerns not subordination to vs. freedom from certain value standards whatever their 
content, but the type of valuestandard which is defined as relevant to the role-expectation. 
Here recourse must be had to primacy relations among the modes of value-orientation 
themselves, since these define types of standard by which action-orientations are 
evaluated. For this purpose the moral category may be neglected since it is not an 
“autonomous” type, but concerns orientation to the integration of the action system, given 
commitment to the standards involved. Hence the basic alternative is between the 
primacy of cognitive and appreciative standards. What does this mean in the present 
context? 
Cognitive orientation is, it may be said, essentially orientation to the element of 
generalization in the object-world. Cathectic orientation on the other hand, is inherently 
particularized, to particular objects and ordered combinations of them. If generalization is 
paramount in cognitive orientation, then the standards characterized by cognitive primacy 
cannot be particular to the specific relational system (with non-social as well as social 
objects) in which the actor is involved. It transcends this relational context. Normatively 
its orientation is to universal canons of validity. 
In the case of cathectic orientation and the cognate modes of action- and value-
orientation, there is an inherently “subjective” reference to gratification-significance. But 
the gratificational significance of an orientation can never transcend the particular 
relational system of which it is a part. The standard must be couched in terms of 
significance for this particular actor in these particular relations with these particular 
objects. The primacy of cognitive values then may be said to imply a universalistic 
standard of role-expectation, while that of appreciative values implies a particularistic 
standard.14 In the former case the standard is derived from the validity of a set of 
existential ideas, or the generality of a normative rule, in the latter from the particularity 
of the cathectic significance of an object or of the status of the object in a relational 
system. Thus definitions of role-expectations in terms of a universally valid moral 
precept, e.g., the obligation to fulfill contractual agreements, an empirical cognitive 
generalization, or a selection for a role in terms of the belief that technical competence in 
the relevant respects will increase the effectiveness of achievement in the role, are  
 
14 The primacy of appreciative over cognitive standards in particularism means that generalization 
is relativized to the particular relational system. 
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universalistic definitions of roles. On the other hand definitions in such terms as “I 
must try to help him because he is my friend,” or of obligations to a kinsman, a neighbor, 
or the fellow-member of any solidary group because of this membership as such are 
particularistic. 
There is one common source of confusion in this field which must be cleared up at 
once. It derives from the fact that a particu-laristic role-obligation may be formulated in 
terms of a general rule in the sense that it states in general terms the particularistic 
obligations of all those in the relevant class of roles. Thus “honor thy father and thy 
mother” is stated as a general rule of morality. But it is its form that is general. The 
content of the obligation is particularistic, namely for each child, toward his particular 
parents. If the rule were, on the other hand, “pay honor to parents because of their quality 
of parenthood as sucli, regardless of whose parents they are,” it would be a universalistic 
norm. All norms are capable of generality of statement and application (though varying 
greatly in degree of generality). The question is whether or not a discrimination is made 
between those objects with which ego stands in a particularistic relationship and other 
objects possessing the same attributes. Such a discrimination is incompatible wifh the 
conception of a universalistic norm. If parenthood is the relevant attribute, then the norm, 
if it is universalistic, applies equally to all objects possessing that attribute. 
The first three alternative-pairs have been defined in terms of relative primacy 
relations of the orientational components of action, that is, with reference to ego as actor. 
In terms of primary functional significance for the patterning of role-orientations these 
three are exhaustive of the major possibilities, on the same level of generality. But they 
have not taken account of the total frame of reference. There remain alternatives with 
respect to the characteristics of social objects themselves, that is, from ego’s point of 
view of the alter in the complementary role-orientation structure or to ego himself as an 
object, and with reference to the scape of relevance of alter an an object. These contexts 
produce two further alternative-pairs. 
In both cases it is essential to strike just the right level of generality which is 
coordinate with that of the relevance of the first three pairs. Applying this criterion it 
seems that there is one dilemma which is of the most generalized significance in each 
context. With respect to characteristics of the object it is that of the focus on its qualities 
or attributes as distinguished from focus on its performances. “Performance” in this sense 
is a characteristic which, by definition, we have confined to the category of social 
objects. But the “alter” who is the complementary member of a reciprocal role-
orientation system is also by definition a social object, and therefore is characterized by 
performance. 
Orientation to the actor’s performance (which may be either ego’s or alter’s or both) 
means that the focus is on his achievement. The expectation is that the actor is committed 
to the achievement of certain goals or expressive performances and that expectations are 
oriented to his “effectiveness” or “success” in achieving them, hence that positive 
sanctions will reward such success and negative sanctions will ensue in case of failure to 
achieve. There are of course all manner of complications such as the definition of what 
constitute “extenuating circumstances,” but this is the major axis of the expectation 
structure. 
On the other hand, even though actors can and do perform in the above sense, the 
major focus of a particular role-expectation need not be on this performance. All objects 
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have attributes, they not only do this or that, but they are such and such. They have 
attributes of sex, age, intelligence, physical characteristics, statuses in relational systems, 
e.g., collectivity memberships. The focus of orientation then may be what the object is in 
this sense, e.g., that he is ego’s father, that he is a physician, or that he is over six feet 
tall. Such attributes or quality-complexes may be conditions of a variety of performances, 
for physical or social reasons, but even so the orientation focus may still be the quality as 
such. This may be the criterion for differentiation of treatment and of expectations of his 
behavior. 
This distinction has become current in the sociological literature in Linton’s terms of 
achieved and ascribed status and hence it seems advisable to adopt those terms here. 
Achievement-oriented roles are those which place the accent on the performances of the 
incumbent, ascribed roles, on his qualities or attributes independently of specific 
expected performances. 
The incidence of the alternative as between qualities and performances involves a 
further set of ramifications beyond the ascription-achievement distinction with reference 
to role-expectations, which because of their general importance in the theory of action 
may be brought to attention here. These concern its application to the definition of ideal 
states of affairs where they differ from a given initial state. Where performances are the 
focus of value-orientation the emphasis may be on the goal as the “expression,” as it 
were, of the valued achievement-process. On the other hand the valuation of the goal-
state as such may emphasize its qualities independently of the processes of its 
achievement. We shall see that this distinction is of considerable significance in defining 
different patterns of orientation to “ideal” states of affairs. 
The achievement-ascription alternative-pair concerns characteristics of the object 
which may be selected as the focus of orientation. There remains the question of the 
scope of ego’s “interest” in the object. It has been noted above how crucially important is 
the differentiation of modes of orientation of action and the corresponding differentiation 
of types of orientations in terms of primacies. But this differentiation has been treated in 
terms of the orientation of an actor taken as a point of reference without regard to the 
question of whether the different modes of orientation were segregated out in relation to 
different objects, or combined in orientation to the same object. This question of the 
relative incidence of “fusions” and “segregations” of action-orientation types will be seen 
to be of the greatest importance for the analysis of social structure. 
When many empirical differences are taken into account it will prove to be possible to 
derive very complex permutations and combinations in this respect. But on the present 
level of generality the starting point should again be the evaluative types of action-
orientation as such. Here a particular instrumental or expressive orientation or interest has 
a certain specificity such that is capable of clear analytical segregation from the other or 
from moral orientations. Hence one hom of the dilemma will be the definition of the role 
as orienting to the social object in specific terms, that is in terrns of a specific 
instrumental or expressive interest. This is, it will be noted, a definition of the scope of 
the object’s (alter’s) significance to ego. Since it is defined in terms of a moral value-
pattern it means that he is held to be entitled or even obligated to confine the relevance of 
this particular object or class of them within these limits. Hence the burden of proof rests 
on him who would suggest that ego has obligations vis-à-vis the object in question which 
transcend this specificity of relevance. 
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The alternative is to treat the object as significant in an indefinite plurality of specific 
orientation contexts. This always implies a 
moral element because the problem of evaluative integration of the ditferent 
components of the total orientation to the object is by definition involved. Conversely the 
binding together of such a plurality of such specific interests in a single object-relation 
always implies a moral component in the orientation (note, this may be only ego-
integrative, not relational. It does not imply consideration for the welfare of the object-a 
range of variation which is conceptualized in terms of self- vs. collectivity-orientation). 
Hence the clear antithesis of the specific, interest-segregated type of orientation is a 
diffuse mode, where the burden of proof is on the side of the exclusion of an interest or 
mode of orientation as outside the range of obligations defined by the role-expectation. 
This proof can be furnished by invoking an obligation nigher in a scale of evaluative 
priority. 
As in the cases of the other alternative-pairs it is essential here to keep in mind the 
relativity of this conceptualization. Like the others it applies at the choice-point to 
directions of orientation. It is a question at such a point of confining relevance and hence 
obligation to a specific interest (definable on various levels of generality) or of admitting 
the possible relevance in terms of integrative evaluation and subject to a priority scale, of 
any contingency which might arise. 
If the derivation of these five alternative pairs from possibilities of the combination of 
the basic components of the action system has been correct, if they are in fact all on the 
same level of generality and are exhaustive of the relevant logical possibilities on that 
level, they may be held to constitute a system. Then, on the relevant level which, as we 
shall see is only one which needs to be considered, their permutations and combinations 
should yield a system of types of possible role-expectation pattern, on the relational level, 
namely defining the pattern of orientation to the actors in the role relationship. This 
system will consist of thirty-two types, which may in turn be grouped into a smaller 
number of more fundamental ones. These problems will be taken up in the following 
chapter. 
For the convenience of the reader these five concept-pairs, which will be called the 
pattern variables of role-definition, may be schematically outlined as follows:  
I. The Gratification-Discipline Dilemma Affectivity vs. Affective Neutrality 
II. The Private vs. Collective Interest Dilemma Self-Orientation vs. Collectivity-
Orientation 
III. The Choice Between Types of Value-Orientation Standard Universalism vs. 
Particularism 
IV. The Choice between “Modalities” of the Social Object Achievement vs. Ascription 
V. The Definition of Scope of Interest in the Object Specificity vs. Diffuseness. 
That these five pattern variables are focused on the relational aspect of the role structure 
of the social system does not mean that they are irrelevant to the definition of the patterns 
of regulative and of cultural institutions. They cannot be, if only because of the element 
of consistency of pattern which must run throughout a system of value-orientations in a 
cultural tradition. But for us the system of relational institutions is the core of the social 
structure and it will facilitate development of the analysis to start from this core and work 
out from there. 
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The main body of the book thus falls into two principal parts. After the principal 
components of the social system have been outlined in Chapter II, the following three 
chapters, III–V are concerned with the elaboration of the analysis of social structure, 
pushing it to the point of considerable refinement of detail. Chapter VI, on the 
Mechanisms of Socialization then returns to the central paradigm of interaction. This and 
the following three chapters are mainly concerned with the elements of this paradigm as 
they are outlined in Chapter II. The refinements of the analysis of social structure 
developed in Chapters III to V are for the most part not directly used. 
It is suggested that the reader keep this clearly in mind as he proceeds, and keep 
continually referring back to the fundamental conceptual elements of Chapter II. It may 
well be that if he finds the elaborateness of Chapters III to V confusing he would be well 
advised to skim over them and resume his careful reading in Chapter VI, coming back to 
Chapters III to V after he has finished Chapter X.  
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III 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIAL 
SYSTEM, I: THE ORGANIZATION OF 
THE COMPONENTS INTO SUB-SYSTEMS 
 
THE two foregoing chapters have been designed to prepare the ground for the task of the 
present one. The first developed an oudine of the general frame of reference of action and 
showed the character of its components and of the types of system into which they are 
organized. The second carried this development further with reference to those features 
of action most directly relevant to the social system. It analyzed the basic functional 
problems and prerequisites of social systems, the points of reference relative to which 
their principal components must be analyzed, and the nature and place in the action 
scheme of those components themselves, the types of action-orientation of roles, 
institutions and their component value-patterns. We are now in a position to take a first 
major step toward showing how these components become organized to constitute a 
social system. 
We shall begin by analyzing certain features of what may be called the “relational 
context” of types of action-orientation relative to which these actions must be 
institutionalized. We have so far dealt with these crucial evaluative action-orientation 
types only in the context of particular roles, not in their combinations in differentiated 
reciprocal interaction systems. It is this step which must now be taken. After that we must 
go into further detail with respect to the analysis of the points of rererence which 
differentiate objects, that is, the differentiation of their ascriptive quality-com-plexes 
which are significant for role-structure, and of their achievement pattern-types. 
Then in the following chapter we shall place the results of this analysis into the setting 
of the major functional problem-foci of the social system which will be classified as the 
allocative and the integrative problems respectively, and will be further differentiated. 
Finally, then, we will be in a position to raise the question of the actual constitution of a 
systematically differentiated role-structure which is adequate to the functional 
requirements of a society. The starting point of this will be the treatment of the 
combinations of the values of the pattern variables which were put forward in the last 
main section of the foregoing chapter. These primary pattern elements of role structure 
will be seen to be of necessity unevenly distributed in different parts of the same social 
system. Finally, the primary patterns will be related to further “adaptive” structures which 
bridge the gap, as it were, between the rather abstract formalism of the primary patterns 
and the more specific adjustment problems of action in particular situations within the 
relevant sector of the social system. It will be shown that from these same starting points 
it is possible to carry out the analysis both of the bases of internal differentiation within 
the structure of a given social system, and of the definition of the ranges of variation 
between social systems. 
§ THE STRUCTURE OF THE RELATIONAL CONTEXT OF 
EVALUATIVE ACTION-ORIENTATIONS 
THE types of action-orientation are, it will be remembered, the instrumental, the 
expressive and the moral. In the last chapter we considered them only in terms of their 
relevance to the structure of a particular role, not of systems of roles. We will now 
proceed to this step. It will simplify matters to take the cases of systems of each of the 
first two types in turn by itself before attempting to put them together into a composite 
system. We will start with the instrumental. 
Fortunately a long tradition of thought has worked out most of the problems in this 
area and all that is necessary is to take over the results and place them in the proper 
setting. The key concept is that of the “division of labor” as developed by Adam Smith 
and his successors in utilitarian, especially economic theory. The starting point is the 
conception of a given actor, ego, as instrumentally oriented to the attainment of a goal, a 
goal which may be of any desired degree of specificity or generality. The relational 
problems enter in when alter becomes significant not only passively as a means or 
condition of the attainment of ego’s goal, but his reactions become a constitutive part of 
the system which includes ego’s own goal-striving. 
If we conceive a system of such instrumentally oriented interaction, the simplest case 
is that of reciprocity of goal orientation, the classical economic case of exchange, where 
alter’s action is a means to the attainment of ego’s goal, and vice versa, ego is a means to 
the attainment of alter’s. Exchange in this sense may be confined to a highly ad hoc 
particular transaction, but it may become elaborated into a highly organized and durable 
system of interaction. As this occurs ego may become specialized in the process of 
attaining his own goals by the “production” of means to the attainment of the goals of one 
or a class of alters. Reciprocally the attainment of his own goals is enmeshed in 
expectations of (to him) instrumentally significant results of the actions of these alters. 
The attainment of ego’s goals then becomes dependent on the relational context in a 
double way. What he gets depends not only on what he himself “produces” in the sense 
in which this is independent of what the alters do, but on the “terms of exchange,” that is, 
the patterning of his relationship in certain respects to the relevant alters. There are, in 
turn, two aspects of this relational system: first, the regulation of structuring (through 
settlement of terms) of the “outflow” process which may be called that of “disposal” of 
the product of his efforts to a class of alters; and second, the regulation of the “inflow” 
process, the settlement of the terms on which he receives contributions to his own goals 
from alters, which may be called his “remuneration.” Of course in a single ad hoc 
transaction the two will coincide. Even in a complex reciprocal relationship between two 
actors they may continue to coincide. But it is a critically important feature of the further 
differentiation of action sys-tems that they need not do so; the recipients for the disposal 
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of ego’s “products” may be entirely distinct from the sources of his remuneration. Of 
course, if this is the case, there must be some mechanism by which the two aspects of the 
total interaction system in which ego is involved are adjusted to each other. The most 
conspicuous such mechanism operates through the ramifications of a system of monetary 
exchange. To account for such a mechanism would introduce additional steps into the 
differentiation of the system which need not be considered at this point of our analysis. 
Two centrally significant foci of the problem of order in social systems are brought to 
light immediately by the foregoing considerations. First, and most obvious, is that of the 
regulation of the settlement of the terms of exchange. Because some of what every man 
does is potentially a means (including hindrance) to the attainment of every other man’s 
goals, it is vitally important to the conception of social order that there should be 
mechanisms through which the terms on which ego will or will not make his “services” 
available to alter are setded in such a way as to be compatible with the conditions of 
stability of the system. This is the famous Hobbesian aspect of the problem of order. 
Somewhat less obvious is the fact, secondly, that for there to be exchange there must 
be “somediing” which changes hands in the course of a transaction, something which is 
“disposed of” and “received.” This something may be control of a physical object in 
certain respects, including power to destroy it (e.g., food through “consumption”). It may 
be an agreement to do certain things in the future, positive as contributing to alter’s goals, 
or negative as refraining from interfering with alter’s goals. This somediing will be called 
a possession. There are cogent reasons why the structure of the “rights” defining the 
conditions under which possessions are “held” and may be disposed of cannot in a 
complex social system be setded ad hoc as part of each exchange transaction. A stable 
system of exchange presupposes a priori settlement among possible alternative ways of 
defining such rights, that is, an institutionalization of them. The institutionalizadon of 
rights in such possessions is, in one major aspect, what we mean by the institution of 
property. 
These are the most elementary features of a relational complex of instrumental 
orientations, but two further aspects of differentia-tion are so important that they need to 
be brought in at this point. First, any elaborated system of continuous and specialized 
instrumentally oriented activity, especially with the degree of specialization which 
precludes self-consumption and therefore is inevitably enmeshed in a relational context, 
requires “facilities” which extend beyond those features of the situation available at any 
time on a purely ad hoc basis. Facilities, i.e., materials, equipment, premises and the like 
are possessions in a special mode of significance to action; they are possessions devoted 
to the “production” of further “utilities,” that is, destined to be used as means to some 
future goal rather than as objects of immediate gratification. Regulation of rights to 
facilities or of access to them, and of the possibilities of the acquisition of these rights 
through exchange is therefore another of the fundamental functional problem foci of a 
relational system of instrumental orientation. 
Finally, the elementary paradigm provides only for that type of instrumental activity 
which ego can, to the point of exchange, carry out entirely alone. But very generally, the 
exchangeable entity, the significant “product” or possession, is not the product of a single 
actor’s activity, but of the cooperation of a plurality of individual actors. Cooperation is a 
closer mode of the integration of instrumental activities than is exchange. It means the 
meshing of activities or “contributions” in such a way that the outcome is a unit which as 
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a unit can enter into the exchange process. (Of course the terms on which cooperative 
relationships are entered into or continued may also be settled by an exchange 
transaction, a “contract.”) According to the nature of the cooperative goal, the “unit 
product,” and of other features of the system of cooperative activity (e.g., the numbers 
involved), the imperatives or a functioning process of cooperative activity, will differ. 
But they are always more stringent than those imposed on a system of exchange 
relationships. A system of cooperative relationships may be called an organization. 
A given actor, ego, then is within an “instrumental complex” as it may be called, 
confronted with four major types of problems of the ordering of his relations to the 
significant alters. There is, first, the problem of “disposal,” the settlement of terms on 
which his non-self-consumed product is made available to others. Secondly, there is the 
problem of “remuneration,” of settlement of terms on which he receives the significant 
products of the activities of other actors (individually or collective as organizations). 
Third there is the problem of his access to facilities, and the regulation of his relations to 
competitors, actual and potential, for use of the same facilities. Underlying all three 
problems of exchange is that of the definition of rights in possessions and their limits, and 
of their differentiation according to classes of possessions. Finally there is the problem of 
his relationships of cooperation with others in the same “productive” process, which may 
include assumption of authority over some others and/or acceptance of subjection to the 
authority of others. These elements and their relations are diagrammatically represented 
as follows:  
 
These relational problem-contexts may in any way be fused with each other in the same 
concrete relationships, or segregated, in that they involve different relations to different 
alters with different roles of and vis-à-vis ego. The ways in which these differentiations 
take place or fail to do so provide highly important criteria for classification of different 
types of social structure, and will be analyzed below. 
This paradigm also provides important points of reference for analyzing the 
organization and dynamics of complex social systems. The access to “markets” and to 
facilities are among the most important conditions for the pursuit of any type of 
instrumentally oriented activity the more so the more specialized, while the 
“remuneration” receivable through the relational system is obviously of crucial 
importance to the motivation of such a type of instrumental activity. 
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What we have done in the foregoing pages is to describe, from the point of view of 
ego’s role taken as point of reference, the main outline of the structure of a differentiated 
system of instrumentally oriented activity, involving an indefinite plurality of interacting 
actors. In so far as such a system develops, the institutional patterns of the component 
roles must do more than describe the value-orientations of the component actors. They 
constitute, rather, a set of value-orientation patterns relative to a specifically structured 
interaction situation. They define expectations of ego’s action as follows: 1) in the 
processes of fulfilling his own technical goals; 2) in exchange relations with a series of 
alters relative to disposal, remuneration and facilities; and 3) in cooperative relations with 
alters. (Each of these can of course be further differentiated.) In such a system, 
concretely, there is necessarily a relational orientation component and, so far as the 
interests of the actors are not all interests in common goals, a regulative component, 
especially with reference to the settlement of terms and to rights in possessions. There 
may also be elements of cultural institutionalization, e.g., with reference to common 
beliefs. 
The specifically sociological problem focus with reference to such a sub-system of 
social action concerns the kinds of value-orientations which are institutionalized in it, and 
the degrees to which and ways in which they are institutionalized to define the roles of 
the component actors. It concerns the mechanisms of learning of these patterns, and of 
social control where tendencies to deviance from them exist. With special reference to 
these factors thus the concern of sociological analysis with such a system is with their 
bearing on processes within the system, e.g., recruitment and status-chahge of personnel; 
and with processes of change in the institutional structure of the system itself, e.g., further 
elaboration of the division of labor. 
The same paradigm, however, underlies certain problem-areas of other social sciences, 
notably economics and political science. The economic problem is two-fold. On the one 
hand, within a given institutional role-structure, it concerns the processes of allocation of 
resources, i.e., “labor power” and facilities within the system. On the other hand, it 
concerns in motivational terms the processes of balancing advantages and cost with 
special reference to the settlement of terms and within a given role-structure and a given 
set of power conditions. Political science, on the other hand, is concerned with the power 
relations within the institutional system and with a broader aspect of settlement of terms. 
These problems will be further discussed in the next chapter after a more extensive 
groundwork for them has been laid. 
There is a closely parallel paradigm of the relational context involved in a 
differentiated system of expressively oriented actions. In this case, it will be remembered, 
the motivational significance of the action is given in the immediate gratification of a 
need-disposition, that is, through the action itself, not through the attainment of a goal 
beyond the particular action-process. Such orientation is, of course, organized in terms of 
a cultural pattern of value-orientation as well as of its motivational significance, hence it 
is expressive, not only cathectic. 
The type of case of motivational orientation which is most directly relevant here is that 
where alter is a cathected object and this cathectic significance is the primary focus of the 
orientation on the motivational side. Here ego has a problem homologous with that of 
disposal, namely, that of ensuring alter’s “acceptance” of his orientation, of his 
willingness to serve as an object of the relevant type of expressive interest on ego’s part. 
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This may be called the problem of alter’s “receptiveness” to ego’s orientation. It only 
arises, of course, when from ego’s point of view alter is an “appropriate” object for him.1 
Secondly, however, expressive interaction is generally not a “one-way street.” Alter is 
not only a passively receptive object but the gratification of ego’s need-disposition may 
depend on an active “response” from alter. It may not, for example, be enough to “love” 
alter as an object; it may be very important to “be loved” in return. Response, thus, would 
seem to be homologous with the remunetation aspect of an instrumental system. 
It is probable that the psychological characteristics of expressive interests are such that 
more generally than in the instrumental case receptiveness and response are and must be 
found in the same social object. Nevertheless differentiation in this respect is by no 
means unknown even in an intimately “affective” object relationships. The most familiar 
case perhaps is the case of needing to be loved without the capacity for loving in return. 
But the separation of the two elements in relation to two different objects is certainly by 
no means unknown to clinical experience.1a Furthermore it must not be forgotten that the 
category of expressive orientation is by no means confined to such intimate relationships. 
It may, for example, be a matter of attitudes toward collectivities. 
Expressive action is not oriented to the attainment of a goal outside the immediate 
action situation and process itself in the same sense as is instrumental action. But this 
does not mean that objects in the situation other than the immediate object of focus are 
indifferent from the expressive point of view. On the contrary an indefinite range of 
situational objects may be significant to ego as objects of cathexis and as expressive 
symbols which provide an appropriate context or “occasion” for the expressive activity. 
This includes such matters as the appropriateness of time and place for an expressive 
activity, the significance of surrounding physical objects, including the embodiments of 
cultural symbolism, e.g., works of art, the presence and role of third parties and the 
relation to collectivities as social objects. Hence the selection and regulation of the 
components of the occasion in this sense constitutes a third major problem area of ego’s 
relational system of expressive orientation. The various objects in and aspects of the 
situation apart from the focal object are symbolically integrated with that focal object and 
its significance in ego’s orientation patterning, and hence there is a need to have them 
“fit” with the central expressive interest. In one important aspect this may be spoken of as 
the need for an integrated “style” patterning for the context of expressive activities. 
It should be quite clear that the same concrete objects of the situation may function 
both as objects of instrumental orientation and as cathectic-expressive symbolic objects. 
In particular, the processes of acquisition of objects which are significant in the 
expressive context are generally best analyzed in instrumental terms, not as themselves 
processes of expressive activity.  
1 Of course, some expressive orientations do not require receptiveness, e.g., a “hero” may be 
“worshipped” without even being aware of the identity of many of his admirers. 
1a The problem of the interpretation of ambivalent orientations toward the same object introduces 
complications which will be taken up later. Cf. Chapter VII. 
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Finally, there is also a clear expressive homologue of the instrumental category of 
cooperation in the cathectic-expressive aspect of ego’s integration with alter; where this 
integration is institutionalized we will call it solidarity,2 short of this it will be called 
loyalty. There are two aspects of this loyalty. In the purely cathectic sense alter may be an 
object of attachment. This means that the relation to alter is the source, not merely of 
discrete, unorganized, ad hoc gratifications for ego, but of an organized system of 
gratifications which include expectations of the future continuance and development of 
alter’s gratificatory significance. In the normally integrated case, as between individual 
actors, there would, of course, be a mutuality of this attachment significance. What the 
attachment does is to organize a plurality of need-dispositions in relation to a particular 
object into an integrated system. 
The second aspect of the loyalty derives from the fact that the attachment is organized 
in terms of a cultural pattern which, in the first instance, will be a pattern of expressive 
symbols, the meanings of which are shared between ego and alter. This will involve 
value-orientations at least on the level of appreciative standards; whether it will go 
beyond that to involve a moral level of value-orientation is an open question. It will do so 
if the loyalty between ego and alter becomes institutionalized and is thus shifted to 
solidarity. Thus between two lovers a system of shared erotic symbolism will be 
developed which is an inherent aspect of the relationship and a condition of its 
integration.3 When institutionalized in the form of marriage, however, this symbolism 
acquires the further dimension of moral sanction and obligation in terms of the common 
value system of the society. A relationship of expressive loyalty then organizes a set of 
need-dispositions in an attachment to the particular object and integrates it with a system 
of commonly shared expressive symbols which are appropriate to the cathectic interests 
in question. It is this loyalty integrated with a social object which is the homologue of 
cooperation in the instrumental case. 
By extension of this conception of expressive loyalty between individual actors we derive 
the further important concept of the loyalty of the individual actor to a collectivity of 
which he is a member. The collectivity may be treated as an object of attach- ment, as 
when we speak of “love of country” in what is clearly more than a metaphorical sense. In 
such a case it is clearly the collectivity, not its members as individuals, which is the 
significant object. It is quite possible to love one’s country and at the same time to be 
highly selective about loving one’s fellow-countrymen as individuals. By essentially the 
same token, attachment to a collectivity is integrated with a system of expressive 
symbolism which in its application to ego signifies membership, status within the 
collectivity and perhaps meritorious services on behalf of the collectivity. On the side of 
the collectivity itself there are symbols such as flags, emblems, buildings and leaders in 
their expressive capacity which are foci for the expressive orientation of the members of 
the collectivity. 
In the nature of the case the relation between an individual actor and a collectivity in 
terms of expressive loyalty cannot be symmetrical in the same sense as that between two 
2 See below, pp. 96 ff. 
3 See Chapter IX below for a further analysis of this problem. 
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individual actors. A collectivity can act only through the actions of its members, 
particularly those in roles of responsibility. It does not itself have affective “feelings” 
toward its members, it can only symbolize the common feelings of its members. It is of 
the highest importance to be clear about these fundamental differences between a 
collectivity and an individual actor. Nevertheless the conception of attachment to and 
loyalty to a collectivity is an exceedingly important tool of sociological analysis. It is the 
focus for the analysis of the cathectic-expressive relation of the individual to the group. 
There are, furthermore, homologies with respect to the problems both of settlement of 
the terms of exchange, and of rights to possessions, between the instrumental and the 
expressive cases. Possessions in their expressive significance will be called rewards, the 
category of rewards being treated as directly parallel with that of facilities. The reward-
object is always an object of immediate gratification, but its eratificatory significance 
depends not only on its properties as an object as such, but also on its specific relation to 
ego. That specific relation, so far as it is contingent on the organization of the interaction 
between ego and the relevant alters, is the focus of the sociological problem of rewards. 
But just as rewards are obiects of gratification so in a culturally patterned action system 
they must at the same time be significant as expressive symbols.  
Concretely rewards may consist in the possession of physical objects or specific 
relations to cultural objects. But a special significance attaches to one class of rewards, 
namely, the “possession” of contingent relations to other actors. Above all, because of the 
significance of the mutuality of attitudes involved in attachments and of loyalty and 
solidarity, to be in a position to “count on” the favorable attitudes of alter-of the 
appropriate type-may be regarded as the primary core of the reward system. Alter, that is, 
may give or withdraw his responsiveness, his love, or his esteem; ego, therefore, acquires 
and retains his place in alter’s orientation system only under specific conditions. The 
institutionalization of these conditions is an aspect of the ordering of the social system. 
As in the case of the acquisition and use of facilities, the social system need not and 
very generally does not prescribe by institutionalization precisely what rewards should be 
allocated to what actors. But both with regard to the terms on which rights to various 
kinds of rewards are held and exercised, and with regard to the settlement of the terms of 
exchange for the acquisition and disposal of reward-possessions there is an inherent 
problem of order for the social system. Institutionalization in this sphere is as much an 
imperative of social order as it is with respect to facilities. 
Indeed, it is in relation to the differentiation of the relatfonal contexts both of 
instrumental and of expressive activities, that the most fundamental regulative problems 
of the social system arise, and that regulative institutions are primarily focused. The 
implications of this situation will be taken up at a variety of points in the chapters which 
follow. 
The paradigm for the analysis of the structure of the relational context of an expressive 
orientation is as follows:  
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 We may now turn to the moral aspect of the structure and ordering of ego’s relational 
system. It is quite clear that this raises problems on a different plane from the 
instrumental and expressive because moral orientation is directly of integrative 
significance with reference to the components of an action system. We may, therefore, 
say that the problem is that of establishing the patterns of order both within the 
instrumental and the expressive complexes respectively, and between them, since every 
actor must have relationships of both types. 
We have here reached a vantage point for making clear the difference in one crucial 
respect between the ego-integrative and the relational aspect of the moral orientation 
problem. Any given individual actor is, in both instrumental and expressive respects, 
involved in a complex system of relationships to other actors. The composition of this 
system is, because no other person occupies exactly the same place in the total society, 
largely idiosyncratic to him. Its organization and integrative stabilization as a system with 
his physiological organism and his particular environmental situation, presents a 
distinctive integrative focus not reducible to that of any other individual nor to that of the 
social system. The integration of the structures of the relational system of one actor, 
which will in some of the most important cases constitute his roles, represents one of the 
most important foci of the problems of the theory of personality. 
But our concern is only indirectly with this. Directly it is with the correlative 
integrative problem of the relational system itself as a system, for as between social 
objects or actors this is by definition a social system. The focus of this problem concerns 
the conditions of order in such a system; in such systems generally and in each particular 
differentiated type of such system. 
At present our interest is in the bases of structural differentiation, so we may follow up 
from this point of view. It is to be remembered that we are considering this structure in 
terms of the relational system as a system of roles, and hence we are concerned with the 
relevance of differentiation or role-pattern types. 
In terms of the two paradigms presented above and the relations between them there 
seem to be two ranges of variability to consider. The first concerns the differentiations 
and integrations within each one of the orientation systems. The second concerns the 
possibilities of segregation and fusion of components of both in the same role. 
Certain of the pattern variables outlined in the last chapter provide us with a basis for 
classifying these possibilities. Three of them, namely affectivity-neutrality, specificity-
diffuseness and universalism-particularism, are all relevant to the problem on the most 
elementary level. The fourth and fifth fit into different contexts which will be taken up in 
due course. 
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The definition of a role in terms of affective neutrality excludes any expressive 
interest4 from primacy in the orientation structure and gives the primacy either to 
instrumental or to moral considerations. This does not mean that, concretely, the actor 
does not receive any direct gratifications through the performance of such a role, far from 
it, but that in the definition of the role-expectations, these interests, whatever they may be, 
are in the case of conflict, to be subordinated to one or both of the other types of 
consideration. If there is no conflict it is another matter. By itself, this variable does not 
discriminate between instrumental and moral orientations, nor between private and 
collective interests. It serves only to discriminate the legitimacy of relative primacies of 
expressive and non-expressive orientations. 
However, there are important respects in which the discrimination between 
instrumental and ego-integrative moral orientation is secondary if not indifferent from the 
point of view of the ordering of the social system. The functional problem in these terms 
is that of moral integration on the social level, not that of personality. But this brings us 
into ground not yet worked out. This variable defines quite clearly the relative primacy as 
between expressive and instrumental orientations. 
It will be convenient next to take up the application of the specificity-diffuseness 
variable. Specificity in a role-expectation “segregates” out one specific element of an 
instrumental or an expressive complex from the rest of its relational context. Thus the 
content of the role may he confined to the “productive” process itself without reference to 
responsibility for disposal or for the provision of facilities or regulation of cooperative 
relationships, or it may be concerned with the gratification of a need-disposition without 
reference to the context of occasions or its combination with others in an attachment. It 
would seem that the possibilities of segregation in the expressive field were intrinsically 
more limited than in the instrumental. 
In any case, however, diffuseness refers to such a fusion of relational aspects or 
relevant need-dispositions into a single “bundle.” The important point to remember is that 
a pattern variable in the present context defines role-expectations, that is, rights and 
obligations vis-à-vis others, and hence the structuring of sanctions. Therefore, a 
“specific” role is one in which obligations are expected to be confined to the specifically 
defined relational content, while in a “diffuse” role the expectation is that no claim to 
obligation arising out of a contingency of the situadon will be a priori irrelevant; its 
irrelevance must be justified in terms of conflict with a higher obligation in terms of a 
priority scale. 
There is a certain relativity in defining what is a segregated aspect which is apt to give 
rise to confusion unless it is clearly recognized. In the instrumental case it derives from 
the fact that any desired future state of affairs may be conceived as a goal. Therefore, 
when we speak of the productive (or “functional”) goal of an instrumental orientation, 
disposal, adequate remuneration, etc., may each serve as such a goal. What, therefore, is 
to be considered the “technical” goal at the center of an instrumental system of division 
of labor as indicated in the paradigm, is relative to the position of ego in the system of 
4 The extent to which a cathectic interest is or is not integrated with a pattern of expressive 
symbolism may be neglected for purposes of the following analysis. In general we shall assume this 
integration and deal with the evaluative action-orientation level. 
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division of labor. What is from ego’s point of view the technical goal, may, seen from the 
perspective of the wider system, be the performance of a disposal function (e.g., he may 
be a “salesman”) or some other function. This should not be a serious source of difficulty 
if the frame of reference within which a statement belongs is always made clear. 
In the expressive case it is somewhat different. The system into which a need-
disposition gratification is to be fitted, must be taken to include other need-dispositions of 
the same actor as well as his relations to objects. Hence a “fusion” may mean either the 
organization of a system of need-dispositions relative to the same object, or the 
organization of a system of objects relative to gratification of the same need-disposition 
or both. 
It would seem to be clear that an object-orientation which includes both expressive 
and instrumental elements, defined as positively expected rather than only permissively 
legitimate in the role-expectation, should be treated as diffuse. However, this would not 
seem to be possible unless on either the instrumental or the expressive side diffuseness 
were already involved. The most obvious type of case is that where an instrumentally 
specific expectation is bound up with an expressively diffuse one, in orientation to 
another person or to a collectivity. Solidarity, which will be further discussed below, 
necessarily has a component of this diffuse character. But in the absence of the 
collectivity-orientation involved in solidarity we may speak of the obligation of loyalty to 
alter or to a collectivity, as defined above, when the instrumental orientation is fitted into 
the context of a diffuse relation of reciprocal expressive significance. 
It is also evident that there are important relations of the variable universalism-
particularism to this context. The standards governing instrumental orientations are, given 
the goal, as we have seen inherently universalistic. They have to do with the intrinsic, 
relationally indifferent criteria of effective goal-attainment. The primacy of an 
instrumental orientation, even a diffuse one, is, therefore, always a primacy of 
universalistic standards. The same may, but need not, be true of an expressive orientation. 
Here it depends on whether the orientation is inherently to the specific object or to a 
universalistically defined class of objects. If any object of the generally defined class is 
appropriate, the standard is universalistic. 
However, the orientation is more likely, in the expressive case, to be particularistic. 
This is especially, indeed overwhelmingly, so unless the object is an abstract, cultural 
object which contains the property of universality within itself or a class of other objects 
in their symbolic significance. Perhaps, for instance, universal love in the religious sense 
is an example of a universalistically defined attachment, to all men without 
discrimination. It is, however, evident that it is extremely difficult of realization. It may 
be surmised that the universalistic orientation is more likely to be to the abstraction 
“humanity,” that is, to a symbol, than it is to all concrete human beings.  
Table 1 presents a cross-classification of the values of these three pattern variables, 
yielding eight types. It can be seen from this that there is a considerable, though not a 
complete correspondence with the outcome of the analysis of the instrumental and 
expressive paradigms. The table is formulated in such a way that the neutrality-affectivity 
variable is consistently used to discriminate the primacy of instrumental and expressive 
orientations respectively, and the specificity-diffuseness variable to distinguish limitation 
to a specific component of the relational system from the integration of the system in 
question as a system. These lines of discrimination seem to be quite clear. The main 
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difficulty with them is that the classification does not as such take account of the 
combinations of instrumental and expressive elements in the same role-expectation 
pattern. The best way to do this appears to be to conceive sucn a combined pattern as 
covering two cells in the table, for example, both the affective and the neutral cell where 
the combination of the other two variables is still the same. Such a combined type could 
then be further differentiated according to whether the instrumental or the expressive (or 
possibly a moral) element were given primacy. This is highly important in the case of 
cells 6 and 8 which define-so far as these variables are concerned-the very important 
cases where a diffuse attachment is integrated with expeo tations of reciprocal 
instrumental performances. A major example is that of kinship roles. 
Another complication arises where the primary interest is expressive on one side and 
instrumental on the other. This would, for instance, be true in the relation between 
performer and audience in commercial entertainment, where the member of the audience 
is directly gratifying a need-disposition whereas the performer is in an occupational role.5 
In such an asymmetrical role interaction system it seems necessary to classify one role in 
one box, the other in another. Thus the role of the performer in the above case would 
belong in cell 1 while that of the spectator would belong in cell 3.  
It is still significant that the complementary pair belong in two adjacent cells out of the 
eight possibilities. It would not be possible to build up complementary pairs of role-
patterns by random combinations of the eight cells. 
Another set of problems arises in connection with the place of the variable 
universalism-particularism, Row 1 (cells 1 and 2) which defines the primary components 
of both technical and executive roles in the instrumental complex, is clear and 
unambiguous. With respect to all of the others there are problems. Cell 3 is certainly 
important with respect to specific gratifications. But if the object is a social object there is 
a strong pressure to shift the emphasis in a particularistic and diffuse direction, the more 
so the more lasting the relation and the more strategic the cathectic interest. There seems 
to be an inherent instability in this combination of orientation interests. It never appears 
as central to the structure of a social system (where the object must be a social object) but 
mainly in “safety valve” or deviant phenomena, e,g., prostitution. 
The instability of the orientation defined by cell 4 has also been commented upon. 
Here the difficulty is in maintaining the universalism of the pattern in the face of the 
pressures to particularism of the affective expressive primacy. Thus religious 
universalism very easily shifts into a denominational particularism where the primary 
loyalty is to the particular religious collectivity, e.g., the church, rather than to “all men,” 
especially, of course, where men outside the church refuse to recognize the definition of 
the situation espoused by the denomination in question. 
To take one further example, cell 8 formulates the “ideal type” of the romantic love 
relationsnip. But it seems to be in the nature of a concrete love attachment that if it is 
intense and durable it will come to involve realistic common and reciprocal activities 
5 To account for the integration of such an interaction pattern it seems necessary to assume that 
there is institutionalization of a common pattern of expressive symbolism between performer and 
audience, a pattern which would be internalized in the performer’s personality. Then the latter’s 
instrumental orientation to “getting across” and/or to remuneration would operate within this value-
orientation matrix. This problem will be further analyzed in Chapter IX, pp. 408 ff. 
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outside the core of expressive symbolism itself. Though also possessing symbolic 
significance many of these activities will possess or acquire instrumental significance as 
well. The actual role pattern, then, will tend to “spill over” into cell 6 and to fuse the two. 
With integration in a larger functional system including the presence of offspring and 
responsibility for their care the love relationship shades into that of marriage. Kinship 
roles in all societies involve a fusion of the pattern-elements formulated in cells 6 and 8.  
These cases are not exhaustive of the implications of the table but will suffice for the 
present. The fundamental reason why we do not find a “perfect fit” between the logically 
elaborated scneme of pattern variable combinations and the results of analyzing the 
TABLE 1 
Universalism 
 
relational complexes of instrumental and expressive action lies in the fact that the former 
is a cultural pattern element, and the types derived in these terms are governed by the 
rules of pattern consistency and symmetry. The relational paradigms on the other hand 
analyze the structure of social relations on another level. We see here some of the 
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beginnings of the sources of tensions between cultural patterns and the realistic 
conditions of functioning of a social system. 
It must not be forgotten that in Table 1 two of the pattern variables have been omitted, 
namely achievement-ascription and self-collectivity orientation. Especially the latter 
variable will be found to modify the results of this table considerably. But we are not yet 
ready to introduce these modifications. 
In a very tentative way it will be useful to bring together the results of the above 
analysis of the instrumental and expressive orientation systems, by setting up a 
classification of types of fusion and segregation of the components of these paradigms. 
These will not suffice to characterize concrete role types but will provide some very 
important elements in them, and in particular will lay the basis for a series of highly 
important discriminations in the field of social structure to be utilized further in Chapter 
IV below.  
1. The segregation of specific cathectic-expressive interests, both from diffuse 
attachments or loyalties and from instrumental expectations, e.g., the role of spectator 
at an unpaid entertainment (cells 3 and 7 of Table 1). 
2. The fusion of a plurality of specific cathectic-expressive interests in a diffuse object 
attachment, e.g., the “pure” type of romantic love role. (Cell 8.) 
3. The conditioning of the gratification of a specific cathectic-expressive interest on a 
specific instrumental performance (asymmetrical) e.g., the role of spectator at a 
commercial entertainment (involves all of left hand-specificity-column in Table 1). 
4. The fusion of a diffuse attachment and loyalty with a diffuse complex of expected 
instrumental performances, e.g., kinship roles (cells 6 and 8), 
5. The segregation of specific instrumental performances, both from expressive 
orientations other than the specifically appropriate rewards and from other 
components of the instrumental complex, e.g., “technical” roles (cell 1). 
6. The fusion of a diffuse plurality of instrumental functions with the specifically 
appropriate rewards in a complex segre-gated from other expressive interests, e.g., 
“artisan” and “executive” roles (cell 2). 
7. The fusion of a plurality of expressive interests in a diffuse attachment to a class of 
objects or an abstract cultural object, e.g., “universal love” in a religious sense (cell 4). 
§ THE MODALITIES OF OBJECTS AS FOCI OF ROLE-
EXPECTATIONS 
THE foregoing section was concerned with differentiations in patterns relevant to the 
structuring of social relationships and hence of roles. The bases of differentiation, that is, 
were found in the motivational structure of the actor’s orientation and in the cultural 
value-standards which are built into his action orientation. It is now necessary to take up 
the relevance of differentiation within the object itself which may serve as a focus for 
selective differentiation of orientation, that is, relative primacies among alternatives. We 
are concerned here, it will be remembered, with role-pattern structure and hence the 
mutual orientations of actors to each other. The relevant object is for this purpose always 
a social object. 
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This immediately suggests the usefulness of building the analysis around the pattern 
variable of ascription-achievement as this is nothing other than the formulation of the 
most significant differentiation running through the constitution of the social object 
world. In orienting to an actor as object, then (including ego’s own personality) primacy 
may be given on the one hand to his attributes or qualities, independently of specific 
expected performances, or on the other, it may be given to his performances, completed, 
in process, or expected in the future. The relevant context, it will be remembered, is 
always the evaluation of the object as a whole in the relevant respects. This evaluation 
may be applied to the selection of the object, from among alternative possibilities, or to 
the structuring of expectations relative to the object once a relationship is established, that 
is, the “treatment” he receives in a role. 
The nature of the general differentiation should be clear. The main problem of this 
section is to bring out its relevance by spelling out some of the more empirical 
considerations that are involved under each of the two main alternatives. We may start 
with the analysis of quality-complexes, or ascriptive criteria.  
It seems essential at the start to differentiate between two classes of such criteria. For 
convenience they may be called primary and secondary. The former are those which are 
logically prior to the social system, the latter those which derive from the relevant 
features of social systems. Relative to both classes, for purposes of making the relevance 
to social structure clear, it is useful to make a further initial distinction, namely between 
classificatory and relational criteria. By classificatory criteria is meant those which orient 
the actor to the object by virtue of the fact that it belongs to a universalistically defined 
class which as a class has special significance for ego. By relational criteria, on the other 
hand, is meant those by which the object as a particular object is placed in a specific 
significant relation to ego and thus to other significant objects. Thus the sex of the object 
is a classificatory criterion while a specific biological relationship to ego, e.g., as parent, 
is relational. The relevance of this distinction to relating ascriptive criteria to the 
incidence of the universalism-particularism variable seems to be obvious. 
The relevant primary ascriptive criteria may be classified as attributes of organisms 
(ego’s and alter’s) or attributes of personalities (again both ego’s and alter’s). 
Collectivities are excluded as belonging only to the secondary class. Physical and cultural 
objects are likewise excluded. Apart from their relations to social objects they are by 
definition irrelevant to our present discussion. Cultural objects as internalized are part of 
personality, as institudonalized patterns of the social system, they are secondary. Physical 
objects (other than organisms of actors) are only indirectly relevant. They may, that is, be 
involved in relational criteria, because of the object’s relation to his environment, as in 
the case of spatial location. 
We have, then, the classificatory and the relational attributes of the organism. The 
former are his biological or, as it is sometimes expressed, “physical” traits. Two of these, 
because of their universality and their relevance to certain intrinsic functional problems 
of social systems stand out from the others, they are sex, and age, or more precisely, stage 
of the biological life cycle. The fact that all human populations are classifiable by sex 
into two and only two categories (with negligible exceptions) forms a crucial focus of 
orientation to human individuals. Similarly with age. Beside these two we may refer only 
to a residual category of numerous physical or somatic traits which will include stature, 
body weight and shape, skin and eye color and the rest of the familiar catalogue. Traits 
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which are manifested only or mainly in behavior and where the physiological basis and 
the socio-culturally acquired element can only be distinguished by sophisticated analysis 
if at all, are best treated as traits of personality rather than of the organism, e.g., 
“intelligence.” 
Turning to the relational category, there seem to be three primary relational attributes 
of the organism which stand out as of primary significance, namely “biological position,” 
spatial or territorial location and temporal location. By biological position is meant the 
place of alter relative to ego in the concatenations of sexual reproduction and descent, 
what is sometimes called the “biological structure of kinship.” Descent through bisexual 
reproduction is the essential fact. Alter is always related to ego, if any relationship can be 
traced at all, through specific lines of descent from specific common ancestors, with, of 
course, the possibility of more than one line being involved. For reasons which will be 
discussed in the following chapters biological position is a fundamental ascriptive 
criterion in all known societies, defining the focus of the social structures known as 
kinship. 
Territorial location is equally important. By this is meant, given the spatial position of 
ego as organism at a given time, the relation to this of the position in space at which alter 
is located. With ego himself as object, of course, the identity of spatial position is itself a 
crucial fact. He cannot, that is, be spatially separated from “himself.” Since all individual 
actors are organisms this focus of orientation can never be left out, it is always there by 
implication if not explicitly dealt with. It always creates a “problem” for action. If ego 
and alter are out of sight and hearing there must be specific physical mechanisms which 
enable them to communicate, e.g., mail or telephone. Or if communication is not enough 
to accomplish ego’s goal, he must somehow be able to “get at” alter in the place where he 
is located, or bring about a change in the location of one or both. It should be quite clear 
that territorial location, in this context, is always a relational attribute of the organism of 
an actor. Though obviously influenced by past action and subject to altera-tion through a 
projected course of action, at any given time it simply is a given fact. 
Though relative territorial location inherently enters into all action it is of particularly 
crucial significance in two contexts. One is that of residential location. The plurality of 
roles of any individual actor implies a time-allocation between them, and conditions are 
such that the time-segments cannot be long enough to permit more than limited spatial 
mobility in the course of the change-over between at least some of them, e.g., family and 
job. This means that the main “bases of operations” of the action of an individual must be 
within a limited territorial area, though “commuting” by mechanical means has 
considerably extended the range. This base of operations requirement is at the basis of the 
grouping we call a “community.” A community is that collectivity the members of which 
share a common territorial area as their base of operations for daily activities. 
The second crucial context is that of the use of force. Force operates on the actor 
through the organism, by limiting its freedom, e.g., of motion or communication, or by 
inflicting injury on it. In order to use force against an actor it is necessary to “get at him” 
in the place where he is or would like to be. Since the use of force is an ultimate means of 
prevention of action (a dead man does not act), and since as a component of power the 
use of force must be controlled in a society, the territorial organization of force and its 
contingent use is always a focus of the structure of the society. 
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Time relations may be treated as the third set of relational criteria relative to the 
organism. All action is, of course, in one of its major aspects, temporal sequence. For 
interaction the crucial implication is that the impact of ego’s action on alter is always 
specifically located in that sequence. “Timing” of actions is always possible within limits, 
but when an act has been performed its consequences flow into the temporal seouence, as 
part of the “experience” of alter as well as of ego. Ego is, therefore, always related to 
alter in time in the sense that they co-exist in the temporal continuum, and the relevant 
state of either for interaction orientation is the state “at the time.” 
But action is not only “located” in time, it “ranges” through time. The consequences of 
past actions are situationally given and thus always of ascriptive significance. Action 
itself, as involving expectation, however, is oriented to the future. The assessment or 
“how long it will take” and “when is the proper time” are inherently parts of any action 
problem. In relation to the structuring of action perhaps the most important relevance of 
these considerations is to the proliferation of instrumental orientations in systems. The 
more complex the instrumental system the more are goals, which as goals are meaningful 
in the present, capable of attainment only in a more or less distant future. An 
instrumentally elaborated social system is one in which orientations are to a high degree 
“time-extended.” Its members cannot simply live “for the moment.” In particular the 
significance of alter for ego clearly has a highly important time dimension. 
Turning now to personality (ego’s own or alter’s) as object we have the immense field 
of personality traits. It is perhaps questionable how far it is legitimate to treat these as 
primary ascriptive criteria at all, since they are so intimately bound up with the social 
system itself. Hence there is a possible arbitrariness in where they should be classified. 
But provisionally they may be put here. The most important distinction within the 
classificatory category seems to be between those traits which are primarily significant to 
performances and those which are not. The former may be called “performance-
capacities.” Admittedly the line is difficult to draw and is probably relative to context, but 
it is an important line. Such traits as physical strength or agility, as intelligence or 
responsibility, are primarily ways of formulating the kind of performances which may be 
expected under certain conditions. On the other hand such traits as cheerfulness or 
“attractiveness” seem relatively independent of specific performances. 
In any case it is important to emphasize that performance capacities are attributes 
which may function as ascriptive criteria. Even though, as is frequently the case, past 
performance serves as the empirical criterion, still persons regarded as having the trait in 
question, or having it in the requisite degree, are classified together, and belonging to this 
class may be taken as the criterion of status-ascription, independently of any specific 
expected performances. Indeed every performance, once it has been accomplished, 
becomes in its consequences an aspect of a given situation and the person who has done it 
has the attribute of being the one who did. This is the basis of certain dynamic relations 
between achievement and ascription. 
It is evident that there are no relational attributes of personalities which are “primary,” 
that is, are neither attributes of the organism of the sorts just discussed, nor secondary 
attributes derived from the social system. This is merely another way of saying that thc 
relational system in which personalities as personalities are involved is by definition the 
social system. 
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Turning then to secondary criteria of ascription, in the classificatory category the most 
important ones are status-classes or categories. Though a large proportion of statuses also 
involve collectivity memberships, it is highly important to distinguish the two. High 
School graduates, or married persons, or professional men, for example, constitute status 
classes. The members of a status class are classed together by virtue of a common 
attribute of their place or “location” in the social structure, or of a common attribute 
which is relevant to such status as a determinant or a symbol of status. Thus “rich men” 
or the “indigent” constitute a status class. Such an attribute is not a personality trait in the 
usual sense, though again admittedly the line is indistinct when personality characteristics 
are in fact made the focus of status ascription. But generally there is room for 
considerable variability in the personality traits of the members of a status class. 
To be distinguished from membership in a status-class are the two types of secondary 
relational criteria, participation in an “ecological” system and membership in a 
collectivity. By an ecological system is meant a state of mutually oriented 
interdependence of a plurality of actors who are not integrated by bonds of solidarity to 
form a collectivity but who are objects to one another. The “customers” of a commercial 
firm constitute such a category as do in general the participants in a market. Another 
example is the antagonists in a contest. Of course their interaction is oriented to a system 
of “rules of the game” and in their orientation to these rules they are members of the 
collectivity which upholds them. For ecological interactors in this capacity the only 
“sanction” is failure to achieve the goal or to avoid injury to self. Only the rules, not the 
specific orientations thus are institutionalized, and the relevant institutions are regulative 
not relational. As a relational category such participants must belong to the same concrete 
system of interaction. Classed as customers in general they constitute a status class. 
Membership in a collectivity is also a secondary relational criterion. Such a 
collectivity may, like a kinship group or a community, be constituted by primary 
relational criteria, but it need not be. Even where membership is achieved by the 
individual actor, not ascribed to him, once he is a member this becomes a basis of further 
ascription. 
We may now turn to achievement criteria of object selection or discriminative 
orientation. Such a criterion does not refer to an attribute of a given state of the object as 
such, but to actual or expected specific performance. The significant aspect is the 
contingency; being what he is, is not enough, in addition to this the critical thing is what 
the actor does. The evaluation is always relative to an ascriptively given base. The actor 
might have done otherwise, worse or better, but the focus is on what he actually does, not 
on the ascriptive base. 
That this possibility is inherent in the theory of action is clear from the most 
elementary analysis of interaction, with its emphasis on the contingency element or 
alter’s reactions to what ego does. Achievement orientation, then, is related to ascriptive 
through the addition of the second contingency factor which results in double 
contingency. The expectation is not defined “Being what I am, alter’s treatment of me 
must take one of the following alternatives” but “Depending on which of several 
alternatives open to me I take, I will set alter a problem to which he will react in terms of 
the alternative system of his own which is oriented to my action.” It is this involvement 
in the fundamental paradigm of interaction which makes the pattern variable of 
ascriptive-achievement so crucial in the whole theory of action. 
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In approaching the problem of sub-classification the first remark to be made is that 
primary achievement criteria relative to the organism drop out; achievements are 
specifically defined as those of an actor. However, it seems best, parallel with the place 
of personality traits, to treat the achievements of the individual actor as primary rather 
than secondary criteria for orientation. This leaves only the achievements of collectivities 
considered as actors as secondary achievement foci. Such collective achievements as the 
record of games won by a team or the profits of a business firm would be cases in point. 
The next important point is that achievement criteria as such are in the nature of the 
case always classificatory, never relational. They are always abstractable from context, to 
be “measured” by a universalistic standard. Achievement primacy is always 
universalistic, so far as the criteria of achievement are directly applicable. There are, 
however, certain difficulties in the interpretation of this statement. Performance is always 
relative to a goal; performance criteria are, therefore, limited in their direct applicability 
to the relations of means and conditions to a given goal, in such terms as effectiveness, 
efficiency, economy. They are thus intrinsically limited to instrumental orientations. But 
while instrumental orientation may be a component of a concrete role-expectation system, 
it need not exhaust it. The value-orientations in terms of which the goals themselves are 
defined need not be universalistic. There is, therefore, such a thing as performance in the 
interest of particularistic values. Furthermore other things than performances may be 
involved in the sanction system, and the achievement of certain responses on alter’s part 
may be part of the goal. These may be expressive orientations on alter’s part. There is 
thus in many cases an intricate web to unravel before the significance of the above 
propositions can be properly assessed. 
A particularly important case of this is the secondary type of achievement criterion, 
namely collective achievement, that is, achievement imputable to a collectivity as an 
actor. Membership in a collectivity is, we have seen, inherently a relational quality. This 
has certain implications for the structure of a role of “responsibility” in relation to a 
collectivity, notably a leadership role which may be defined as a role of diffuse 
responsibility relative to a collectivity. The focus of that responsibility is always in one 
sense particularistic because of the relational involvement. Yet, the leadership role may 
be achievement-oriented and “success” measured in universalistic terms, given the goal, 
which must in some sense include “promotion of the welfare of the collectivity.” 
It is in the light of considerations such as these that it is necessary to assess the 
implications of a value-orientation system which combines achievement values and 
particularism for the structure of the social system in which it is institutionalized. The 
particularistic component of the value-system places stringent limitations on the choice of 
goals to which achievement values may legitimately be applied. Above all the emphasis 
is thrown on collective achievements and roles involving responsibility toward 
collectivities. This, for example, underlies the “collectivism” of traditional Chinese 
values as distinguished from our own type of individualism. 
To suin up, we may say that the ascription-achievement variable defines the major 
axis of differentiation of actors in a social system in their capacity as objects of 
orientation, as distinguished from their capacity as actors whose own orientations are to 
be analyzed. Since all statuses in the social system have to be entered into by the 
individual actor, if only by the fact of being born, in the first place these criteria are 
relevant to classifying the discriminations by which actors are distributed among the 
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statuses and roles of the social system. They thus define criteria of eligibility, and 
therefore in what roles ego may or may not appear vis-à-vis alter. Furthermore, they 
define patterns of differential treatment within a role, once the actor is an incumbent of it. 
They are foci for the definition of expectations for deciding between alternative 
evaluations. They constitute the framework for defining in what respects the actor as 
object (again both ego and alter) is significant, in the sense that is relevant to ego’s 
orientation.  
§ THE SOLIDARITY OF THE COLLECTIVITY 
WE have so far dealt with the structure of role complexes, first treating the differentiation 
of the different roles composing such a complex in terms of the orientational content of 
the expectations and then in terms of selectivity as between the basic modalities of the 
objects of the orientations, of quality and performance. It remains to discuss the relevance 
of the problem of the specific commonness of the value-orientation patterns of the 
participants in a system of social interaction. This constitutes one primary aspect of the 
integration of such a system. 
In one aspect or sense, of course, any actually existent system is “integrated” in that its 
parts have somehow to “intermesh.” This is true of a system of roles in the same sense as 
any other type of system. Going one step further, there is, as we have seen, a normative 
aspect of any system of social interaction. There is an element of common value-
orientation, therefore, in any system of social interaction. These values may, for example, 
be cognitive standards governing communication, or appreciative standards governing the 
appropriateness of expressive symbols. But the present concern is with the next “higher” 
level of integration, the “moral” in its relational or social system relevance. 
On this level, it is not determined by the fact of interaction alone, or by the presence of 
common values in the more general sense, whether with respect to a given orientation-
alternative choice, there is a “moral issue” involved or not. The problem may be purely 
an instrumental one of efficiency, or an expressive one of appropriate object choice and 
attitude. There is a moral issue only when the alternatives involve a presumption of 
relevance to the “integrity” or the “solidarity” of an interaction system when the 
preservation of that integrity or solidarity is itself a value. The fifth of the pattern 
variables constitutes the conceptualization of this alternative with reference to the 
integration of social systems. The case of self-orientation is the case where, in the choice 
in question, which alternative is chosen is felt to be or defined as indifferent as far as the 
integrity of a valued social system of action is concerned. That of collectivity-orientation 
on the other hand is that where such integrity is defined as being involved, so that the 
actor who chooses one side is violating his responsibilities, to the system as a unit and its 
participant members. It is only when as action system involves solidarity6 in this sense 
that its members define certain actions as required in the interest of the integrity of the 
system itself, and others as incompatible with that integrity-with the result that sanctions 
are organized about this definition. Such a system will be called a “collectivity.” 
Collectivity-orientation, as it were, involves posing the “question of confidence”; “are 
you one of us or not? your attitude on this question decides.” 
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It will be noted that solidarity in this sense involves going a step beyond “loyalty” as 
that concept was defined above. Loyalty is, as it were, the uninstitutionalized precursor of 
solidarity, it is the “spilling over” of motivation to conform with the interests or 
expectations of alter beyond the boundaries of any institutionalized or agreed obligation. 
Collectivity-orientation on the other hand converts this “propensity” into an 
institutionalized obligadon of the role-expectation. Then whether the actor “feels like it” 
or not, he is obligated to act in certain ways and risks the applicadoh of negative 
sanctions if he does not. 
It is exceedingly important to be clear about the relativity of the concepts of solidarity 
and collectivity and hence the applicability of the self-collectivity variable. Only in the 
limiting case would a collectivity constitute an aggregate of persons as total 
individuals—that of a completely self-subsistent society. The type case is rather the 
aggregate as participants in a particular interactive system organized as a system of 
complementary roles, i.e., a partial social system. Therefore, an actor may be a member 
of as many collectivities as he has roles—there is no inherent limitation to that number. 
With regard to personnel of collectivities it follows that while some may be completely 
separate with no overlap, others overlap, with some members in common, others not, 
while still others are related as more and less inclusive collectivities. Thus in this country 
residents of a town or city are also residents of a state, and in turn also of the United 
States; they thus have the role of “citizen” in each of these three levels of governmental 
organization, that is, are members of all three collectivities. 
Every role, so far as it is institutionalized, involves a pattern of solidarity obligations; 
it entails, that is, membership in at least one collectivity. But in the particular orientation 
within the role these obligations may or may not be involved. The range of orientation 
alternatives relative to which they are not invoked is defined by the concept self-
orientation, that where they are invoked by collectivity-orientation. Thus, to take a 
familiar example, the participants in a commercial market are members of a collectivity, 
the state, which has “rules of law.” In their particular orientations to actual or potential 
exchange partners, within certain limits, they may be “selforiented,” for example, with 
reference to negotiating agreements on particular prices. But beyond those limits 
solidarity obligations come to be invoked in the form of insistence on compliance with 
certain common rules, e.g., with respect to refraining from fraudulent misrepresentations 
about the nature of commodities. The obligation to observe these rules is a collectivity-
orientation element of the total role. When we speak of the system of market relations as 
“governed by self-interest” we mean that within a range of permissiveness defined by 
such a set of (formal and informal) rules, decisions can be made on grounds which are 
treated as iirelevant or indifferent in terms of solidarity obligations. To reiterate the 
crucial point: All institutionalization involves common moral as well as other values. 
Collectivity obligations are, therefore, an aspect of every institutionalized role. But in 
certain contexts of orientation-choice these obligations may be latent, while in others they 
are “activated” in the sense that the actor faces the choice either of choosing the 
6 It will be, evident that the present conception of patterns defining social morality and solidarity in 
this sense is congruent with Sumner’s concept of the mores and Durkheim’s of moral canstraint. 
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alternatives which conform with these values or of accepting the negative sanctions 
which go with violation. 
There is another aspect of latency which is particularly applicable to collectivity-
orientations or solidarity obligations but is also more widely relevant. Many obligations 
are contingent on certain specific situational conditions. In the absence of such conditions 
they may remain latent-e.g., a professor has an obligation to teach. An observer who 
knew him only in the summer months and did not see him teaching would obviously not 
be entitled to condude that he was violating his obligation to teach or did not “recognize 
it.” It is only that the obligation is latent when the university is not “in session.” The only 
test, therefore, of the recognition of an obligation is the reaction of the actor in the 
specific situation to which it applies. Of course a secondary but not always reliable test is 
the verbal response to a question such as “what would you do in such and such a 
situation?” 
Conformity with expectations of collectivity-orientation may be called taking 
“responsibility” as a member of the collectivity. But it is a further step of elaboration to 
conceive of the collectivity “acting as a unit,” or “in concert.” Such action is, in a latent 
sense, a constitutive property of any collectivity-at a minimum a system which would in 
no sense ever “defend itself,” that is, mobilize some kind of resistance to a threat to its 
integrity, could not be called a col-lectivity in the present sense. But only in certain types 
of situation will this latent property of action in concert be mobilized or activated. 
A collectivity in which expressive interests have primacy in its orientation to continual 
action in concert may for lack of a better term, be called a Gemeinschaft; one in which 
instrumental interests have primacy is an “organization” in the sense defined above. In so 
far as either type has explicit and formalized rules and differentiated organs or 
implementation of collective action (including inteipretation and.enforcement of rules) it 
is an “association.”* 
When the association level of the organizadon of collectivities is reached, and to some 
degree short of this, it certainly involves an internal differentiation of roles with respect 
to the functions of the collectivity as a unit, as well as those of what may be called its 
primary division of labor. This differentiation is about the axis of “responsibility” relative 
to the possibilities of “action in concert” Internally this may be called a leadership role. 
When the special concern is with relations of the collectivity and its members outside 
itself, to other persons and collectivities, it may be called a “representative” role. 
In terms of the discussion of the division of labor earlier in this chapter it should be 
clear that, while there is a good deal of room for differences of specification, relative to 
specialized “contributions” to a cooperative action system, leadership roles are always 
diffuse. Responsibility in the present sense can never be confined to the efficient 
performance of a specialized function, but involves in some sense coordinating a variety 
of factors and contingencies in the interest of the collective goals. Like so many of the 
distinctions involved in this discussion, there is an important relativity about this one. But 
the focus on relational context as distinguished from technical goal, is the essential 
criterion of a leadership or execudve role. 
At the limiting pole of completely uninstitutionalized fluidity a system of social 
interaction would involve no collectivities in the technical sense of the present 
discussion; it would be only an ecological complex. But this is definitely a limiting case. 
No actual society approaches close to it. The only concretely relevant cases 
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which do are certain classes of partial social systems within an insti-tutionalized society, 
such as ad noc small groups set up for purposes of observation. Such a group will not yet 
have attained an institu-tionalized structure peculiar to itself, and, therefore, until a 
certain stage of its integration as a group is reached, it does not make sense to apply the 
variable of self-collectivity orientation to it. This case is empirically important as calling 
attention to the fact that the collectivity-structure of a larger social system is always more 
or less fluid, tnough societies differ greatly in this respect. But there is a continual 
process of dissolution of old collectivities and formation of new ones, and this is one of 
the most important processes of social change. It does not, of course, preclude that there 
should also be processes of change within a collectivity which do not destroy its identity.  
In one sense a social system, except for the above limiting case, may be regarded as a 
collectivity. But in a much more important sense a society or any at all complex partial 
social system is to be regarded as a net-work of collectivities, side by side, overlapping 
and larger-smaller. The concept of collectivity has here been introduced as one of the 
most important of the sub-structuies of the structure of social systems, not as a name for 
the overall characterization of such systems. 
§ TYPES OF SOCIAL VALUE-ORIENTATION 
THE main thread of the organization of material of this chapter has been the pattern 
variables and their context of applicability to the different modes of organization of the 
components of relational systems. In conclusion we may bring together this material bv 
showing how all five of the variables can be used to set forth a classification of value-
pattern types defining role-orientations. This is done in Table 2. The organization of this 
table of classification requires some comment. 
When the pattern variables are seen in the context of the general action scheme, they 
fall into a pattern of mutual interrelations; they do not, that is, simply constitute a list, but 
they have important systematic interrelations. There is a certain symmetry in the scheme 
which revolves about an axis which has two primary aspects of significance. This axis is 
that of the polarity between motivational orientation on the one hand, and cultural 
orientation on the other. In the presendy relevant sense, as will be evident from the above 
analysis, it is the value-orientation aspect of culture which is of crucial significance here. 
* This terminology is similar to, but a somewhat modified version of, that of Max Weber. Cf. The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Chapter I. 
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TABLE 2a 
Types of Combination of Value-Orientation 
Components7 
Major Social Value-Orientations 
 
This polarity of the reference points of action systems in general is reflected on the next 
level of derivation “down” toward their concrete structure, that is, in the pattern variables, 
in that two of them are of particular relevance to one pole of the reference system, two to 
the other, and the fifth is, as it were, “neutral” between them. These relations are 
diagrammatically represented in Chart I. 
The first section of the present chapter built up certain ele- 
7 For simplicity the pattern variable of self vs. collectivity orientation is omitted from these tables. 
Because of its symmetrical relation to the whole scheme it can be used to subdivide any cell in the 
tables. 
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TABLE 2b 
Types of Value-Orientation Components of Social 
Role-Expectation 
Universalism 
 
Types of Value-Orientation Components of Social 
Role-Expectation 
Particularism 
The structure of the social system, I     69
 mentary types of social sub-system from the organization of types of action-orientation in 
different relational systems. This analysis started out from the pole of motivational 
orientations. It used them, not on the most elementary level, but on that of organization 
with cultural elcmcnts which was called, in Chapter II, evaluative action orientation. The 
two pattern variables of affectivity-neutrality and specificity-diffuseness were the ones 
most directly relevant to that 
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CHART I 
 
motivational focus and may be said to be the keynote of value-orientation relevance on 
that level. The universalism-particularism variable was then brought in as introducing 
further specification into the structuring of these orientations, above all because of its 
relevance to the primacy of cognitive elements in instrumental orientations, once goals 
are assumed as given. 
This consideration, combined with their relevance to the structure of personality which 
will be discussed in Chapter V below, justifies putting this pair of variables together. 
They may, indeed, be considered as the major axes of the organization of action with 
reference to the needs of personality, that is, in the first context of the problems of 
functional prerequisites of social systems discussed in Chapter II, the Hobbesian problem 
of order. They formulate the necessity of balances in two fundamental respects. On the 
one hand the actor must have gratifications; without them he can neither subsist nor be 
adequately motivated for the performance of social roles. On the other hand he must also 
accept discipline, both in the interest of his own longer run gratification-deprivation 
balance, and in the social interest, that of his role-performance. Secondly in its 
psychological reference the specificity-diffuseness variable in the first place formulates 
the significance of diffuse loyalties, but at the same time conversely the necessity of 
limitations on such loyalties, in the interest of instrumental performances and kinds of 
gratification which cannot be integrated with attachments. In relation to collectivities 
solidarity with its diffusion of responsibility to the collectivity, involving diffuseness, is 
the institutionalized counterpart of loyalty between individuals without 
institutionalization. 
We must keep in mind that we are here dealing with the social system context, not 
with action in general. Hence these two variables for us concern the mechanisms which 
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mediate between the needs and capacities of the personalities which as actors compose 
social systems, and the structure of the social systems themselves. 
The other pair of variables is universalism-particularism and ascription-achievement. 
These variables have, by contrast with the other pair, reference to the social system as 
sucb. They are concerned, as we have seen, respectively with the type of value-norms 
which enter into the structure of the social system, and with the ways in which the 
characteristics of actors as objects of orientation are “taken account of’ in the selective 
processes through which social structures are built up. Both pairs of variables are 
constitutive of the structure of the relational system, otherwise they would not be relevant 
to the present analysis. But the second pair is concerned more with the social-system pole 
of functional reference. There is a sense’ in which the motivational adequacy of a social 
system to the needs of individuals can be more nearly accounted for in terms of the first 
pair, ignoring the second. But this is not true of the bases of structural differentiation and 
variability of social systems. In a sense, therefore, the second pair will have primacy for 
analysis of the variability of social systems as structural types, the combinations of the 
first pair being, as it were, resultants of the fact that a given society is structured in a 
given way with respect to the second pair. On the other hand, for analysis of adjustive 
and personality problems, and of the variability of these phenomena within a given social 
structure, the first pair will have primacy. 
Finally the fiftn variable, self-collectivity-orientation has been placed “in the middle.” 
This is because it does not as such have primary structural significance, but rather its 
significance is integrative. It is, to be sure, just as the others are, a component of the 
structure of social systems, otherwise it would not belong here. But the reference points 
for this variable are “internar to the social system itself, they are relational as it were, 
while the reference points for the other four variables are “extemal” in the sense of 
referring to features of the action-components which are logically prior to their 
organization in social systems. 
For these reasons, in Table 2 the fourfold table of possible combinations of the 
variables, universalism-particularism and ascription-achievement are given primacy as 
yielding a classification of four major types of social value-orientation. Each of the cells 
of this first part of the table may, however, be regarded not as a single cell but as a 
summary designation for a “block” of eight cells of the full table which details-all the 
thirty-two possibilities of combination of polar values of the five variables. However, for 
most purposes of classification of social structure, it seems justified to regard these latter 
as “sub-types” of the four major types. This point should not, however, be 
overemphasized. The most important thing is the classification itself, and the possibility 
of deriving a systematic classification of this sort from the most general considerations of 
the structure of action and its elaboration in social systems. It constitutes the fundamental 
starting point for a classification of possible types of social structure and eventually of 
societies. It should, however, be quite clear that as such it does not constitute such a 
classification because it includes only the value-orientation element and does not account 
for the rest of the components of the social system. 
A very brief comment on each of the four major types is in order to give the 
classification some kind of concrete relevance; fuller discussion will be reserved to 
Chapter V. Cell 1, the “Universalistic Achievement Pattern” is best exemplified in the 
dominant American ethos. The combination of universalism and achievement-orientation 
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puts the primary emphasis on universalistically defined goal-achievement and on the 
dynamic quality of continuing to achieve particular goals. It does not emphasize a “final” 
goal-state, 
TABLE 2c 
Major Types of Value-Orientation of Personal 
Attitudes 
 
which once achieved is to be maintained in perpetuity. The combination of universalism 
with achievement values puts the primary universalistic accent on process, that is, on 
means-choice and particular goal-choice, leaving the goal-system fluid. In some such 
sense the philosophy of Pragmatism epitomizes this orientation. 
When universalism is combined with an ascriptive emphasis in Cell 3 on the other 
hand, to constitute the “Universalistic Ascriptive Pattern” the primary relevance of 
universalistic standards shirts to the validadon of the quality-ideal. The focus is on the 
attainment of an ideal state of affairs, which once attained is considered to be 
permanently valid. But the universalistic element introduces a factor of strain since, in its 
main lines, it is scarcely possible to maintain  
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TABLE 2d 
Types of Value-Orientation Components of Need-
Dispositions (Attitudes) of Personality 
Affectivity 
 
Types of Value-Orientation Components of Need-Dispositions (Attitudes) of 
Personality 
Neutrality 
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 that any status quo of a social system conforms with any sharply defined ideal state. 
Hence a tendency to a dualism of ideal and real. Broadly the philosophy of “idealism” 
and the German cultural ideal seem to conform with this pattern. 
When we move to Cell 2, the combination of particularism and achievement which is 
called the “Particularistic Achievement Pattern” there is a great mitigation of this tension 
between ideal and real, for the focus is no longer on an absolutely ideal state, but on a 
given dynamic relational system. But with the accent on achievement the actor’s relation 
to this is “dynamically” conceived. It is not something which “comes automatically,” but 
which must be achieved, and may, if not enough care is taken, deteriorate and have to be 
re-achieved. An excellent example seems to be the Classical Chinese cultural pattern, 
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with its concept of a harmonious order for the maintenance or restoration of which men 
are held to be responsible. There is truth in the common saying that the Confucian 
Chinese were above all concerned wkh morality, namely responsibility for the 
maintenance of a given social structure as a going concern. But, by contrast with botn 
universalistic types of pattern this is, as Max Weber said, a doctrine of “adaptation to the 
world” not of “mastery over the world.” 
Finally, the combination of ascription and particularism yields what may be called the 
“Particularistic Ascriptive Pattern.” Here the order is conceived as given in a more radical 
sense, in that man is thought of as adapting his action within an order for which he cannot 
be held responsible. The accent, therefore, is on “making the most” of expressive 
opportunities, using the social order as a kind of “stage” for the play. The Spanish-
American pattern seems to be a close approximation to this type. 
One or two interesting relations between these four types may be called to attention. 
First they involve an order of “tension” which may be put roughly as Cells 3, 1, 2, 4 from 
high to low. This order is changed, however, when the focus is on responsibility for the 
social system as such, that is, the accent is on collectivitv-orientation. Here it seems that 
there are two pairs. Cells 2 and 3 place a strong accent on such responsibility because a 
system as such is in the center of attention. Cells 1 and 4 on the other hand tend to be 
much more “individualistic” but of very different types in the two cases. In the first case 
it is a kind of “goal-achievement” individualism which is not bound into a particularistic 
nexus as in Cell 2, in that the accent on achievement tends to preclude subordinating the 
achieving unit to a system in any sense, and the ascriptive focus on an absolute ideal is 
lacking. In the case of cell 4, on the other hand, the individualism has an expressive 
focus, because it has to take place within a framework treated as given. 
Relationships of this character will be further discussed later. Next, however, it is 
essential to place these cultural ideal patterns in their adaptive context in relation to the 
functional problems of social systems. In a very broad way the differentiations between 
types of social system do correspond to this order of cultural value pattern differentiation, 
but only in a very broad way. Actual social structures are not value-pattern types, but 
resultants of the integration of value-patterns with the other components of the social 
system.  
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IV 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIAL 
SYSTEM, II: INVARIANT POINTS OF 
REFERENCE FOR THE STRUCTURAL 
DIFFERENTIATION AND VARIATION OF 
SOCIETIES 
 
THE foregoing chapter brought us a step farther toward the conception of an operating 
social system. Instead of dealing only with the more elementary components of such a 
system, as was done in Chapter II, it showed how these elementary components could be 
organized into relational complexes and collectivities, and how the structure of these 
complexes could vary about the fundamental foci of crystallization of the social system. 
The task of the present chapter is to show how, in turn, these “sub-systems” are brought 
together to constitute more complex social systems, approaching the level of concreteness 
with which the empirical sociologist is concerned. 
The norm for this discussion will be the society as defined above, that is, the social 
system which is potentially or, “in principle” self-subsistent. This is essential because 
only with reference to this norm can the problems of differentiation of a total system be 
analyzed. However, the results of the analysis will be applicable to any partial social 
system once it can be satisfactorily “located” within the society of which it is a part, and 
its boundaries relative to the rest of the society determined. 
We shall have to start by analyzing still another set of points of reference, the 
functional foci for the structural differentiation of the social system. These points of 
reference may be regarded as the derivatives, on the requisite level of concreteness, of the 
points of reference for the analysis of action-orientations dealt with above, and many 
specific connections with that foregoing analysis will be established. 
§ THE FOCI OF CRYSTALLIZATION FOR SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
A SOCIAL system is, with respect to its structurally significant components, a 
differentiated system. For our purposes we can assume that what is differentiated is the 
unit of structure with which so much of the foregoing discussion has been concerned, the 
role including the object-significances of actors as well as their orientation patterns. 
Hence the fundamental focus for the analysis of the system as a differentiated system 
concerns the ways in which roles within it are differentiated and, in turn, these 
differentiated roles are integrated together, that is “mesh” to form a functioning system. 
At the same time it is not only roles which are differentiated. The individual and 
collective actors must be distributed between the various roles and role-clusters in the 
social system. Furthermore, so far as the roles involve instrumental orientations there 
must be facilities, and, so far as they involve expressive orientations, rewards. 
The differentiation of the social system may then be treated under two main headings. 
First, it is a system of differentiated roles. The types of which it is composed, how they 
are distributed within the social system and how integrated with each other must be 
analyzed. This is what we mean by the social structure in the narrower sense of the term. 
Secondly, however, given the role structure, we must analyze the processes of 
distribution of “movable” elements as between statuses and roles. This process of 
distribution of significant objects within the role-system will be called allocation.1 There 
are three contexts of the problem of allocation which we will have to consider: 1) the 
allocation of personnel, i.e., of actors, between roles; 2) the allocation of facilities; and 3) 
the allocation of rewards. The last two can, for certain purposes, be treated together as 
constituting the allocation of possessions. Each of these will be discussed in tum, but first 
a few words need to be said about the general significance of allocation itself. 
Allocation is, as noted, essentially an economic concept, and as here used is concerned 
with the “economic” aspect of the social system, but this is treated in a somewhat broader 
sense than is customary in the discipline of economics. The basic concept is the dilemma 
of scarcity which is always relative to demand. This is, in turn, a version of the still more 
general dilemma of “wanting to eat your cake and have it,” that is of the incompatibilities 
of two or more things which, from some point of view, are both desired. The most 
obvious cases of allocation are those of quantifiable entities, which must somehow be 
divided up between claims and claimants. Money is of course a type case since the 
question “how much?” has a completely unambiguous meaning. But even where 
quantification reaches only the level of rank-ordering, essentially the same basic problem 
arises. 
The distribution of role-types within the social system has been separated off from the 
three problems of allocation of “movable” elements within the system. There is, however, 
an allocative aspect to this distribudon which is in a sense the obverse of the other three 
allocations. Roles are, from the point of view of the functioning of the social system, the 
primary mechanisms through which the essential functional prerequisites of the system 
are met. There is the same order of relationship between roles and functions relative to 
the system in social systems, as there is between organs and functions in the organism. 
There is not, with certain exceptions to be noted, an inherenuy limited supply of roles 
which has to be allocated among claimants. However, if the role is to serve the requisite 
functions in the social system, it must be adapted to the capacities and needs of the 
incumbents. The role structure must be adapted to such conditions as the possibility of 
the same individual combining a given set of roles in his own activity; e.g., with respect 
1 The term is taken from economics and means essentially distribution in the perspective of 
functional significance to the system. 
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to time limitations, to requirements of geographical location of the activities, with respect 
to psychological compatibility, as in the case of requiring both decisive action and 
reflective thought from the incumbent of the same role. 
Subject to such conditions the performance of the various func-tions essential to the 
system comes to be allocated among the population of the system through the patterning 
of their roles, and must, as noted, be adapted to the human material. But precisely 
because in the larger scale social systems the role structure itself is the stabler element it 
is for most purposes more convenient to consider a given role structure as the major point 
of reference for the analysis of the three allocative processes we have distinguished. 
There is one specific scarcity aspect relative to the distribution of role-content between 
persons. In a given social system, with a given type and level of differentiation, if the 
functions of a role are specialized relative to the social system, there will not be “room” 
for an indefinite number of the particular class of roles in the same system. There is a 
wide variation between types of roles in this respect. If, as is always empirically the case, 
socialization is organized largely about kinship, there is necessarily “room” for as many 
mother roles as there are conjugal family units in the society, generally approaching the 
number of adult couples in the society; in other words practically any adult woman wilf 
be “eligible” for a mother role. But at the other end of the distribution there may be some 
types of role which in the nature of the case must be extremely limited in numbers in the 
same society. There seem to be essentially two types of these. One is the type of role 
which is near the “top” in a scale of responsibility or prestige or both-e.g., there can be 
only one President of the United States at a time-the other is the type of role which is 
extremely specialized in other respects-hence there are severe limitations on the “market” 
for the relevant products or services. An example would be the role of theoretical 
physicist. 
The existence of different types of roles in the same society distributed among the 
population in different ways is of course also limited by their mutual compatibility in the 
svstem, whether they mesh or generate conflict. This, however, is an integrative, not an 
allocative aspect of the problems of social structure. 
We have noted that this distribution of role types is itself the basic structure of the 
social system as a system. This structure is described by the answers to such questions as 
of what types of roles is it made up, in what proportions and how distributed in 
“clusters”? But to develop a conception of the social system it is highly im-portant to 
relate this role structure to the three allocative problem-foci of the social system. 
The first of these is the allocation of personnel.2 From the point of view of the analysis 
of personality, roles are, as it were, allocated to actors. But from the point of view of the 
social system the primary allocative problem is the obverse, the regulation of the “flow” 
of personnel within the role-system. It is orcourse possible that the two processes should 
coincide as in the development of a new social structure. But the larger, stabler social 
structures obviously transcend the life-span of the human individual, or that sector of it 
which is suitable for incumbency of a given role. Social structures, even relatively stable 
ones, change too, but their rhythms and periodicities of change are not the same as those 
of the individual life cycle. There must from the point of view of the going social system, 
therefore, be a continual process of “replacement” of the personnel in the roles of the  
2 Collectivities as actors are within limits also subject to allocation as units. The following 
discussion will, however, be confined to individual actors. 
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social system. It is of course essential to stability in most cases that this should not 
comeall at once, and it seldom does but nevertheless it is always going on. 
The first allocative “decision” about a given individual of course concerns where he is 
going to start off. This is, in all known societies determined by the fact that he is an infant 
of a given sex, and that he is born as a child into a particular position in a particular 
kinship unit. The initial allocative criteria, therefore, are in the nature of the case 
ascriptive, both classificatory, with respect to age and sex, which presumably cannot be 
changed, and relational, with respect to kinsnip unit membership, which conceivably 
might. Why kinship ascription should be universal constitutes an empirical problem. 
In some respects in all societies, and overwhelmingly in some, status by birth 
continues as an allocative criterion througnout the life cycle. But in some respects which 
are functionally of the highest significance, there is in all societies a series of status 
changes in the course of the life cycle. The sequence may be ascriptively pre-determined 
or it may not, that is, there may be selection-points where a sorting out process takes 
place at various stages. 
Besides the automatically ascriptive mechanism of which allo-cation of status and role 
by birth is the type case, there are two other principally relevant possibilities, the second 
of which falls into two major sub-types. The first is the allocation by explicit decision of 
otherpersons, what is usually called the system of appointment. 
The second is allocation as the outcome of an unplanned selec-tive process. Such a 
selective process may be competitive to a greater or less degree. In one sub-type those 
who “happen” to reach a certain position are automatically selectecl. In the other sub-type 
the actor “tries for” a given role-status as a goal of intentional endeavor and in order to 
reach his goal must win out over his competitors. The type case of the latter which may 
be called competitive allocation is of course the process of economic competition in the 
market situation. 
All three of these types are continually involved in social systems and occur in varying 
combinations. Allocation by appointment very generally is combined with selective 
processes in that appointment is from among those who have qualined for it by some 
criterion of eligibility. Fulfillment of the criteria may or may not be the result of a 
competitive endeavor to meet them. Thus it may be laid down that a high Government 
appointment should go to a prominent businessman. But it would be extremely unlikely 
that any of those considered for it became prominent businessmen in order to qualify for 
this type of appointment. On the other hand, certainly most graduate students directly 
seek the Ph.D. degree in part at least in order to qualify for a certain class of academic or 
research appointment. 
Analysis of what above has been called the Hobbesian problem of order shows 
conclusively that competitive allocation cannot operate without institutionalization of a 
set of norms defining the limits of legitimate action, particularly in this case with regard 
to legitimacy of means of attaining the goal. Both appointive and selective allocation are 
associated with primacy of achievement-orientation over ascriptive. The “power or 
appointment” may indeed be regarded as a further specification of the regulation of 
competition in terms of rules. The raison d’etre of appointment is often to ensure the 
closest possible approximation to an achievement norm. But both types are, in different 
ways, open to possibilities of “bias” of any given selective criteria, the competitive 
through the “loopholes” of the system of regulatory norms and of their enforcement, the 
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appointive through biases in the action of the appointing “authorities” (often of course a 
reflecdon of “pressures”). 
Facilities, it will be remembered from the last chapter, are possessions which are 
significant as means to further goals in complexes of instrumental orientation. The 
criteria of a facility are therefore intrinsic transferability between actors, individual or 
collective, and relevance to instrumental orientation. The former distinguishes it from the 
modality of an actor as object; neither his qualities nor his performances are intrinsically 
transferable, they are always and indelibly “his.” Facilities must also be distinguished 
from rewards. Rewards may or may not be the same concrete possessions in another 
aspect. But in any case analytically the distinction is crucial. Rewards are always to be 
understood as part of the complex of expressive symbolism not part of the instrumental 
means-end complex. 
A possession has been defined as an entity which is transferable from one actor to 
another, which can change hands through the process of exchange. This entity, the 
possession as such, is always a right or a bundle of rights. In other words, it is a set of 
expectations relative to social behavior and attitudes. It is never as such a physical object, 
but always consists in rights in or relative to physical, social, or cultural objects, rights of 
use or of control of disposal. At the very least ego’s right implies the negative obligation 
or alter to refrain from interfering with ego’s use or control of the object of his rights of 
possession; on occasion it may go further to require positive performances from alter, 
such as relinquishment of a mode of control which “rightfully belongs” to ego. 
It is true that physical objects “change hands,” but in terms of the social system this is 
not the essential but a derivative phenomenon. In innumerable cases of transfer of 
possessions in a physi-cal sense nothing changes hands, or only a symbolic entity, e.g., a 
“piece of paper.” This is true even with respect to rights in physical objects, wnere, as in 
the case of land, the object “stays put” and what changes is the relation to it of the 
previous “owner” on the one hand and the new one on the other. But many of the most 
important objects in which there are rights of possession are not physical at all, but may 
be cultural objects, e.g., the “book” an author has written. Another exceedingly important 
class is that of relational possessions. By this is meant the incumbency of given positions 
in the social system to which certain advantages attach and which may be relinquished in 
favor of another. Thus eligibility for a status, e.g., a “job,” or a claim to the services of 
another, may be a possession. 
Every social system must have mechanisms for the allocation of possessions as 
facilities, because their possession is desirable and they are inherently limited in supply 
relative to demand. The next question concerns the sources of this scarcity, and the 
implications of these facts for the social system. For present purposes it is sufficient to 
classify these sources as relational and non-relational. 
The non-relational sources are extrinsic to the social system as such. They concern for 
example physical and biological limitations on the availability of physical objects or the 
fact that though they can be produced, this is at a cost in the economic sense of the term. 
Thus buildings, machines and the like are limited in supply for cost reasons. This whole 
subject has been so fully treated in the literature of economics that it need not detain us 
further here. 
Similar considerations apply to a certain class of cultural possessions which may be 
important as facilities. Thus specialized technical knowledge can be acquired only 
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through labor, and often through access to other special facilities as well, such as the 
services of teachers and various types of equipment, e.g., books. When such knowledge 
can only be attained at a cost, or far more effectively by utilizing such facilities, the 
possessor of the specialized knowledge may acquire rights in it as a possession, for 
example the right to use an academic degree, which may even as in the case of the M.D. 
degree, be the prerequisite of practicing a given profession. 
An intermediate case is that of physical possessions which are for physical reasons 
intrinsically incapable of increase and cannot therefore be produced at any case. The most 
familiar example is space on the surtace of the earth. A particularly desirable location, 
e.g., an urban business site, must therefore be allocated to some user, and many 
competitors for it excluded. The same is essentially true of time limitations. Becausc of 
the finitude of the human life span it is strictly impossible for anyone ever to “find the 
time” to do every-thing he might want to do. These two bases of intrinsic limitation alone 
are sufficient to preclude the notion sometimes put fonvard that we are on the verge of an 
“economy of abundance” where scarcity in the economic sense would come to be in 
principle meaningless. 
The most fundamental limitation, however, is the directly relational one, as 
distinguished from the indirectly relational character of space and time limitations on the 
freedom of action. The relational limitation rests upon the fact that it is inherent in the 
nature of social interaction that the gratification of ego’s need-dispositions is contingent 
on alter’s action and vice versa. The action system of each actor is a finite system of 
limited possibilities. Therefore alter in the nature of the case cannot do everything ego 
might want him to do, and vice versa. Relational possessions in the sense of rights of any 
actor to count on certain reciprocal actions (and attitudes) of others, must in the nature of 
the case be organized into a patterned system. Every actor must distribute his actions 
which are significant to others in a determinate way, as between the various claimants, as 
between types of action, and as between occasions, and this determinate organization 
must be mutual. Ego, for example, cannot, in the sense of what we mean by an 
occupational role, “work for” an indefinite number of clients or employers. The fact that 
he must choose is reflected in the fact that not all the alters who might like to have his 
services can do so. 
So far as it concerns the problem of the allocation of facilities this basically relational 
problem of order we shall, following Hobbes, call the problem of power. With one 
qualification Hobbes’ own famous definition of power “a man’s present means to any 
future good” fits the case. We would add the qualification, that sucn means constitute his 
power, so far as these means are dependent on his relations to other actors; the correlative 
is the obligation of alter to respect ego’s rights. Hence in one aspect all possession of 
facilities is possession of power because it is at least in an implied and contingent sense a 
control over the actions of others, at least in the sense of ability to count on their non-
interference. There is a complete shading off between this negative, contingent aspect of 
power, and the positive aspect, ego’s capacity to influence the action of others in the 
interest of attainment of his positive goal beyond merely counting on their otherwise 
expected non-interterence. 
Power and its bases may be highly specific and particularized. Thus possession of a 
particular bit ofland may have no further social implications than the “power” to forestall 
trespass. But the significance of power in the social system, besides the 
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institutionalization of rights to particularized possessions, is dependent on the fact of its 
generalization and, as a consequence of this, of its quantification. This generalization and 
quantification is a matter of degree with highly different levels of development in 
different social systems. It seems to depend above all on three conditions. The first is the 
inherent significance of what we have called the exchange problem in all systems of 
differentiated roles. The higher the degree of differentiation of the role system, the more 
extended the network of exchange relationships must become, the more that is, there 
must be processes of settlement of terms between the incumbents of different roles. It is 
in these processes of the settlement of terms that the opportunity to exercise power arises, 
and that its significance to goalachievement resides. This is essentially another way of 
stating the fact of the inherendy relational character of possessions, including facilities. 
The significance of power to the realization of any given goal-orientation of one or more 
actors within the social system is a function of the extensity of the system of actual or 
potential exchange relationships through which it ramifies. 
The second condition is the incidence of universalistic orientations within the social 
system. This and the elaboration of role differentiation are inherently linked. The more 
extensive the relational context of an instrumental orientation in which exchange 
processes take place freely, and hence can become of prime functional significance, the 
more it is essential for these processes to be governed by generalized norms which in 
their applicability transcend the particularity of each specific set of relationships within 
which they occur. It is only on this condition that a restriction of the range of exchanges 
which would in itself lead to constriction of the differentiation of roles can be overcome. 
The more narrowly particularistic the institutional structure is then the greater the barriers 
to extension of ego’s influence to alters beyond the immediate range of the particular 
associations in which he is implicated. Breakdown of particularistic ties is the first 
condition of extension of the power system. But this taken alone leads to instability 
which can only be met either by reversion to particularistic restrictions or by the 
institutionalization of universalistic norms.  
The third condition is what may be called a gradient of effectiveness or “drasticness” 
of means. All institutionalization of exchange relations involves, as was pointed out in 
the last chapter, the definition of legitimate limits on the choice of means. The 
fundamental functional basis of the need for such institutionalization lies in the fact that 
resort to certain means would give ego “too much power” in the sense that, unless his 
power can be generalized to others he could gain his ends at the expense of alter. In 
individual exchange relationships there are above all two classes of means which are the 
focus of this institutional regulation, fraud and force. The Hobbesian analysis shows in 
classic form why their unregulated use would lead to the “war of all against all.” There is, 
however a third equally basic problem concerned with the control of organization, since 
so many goals can be attained through organization which would be impossible without 
it. This is of course preeminently true of the use of force.3 The essential point is that  
3 On a somewhat subtler level capacity to play on the “sentiments” of others is another means of 
attainment of goals which must be subject to institutionalized control. This problem belongs, 
however, primarily under the heading of the institutionalization of expressive symbolism and the 
reward system rather than of the organization and allocation ol facilities. 
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power can always in the short run be increased by going farther along the gradient of 
more and more drastic means. But, of course, since power, being relational, is by 
definition relative, ego can enhance his power by resort to more orastic means, only so 
long as alter fails to take “countermeasures” by resort to the corresponding means on his 
side. It is this interactive resort to more and more drastic means which is the source of the 
“struggle for power” and the inherent vicious-circle character of this struggle. Only by 
some sort of control operating on both parties to a conflict can the vicious circle be 
broken. 
The generalization and quantification of power in social systems seems to occur in two 
principal interdependent but distinct modes or directions, which may be called the 
economic and the political respectively. The economic type consists in the extension of 
the range of actually and potentially available exchange relationships, and hence of the 
range of any given actor’s choice relative to the arnuisition and disposal of rights of 
possession of facilities—and of course rewards so far as these are “negotiable.” This 
extension is  
possible only under relatively rigidly defined conditions which include on the negative 
side primarily the “emancipation” of the exchange context from diffuse and 
particularistic involvements so that criteria of instrumental efficiency may have primacy, 
and on the positive side the institudonalization of restrictions on resort to means of 
gaining advantage which would be disruptive of the operation of sucn an exchange 
system, notably fraud and force, and the “abuse” (defined in the requisite functional 
terms) of the control of organization. In this sense the situation of the exercise of 
economic power must be specific, not diffuse in its pattern. 
Power which is in this sense laterally extended through a ramified exchange system, 
but at the same time sharply restricted in scope in the above sense is economic or 
“purchasing” power. This potential scope is of course enormously extended through the 
cultural invention of money which, in present terms, may be treated as the symbolic 
generalization of purchasing power, indeed one of the most remarkable and important of 
all numan symbolizations. The essence of this symbolization is that, within the snarply 
defined limits of relevance to this particular type of exchange transaction relationship, a 
certain quantity of money can “stand for” or “mean” a whole complex of particular 
physical or cultural “goods” or relational “services” to use the traditional terminology of 
economics. 
Economic power, particularly as culturally defined and shaped through the 
institutionalization of money, has remarkable properties not shared by any other 
phenomenon of the whole system of social interaction. The most irteresting of these 
properties, for present purposes, is the fact that it can, within the requisite limits, be 
treated as a lineally quantitative element or variable in the total equilibrium of social 
systems—perhaps it is the only variable on a comparable level of generalized 
significance which possesses this pioperty. Obviously such concepts as wealth and 
income can be treated as special cases of the more general category of economic power. 
Here we find the point of departure of economic theory as a special branch of the 
theory of social systems. Economic theory is the conceptual scheme dealing with the 
phenomenon of economic power in this sense, and in the most tecnnical sense, with the 
com-plex interdependences involved in a system of such power relations in an 
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“economy.” The relevance of these interdependencies in turn to the processes of 
allocation of facilities and personnel within a social system should be obvious in the light 
of the foregoing discussion. 
It should also be clear that the empirical relevance of economic theory in a technical 
sense is very strictly a function of the type of social system to which it is applied. This 
relevance depends upon the scope of exchange relationships where the settlement of 
terms can operate independently of the institutional variables of the social system and of 
political power. These relationships must operate within a framework of regulative 
institutions which both enforce the degree of emancipation from particularism and 
diffuseness which are prerequisite to the independent orientational significance of 
“economic considerations,” and enforce observance of the limitations on choice of goals 
and means which prevent the merging of an economic into a political problem. In so far 
as these conditions fail to be fulfilled economic theory loses its independent relevance as 
an explanatory scheme. Its relevance, that is, must be confined to the sphere where what 
may in motivational terms be legitimately called “economizing” actually takes place, and 
in the absence of the above conditions this is a narrow sphere. But in such a case 
economic theory may still retain another order of significance as a canon of functional 
interpretation. Action that is, however oriented, may still have economic consequences, 
with regard to the allocation of facilities in the social system, and analysis of the 
significance of these consequences in terms of the social system regarded as a 
hypothetical “economy” may still be of very great importance. 
The second direction of generalization and quantification of power has been called the 
political. The range of potential exchange relations to which the possibility of “influence” 
is extended is relevant here as in the economic case. But what is distinctive about 
political power is not this, but extension of the scope of considerations relevant to its 
definition and exercise. Economic power, that is, is focused on the possession of means 
(the use of the term in such expressions as “a man of means” is significant) to maximize 
advantage in a range of alternatively possible exchange transactions under very strictly 
defined conditions through the offer of balancing advantages. Political power, on the 
other hand, is generalized through the broadening of the scope of relevance to the whole 
relational context of a given goal. On the level of the particular relational context political 
power is capacity to control the relational system as a system, whether it be an 
organization or a diffuser, less integrated system. 
The principle of generalization of political power then is its extension to more and 
more comprehensive relational systems which must as power systems be integrated in 
this sense into master systems and sub-systems. While the structure of economic power 
is, as we have noted, lineally quantitative, simply a matter of more and less, that of 
political power is hierarchical; that is, of higher and lower levels. The greater power is 
power over the lesser, not merely more power than the lesser. Political power is 
relational, not merely in reference, that is to n potendal exchange partners, but in direct 
significance. This is perhaps another way of stating the diffuseness of political power, in 
that it is a mobilization of the total relational context as a facility relative to the goal in 
question. 
This diffuse character of political power explains the peculiar relevance to it of the 
gradient of drasticness of means. Since ability to use force in its relation to territoriality is 
one ultimate focus of power in this sense, the control of the use and organization of force 
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relative to territory is always a crucial focus of the political power system, in one sense 
the crucial focus. It is this which gives the state its central position in the power system of 
a complex society. It is in turn the functional need to organize the power system relative 
to force and territory which gives control of the machinery of govemirtental organization 
its strategic position as a proximate goal of emulation for power. 
These considerations throw some light on the problems of the status of political 
science as a discipline which will be developed further in the final chapter. Neither power 
in the political sense nor the operation of government as a sub-system of the social 
system can be treated in terms of a specifically specialized conceptual scheme of the 
same order as that or economic theory, precisely for the reason that the political problem 
of the social system is a focus for the integration of all of its analytically distinguishable 
components, not of a specially differentiated class of these components. Political science 
thus tends to be a synthetic science, not one built about an analytical theory as is the case 
with economics. 
In conclusion we may reiterate that the generalization of power in the economic 
direction is dependent on the institutionalization of universalistic and functionally 
specific insdtutions which are regulative institutions par excellence. The 
institutionalization of economic power is focused on the maintenance of the conditions, 
on the one hand of its generalization, on the other of its insulation from other components 
of the system of facilities, above all from political power. This includes preventing large 
concentrations of economic power from having “undue influence”,as facilities for the 
exercise or political power. Political power, on the other hand, is inherendy diffuse, and is 
gteater in proportion to the scope of the relational context which is involved. Its 
generalization is, however, dependent on the level of univeralism. The problem of control 
of political power is above all the problem of integration, of building the power of 
individuals and sub-collectivities into a coherent system of legitimized authority where 
power is fused with collective responsibility. 
By rewards we mean diose transferable entities or possessions which are desired as 
objects of immediate gratification by actors. A possession is a facility so far as the actor’s 
orientation to it is primarily instrumental (and it is not itself an ultimate “goal-object”). It 
is a reward so far as the actor’s orientation (i.e., basis of interest) is predominantly 
expressive. This means that so far as ego’s interest is in alter because the object can be 
“got from” alter, the orientation to alter should be treated as instrumental. Only when 
alter himself is, in some relevant aspect, the object, is it expressive. Ego’s relation to alter 
as a means to a goal, e.g., the mother as the source of food, is one in terms of which the 
rignts vis-à-vis alter should be classified as facilities. This example shows the 
fundamental character of the reciprocal interdependence of human beings on each other 
in an instrumental context. 
All classes of objects may, as objects of cathexis, function as rewards, and the problem 
of the allocation of rights in their pos-session may enter into the allocative processes of 
the social system for all of them. This is obviously true of “consumer goods” in the 
terminology of economics. Such goods are both cathected objects in the sense of their 
significance to the gratification processes of the actor, and they are expressive symbols. 
In the latter capacity they come to be evaluated in terms of their conformity with 
appreciative standards as well as their immediate role as need-disposition gratifiers. It is 
above all in this connection that so many physical artifacts are more significantly cultural 
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than physical objeets, because their style-patterning is more important than any other 
aspect of them. A good example would be style in clothing or in house furnishings. 
But just as in the case of facilities, perhaps even more so, a central significance 
attaches to the relational aspects of the reward system. Just as alter’s reaction to ego’s 
action can be of fundamental instrumental significance for the attainment or the blocking 
of ego’s goals, so alter’s reactions may be of fundamental expressive significance so far 
as alter is cathected as an object. We have seen in the last chapter that there is 
generalization from the cathexis of particular acts on alter’s part, to that of alter’s 
attitudes. This implies the establishment of expectations on both sides that actions toward 
the other will fit a certain pattern. Where the cathexis is positive, this involves an 
attachment, and where there is a common evaluative standard of expressive symbolism, 
we have spoken of a relation of “loyalty” between ego and alter. 
The expectation of a continuing pattern of attitude on alter’s part, with the exceptions 
of appropriate behavior, may be regarded as a relational possession of ego. It is 
intrinsically transferable in the sense first that the element of contingency means that 
either party may “withdraw” his loyalty from the other if his expectations are not met (or 
from other motives). The fulfillment of his expectations by alter can therefore only 
conditionally be counted upon by ego, and is not an intrinsic property of eeo’s situation. 
Further-more, most attitudes toward actors are capable of being transferred from one 
actor to another. 
This is true above all because from one point of view the cathexis of any one actor is 
the result of a selection among possibilities. There is always implicit if not explicit a 
comparative referenee in a loyalty relationship, namely, “I am more loyal to A than to B 
because of a differential evaluation of their respective significances to me.” This may be 
a wholly particularistic evaluation, e.g., because A is my mother whereas B is only a 
cousin, or it may be because A ranks higher by a universalistic standard of evaluation 
than does B, e.g., has a higher level of technical competence in a relevant field. But in 
any case this differential evaluation is as it were the obverse of the contingency of the 
particular loyalty; that is, the latter is contingent on ego retaining his place in accordance 
with the evaluative criteria. 
Then relational reward-possessions present an allocative problem just as do facilities, 
that is, through the power problem, and in the homologous way. The conditions on which 
ego has a right to a certain attitude of loyalty on alter’s part cannot be left unstructured 
and random. Indeed because of the crucial significance of the mutual orientation of ego 
and alter in interaction for the social system, it may be said that relational rewards are the 
core of the reward system of a society. The first principle of its organization is the 
institutionalization of the possession of relational rewards themselves. Physical and 
cultural reward-objects then come to be built into an integrated reward system in the first 
instance through their symbolic association with relational rewards; that is, on the level of 
expressive symbolism.4 
Before putting forward a few considerations about this integration it is best to raise the 
question of whether there is any basis of generalization and quantification in the reward 
system which is comparable to that in the system of facilities. This raises the question of 
the basis of classification of relational rewards. 
4 This type of symbolic integration will be further analyzed in Chapter IX below. 
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This in turn is the problem of classification of the fundamental types of attachment 
and hence of loyalty. Because these are so deeply involved in the fundamental attitude 
structure of the personality, it seems justified to take as the basis of this classification the 
two pattern variables of affectivity-neutrality and specificity-diffuseness. This, as was 
shown in the last chapter, yields the following fourfold table: 
 
The bases for the significance of this classification have been laid in the discussion in the 
last chapter of the relational context of expressive action-orientation. It remains here to 
draw a few of the implications for the structure of the reward system. 
There seem to be inherent empirical connections between diffuse love attachments and 
particularism. This means that through love attachments an actor is likely to be bound 
only to a small circle of persons “close” to him. However, the same order of attachment 
may be involved, as we have seen, in his integration with collectivities, including very 
large ones such as the nation. But a very important feature of such attachment to a 
collectivity is that it is not a basis of differential reward as between those who share 
membership, though there may of course be differential rewards in the form of statuses 
and other symbolically significant things within the collectivity—but this is different 
from the significance of membership as such. Furthermore, love attachments become 
attenuated into “casual” friendliness as they go down in the order of precedence of 
obligation, but precisely because of this attenuation, to be treated in a friendly way is not 
a focally significant reward in most situations from the point of view of personality. 
The attitudes of receptiveness and responsiveness in specific expressively significant 
contexts are considerably more capable of generalization. Indeed by virtue of their 
specificity they are in certain respects comparable with the pattern of economic 
exchange. It is of course well known that under certain circumstances mutual erotic 
gratification may be made to fit such a context, though this is never the central pattern of 
the institutionalization of this class of rewards. Similarly with the type of expressively 
oriented activity we may call recreation or entertainment. Indeed in all probability what is 
usually thought of as friendliness should probably be placed in this category. It is a kind 
of “recreational penumbra” of orientations, the core of which belongs on another level. 
In societies with a primacy of expressive orientations it is probable that the primary 
focus of the total reward system is to be sought on this level (i.e., of love and 
receptiveness-response). In this case institutionalization will tend to prescribe the limits 
and the scope of obligations involved in legitimate love attachments, as well as defining 
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the range of legitimacy of the expressive interests and activities. The proliferation of 
recreational activities and of art would be expected in such a society. 
There would, however, appear to be considerably greater possibilities of 
generalization where the balance is shifted from affectivity to the affectively neutral side. 
For evident reasons rewards in the form of attitudes of approval and esteem would be 
more prominent in societies and subsystems of any society where either universalism or 
achievement values or both were prominent. 
There is an interesting parallel between the distinction between economic and political 
power on the one hand, and approval and esteem rewards on the other. Approval is an 
attitude focused on a specific context, a quality complex or a type of performance. It is 
therefore capable of abstraction to a relatively hign degree from the other features of the 
object. We can approve or admire competent performance even though we are far from 
admiring other things about the person in question. Approval-rewards are clearly of great 
importance to the reward system of a society which institutionalizes universalistic-
achievement values and which gives a prominent place to roles defined in these terms and 
those of functional specificity. The great difference from economic power, however, lies 
in the fact that there is no symbolic quantification of the objects of approval to compare 
with money with respect to simplicity and lack or ambiguity. This, however, is one 
principal reason why money tends to acquire such a prominent status as a symbol of 
approved qualities or achievements in such a situation. It is a peculfarly appropriate 
symbol. 
The case of esteem is more closely analogous with political power. Approval may be 
given without the implication of a generalized rank-ordering. Esteem, because of the 
element of diffuseness, however, makes segregation of particular contexts more difficult. 
Hence there is at least a tendency to a hierarchical ordering in terms of esteem. This 
hierarchical ordering we may call prestige, which is the relative esteem in which an 
individual is held in an ordered total system of differentiated evaluadon. 
There is, therefore, a sense in which all the elements of the relational reward system 
come to be integrated in terms of a ranking system in terms of esteem, just as the control 
of facilities is ordered in a political power system. This ranking system in terms of esteem 
is what we may call the system of stratification of the society. It is the general resultant 
of many particular bases of differential evaluation. Non-relational reward-objects 
naturally have to be integrated with the prestige system in one aspect of their significance 
as expressive symbols. Hence many elements of the “style of life” come to have 
significance, among other things, as symbols of prestige in the system of stratification. 
One further general point needs to be made. Affective neutrality in general terms 
means, as we saw in the last chapter, primacy either of instrumental or of moral 
orientations. In the case of approval and esteem it must mean the latter because only this 
is directly relevant to expressive orientations. This is the fundamental analytical basis of 
the place of moral sentiments in the institutionalization of the reward allocation systems 
of societies on which Durkheim and Max Weber laid such great stress. Both affective and 
affectively neutral attitudes play a fundamental part in the sanction system of role-
orientations. The present analysis gives us a basis for discriminating their respective 
places, and their relation to the instrumental aspect of sanctions. 
We may now turn to the integrative foci of the functional problems of the social 
system. These fall, in accordance with the discussions of the last chapter, into two well 
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defined classes. First are the negative problems of defining the limits of permissiveness 
for “private” interests or self-orientation, both of individual actors and of sub-
collectivities. The second is that of the institutionalization of the positively integrative 
functions of the social system considered as a collectivity; that is, the definition of the 
gradations of responsibility, and the structuring of leadership, including executive and 
representative roles. 
In approaching this problem area it should first be called to mind that the 
institutionalization of roles is itself a mode of integration of the social system. It is the 
most elementary level of putting together of the units. Our concern now is with the higher 
reaches of integration of many sub-integrations. This conception of a hierarchy of 
integrations may be carried a step farther. A collectivity is a system of roles integrated in 
certain ways, which were discussed in the last chapter. But a social system is in one 
aspect a network of sub-collectivities, connected by “interstitial” patternings and 
mechanisms. At the same time a society, and many though not all types of partial social 
system, is itself a collectivity of a higher order of organization. Thus our fundamental 
starting point has to be the general nature of the collectivity and hence of its possibilities 
of differentiation. Conversely the problems of the society are referable back to any 
collectivity, with the appropriate allowance for its partiality. 
The first basic integrative reference then is to the limitations on permissiveness for 
orientation in terms of private interests. These limitations are referable to functional 
“problem” contexts of the social system as a collectivity. These are in turn classifiable as 
the regulation of the allocative processes, and adequate provision for collective needs. 
This is the functional focus of the significance of what we have called regulative 
institutions. 
The problem of the regulation of allocative processes may be broken down in terms of 
the foregoing classification. There must be regulation of the processes by which roles 
themselves and their relationships change within the system. Only in a limiting case is the 
role-structure of a system completely fixed. Most social systems are dynamically 
changing in this as in other respects. But room for change does not mean that any actor or 
group of them can “innovate” by redefining their roles in any way they may happen to 
desire. Some types of such innovation are compatible with the stability of the social 
system while others are not. Hence the institutionalization of patterns of legitimation of 
private role-innovation is one important context of regulation of permissiveness. 
The second context is regulation of the processes of allocation of personnel where the 
problem is to see that the “right” people get into the right roles, and that people stay 
“where they belong” in terms of status. Essentially the same is to be said about thc 
regulation of the allocation of facilities and of rewards, heading as they do up to the 
political power problem and the prestige problem. In all three of these contexts there is 
not only the problem of protecting a status quo but of the institutionalization of regulated 
innovation. This is extremely closely connected with regulation of what have been called 
the competitive aspects of the processes of allocation. 
A stable equilibrium of purely competitive orientation is, of course, as economic 
theory has shown, fully conceivable. Nonetheless such interaction systems must be 
presumed to be in general more unstable than the automatically ascriptive type and 
probably more so than the appointive or decision-selection type. The prediction of just 
how personnel, facility and reward allocation will come out when left to a freely 
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competitive process may be highly uncertain. A social system in whicn such processes 
are prominent must therefore presumably have a considerable range of tolerance for 
differences of outcome. At the same time the disruptive potentialities are so great that 
there must also be limits to this range, even though they are flexible. It seems probable 
that an “individualistic” society of this sort will also have to be able to tolerate 
considerable deviations from any abstract standard of “justice.” 
With respect to any or all of the above integrative problems there is a range of 
possibilities as to how this set of norms limiting permissiveness, that is, the system of 
regulative institutions, is both patterned and institutionalized in the sense of the structure 
of the sanction system. Here there seem to be two most significant poles of variability on 
the latter basis, the “informa” and the “formal.” In the first case sanctions are left in 
“private” hands alone. They are a matter of the “spontaneous” reaction of alter to what 
ego does. There is no differentiation of roles about the axis of implementation of the 
common value patterns as a collective interest. This informal mode of institutionalization 
is, the evidence seems to show, the fundamental foundation of “social control” in all 
societies next to the institutionalization of roles in general. There is little hope of a formal 
sanction system operating effectively in most cases unless it is backed by such a system 
of moral sentiments as on the whole favor the institutionalized pattern system so that alter 
is inclined spontaneously to react favorably to conformity and unfavorably to deviance on 
ego’s part. 
The second polar type, however, is that of formalized sanctions. This implies, as 
noted, differentiation of roles relative to responsibility vis-à-vis the collectivity for 
maintenance of the integrity of a normative system. There are, in tum, two main functions 
in such differentiated roles, namely, interpretation, which is important because of the 
frequent range of uncertainty as to just what role-obligations are and how generalized 
rules apply, and enforcement. Enforcement here should not be interpreted to mean only 
the application of negative sanctions in case of deviance, but special responsibility for use 
of any and all sanctions, positive or negative. The difference from the spontaneous 
informal case is that in that case sanctions are a matter of “private morality,” whereas in 
the formal case they are a matter of specific role-obligation. 
Most larger-scale social systems of course have important elements of both types of 
institutionalization. As noted, the fundamental groundwork tends to be informal, but the 
more complex and dynamic the social system, the more this tends to be supplemented by 
the differentiation of roles carrying collective responsibility, which thus have directly 
integrative functions in this sense. 
The other aspect of the foci for integrative structuring is that of the positive promotion 
of collective goals or interests. Again in a limiting case this may be informally structured, 
with completely spontaneous collective reactions. But the limits of this informality, 
according to size of group and other factors, are extremely narrow. Very soon 
“leadership” roles appear, which in most complex social systems become of very great 
significance. As we noted above such roles may in turn be differentiated according to 
functions internal to the collcctivity as “administrative” roles, and those external to it in 
relations outside, in “representative” roles. 
There is of course a wide variety of functional problems concerned with the relation 
between leadership roles and the rest of the collectivity, problems which have been 
intensively worked over in studies in the field of govemment, and elsewhere. Following 
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Max Weber here we may put primary stress on the basis of the legitimacy of “authority” 
to take action which is “binding” on the collectivity as a unit and hence its members. 
Authority to bind and to coerce a member of the collectivity is, in this respect, of the 
same fundamental character as authority to assume a treaty obligation. In other words, the 
primary starting point for the analysis of 
TABLE 3 
PARADIGM FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL 
SYSTEMS 
Prerequisites of Social Structure: 1) Motivational 
Resources for Role-behavior requirements. 2) 
Situational Resources and Conditions. 3) Cultural 
Accumulation: knowledge, artifacts, etc. 
STRUCTURE OF THE OBJECT 
SITUATION (AS ENTERING 
INTO THE DEFINITIONS OF 
ROLEEXPECTATIONS) 
FUNCTIONAL 
FOCI FOR 
STRUCTURING OF 
THE SOCIAL 
SYSTEM 
SELECTIVE CHOICE-
ALTER-NATIVE FOCI 
FOR THE 
STRUCTURING OF 
ROLE-EXPECTATIONS 
(PATTERN 
VARIABLES) 
Allocative Foci. 1. 
  
Primarily relevant to 
status-structure 
patterning. 
Organisms 
a) Distribution of 
rolecontent types. 
  
  
a) Universalism—
Particularism. 
Ego as 
Personality 
Social objects 
oriented to 
selectivquality or ity 
by performance 
modalities 
b) Distribution of 
perroles, including 
sonnel between 
memberships in 
collectivities. 
  b) Ascription—
Achievement. 
Alter as 
Personality 
—— c) Distribution of 
facilities, among 
roles and actors. 
2. Primarily relevant to 
attitude-orientation within 
roles. 
  c) Affectivity—Affective Collectivities 
1.
d) Distribution of 
Rewards among 
roles and actors.   d) Specificity—
Neutrality. Diffuseness 
Integrative Foci.     Physical 
Objects 
All objects as of 
Cognitive-
Cathnificance ectic 
sigand as 
instrumental means 
or conditions 
2.
a) Sub-collectivity 
solidarities. 
3. Primarily relevant to 
integration of the
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  b) Society—wide 
solidarity (Relation 
to the Ethos of the 
Culture). 
  collectivity. 
Cultural 
Objects 
 
  
    e) Self-Orientation—
Collectivity—Orientadon. 
variability lies in the nature of the value-orientation patterns which define this aspect of 
the role. 
These functional foci of crystallization of the structure of the social system discussed 
in this section are shown in relation to the pattem variables and to the structure of the 
situation in Table 3.  
§ THE INTERNAL DIFFERENTIATION OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
WE have now reached the point where an attempt must be made to work out a basis for 
the structural description of a social system as a whole, showing the basis of the 
differentiation of its units from each other, the ranges of that differentiation, and the 
structural relations of the units which constitute the system. 
We will classify these possible sources of structural differentiation under six headings 
as follows:  
RELATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
1. The Categorization of actor-units as objects of orientation. Their classificatory 
differentiation and distribution, i.e., their objectroles (statuses), within the social 
system 
a. Individual actors as objects 
b. Collective actors as objects 
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2. The Classification of role-orientation types and their distribution within the social 
system. 
a. Roles of individual actors 
b. Roles of collective actors 
REGULATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
3. The “Economy” of instrumentally oriented relationships; classification and distribution 
of facilities and the organization of the power system. 
4. The “Economy” of expressively oriented relationships; the classification and 
distribution of rewards and the organization of the reward system. 
CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS 
5. The Cultural Orientation System 
The patterning of cultural orientations in relation to the social structure; ideology, 
religious beliefs, expressive symbol-systems and their syntheses including 
mechanisms of enforcement and positive implementation. 
RELATIONAL AND REGULATIVE INSTITUTIONS 
6. The Integrative Structures 
Social-relational integration (moral); the social system as itself a collectivity; 
regulative norms and their enforcement. Roles institutionalizing special 
responsibilities for collective interests. 
It will be maintained that filling in the above outline with the requisite detail of properly 
conceptualized statements of empirical fact will constitute an adequate description of a 
concrete social system, the amount of detail required depending on the problem. This of 
course implies that under each main heading there is available an adequate classification 
of the ranges of possible variability and then that the facts under each heading and the 
proper subclasses can be put together to describe the system coherently. Working out at 
least the starting points for these sub-classifications will be the principal task of the 
present section. But before entering upon it a few remarks about the rationale of the 
classification as a whole are needed. 
Perhaps the most familiar feature of the classification is the distinction between the 
first and second categories, namely, the classification of actors as objects, and the 
classification of orientation role-types. The employment of this distinction and its 
relevance to the analysis of social structure, along with the relevance of the concept of 
“possessions” to categories three and four, makes it possible to clarify a number of what 
have hitherto been baffling problems. 
The classification of object-units is concerned with what has sometimes been called 
“categorization” in the analysis of social structure, what in the last chapter were called 
the ascriptive qualities and the performance capacities. The ascription-achievement 
variable was, it has been seen, concerned with the modalities of objects; it is therefore the 
major axis around which the classification under this heading must be worked out. Such 
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categories of social structure as age and sex differentiations clearly belong here. But just 
as clearly both individual and collective actors must be included, of course with due 
attention to the differences. It has been evident throughout the development of the present 
conceptual scheme from early in Chapter I that collectivities must in certain contexts be 
treated as actors.5 If this is true in general two obvious conclusions follow for the present 
context. First they are objects just as are individual actors and must be included in any 
classification of social objects. Second, the classification and distribution of collectivity 
types, that is what, relative to the social system in question are its sub-collectivities, must 
be treated as part of the structure of the social system. 
The second main heading concerns the classification and distribution of role-
orientation types. These are, as we have seen, basic units of the social system. But they 
are units seen in one of the two possible perspectives, that of the orientations of actors, 
while the object-position of the same actors is the other perspective. The attempt to 
combine both in the formulation of the role concept without making allowance for the 
difference of perspective has been the source of considerable difficulty in the analysis of 
social structures. The essential point is perhaps that the total unit of social structure is an 
interactive relationship. Such a relationship includes, at the minimum, two actors, each in 
two capacities, first as an orienting actor, second as an object, but the same actor does not 
operate in both capacities in the same relationship from the same orientation point of 
reference.6 
In a completely “free” orientation relationship ego is free to “define” alter as an object 
any way he sees fit, within limits of what “makes sense.” But here we are talking about 
social structures. It is taken for granted that social structure through institutionalization 
places limits on the range of legitimized orientation of an actor in a given status of ego. 
By exactly the same token it places limits on the ranges within which he may legitimately 
define alter as an object. In other words alter as object is institutionally “categorized.” 
Only certain of the intrinsically possible meanings permitted of alter as an object are to 
be acted upon in this particufar social system or the relevant part of it. 
The first heading then concerns the categorization of alters. What, in an “existential” 
sense, are they within this social system and its relevant parts? The second heading deals 
with exactly the same concrete actors, but as egos, with the structuring of their 
orientations to the given object-world, the alters. Each actor is a “bundle” in each respeet. 
For each social relationship in which he is involved he has, that is, what may be called an 
object-role and an orientation- role. Just as in orientation terms he is not a single unitary 
entity, he has for instance an instrumental role toward one object, and an expressive role 
toward another, so in his object-roles he can also be “broken down,” he may be an 
ascriptively significant object for one, an achieving object for the other and so on. This 
separation of the object-role and the orientation-role of course involves a special type of 
abstraction. It must never be forgotten that these are both abstractions from the same 
concrete roles of the same concrete actors. 
 
5 This view is also extensively discussed in Values, Motives and Systems of Action. 
6 Ego may for certain purposes be located as an object to himself—but this special case does not 
affect the above statements. 
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The second pair of main headings of the classification also call for preliminary 
comment. Their rationale rests heavily on the analysis of the nature of facilities and of 
rewards and of “rights” to them put forward in the preceding section. Besides the 
allocative distribution of actors themselves as object-units, what is in fact allocated as 
part of the social structure consists in rights to these two categories of possessions, which 
in the specifically relational category of possessions comes to be identical with (or at 
least inseparable from) the possessions themselves. The concept of rights to possessions 
(and the obverse, the obligations to respect these rights) constitutes the rehtional link 
between the orientation-role asfect of social structure and the object-role aspect. Under 
these two categories, therefore, are treated the specifically relational structures or aspects, 
as distinguished from the classification and distribution of structural units. 
The possibility of reducing this relational aspect of the organization of rights to the 
two categories of facilities and to rewards means an enormous simplification of the usual 
common sense ways of handling such problems. It is derived directly from the 
classification of evaluative action-orientations themselves, reserving the moral class for 
special treatment in the integrative context, Of course as a classification of concrete 
relational nexi it must be put in terms of primacies, since all the concrete elements are 
inherently involved in every concrete social relationship. 
The fifth category is the cultural orientation system as such, so far as it is not already 
taken account of in the value-orientation patterns which are involved in the preceding 
four categories. Primarily, that is, this concerns belief systems and systems of expres-sive 
symbols. They cannot, in the nature of their place in systems of action generally, vary at 
random relative to the structure of the social system itself and must like the other 
elements vary within determinate ranges relative to definite foci of crystallization.7 
The sixth category concerns the overall integrative structure of the social system as a 
whole. It has already been made clear that in this connection it is necessary to consider 
the society itself as a collectivity, or perhaps (as in the case of Medieval Europe with 
church and state) of two (or even more) interpenetrating and partially integrated 
collectivities. Many partial social systems of course, such as a market complex, may be 
lacking sucn an integrative structure within themselves. 
Finally we may point out the relation of the present classification of the primary 
elements of social structure to the classification of the types of institutions presented in 
Chapter II above. Very clearly the primary relational institutions fall under categories one 
and two. Categories three and four are the focus of the primary regulative institutions and 
five of the cultural institutions. Category six, finally, has relevance to both of the first two 
classes of institutions. The structure of leadership roles itself may be regarded as a 
relational structure—but in addition the overall collectivity has regulative functions 
including those toward beliefs and expressive symbols. It must not be forgotten that 
relative to all these categories of structural elements there may be any degree of 
institutionalization from complete anomie at one pole to “perfect integration” at the other. 
 
7 Fuller analysis of these problems will be presented in Chapters VIII and IX below. 
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The procedure will be next to present a sub-classification under each of the six main 
headings with a brief commentary in connection with each, and then in the next chapter 
to enter into a discussion of how these can be put together to describe a total social 
system. For filling in the first heading we take up the discussion of ascriptive and 
achievement criteria in the last chapter.8  
 
I. Categorization of actor-units in object-roles: 
A. Individual actors 
1. Ascriptive Quality foci 
a. Classificatory 
Sex 
Age 
Organic and personality traits 
b. Relational 
Biological position 
Spatial location 
Temporal location 
“Ecological” situation 
Collectivity memberships 
2. Performance-capacity foci (all classificatory) 
a. Instrumental primacy 
Technical competence 
Instrumental leadership capacity (executive and representative) 
b. Expressive primacy 
Capacity to elicit receptiveness and response 
Capacity to form and maintain diffuse attachments and loyalties 
Expressive leadership capacity 
c. Moral primacy 
“Private” moral “character” Moral leadership capacity 
(charisma) 
both eliciting approval and 
esteem 
 
8 What we are presenting here, it should be made clear, is a schetne of the invariant points of 
reference or foci of crystallization relative to which concrete social structures become patterned and 
organized. 
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B. Collectivities as actors 
1. Ascriptive Qualities as foci 
a. Classificatory 
Size (number of participant individual actors) 
Composition (object-role types, distribution of relevant qualities of 
constituent individuals as detailed under A). 
Constituent orientation-role types (as under II below). 
Traits as a collectivity-unit (e.g., “rationalism” or “traditionalism,” 
“individualism” or “collectivism”). 
b. Relational 
Territorial location focus (is membership territorially bound or not? 
how?). 
Temporal location 
Inclusiveness (relative to any given other collectivity is membership 
mutually exclusive, are the two overlapping, or is collectivity B a sub-
collectivity of collectivty A?).  
2. Performance-capacity foci 
a. Instrumental primacy (e.g., a “productive” organization, a military unit). 
b. Expressive primacy (e.g., a theatrical troupe, certain types of propaganda 
agency). 
c. Moral primacy (e.g., a church). 
This is a somewhat elaborate classification but a simpler one will not do justice to the 
complexity of the subject-matter. At any rate, in the main, it is systematically derived and 
should serve to order empirically descriptive materials. It is, from one point of view not 
as elaborate as it seems in that it incorporates generally significant variables which have 
played a critical part throughout the development of the present conceptual scheme, 
namely, ascriptionachievement, universalism-particularism through its relation to the 
classificatory-relational distinction, and the classification of types of action-orientation. It 
is by virtue of such connections that the detail of such a classification can be given 
generalized significance. 
Of course, there remains the task of classifying the possible and significant ranges of 
variation with reference to each of these foci and certain of their combinations. For 
example, biological position in combination with sex and age, give the points of 
reference for the classification of the actual possibilities of kinship structures. If this 
problem of classification of concrete types were approached solely in terms of logically 
possible permutations and combinations it would very quickly become impossible 
complex. It will be necessary, therefore, to look for possibilities of simplification; a 
problem which will be raised in the following chapter. 
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II. Classification of orientation-role types 
A. Individual actors 
1. Primacy of “private” interests (self-orientation). 
a. Instrumental—orientation to alter primarily as a source of facilities, i.e., 
acquisition of rights to instrumental possessions or services, “contractual” or 
cooperative. 
b. Expressive—orientation to alter primarily as a source of rewards, i.e., rights to 
relational possessions and other possessions as symbolic of them. 
c. Moral—orientation to alter primarily in terms of “private morality,” i.e., their 
respective ego-integrative standards. These may or may not be deviant relative 
to institutionalized collective moral standards. 
(In all three cases if there is institutionalization at all, it is regulative 
institutionalization in terms of “rules of the game,” the conditions on 
which rights may be established and relinquished as limits of 
pertnissiveness.) 
2. Primacy of collective obligations (collectivity-orientation). Ego’s role that of 
collectivity member, 
a. Instrumental primacy of orientation with performance of instrumental functions 
sanctioned as obligation to the collectivity. Orientation to alter within the 
collectivity primarily as a “cooperating” colleague, to any alter outside, ego 
takes a representative role. Facilities are for the collectivity, not individualized. 
b. Expressive primacy of orientation with performance of expressive functions 
sancrioned as obligation to the collectivity. Orientation to alter within the 
collectivity as “comrade” with whom reciprocity of sentiment is shared, 
orientation outside the collectivity in a representative role. Rewards are for the 
collectivity, not individualized. In the case of an individual they symbolize 
status in and services to the collectivity. 
(In both the above two cases the focus is not on the limits of 
permissiveness for private interests, but on the positive obligations of 
fulfillment of membership expectations. But the focus is not on the 
significance of the collectivity in the larger social system, that comes 
under B below; it is on ego’s orientation to the collectivity.) 
c. Moral primacy. Expectation of both instrumental and expressive content of 
obligations to the collectivity (e.g., most kinship roles). With clear cut primacy 
in either direction this type would slip over to a or b type. Both rewards and 
facilities are for the collectivity and orientation to any alter outside is in a 
representative role. Obligation to collectivity is not merely a matter of 
“perform ance of duty” but of solidarity in sentiment, 
B. Collectivities as Actors 
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1.Primacy of “private interests,” i.e., of the particular collectivity vis-à-vis the wider 
social system. 
a. Instrumental—orientation to other actors, collective and individual primarily as 
facilities (including prospective members as contributors of “services”) and 
including enhancement of power posidon of the collectivity as a possible goal. 
b. Expressive—orientation to other actors, collective and individual, primarily as 
rewards, including above all enhancement of the collectivity’s prestige as a 
focus. 
c. Moral—orientation to other actors, collective and individual in terms of their 
respective moral standards and of the possibility or lack of it of solidarity with 
them, i.e.,of merging into a wider collectivity.  
2. Primacy of collective obligations to a larger collectivity of which the first is defined as 
a part. Primacy of the “functions” of the sub-collectivity for the larger collectivity. 
a. Instrumental primacy of orientation, with instrumental functions on behalf of 
the larger collectivity sanctioned as obligations to the latter, e.g., the army’s 
obligations to the “state” of which it is an organizational part. 
b. Expressive primacy of orientation with expressive functions for the larger 
collectivity sanctioned as obligations, e.g., the choir as part of the organization 
of the church. 
c. Moral primacy—essentially parallel to the individual case. 
The above classification, it is evidcnt, is organized about the types of evaluative action 
orientation, and the variable of self-collectivity orientation. This, as distinguished from 
category I, is not merely a classification of foci of crystallization but of actual role-
orientation types because it is concerned with the fabric of the relational structure itself, 
not the properties of the objects which enter into those relationships as in the case of 
Heading I. It is therefore in fact a classification of the possibilities of variation of social 
structures. 
III. The “Economy” of Instrumental Orientations 
(Here, instrumentally oriented roles of the types delineated under II, A and B are thought 
of as integrated to from differentiated complexes. These are of three types: 1) 
“ecological” complexes of division of labor without organization as collectivities, 2) 
collectivities and 3) the instrumental economy of the social system as a whole considered 
as an ecological system. The fourth possibility, the social system as a whole as an 
instrumentally oriented collectivity does not require special treatment because in its 
fundamental structure it is the same as any other collectivity.) 
A. The “instrumental ecological complex,” seen with any givenego as a point of 
reference. 
1. Ego’s technical role. 
2. Structuring of ego’s “disposal” reladons. 
3. Structuring of ego’s “remuneration” relations. 
4. Structuring of ego’s facility-procurement relations. 
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5. Structuring of ego’s cooperative relations. 
(Structural variability occurs especially with regard to the segregation of one from 
all the other functions, or the fusion of one or more of them into the same role. 
Segregation extreme: technical role—fusion extreme; without organizadon 
artisan, independent professional role.) 
(The content of the technical role or its fused counterparts will vary enormously, 
and such roles must always also be classified by content of “production” goal 
which are as various as “functions” on behalf either of actors or of a social system 
can be. The social system can, within the limits of permissiveness for private 
interests, be conceived as a “seamless web” of such instrumental ecological 
complexes each with an ego as its referential center. Certain such groups of 
complexes may be singled out as “markets” or “fields of competition,” etc., i.e., 
as units of a sort.) 
B. The instrumentally oriented sub-collectivity or “organization” (II-B-2a), as a system of 
differential instrumental roles. 
1. Differentiated technical roles—“contributions” to the cooperative production 
process. 
2. “Policy roles,” decision-making with regard to the goal-orientations of the 
organization, “what to produce,” quantities, timing, “public relations,” etc. 
3. Administrative or “implementation” roles. 
a. Internal to orgauization. 
Allocative—budget, facilities, etc. 
Supervisory—“seeing that things get done” (instrumental authority). 
b. External to organization (representative). 
Disposal functions. 
Income-securing and facility-securing functions. 
Cooperation arranging and implemendng roles. 
(Except so far as the collectivity is an “organ” or an “agency” of a more inclusive 
collectivity, such collectivities constitute foci of ecological complexes relative to 
the larger social system. They operate within the range of permissiveness for self-
orientation for collectivities—which may of course be differentiated by type of 
collectivity. Each one is the point of reference for such a complex. Similarly there 
is differendadon of functional content reladve to the social system, and grouping 
as in “industries” or “institutions of higher education.” Such terms may designate 
either a status class of actors or an ecological complex or both.) 
C. The instrumental economy as a differentiated and integrated system.  
1. Types of unit and their distribution; individual actors, organizations by size, 
composition, role-constitution type, etc. 
2. Functional content-differentiation of units. Production, product distribudon, income 
distribution, facility provision, cooperation. 
3. The instrumental units as a power system. (Institutionalization of power relations 
and “regulation of competition.”) 
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Obviously the subject-matter under this heading has been intensively dealt with in 
economics and political science. The present attempt is limited to taking over a few of the 
familiar concepts of these fields in such a way as to facilitate connecting them with the 
general analytical framework of this work. This would be the primary starting point for 
an analysis of economic and political institutions, thougn in the political case 
considerable attention needs to be devoted to the expressive and integrative elements as 
well as the instrumental. 
IV. The “Economy” of Expressive Orientations 
A. The “ecological” complex of expressive reciprocities with any given ego as a point of 
reference. 
1. Ego’s specific gratification and expressive-symbolic orientation to a parricular 
object, or class of objects. 
2. Structuring of ego’s receptiveness relations. 
3. Structuring of ego’s response relations. 
4. Structuring of occasions. 
5. Structuring of ego’s diffuse attachments and loyaldes.  
(As in the instrumental case structural variability will be in terms of fusion-
segregation with respect to the elements of this complex. The economy of 
“private” individual expressive orientations is another “seamless web” with each 
individual ego as a point of reference.) 
(Also, again, the “content” of the expressive interest will vary, and there must 
also [C below] be a classification by content.) 
B. The expressively oriented sub-collectivity (the Gemeinschaft) (II-B-2b) as a system of 
differentiated expressive roles.  
1. Differentiated expressive “contributions” to the collectivity, rewarding different 
members and the collectivity as a whole in different ways. 
2. Expressive leadership roles, eliciting receptiveness and response, becoming focus of 
attachments and loyalties. 
a. Internally—symbolic foci of loyalty. 
b. Externally—representative roles, e.g., as “propagandist.” 
(Fundamentally this is exactly parallel to the instrumental case, but of course 
structural elaboration does not go so far, and it is much rarer to find anything 
approaching “pure” cases of expressive primacy, than of instrumental primacy.) 
C. The expressive economy as a differentiated and integrated system. 
1. Types of unit; individual actors, collectivities by size, composition, role-orientation 
type, etc. 
2. Functional content-differentiation of units. Fusions and segregations, receptiveness-
responsiveness, love, approval, esteem orientadons. 
3. The expressive units as a prestige system (when institutionalized, stratification of 
the social system). 
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As noted, pure expressive primacy is relatively rare in the more conspicuous social 
structures. It is therefore essential to “dissect out” the elements of this expressive 
interaction structure. It is highly conspicuous in affectively accented relationships such as 
much of kinship or friendship, and of certain types of solidarity and leader-follower 
relations. 
V. The Cultural Orientation System 
A. Belief Systems. 
1. Existential Beliefs. 
a. Empirical—Science and empirical lore. 
b. Non-Empirical—Philosophy and supernatural lore. 
c. Specialization of roles with respect to invesdgative interests (e.g., scientist and 
philosopher). 
2. Evaluative Beliefs. 
a. Ideologies. 
b. Religious ideas. 
c. Role differentiation with respect to responsibility for evaluative beliefs (roles of 
religious and ideological “authorities”). 
B. Systems of Expressive Symbols. 
1. Purely expressive symbol systems. 
a. Expressive of accepted attitude system. 
b. Expressive of adjustive needs in response to strain. 
c. Specialization of roles with respect to symbolism (e.g., artist or performer). 
2. Evaluative symbolism.  
a. Symbolization of collective solidarity. 
b. Symbolization of meaning-adjustment patterns; religious symbolism. 
c. Differentiation of roles with respect to evaluative symbolism—moral-
expressive leadership or priesthood. 
In addition to providing a set of foci of crystallization for cultural institutions as such, the 
above classification calls attention to the fact that roles may be differentiated with respect 
to the special significances of cultural problems other than those of value-orientation as 
such in their general bearing on role-structure. The roles of scientist, philosopher, 
theologian, artist and priest—in the sense of “cult administrator”—fit in here. As noted 
above, this whole aspect of the relation of cultural patterns to the social system will be 
dealt with more in detail in Chapters VIII and IX below.  
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VI. Integrative Structures 
The system of moral valueorientation patterns on the social relational level in their 
relevance to the institutionalization of the social system as an overall collectivity. 
A. Institutionalization of the regulative patterns governing and defining the limits of the 
private sphere of orientations—for individuals and sub-collectivities. (The interests 
will be classifiable as instrumental, expressive and moral in the sense eitherof ego-
integrative or sub-collectivity integrative.) 
1. Through spontaneous action and informal sanctions. 
2. Through formalized enforcement machinery.  
a. Differentiation of roles with respect to enforcement functions. 
B. Institutionalization of positive collective functions, instrumental or expressive. 
1. Informally. 
2. Through differentiation of leadership roles and institutionalization of their authority. 
a. Oriented to internal coordination functions—administrative roles. 
b. Oriented to the situation external to the collectivity—representative roles. 
(In content the above classification should be the same as III-B and hence 
is not elaborated again here. Among the problems are those of the extent 
to which the integration of cultural orientations is fused with that of value-
orientations in general, e.g., are “church” and “state” the same structures 
or are they differentiated from one another?) 
The above classification is somewhat elaborate, and especially in the finer details, highly 
provisional. Such taxonomy is, of course, not profitable if undertaken only for its own 
sake. It is essentially a tool. Only in rather exceptional cases will any one research study 
involve very large parts or the total scheme. But it is extremely important to have such a 
scheme and to have it coherently worked out, to serve as a system of points of reference 
within which to locate any more specialized study and to begin to establish connections 
between the different parts. Such a scheme is, furthermore, the basis from which the 
comparative analysis of different social structures must start. It is the main outline, in 
short, of the structural framework to what has been called a “structural-functional” level 
of theoretical analysis.9 
9 Far more than any other single source this scheme derives from that of Max Weber as outlined in 
Chapter I of The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. 
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V 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE SOCIAL 
SYSTEM, III: EMPIRICAL 
DIFFERENTIATION AND VARIATION IN 
THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETIES 
 
THE classification presented in the last section of the foregoing chapter brings us a long 
step nearer to the possibility of treating systematically the concrete structure of societies 
in terms of the internal differentiations in the structure of any particular society and the 
ranges of variability between societies. At this point, however, we encounter a serious 
difficulty. From a certain abstract theoretical point of view a systematic treatment of 
these problems could only be attained by methodically spelling out all the logically 
possible permutations and combinations of all the elements which have been 
distinguished in the outline of points of reference, or which could be derived by further 
subdivision of the categories. 
Certainly far more work along these lines should be carefully and systematically 
undertaken than has so far been the case. Such an undertaking is, however, far beyond the 
possible scope of the present work. Many particular phases of it will prove to be of great 
importance in connection with the solution of problems in more specialized fields of 
sociology. We do not, however, propose to attempt to carry such structural morphology 
farther here. Before leaving the treatment of social structure as such it will, however, 
prove useful and illuminating to attempt to short-cut this process by mobilizing available 
empirical and theoredcal knowledge to give some indications of the main lines of internal 
differentiation and comparative variability of types of social structure.  
There are two devices by which we can attempt to take such a short cut. The first is by 
applying the broad classificatory scheme we have developed to the assessment of the 
significance of certain empirical uniformities which are fairly well established in 
sociology. The essential point is that in certain crucial areas of social structure we do not 
find that empirically observable structures cover anything like the whole range or 
theoretically possible variability; possible, that is, according to purely logical 
permutations and combinations of structural components. Actual structures are, rather, 
concentrated in empirical “clusterings.” In the first section of this chapter we will review 
certain highlights of evidence for the special importance of four such clusterings, those 1) 
of kinship, control of sex relations and socialization, 2) of the organization of 
instrumental achievement roles and stratification, 3) of the relation between power, force 
and territoriality, and 4) of the relation of the paramount integration of value-orientations 
to cognitive orientations and certain problems of personality adjustment in “religion.” If 
the existence of such clusterings can be validated, even only in a rather rough way, this 
validation serves a two-fold purpose for the sociologist. On the one hand it justifies his 
short-cutting investigation of the whole range of structural possibilities and concentrating 
on a fraction of them; thus it enormously simplifies arriving at least at a first 
approximation of a systematic classification of empirically significant ranges of 
differentiation and structural variation of societies. On the other hand, it can serve as a 
highly important lead into the formulation, and hence testing, of fundamental dynamic 
generalizations, of laws of social process, since the explanation of why the logically 
possible range of variability is empirically restricted can be found only in terms of such 
laws. 
The second short cut involves making use of certain of the positive theoretical results 
of the foregping analysis. The whole nature of the theory of action in general, and hence 
of the theory of social systems, as here developed, is such that precisely with respect to 
variability of structure, patterns of value-orientation as the focus of institutionalization, 
must play a crucial role. Empirical demonstration that this was not the case would, in 
effect, be a refutation of the present general conceptual scheme, or the reduction of its 
ana-lytical relevance to relative insignificance. We are, therefore justified in taking the 
possibilities of variation in fundamental value-orientations, i.e., in pattern-variable 
combinations, as a point of departure for developing a provisional classification of 
generalized types of social system in structural terms. If this is taken as a point of 
departure it is possible to introduce modifications of the purely logical implications of 
such a classification, modifications which are necessitated by what we know about the 
empirical interdependence of patterns of value-orientation with the other components of 
the social system. This attempt will be undertaken in the final section of the present 
chapter. 
In the middle section we will attempt to make the transition between the problems 
presented by the empirical clusterings to be reviewed here in the first section and the 
classification of total societies, by showing the importance of what we may call the 
adaptive structures and the corresponding integrative imperatives of the particular social 
system for the limitations of compatibility of different structural elements as parts of the 
same society. 
§ SOME EMPIRICAL CLUSTERINGS OF THE STRUCTURAL 
COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
1. Kinship Systems 
FROM a purely taxonomic point of view any considerable prominence of kinship in 
social structures generally would seem nighly problematical. Elaborate as the 
classification under the first heading in the scheme presented in the last chapter, 
Categorization of Objects, was, it got only so far as to name the principal ascriptive foci 
of a kinship system, namely sex, age and biological relatedness, without developing a 
classification under each or showing how they were combined, to say nothing of 
The social system     106
developing a classification of types of kinship structure themselves. In other words, 
kinship in terms of the possible combinations of the general structural elements of social 
systems has a high degree of specificity. The fact that kinship looms large in every 
known society means that a great many other logically possible permutations of the 
structural elements have either been eliminated or relegated to secondary positions in the 
social structure. This calls for explanation. 
But not only do kinship systems, that is, prominent groupings in a population 
constituted on the basis of biological relatedness, exist but certain further general facts 
are highly significant. The first of these is that membership in a kinship unit and status 
within it is universally the primary mode of initial status ascription of the new-born infant 
in all known societies. Following this, a highly significant part of the socialization 
process almost always occurs within the kinship unit, with kinship personalities serving 
as strategically important socializing agents. Thus just as initial status is ascribed by birth 
in a kinship unit and relations to the rest of the social structure are initially mediated only 
through relation of that unit as a unit to the outside society, so child-care is a function 
every-where ascribed to kinship units, and to various statuses within them. Details vary, 
especially the incidence of other agencies such as organs of “formal education” and 
various others such as health care, out the central fact remains. 
Third, there is a universal relation between kinship structures and the regulation of 
erotic relations between the sexes. It is universally true that there is a taboo on incest, 
namely that sexual relations as well as intermarriage are, for at least the vast majority of 
the population, except for spouses forbidden within the conjugal family, and often within 
larger kinship units. It is unusual for the legitimacy of sexual relations to be confined to 
the marriage relationship, but there is never lack of discrimination with regard to sexual 
access to married persons; their spouses always have defined sexual privileges, and post 
marital sexual relations outside are most generally rather narrowly restricted both by 
eligibility of partners and by occasion.1 
Finally, kinship units themselves, in spite of their many variations, fall within a narrow 
sector of the total range of structural variability of types of collectivities. In pattern 
variable terms, roles within them are always functionally diffuse and collectivity-
oriented. Their constitution on the basis of biological relatedness precludes the primacy 
of universalistic orientations, and narrowly limits the relevance of achievement patterns, 
at least as criteria of membership, to the marriage selection process. 
The important point is the near universality of the limitation of variability to such 
narrow limits both with respect to function and to structural type. Why is not initial 
status-ascription made on the basis of an assessment of individual organic and personality 
traits? Why is not all child care and responsibility sometimes placed in the hands of 
specialized organs just as formal education is? Why is not the regulation of sexual 
relations divorced from responsibility for child care and status ascription? Why are 
kinship units not patterned like industrial organizations? It is, of course, by no means 
excluded that fundamental changes in any or all of these respects may sometimes come 
1 Cf. G.P.Murdock, Social Structure, for the comparative evidence on this point. 
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about. But the fact that they have not yet done so in spite of the very wide variability 
of known social systems in other respects is none the less a fact of considerable 
importance. 
The broad lines of the explanation of this particular clustering are fairly well known, 
though many details are still obscure. The most fundamental considerations probably 
have to do with the consequences of the plasticity, sensitivity and dependency of the 
human infant and with certain closely associated features of the place of “sex” in the 
need-structure of the human personality. Presumably there is continuity from sub-human 
origins in one critical respect, namely the centering of the earliest child-care on the 
mother. This fact, plus the disabilities of pregnancy and the fact that only recently has 
other than breast-feeding become widely feasible, lie at the basis of the differentiation of 
sex roles. 
It seems, then, that the personality of the human infant has always developed in the 
context of certain crucially important early attachments, that to the mother looming by far 
the largest. Whatever the importance of these facts for the general possibilities of 
personality development, it seems that they are crucial for the perpetuation of kinship as a 
central focus of social structure. The most essential point is that the child grows up with a 
deeply rooted need for adult attachments which can serve as substitutes for his infantile 
attachments. Furthermore, this attachment system comes to be structured along the axis 
of sex discrimination. Surely, in spite of the apparently very great institutional plasticity 
of erotic need-structures, the great regularity with which homosexuality is tabooed, or at 
most permitted within very narrow limits, is a further fact which deserves to be ranked 
with those of initial status ascription, that of child care and the regulation of heterosexual 
relations as a central social uniformity. One essential point, then, is above all that the 
child has his erotic development channeled in the direction of normal heterosexuality and 
that this includes not only needs for erotic gratification in a specific sense, but for the 
placing at least of some erotic gratifications in the context of a diffuse heterosexual 
attachment. A stable attachment of a man to a woman with inclusion of sexual relations 
taken for granted, almost automatically results in a family. If this happens, the forces 
tending to integrate the child into the same unit are very powerful indeed. 
It is a highly open question how far the human family has an “instinctive” basis. 
However that may be, there is a powerful complex of forces on the action level which, 
once the family is given, tends to perpetuate it. The essential point is that the conditions 
of socialization within a kinship unit predispose the child to assume both marital and 
paxental roles at the relevant stage of his own life cycle. It is by no means out of the 
question that this basic complex of social structures and motivational forces should 
sometime be broken. Our knowledge is not yet sufficient to be able to say in much detail 
what the conditions necessary to break out of it would be, nor what would be its effects 
on personality and social structure. But, in spite of the enormous and nighly significant 
variability of kinship structure itself, the persistence of the kinship complex throughout 
the range of variability of social structures in other respects is indicative of a powerful 
combination of forces. 
The most recent large-scale demonstration of its power is the case of Soviet Russia,2  
 
2 Cf. Alex Inkeles, “Some Aspects of Social Stratification in the USSR,” American Sociological 
Review, Sept. 1950. 
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There is nothing in Marxist ideology in favor of preservation of the family; indeed the 
balance is strongly the other way. In the early days of the revolution it was taken for 
granted that the family was mainly a “bourgeois prejudice” and was in process of 
immediately “withering away.” Then came a very powerful reaction so that in legislative 
terms a far stricter level of official enforcement of family obligation than in most Western 
countries emerged. A possible set of forces operating to bring this about may be 
suggested, along with whatever may have seemed “good policy” to the top leaoership. 
The basic need-disposition structure on which motivation for the familial roles of adults 
is built up is developed in the context of childhood attachments. Ambivalence relative to 
these attachments is, of course, the rule though varying in intensity. The revolutionary 
situation may well have given opportunity for expression of the negative side of the 
ambivalence. But it is well known that in situations of acute psychological insecurity 
there is a strong tendency to regression. A revolutionary period certainly creates a great 
deal of insecurity. It may well be, therefore, that the resurgence of a demand for, or at 
least a toleration of, strict family morality, involved a widespread regression to 
attachment needs with high security values. This interpretation, if correct, would illustrate 
the difficulty of “abolishing” such a deep-rooted complex of role-orientations as those 
underlying the place of kinship structures in societies.3 
2. Instrumental Achievement Structures and Stratification 
A second principal clustering which limits the variation of structures which might 
otherwise be formally possible, is that of the relation of instrumental complexes to 
stratification. The essential fact here seems to be that there are rather sharp limits to the 
independent variability of the instrumental structure and the distribution of facilities, on 
the one hand, the distribution of rewards on the other. The actual variability, that is, 
occurs within a “band” which is considerably narrower than the range of logically 
possible permutations and combinations. 
The more “strung out” dimension of this band is the degree to which instrumental 
orientations are segregated out from fusions with expressive orientations and are 
differentiated. On this continuum, the modern Western type of occupational role structure 
stands near the pole of maximum segregation, while the situation characteristic of so 
many non-literate societies, where the over- whelming proportion of instrumental 
functions is carried out in kinship roles, stands close to the opposite pole. This is, to be 
sure, a highly significant range of variability in social structures and the differences along 
it are fundamental in a whole series of respects. 
But the “band” is relatively narrow. This is a way of saying in figurative terms that 
there is not very much variability along another dimension. This dimension is the matter 
of the degree of independence of instrumental role allocation and hence distribution of 
facilities from prestige distribution, or allocation of rewards. Whatever the type of 
structure with regard to fusions and segregations, and the degree of functional 
3 A similar process took place in the French Revolution in connection especially with the attempt to 
abolish the legal distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children. Cf. Crane Brinton, 
French Revolutionary Legislation on Illegitimacy 1798–1804. 
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differentiation of roles, these two tend to go hand in hand, to be closely integrated with 
each other. 
There are two primary aspects of this integration. The first concerns problems internal 
to a universalistic, functionally specific, and affectively neutral sub-system of 
instrumental orientations. Here the relational reward system consists primarily of 
approval and esteem, and their obverses disapproval and disesteem, and the distribution 
of non-social reward-objects in accordance with their symbolic relations to an approval-
esteem scale. The second concerns the response and love aspects of the reward system 
and its relation to the instrumental complex. The significance of kinship in this latter 
context is, because of the considerations just outlined, so great that it is above all a 
question of the relations between the instrumental complex and the family. 
First, within the instrumental complex itself. With the elaboration of the division of 
labor there is an inherent tendency to differentiate along two axes both of which have 
inferiority-superiority implications. In the first place, achievement values cannot mean 
anything at all, if there is no discrimination between doing things “well” and doing them 
“badly.” The capacity to do things relativdy “well” (which is always at least implicidy a 
comparative judgment, relative to other actors) may be called “competence” or “skill.” 
With any at all elaborate system of the division of labor there will inevitably be a 
considerable range of differentiation of levels of competence, especially when a system 
of different technical roles and not just one such role is considered.  
Secondly, beyond rather elementary levels, instrumental role-differentiation requires 
organization. Organization in turn differentiates roles along the axis of “responsibility” 
for the affairs of the collectivity. It seems to be one of the best attested empirical 
generalizations of social science that every continuous organization which involves at all 
complex cooperative processes, is significandy differentiated along this axis, informally 
if not formally. 
It goes almost without saying that the imperatives of effectiveness demand that with 
differentials of competence and of responsibility there should go differentials in facilities. 
It would clearly not be efficient to place the best tools in the hands of the least efficient 
workers in order to compensate them for their lower efficiency status, still less perhaps to 
entrust the most important facilities to those carrying the least responsibility. The latter is 
indeed strictly impossible because of the relational component in facilities themselves. 
Thus the “connections” necessary to adjust an organization to its social situation, can 
only serve this function if they are accessible to those exercising responsibility. There is, 
therefore, an inherent tendency to allocate greater facilities to those on the higher levels 
of competence and responsibility. 
This tendency is both a functional imperative of effectiveness and efficiency of 
instrumental structures, and an inherent implication of the valuation of instrumental 
achievement. But the valuation of instrumental achievement itself means that achieving 
higher levels of competence and/or responsibility, and having larger facilities at one’s 
command are in themselves rewards, and rewards which are inherently differential. It is 
literally impossible to have an instrumental system sanctioned by the valuation of 
achievement without the internal differentiation of the role and facility structure coming 
also to be a differentiation of rewards, an internal stratification. This conclusion follows 
directly from the fundamental theorem of institutional integration or motivation presented 
in Chapter II. 
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The only way to avoid this would be to suppress the valuation of the differences of 
competence or responsibility, including denial of their functional relevance. Here again 
the history of Soviet Russia is instructive. Marxist ideology, including Lenin’s own state-
ments, did radically deny that any competence above that of the ordinary “worker” was a 
legitimate basis of differential valuation.4 But what has happened in fact is that, with the 
developing industrialization of the Soviet Union, both facilities and rewards have become 
markedly differentiated, includine monetary reward. The fact that the Soviet industrial 
manager belongs to the “intelligentsia” while his American counterpart is called by 
Marxists a “capitalist” does not alter the essential structural situation. Both receive 
rewards greatly in excess of those going to ordinary workers. Whether in this respect the 
equalitarian ideal of communism will be realized in the future remains to be seen. 
Perhaps a sociologist is at least entitled to be skeptical. 
This, of course, does not in the least mean that there is no room for variability in the 
relations between instrumental complexes and reward systems. There is very 
considerable room, but the fact remains that the “band” is far narrower than the 
permutations and combinations of the structural elements of such systems would by 
themselves lead us to believe had to be the case. 
But this is not all. The same individual actor who is the incumbent of instrumentally 
oriented, e.g., occupational roles, also has certain expressive needs which are not 
gratified in that role. He is above all incorporated into other role systems where 
immediate gratifications and diffuse attachments and loyalties to individuals loom large. 
The relative exclusion of such orientations from an occupational role system is itself a 
prerequisite of the latter developing to a high degree of elaboration. 
This is the essential basis for the segregation of kinship and occupational roles in 
“industrial” societies. But no such society so far known has shown strong signs of 
eliminating the kinship unit entirely or for a long period—as we illustrated by the case of 
Soviet Russia. In view of these facts it is not conceivable that, so long as thert is a kinship 
structure, it should be totally unintegrated with the occupational structure. This 
inteeration above all concerns its relation to the reward system. The solidarity of the 
kinship unit is of such a character that if certain facilities and rewards are available to one 
member, they will have to be “shared” with the other members. It is strictly inconceivable 
that most of the men highly placed in the occupational sphere, should fail to share what 
their incomes can buy, with their families if they have them, and perhaps still more 
fundamental, that they should not share their prestige. So long, that is, as there is a 
solidary kinship unit, it is impossible for the wives and children of those high and low in 
the occupational system to be equally treated, regardless of their personal achievements. 
In other words, these two basic components of the reward system of the society, 
occupational approval or esteem and the symbolic accoutrements thereof, and “emotional 
security,” love and response in the kinship unit, must go together in some way. The 
consequence of this is that the combination of an occupationally differentiated industrial 
system and a significantly solidary kinship system must be a system of stratification in 
which the children of the more highly placed come to have differential advantages, by 
virtue of their ascribed kinship status, not shared by 
4 Cf. Barrington Moore, Jr., Soviet Politics, the Dilemma of Power, Chapter II. 
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those lower down. Again this generalization is amply confirmed by the history of Soviet 
Russia. It is conceivable that this empirical generalization will some day be invalidated 
for instance by elimination of the kinship unit. But in the light of the historical 
persistence of this clustering, the question of how this would be possible is sharply posed. 
If what has just been said is true of “industrial” societies, how much more so in the 
cases closer to the “fusion” end of the continuum referred to above. Indeed it can safely 
be said that in such societies, anything even closely approaching “equality of 
opportunity” to the degree to which that is characteristic of modern industrial societies, is 
out of the question. But unless the need for kinship solidarities can be radically reduced 
below, for instance, the present American level, there is an inherent limit to the 
development, not only of absolutely egalitarian societies, but even of complete equality 
of opportunity. 
3. Territoriality, Force and the Integration of the Power System 
A third very central empirical clustering in social systems concerns the power system. 
We have already shown the way in which instrumental orientations, through the 
relational focus of facilities, tend to focus on power as a proximate goal and how, since 
facilities and rewards are so intimately connected, and the power of one actor 
is always relative to that of another, power can readily become the focus of disruptive 
conflicts. Finally it was also shown that force in one primary context, namely that of the 
prevention of undesired action, is an ultimately effective means, and force is inherently 
linked to territorial location because it is a physical means. 
This complex of facts is of such critical functional significance to social systems that it 
is safe to say that no paramount integrative structure of a society could perform that 
function effectively unless it were intimately tied in with the control of power relations in 
general and force in particular. No society can subsist unless there is a basis for “counting 
on” some control of the use of force, and unless disruptive conflicts which inevitably 
become “struggles for power” tending by progression along the gradient of resort to 
increasingly drastic means to eventuate in resort to force, are kept within bounds. If it is a 
partial social system which is in question an essential part of the problem of its relation to 
the society is that of its place in the power system. 
Certain types of integrative structure are, of course, very directly organized about 
these foci. The ideal type case is what we refer to as the state, which is the equivalent for 
this area of the social structure of the kinship system and the system of stratification for 
the other two. There is a very wide range of variability with respect to the extent to which 
such a differentiated structure emerges. Among other things it is a function of the level of 
organization of the use of force, and of course its technology. This in turn is connected 
with the level of technology and organization in general—if there is a highly developed 
occupational system it is always possible that the organizational patterns which 
cnaracterize it can be applied to organization of the use of force. We may say that the 
higner the level of organization the more potentially disruptive violent conflict can 
become, and therefore the greater the functional need for its control. But in any case force 
must be territorially organized. It is not possible to have a variety of different 
jurisdictions commanding force within the same territory without definition of their 
limits. 
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One concrete illustration of the importance of these considerations may be given. 
There seem to be certain elements of inherent instability in societies where the 
overwhelming bulk of the population is organized on the basis of peasant village 
communities. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the village community as the 
primary focus of solidarity can only within very narrow limits be an effective unit for the 
organization of the use of force. It is, in the face of any more extensive organization, not 
a defensible unit. Hence there must always be a “superstructure” over a peasant society, 
which, among other things, organizes and stabilizes the use of force. The question is how 
far such a superstructure is, as it were, “organically” integrated with the self-contained 
village communities and orten the level of integration is not high. This circumstance is of 
great significance for the histoiy of China, and, for example, of Eastern Europe. Among 
many other things it has much to do with the striking fact that the Communist movement 
has had so much more success in peasant societies than in industrialized societies, which 
have a much firmer structure between the lowest level community unit and the paramount 
integration of the power system. 
We may conclude, then, that societies where there is almost unrestricted freedom to 
resort to force, and above all where several agencies with independent control of 
organized force operate within the same territorial area, are as rare as societies where 
children are socialized without any reference to kinship relations or where the reward 
system is in inverse relation to the gradations of competence and responsibility in the 
principal areas of valued achievement. 
4. Religion and Value-Integration 
A fourth empirical clustering may be briefly delineated. In the first place there are certain 
types of situation of human life in any society which, though varying in specific structure, 
incidence and intensity in different societies have certain universal features. There is the 
limitation of the human life span and the universal experience of death, especially of 
premature death, not only as an expectation for the person who knows he is going to the, 
but as posing a problem of emotional adjustment to the survivors. The crucial 
significance of attachments to human individuals is such that death cannot be treated with 
indifference. Secondly, whatever the value system institutionalized in a society, the 
realization of the expectations which it defines is necessarily to some degree both 
uncertain and uneven. In part this results from the exposure of men to an external nature 
which is capricious and in some respects “unfriendly” in relation to human interests—the 
vagaries of the weather constitute one prominent example. But more fundamentally it 
results from the empirical impossibility of complete integration of any value-system with 
the realistic conditions of action. Every social rm is in some degree malintegrated, which 
means that there is ys a problem of the discrepancy between institutionally legitimized 
expectations and the actual outcome of events. There is always a problem of what attitude 
should be taken to what in terms of the current value system is undeserved suffering, and 
to the actual existence of unpunished behavior in contravention of the moral norms of the 
society, the “problem of evil.” The moral economy of a human society never has 
perfectly balanced books. 
From what we know of the psychology of expectations and the consequences of 
frustration, it is clear that there are difficult problems of adjustment in these areas. Just as 
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it is not possible to be indifferent to the death of an object of intense attachment, so it is 
not possible simply to take the frustration of one’s fundamental expectations with respect 
to values, as to what, for example, is fair, “in one’s stride” as it were, saying, “what the 
hell.” It is therefore imperative that there be some sort of socially structured orientation to 
these problems of discrepancy precisely between events and institutionalized 
expectations. This problem of the Ausgleich, the ultimate balancing of the motivational 
and moral economy, is the core of the significance of religion in a sociological context 
The phenomena in this field are exceedingly complex, and cannot be gone into in 
detail here. There is, of course, a very wide range of possibje structures. But the essential 
point for present purposes is that whatever mechanisms of adjustment in this area exist in 
a society—and they must in the nature of the case be more than merely idiosyncratic to 
particular personalities—they must be socially structured, whatever these may be. They 
must in some sense and to some degree be integrated with the dominant system of 
institutionalized values. They cannot vary at random relative to it. There must also be 
some order of cognitive orientation which covers both areas and the relation between 
them; the problem of the “meaning” of the discrepancies cannot be simply ignored in the 
belief systems of the society. Furthermore, there must be some integration on the level of 
expressive symbolism. These problems will be further discussed below in Chapters VIII 
and IX, respectively. 
Essentially the same order of analysis could be carried farther, not only by citing other 
empirical clusterings of the components of social structure, but by citing certain highly 
generalized relations of interdependence between the ones which have already been 
reviewed. Here only one illustration of this interdependence will be given, that of certain 
relations between religion and the power system. 
The religious movement, because of its relation to general value integration, claims a 
paramount jurisdiction over human value-orientations, which must somehow be 
integrated with the values institutionalized in the state. Some of these movements, 
however, have, in their religious ethics, radically repudiated the use of force or more 
broadly concern with power. 
Such movements face a basic dilemma. So long as they are alienated from the central 
institutional structure, the problems of power and force can be relegated to “Caesar” in 
the sense of Early Christianity. But if the movement becomes institutionalized as the 
dominant religion of a going society, it must somehow come to terms with these 
problems. The possibilities are various. The simplest solution structurally is for the 
religious movement to become merged with the “political” integrative structure of the 
society, but this is a solution which places peculiarly severe strains on the maintenance of 
what in this, as in perhaps other respects, are “other-worldly” values. But the structural 
segregation (not separation in the American sense) of church and state as in mediaeval 
Catholicism is not an easy and simple solution either. If the religion is highly organized 
as a church it cannot completely dissociate itself from responsibility in this context—
hence we have such phenomena as the church “itself” repudiating the use of force, but 
heretics being burned at the stake by “the state” as soon as they had been condemned for 
heresy by an ecclesiastical court 
This “dilemma of institutionalization” relative to a religious value-system is one of the 
most important threads of analysis of social systems and will, in particular, be further 
analyzed in Chapter XI on Social Change below. Here it may be remarked that it is also 
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very much of a dilemma for a “secular religion” like Commu-nism which also repudiates 
coercion and the use of force, as a matter of ethical principle, in the ideal state; indeed 
this is perhaps the most definite item in the official Marxist forecast of what 
“communism” really will turn out to be. But as we all know, as a movement, not only in 
promoting the revolution within “capitalist” societies, but in the stage of “socialism” 
within the Soviet Union, far from repudiating the use of force, the Communist movement 
has magnified and glorined it. The obvious question is, how if at all will the transition be 
made. 
These four examples of empirical clusterings of social structures are meant to be 
illustrative, not exhaustive. They are meant to show in the first place that the structural 
analysis of social systems is not merely a matter of spinning out the logical possibilities 
of the permutations and combinations of certain more or less arbitrarily defined structural 
components. We have taken a step toward bringing these components into connection 
with the problems of dynamic analysis, which is always the analysis of motivation in 
relation to personality structures and to situations. This is another way of saying that 
social systems must meet the functional prerequisites of their persistence as systems. 
These empirical clusterings thus provide us with excellent approaches to the analysis 
of dynamic problems. It is well known that value-patterns in many cases vary beyond the 
limits of these clusters, as in the case of doctrines repudiating the use of force, as just 
noted. There is, therefore, a highly important set of problems which concern the 
possibilities of institutionalization of patterns along the edges of the “band” of 
historically given structures, and beyond those edges. Along the edges we are presented 
with what are, more or less definitely ready-made “experimental” situations, of which the 
Soviet regime is a grand-scale example. 
That such situations should continually arise is indicated by evidence which will be 
presented later5 that there are strong forces in all social systems making for commitment 
to “utopian” patterns of value-orientation, that is, patterns which are incompatible with 
the known conditions of effective long-run institutionalization. Thus it seems fair to say 
that in contemporary society advocacy of complete abolition of the family, of absolute 
egalitarianism or of absolute repudiation of coercion, can be placed in this category. 
However, it should be made very clear that it is dangerous to suggest that there is a 
rigid line at the edge of the band. On the contrary there is every reason to believe that the 
line is indefinite. Society is not a static thing, and some things certainly become possible 
at certain stages of its development which were previously not so; to take a simple 
example the modern scale of organization would probably not be possible without 
modern methods of communication and record keeping. But this indefiniteness of the line 
at any given time does not mean that “anything is possible” if some people only want it 
enough, and it most certainly means that if the line is to be importantly shifted, specific 
mechanisms to meet the relevant functional exigencies must also be developed. There 
must be a development of “functional alternatives” to the structures which have been 
eliminated. 
 
5 See below, Chapter VII. 
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§ THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRICAL SOCIETIES 
THE implication of the foregoing review of empirical clusterings of the elements of 
social structure is that societies are subjected to certain functional exigencies without 
which we cannot account for the fact that the known range of actual social structures is 
only a fraction of those which would result from a random assortment of the permutations 
and combinations of their structural components. These exigencies are of two classes: 
first, the universal imperatives, the conditions which must be met by any social system of 
a stable and durable character, and second, the imperatives of compatibility, those which 
limit the range of coexistence of structural elements in the same society, in such a way 
that, given one structural element, such as a given class of occupational role system, the 
type of kinship system which goes with it must fall within certain specifiable limits. 
The elements of social structure have been derived from two sources, the patterns of 
orientation of action, and the elements of the situation to which it is oriented. The 
relevance of the orienta tion elements to the organization of systems of action, including 
social systems, centers on the role of patterns of value-orientation, because it is in the 
selective dilemmas to which these patterns apply that the basic alternatives of such 
organization are to be found. We may say, then, that if the structure of social systems 
were solely a function of the “free choices” of their component actors, their main 
structural outline would be capable of description in terms of the patterns of value-
orientation alone, and these in turn would be derivable from cognitive and expressive 
orientation patterns. The extent to which the structure of social systems is not derivable 
from cultural elements is therefore a measure of the importance of the determinants 
underlying what we have called the two classes of “exigencies” or “imperatives” to 
which they are subject in the realistic conditions of their operation as systems. These 
resultants of these factors may be considered as patterns of deviation from what would be 
the model of “perfect integration” in terms of the dominant pattern of value-orientation. 
Such patterns we may, relative to a given value system, call the adaptive structures of the 
social system. A complete account and classification of such structures cannot be worked 
out in the present state of knowledge. But the knowledge we do have can serve as a rough 
guide to the beginning of systematization. 
We may then distinguish that part of the social structure which directly 
institutionalizes the dominant patterns of value-orientation of the culture; there is little 
doubt for instance that in the American case the core of this is the occupational system. 
But as a concrete sub-system of the social system even this cannot correspond exactly 
with the pattern-expectations of the value-system itself. There will have to be adaptive 
aspects even of this structure, which may be interpreted as modes of adaptation to the 
exigencies of institutionalizing the value patterns in question under the given conditions, 
that is to say, in the light of the strains to which the population in question are subjected, 
in these roles themselves, and in combining these with the other roles in which the same 
people are involved in other aspects of the society. In the American occupational case, for 
example, the simultaneous involvement of the same individuals in both occupational and 
kinship roles is one of the key problems. 
Only in a limiting case, however, would the social structures which directly 
institutionalize the dominant value patterns, even with the above qualifications, meet 
most of the functional pre-requisites of a going society. There will, then, in the same 
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society, be other structures which are adaptive in a still broader sense, in that they are 
organized primarily by the institutionalization of patterns other than the dominant value 
patterns; this would be the case, for instance, with kinship in American society. 
We have already presented evidence to indicate that the exigencies of a going society 
are such that it is exceedingly unlikely that any one eonsistently integrated pattern can 
cover the necessary range. There will, therefore, have to be institutionalization of 
secondary or subsidiary or variant value patterns, institutionalization of which is in a 
sense conditional, in that its application and hence legitimation is limited to certain 
contexts in such a way as to minimize interference with the main value pattern. The 
problem of integration posed by the necessity of “tolerating” and indeed institutionalizing 
patterns deviant from the main values is one of the main integrative problems for social 
systems, the more so, the more complex and differentiated their structure. 
It is, therefore, possible to approach the analysis of types of social structure from the 
side of the patterns of value-orientation. By this procedure the first step will be to 
consider at what points in the system of foci of crystallization reviewed in the last chapter 
the primary foci of significance for the value-system in question will be found, and what 
the functional conditions of realization of the value patterns in question in that area are. 
How will these necessitate modification of the fully ideal pattern? Then the question will 
have to be raised, given what we know about the functional imperatives of social systems 
and their empirical working out, what other structures must also exist in the same social 
system, and how can these other structures be integrated with the central value-focus 
structures? This procedure will in fact be followed out in a sketchy way in the final 
section of the present chapter for each of the four main pattern-variable combinations for 
social value systems. 
Before undertaking this task, however, it will be best to build a somewhat firmer 
foundation for it by inquiring more systematically about some of the minimum structural 
features of all societies and then showing how these provide starting points for further 
differentiation and variation. The contention will be that there are certain types rof 
relationship which must find a place in any society, though their relative importance and 
their relation to others will vary widely. What we will be doing, then, is to approach the 
problem of the constitution of the empirical society from both ends, from that of certain 
functionally required minimum structures, and from that of the differentiation of types of 
value-orientation pattern, and the implications of implementation of these in a concrete 
social relationship system. 
Throughout the discussion, in both contexts, the system of points of reference 
developed in the preceding chapter, particularly the fundamental outline of six categories 
presented on page 137, will be our primary guide. The question will always be, in the 
society we are describing, what structures are found which fit under each of the six 
categories, and of course the further elaborated sub-categories so far as differentiation 
goes far enough to make these relevant. 
We may start by pointing out a conspicuous and apparently fundamental asymmetry in 
the relationship between ascriptive and achievement foci of status and role definition. 
There is, that is, a sense in which categorization in ascriptive terms apparently has a 
certain priority over that in achievement terms. There has to be an ascriptive base relative 
to which achievement-expectations are defined. When we combine these considerations 
with the implication of the universality of the kinship cluster, we may focus attention on a 
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fundamental complex of social structures in which ascriptive criteria play a central part 
and which, so far as we know, is common, though with many variations, to all societies. 
This is the cluster which in classificatory terms utilizes the qualities of age and sex, 
and in relational terms those of biological position and of territorial location as ascriptive 
points of reference. In the first instance on these bases kinship groupings are built up, 
with the conjugal family serving as the nuclear unit. Though there is enormous variation 
in the structure of kinship systems, there is constancy with respect to this focus.6 
Moreover, as was pointed out in the last section, this fact has further implications. This is 
true, first, because given the kinship unit, the status of the child in the wider society must 
be predominately ascriptively defined, and indeed the wider the influence of kinship the 
more powerful the ascriptive emphasis generally. Secondly, in terms of the other pattern 
variables, there is an inherent relationship between this ascriptive emphasis and 
particularism and diffuseness. Particularism follows from the fact of ascription by 
relational criteria. Diffuseness follows from the fact that the kinship unit is not organized 
about specific functions, but about a generalized solidarity of those placed together by the 
relevant ascriptive criteria. Only with respect to the choice of marriage partners, under 
certain conditions, does this primarily ascriptive structure of kinship come to be broken 
through at certain points. 
A central aspect of the diffuse ascriptive solidarity of kinship units is the fact that they 
constitute the units of residence of most normal populations. It is this circumstance which 
links biological relatedness as an ascriptive focus with territorial location. Hence, so far 
as the kinship unit is the unit of residence, we have kinship and community of residence 
directly linked together. In residential terms the community is a cluster of kinship units, 
or put a little differently the effective concrete kinship unit is at the same time the 
primary unit both of a kinship system and of a system of territorial organization of the 
population. 
There are, of course, many exceptions to this pattern. Various population elements 
such as students, some specialized work groups, e.g. lumberjacks, monks and nuns, and 
military forces, do not “live” in kinship units. But there is no known society where living 
apart from kinship units is the primary pattern for the normal individual throughout the 
life cycle. 
There are intricate inter-relationships between kinship and residence which need not 
concern us here.7 But given the universality of this combination of the two structures it 
constitutes a focus from which ramifying structural relationships can be followed out The 
combination, for instance, gives one component at least of the sociological setting of the 
problems of territorial mobility and stability of populations. It is above all because 
territorial mobility must either move kinship units as units, or set the individual into 
relationship with a different set of kinship units that it acquires its sociological 
significance. 
 
 
6 On the whole subject of the variability of kinship systems and their relation to residential location 
see G.P.Murdock, Social Structure. 
7 Cf. Murdock, op. cit. 
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However, there are two directions of ramification which may be selected for comment 
here. They are essentially two fundamentally different ways of organizing kinship units 
into larger clusterings. The first of these is the ethnic group. An ethnic group is an 
aggregate of kinship units, the members of which either trace their origin in terms of 
descent from a common ancestor or in terms of descent from ancestors who all belonged 
to the same categorized ethnic group. It may according to the point of view either be 
regarded as an extension of kinship into larger aggregates or as the matrix, defined in 
terms of biological relatedness, in which a given kinship unit fits. An ethnic group is 
normally endogamous and recruitment is by birth, though, of course, assimilation by 
intermarriage or even other mechanisms is in a certain proportion of cases possible. The 
biological distinctness of an ethnic group will presumably only be signiticant to the social 
structure if the group is characterized by a distinctive social status in the larger social 
system, a status which is very often at least marked and symbolized by a distinctive 
cultural tradition.8 
The second direction of ramification is the sorting out of kinship units relative to 
prestige status within the social system. This is what we call social class, a class being an 
aggregate of kinship units of approximately equal status in the system of stratification. 
Ethnic grouping and class can coincide where there is little or no class mobility. The 
Indian caste system is an approximation to this situation. But in the case of an “open” 
class system the distinction between the two is, of course, crucial; the ethnic and the class 
bases of differentiation cut across each other. 
Within every society, therefore, it becomes necessary to ask what is its kinship system, 
what is the basis of its organization into communities at the various levels of 
inclusiveness, and is it differentiated into ethnic and/or class groups? What groups and on 
what bases and how related to each other? It is possible that there are functional 
equivalents of these structures. We have seen that in the case of kinship this is highly 
unlikely. In the case of community it would appear to be strictly impossible. It is possible 
in the case of ethnic grouping, but only on the basis that the society as a whole constitutes 
a single undifferentiated ethnic group. It is, then, itself always an ethnic group relative to 
groups outside what has been treated as the same society, so we can say that in a strict 
sense this basis of organization is never absent. Theoretically all humanity could be a 
single ethnic group, but this seems rather remote. Similarly ethnic andclass composition 
may in a limiting case coincide. But class differentiation within ethnic groups is the rule 
rather than the exception. Finally, some degree of prestige differentiation of kinship units, 
that is, of class differentiation, also seems to be universal. 
The fact that these types of groupings are built about relationally ascriptive criteria has 
critical implications for the role-patterning within them. With the one exception of choice 
of marriage partner, membership in a kinship group can be only ascribed. Similarly with 
an ethnic group. In the case of a community, entry into the community may be voluntary, 
but given residence the rest is ascribed, e.g. liability to local taxes. This at least greatly 
narrows the range of achievement criteria. Secondly, residence either ensures or 
predisposes to diffuseness of role-obligations rather than specificity, since there is no way 
of ensuring that the exigencies of a situation from which either there is no escape, or 
8As in the case of the Jews. In the case of the Negro color as a visibility symbol in a sense takes the 
place of a distinctive culture. 
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only at the cost of changing residence, can be confined to any specifically defined 
context. 
Therefore, we may say that membership in the four types of groupings, kinship, 
community, ethnic and class, should characterize every individual actor in every society 
and such groupings should, with the requisite qualifications, be looked for as part of the 
structure of every society. Moreover, these groupings will be patterned partly, if not 
wholly, in ascriptive terms; they will have important indeed usually predominant 
particularistic elements, and they will have diffuse emphases, if not without qualification. 
What might be called a “minimum society” might as a structure be describable 
exclusively in terms of these four categories if the requisite discriminations of 
differentiated roles within each of them were made. It will be noted that none of them is 
organized primarily about the primacy of an orientation type. 
The next set of questions concerns the differentiation of roles and sub-collectivities 
not only within these four groupings but in structural independence from any of them. 
These will, in the first instance, concern thc areas open for, and the structures developed 
within sub-systems of, “private” instrumental and expressive orientation. At the lowest 
level of differentiation these would be purely “interstitial” to the ascriptive groupings, in 
which case such orientations would, in the ideal type case, be confined to representative 
roles on behalf of the sub-collectivity. This would, for example, be true of negotiating 
marriage arrangements between kinship groups or rclations between adjacent 
communities. 
But such structures may be more than interstitial. In such a case the structurally morc 
primitive type is, as we have seen, the “ecological complex,” for example, in the 
instrumental case a market nexus, in the expressive a network of “purely personal” 
friendships, Then, as a next step in structural elaooration, particularly in the instrumental 
case, there may develop collectivities characterized by primacy of an orientation type 
instead of an ascriptive basis of constitution. By far the most prominent of these is the 
instrumentally oriented organization. 
Both within the ecological complexes and the collectivities constituted by orientation 
types a premium is placed on achievement criteria over ascriptive. Similarly there is 
much more scope for universalism, and in the instrumental types, instrumental primacy 
implies affective neutrality. 
Both ecological complexes and their constituent orientation-primacy roles should, in 
these terms, if at all stabilized, be treated as parts of the structure of the social system, as, 
of course, are constituent collectivities organized on other than an ascriptive basis. They 
will still in a sense always be interstitial to the ascriptive groupings, but can, of course, 
develop to a point where they over-shadow all except the broadest basis of community 
and of ethnic belongingness. This is, of course, the case in the “industrial” type of 
society. 
The integrative structures fit into this schematization readily. The power-territoriality-
force complex is of such importance that what is ordinarily considered to be a society 
will, if on a high level of differentiation, generally almost always be organized as a single 
collectivity on this basis, will, that is, be a “politically organized” society. There are rare 
cases, such as classical Greece, where a “family” of city-states rather than any one really 
constituted the society. But the relation of this overall political collectivity to the 
“private” spheres of the constituent actors, both individual and collective, constitutes a 
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principal area of the structural features of any social system. As noted, this will almost 
always be closely integrated both with a territorial basis of community and with an ethnic 
tradition, as well as with internal differentiation on a class basis. 
There is, however, as we have seen, a possibility that certain aspects of the integration 
of cultural orientations will be integrated in part separately from the political integration. 
This is the case when there is a “church” distinct from the state. It is also possible for 
cultural integration to belong almost wholly to a private and informal sphere without 
overall formal organization, as in the case of Hinduism in India, which for much of its 
history has coexisted with a plurality of political units. 
Finally, what we have above called the “economies” of the allocation of facilities and 
of rewards as overall organizations must be treated as part of the structure of the society. 
As we have seen they must be closely integrated with each other and with the system of 
ascriptive traits. They are essentially to be regarded as modes of ordering the units of the 
system, the orientation-roles and the object-roles of the constituent actors both individual 
and collective. We can speak of differences in the degree of equality or inequality of the 
distribution of facilities and rewards, of degrees of stringency of control of this 
distribution, of relative prominence of individuals and of collectivities as units, and the 
like, and of equality and inequality of opportunity of access to both facilities and rewards, 
and degrees of mooility and immobility relative to ascriptive starting points. 
The above considerations give us one frame of reference for treating the problem of 
structural differentiation of societies. Underlying all of the more elaborate types of 
differentiation are the fundamental ascriptive groupings of which, in turn, kinship and 
territorial location seem to be the most fundamental, though ethnicity and class rank close 
to them. There may be, as voluminous evidence from anthropological investigations 
shows, a wide variety not only of variations, but of structural elaborations in various 
directions, without breaking through the primacy of these ascriptive foci and the 
predominantly particularistic-diffuse role patterns organized about them—variation 
within these ranges is by and large characteristic of non-literate societies. In general both 
instrumental and expressive functions are carried out within the fused type of role-
structure (Type 4, Chapter III, p, 87). Segregation of such interests is predominantly by 
occasion, not by role differentiation. The contexts of exchange transactions, mediating 
particular roles in relation to each other, are also predominantly included in the 
particularistic-diffuse role system, are institutionalized above all in terms of kinship 
relations or, as it has sometimes been put, the “fiction of kinship.” The “economies” of 
the facility and reward systems are thus not structurally differentiated out, but are integral 
parts of the central ascribed role-systems themselves. There will, of course, inevitably be 
some “interstices” in such a system, but by and large this is the major structural type. 
Within it, let it be repeated, there is room for very considerable structural variation and 
elaboration. 
A qualitatively new gradient of structural differentiation is, however, entered upon 
when two further closely interdependent developments take place. The first of these is the 
specialization of the roles of individual actors and of collectivities in relation to 
instrumental and expressive interests and functions as such, roles which are structurally 
independent of the ascribed diffuse solidarity groupings. The second is the growth of a 
nexus of “free” exchange relationships between these role and collectivity units where the 
settlement of terms is not fused into the particularistic solidary relationship structure, but 
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is allowed to be independently variable. This, in turn, necessitates the institutionalization 
of rights to possessions, both as facilities and as rewards, on a basis which is more than 
just one aspect of an ascribed-particularistic-diffuse solidarity structure. This new 
gradient of differentiation is that usually regarded as constitutive of the more “advanced” 
types of society, and the process may be carried to greatly varying degrees of elaboration. 
It certainly, however, opens out possibilities of the arrangement of human affairs which 
are altogether absent from the other type, no matter how great the elaboration within it. 
Certainly it is connected with literacy on the cultural level, and the concomitant capacity 
for abstraction and for cumulative cultural developments. 
Different types of value-orientation will, of course, have different selective emphases 
relative to the above structural possibilities. The way in whicn these selective emphases 
work out will be reviewed in the final section of the chapter. 
The above applications of the classification on page 137 and following of the last 
chapter bring us relatively close to a system of categories necessary for the adequate 
empirical description of a society as a system. They have all been systematically derived 
from the fundamental components of action theory. As a first approximation they should 
be complete; and very definitely they are not ad hoc. They constitute a systematic outline 
of the structure of the system, in terms which can link quite directly with whatever 
dynamic knowledge we have available, and can serve as a highly important guide to 
research. 
The next task will be to explore certain of the interconnections between these parts of 
the social system. The facts brought forward in the discussion of empirical clusterings 
will again serve as a guide. 
§ THE STRUCTURAL IMPERATIVES OF A GIVEN SOCIAL 
SYSTEM 
LET us go back to the problem of the subjection of a given value-orientation pattern to 
the exigencies of implementation in a given situation. An essential part of this situation is 
the nature of the other parts of the social system in which the pattern itself is 
institutionalized. 
Action toward the implementation of a value-orientation pattern, that is, must not only 
be adapted to certain motivational and situational exigencies which are universal to the 
human species and hence to the existence of stable social systems at all, but must meet 
certain conditions of compatibility within the same social system. The former set have 
been called the universal imperatives, the latter imperatives of compatibility or the 
structural imperatives. Only the two together can give us the limits to ranges of social 
variability. 
First let us discuss some of the problems of the modern type of “industrial” 
occupational structure. Its primary characteristic is a system of universalistic-specific-
affectively neutral achievement-oriented roles. There must not only be particular roles of 
this type but they must fit together into complex systems both within the same 
organization and within the ecological complexes linking in-dividuals and organizations 
together. It is out of the question for such a role system to be directly homologous with a 
kinship structure, so that it should be essentially a network of interlocking kinship units, 
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as many other social structures, like the feudal, tend to be. It must for a variety of reasons 
be segregated from the kinship system, because certain ranges of freedom independently 
of kinship pressures, including freedom for mobility, i.e., change of status, are essential 
to it. These conditions would be incompatible with those essential to many types of 
kinship system. Indeed it can be said that the “conjugal” type of the latter, which isolates 
the conjugal unit from other solidarities to a high degree, is the only kinship type which 
interferes relatively little with an industrial economy. Hence we may say with 
considerable confidence to those whose values lead them to prefer for kinship 
organization the system of mediaeval Europe or of Classical China to our own, that they 
must choose. It is possible to have either the latter type of kinship system or a highly 
industrialized economy, but not both in the same society. Either one requires conditions 
in the corresponding part of the social structure, which are incompatible with the needs of 
the other. In other words, a given type or structure in any major part of the society 
imposes imperatives on the rest, in the sense that given that structure, if it is to continue, 
other relevant structures in the same society cannot vary beyond certain limits which are 
substantially narrower than are the general limits of variability of social structures in the 
relevant spheres. 
A second example may be taken from the Chinese politico-cultural integration, the 
“bureaucratic Empire.” This involved, it will be remembered, under the Emperor, a 
synthesis of religious and cultural authority in the hands of an appointive official group, 
trained in the Confucian classics, and selected by competitive examination. This selection 
was nominally open to all on a basis of complete equality of opportunity. 
Actually, with few exceptions except in times of political disorganization, there was 
an effective monopoly of access to official position in the hands of a land-owning, town-
dwelling “gentry” class. This class, though its informal privileges were in conflict with 
the strict implications of the Confucian value system, had an essential set of functions in 
making such a regime possible. The two were integrated in such a way as to block at least 
two important types of development, either of which would have destroyed the system. 
The first was a feudal system which would have led to an appropriation of governmental 
power on a kinship basis and thereby broken down the universalism and central control of 
the governmental apparatus. This was prevented on the one hand by depriving the 
influential elements of the gentry of the incentive to feudalize because they were “on the 
inside” anyway, while on the other hand, the centrally controlling agency, through the 
power of appointment and related facilities, was in a position to play potentially 
dangerous elements off against each other.9 
Secondly, however, this structure also blocked the development of anything like 
“capitalism” though in other respects the setting for the latter was highly favorable. It did 
this by control of the towns, through the residence there and the participation in 
governmental power of the gentry, and by the capacity to absorb upwardly mobile 
elements into its power orbit and way of life. Capitalism would have destroyed the 
Confucian synthesis by shifting the balance of internal power to a group which could not  
9Another important institution was equality of inheritance between sons, which weakened the long-
term consolidation of the kinship interests. 
The structure of the social system, III     123
be integrated into the “humanistic universalism” of the diffuse politico-cultural type 
which was distinctive of the Chinese “literati.” The state would have had to become 
bureaucratic in a sense resembling the Western types. This case, therefore, again 
illustrates the dependence of a key structure of a society, the special Chinese type of 
“bureaucracy,” on its relation to another structure, the status of the gentry class, and one 
which was not by any means in full conformity with the cultural value-pattern which 
gave the former its raison d’etre. 
One more example may be briefly cited, this time of a case where structural 
incompatibility was a powerful dynamic factor leading to the breakdown of a notable 
social integration, that is, to an altered state of equilibrium of the system. This is the 
famous problem of the relations of church and state in mediaeval Europe. It is quite clear 
that culturally the Catholic church was essential to mediaeval civilization, it was its 
paramount cultural focus of integration. But it was institutionalized in terms of a 
hierarchy of priestly office, the function of which was the implementation of the 
sacerdotal powers of the papacy. Centralized control was the very essence of the Catholic 
system. But the secular structure was organized on a feudal basis. The structural conflict 
focused on the fact that above all the essential facilities for the functioning of any 
organization were accessible only through feudal tenure. Every bishop and priest, 
therefore, was in an equivocal position, as a priest of the church and as a vassal of a 
feudal superior. The two roles were structurally incompatible. 
In such a situation the very upswing of the power and the cultural prestige of the 
church in the 11th century could not but have a most corrosive effect on feudalism. But 
the dissolution of feudalism in turn strongly stimulated the forces which eventually 
destroyed the synthesis of mediaeval civilization. There was never more than a precarious 
balance between the church and the secular power structure, and this was fraught with 
high tensions. The victory of either would destroy the other. It is probably of fateful 
significance in Western civilization that it was a victory for the church, because if the 
balance had tipped the other way the hereditary principle in social organization would 
probably have been consolidated, not attenuated.10 
Again as in the case of the empirical clusterings which define relative universals of 
social structure, the boundaries of the variations which the structural imperatives of 
compatibility permit are not rigidly fixed. Indeed, as the mediaeval case shows, a good 
deal of structural conflict can be tolerated at the price of strain and perhaps instability. 
But there are certainly limits to this tolerance, even though they may change with the 
change of ultimate social “resources.” These structural imperatives, then, give us another 
way of narrowing down the range or social variability which it is realistically important 
to take into serious consideration. The two sets of limitations to empirical variability 
combined make at least an approach to the problem of systematic analysis of the general 
range of comparative social structure feasible. 
10 The celibacy of the priesthood was probably an important factor, because it exempted the church 
from the full force of vested interests in heredity of status. 
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§ PRINCIPAL TYPES OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
WE MAY now return to the value-orientation side of the problem of classification of 
types of social structure. We will proceed by taking up each of a series of value-
orientation patterns in turn under the assumption that this pattern is the dominant value-
pattern of a society. We will inquire first about its most direct institutionalization in a 
social structure, in what sector it can be most directly institutionalized, and broadly what 
type of structure is most likely to be found there. Note will also be taken of the types of 
adaptive structures most likely to be found within this area. Then we will inquire, in the 
light of the foregoing analyses, what principal additional adaptive structures are likely to 
be found in other sectors of the society, and within what ranges they must fall in order to 
meet the imperatives of compatibility, given the central value-institutionalization 
structure of the society. There will also be a brief noting of probable foci of strain, 
instability and susceptibility to processes of change. 
Because of the central place of the pattern variable scheme in the theory of action, we 
will take the four fundamental value-orientation types of social values set forth in 
Chapter III in Table 2a as our point of departure. These, it will be remembered, are 
defined by the combinations of the two pattern variables of ascription-achievement and 
universalism-particularism respectively. The reasons why these two pattern variables 
have been given priority for this purpose have already been discussed. 
In the light of the foregoing section it will be clear that, from the point of view of 
certain interests in comparative social structure, this approach will introduce what from 
some points of view may be regarded as a bias. Either universalism or achievement or 
both enter into three of the four combinations we shall treat This means that societies 
which are organized to an overwhelming degree around the four types of relationally 
ascriptive foci we discussed in the last section, will automatically fall into one of the four 
types. But as shown, for example by Murdock’s work, there is enormous structural 
variation in a whole series of respects within this type, and certainly in numbers of cases 
the great majority of known societies fall in this category. It may, therefore, be said that 
our approach here is biased in favor of stressing the importance of a small minority of 
known social systems which depart from this type. 
There is probably involved here a difference in perspective and interest between the 
sociologist and the anthropologist. Many of the social variations in which the latter is 
most interested will not be brought out on this basis, though they can be treated by more 
detailed breakdowns in terms of the same conceptual scheme. It would seem also to 
follow that the differentiations in which the anthropologist was most interested were less 
likely to be functions in a high degree of major differentiations of value-orientation, 
though this factor is by no means to be excluded. But on the other side of the coin, the 
present approach serves to accent lines of fundamental structural differentiation which 
are in some sense of “evolutionary” significance. They are above all the types which tend 
to emerge when major types of cultural development in the literate cultures have 
occurred, the emergence of the religious systems, the development of science and the 
like, and these developments have had a profound relation to changes in the structure of 
society itself. Both types of interest belong legitimately within the theory of action and of 
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social systems. Our present approach seems to be deeply founded in the structure of the 
theoretical scheme itself, as well as in empirical problems relative to the significance of 
types of variability among “civilizations” rather than among primitive cultures. 
Obviously what can be presented in the remainder of the present chapter is a highly 
schematic introductory sketch and most definitely not a “treatise” on comparative social 
structure. Its intention is to indicate the feasibility of an approach to a problem which, 
since the breakdown of the older evolutionary sociology, has not been satisfactorily 
handled in a systematic way. Carrying the implications of this approach through to a high 
degree of empirical elaboration is an enormous task which cannot be attempted within the 
limits of the present work. 
1. The Universalistic-Achievement Pattern 
This is the combination of value-patterns which in certain respects introduces the most 
drastic antitneses to the values of a social structure built predominantly about the 
relationally ascriptive solidarities we have discussed, of kinship, community, ethnicity 
and class. Universalism has above all two major types of application by itself. In the first 
place it favors status determination, i.e., the allocation of personnel, allocation of 
facilities and rewards, and role-treatment on the basis of generalized rules relating to 
classificatory qualities and performances independently of relational foci. Secondly, on 
the cultural level it favors a cognitive as opposed to an expressive interest. These 
emphases already involve a certain “tension” relative to much of the “givenness” of 
social situations, such as kinship and community relations. 
The combination with achievement values, however, places the accent on the 
valuation of goal-achievement and of instrumental actions leading to such goal 
achievement. The choice of goals must be in accord with the universalistic values. 
Therefore promotion of the welfare of a collectivity as such tends to be ruled out. The 
collectivity is valued so far as it is necessary to the achievement of intrinsically valued 
goals. This is the basis of a certain “individualistic” trend in such a value system. 
The achievement element also has a further bearing on the problem of goal selection. 
If any goal is given, there is some kind of pressure to achievement; in precisely this sense 
achievement-orientation is as it were an endemic and partly an actual aspect of any action 
system. But achievement-orientation as itself a fundamental value pattern, not as only 
instrumental to other values, implies that the choice of goals should embody this value, 
that the choice of goals and not merely the attainment of goals derived from other value-
considerations should be regarded as an expression of the actor’s achievement values. 
This, in the first place, eliminates traditionalism as a criterion of goal selection. But it 
also seems to exclude a universalistically defined absolute goal system, because this is 
intrinsically capable of attainment once and for all, and such attainment would from then 
on deprive the achievement component of the value-system of its meaning. Only where 
such an absolute goal was defined as continually subject to threat even though attained 
would it fit. 
At any rate, more congenial to the universalistic-achievement complex is a pluralism 
of goals with unity in the direction rather than the specific content of the goal-states. This 
is particularly congenial to integration with inherently dynamic cultural patterns, such as 
those of science which do not admit of a final state of perfection. 
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Hence we may speak of the valuation of a pluralistic and/or individualistic system of 
goal-achievement through instrumental actions as the primary concern of people holding 
such a value-orientation pattern. This will lead to valuation of activities segregated from 
the relational solidarities—the primary focus of sucn a social system will hence rest in a 
differentiated instrumental complex, in occupational roles, in the ecological nexi of 
exchange, in possessions and in instrumentally oriented organizations. The combination 
of achievement interests and cognitive primacies will mean that it is a dynamically 
developing system, with an encouragement for initiative in defining new goals, within the 
acceptable range, and an interest in improving instrumental efliciency. This means that 
the instrumental complex will tend to be a progressively developing and differentiating 
system of the division of labor, hence of differentiated occupational roles. This is the type 
of structure central to what are often called “industrial” societies.  
There will, in the nature of the case, be a number of adaptive aspects of such a 
structure. In the first place the goals of occupational aspiration, to say nothing of actual 
role-activity, cannot in a simple sense be the direct embodiment of achievement values in 
all cases, because they have to be realistically adapted to the exigencies of the actual 
occupational opportunity system in which, once an elaborate division or labor has 
become established, many things have to be done which, though necessary conditions of 
highly valued achievement-outcomes, it is not easy to value “in themselves.” While in 
less elaborately differentiated systems these might be links in the chain of instrumental 
steps to a valued goal for the individual, when they are all a given individual does, the 
question of his motivation to do them becomes acute. The most obvious cases of this sort 
are found in the labor role. But there is an important component of this sort in two other 
types of occupational role, those involving collective responsibilities and those involving 
the facilitation of exchange functions where such a high premium is placed on the 
persuasion of the exchange partner. Thus both the executive and the salesman roles 
involve acceptance of conditions which may not be direcdy very meaningful in terms of 
individual achievement values. In the higher reaches the rewards are such that the strain 
may not be very serious, but even here this may be a factor in the tendency for “success” 
to become dissociated as a goal from its basis in valuation of intrinsic achievement.  
One adaptive problem of such a system, then, is to integrate realistic achievement 
orientations in the actual occupational structure with what may be called intrinsic 
achievement values. There will inevitably be considerable discrepancies, which are 
bridged by the institutionalization of compensatory rewards, e.g., short working hours, 
and of the obligations, for example, of the adult male to have a regular job and earn a 
living, even though what he does is “not very interesting.” A second adaptive context 
which may be mentioned is that concerned with the difficulty of implementing genuinely 
universalistic criteria of judgment of performance-qualities and achievements, so that the 
individual is put in the right place and his rewards are nicely proportioned to his actual 
achievements. In this sphere we find institutional patterns which seem directly to 
contravene the principles which would be deduced from the dominant value-orientation 
pattern. Examples are the prevalence of seniority as a criterion of status, promotion and 
privileges throughout much of industry, and the “tenure” system in the academic world 
and in civil service. These may be treated as adaptive structures which have the function 
of mitigating the structured strains inherent in the exposure of people to competitive 
pressures where detailed universalistic discriminations are impracticable. From this point 
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of view such a system is subject to a delicate balance. On the one hand it must resort to 
adaptive structures which are in conflict with its major value patterns, because to push 
these patterns “to their logical conclusion” would increase strain to the breaking point. 
On the other hand, it must not let the adaptive structures become too important lest the 
tail wag the dog, and the major social structure itself shift into another type. 
Along with the institutionalization of occupational roles, it is clear that such a social 
structure is also heavily dependent on the institutionalization of rights in possessions, that 
is property, and of the patterns of exchange within certain limits. The functional 
requirement is above all that possessions and exchange relationships should be 
sufficiently free from restrictions which would prevent an approach to an optimum 
development of a system of facilities for instrumental achievement, and a flexibility of 
rewards which can be proportioned to achievements. 
Next, the reward system must be integrated with such an occu-pational structure. As 
noted above, this must take the form that achievements within the system should be 
valued, and that this valuation should be expressed in attitudes of approval and esteem 
and their antitheses properly distributed within the system. Non-relational rewards must, 
in turn, be symbolically integrated with these attitudes and their gradations. This implies, 
as noted above, a certain minimum of inequality, though its extent and exact content will 
vary with the specific achievement goals and reward symbols and the degree of 
differentiation of the occupational role system. In the most general terms it may be said 
that the basic reward in such a system is “success,” defined as level of approval for 
valued achievement. There are, however, extremely complex problems concerning the 
integration of such a reward system, and above all the ways in which various expressive 
symbols can be integrated with the dominant value-attitudes. 
Approval and esteem are sources of direct gratification but, as we have seen, of a 
specialized character. Above all, they exclude direct gratification of need-dispositions, 
other than the needs for approval and esteem themselves, in specific terms or in diffuse 
attachments. These and a variety of other considerations lead us to predict that as 
adaptive structures there will be institutionalized in this type of social system a variety of 
patterns at variance with the main universalistic achievement patterns. In the first 
instance these will be found in the kinship cluster which is above all built about ascriptive 
statuses and diffuse affective attachments. As noted above no industrial society has yet 
appeared which has come close to dispensing with kinship as a major part of the social 
structure. Perhaps two main things may be said of the type of kinship system which can 
best be integrated with the industrial type of occupational system. First the extent of 
solidarities must be limited so that the individual in his occupational role does not come 
into too drastic conflicts with his kinship roles. Very broadly this tends to be 
accomplished by confining the most stringent kinship obligations to the conjugal family 
of procreation, and isolating this in a relative sense from wider kinship units. Further, the 
involvement of the kinship unit with the occupational system tends to be primarily 
focused on the adult male. Especially with a system of formal education, which serves 
functions especially of technical training for occupational roles, and is, in one primary 
aspect, a kind of system of pre-occupational roles, the relative exclusion of minor 
children is relatively easy. The primary problems and strains center on the role of the 
wife and mother. The “easy” solution is for her to be completely excluded from the 
occupational system by confining herself to the role of housewife. In most industrial 
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societies, however, there tends to be a good deal of adaptation and compromise relative to 
this solution. The second important feature is the accent on affectivity in the kinship 
system. This has partly the function of inhibiting the development of some of the kinds of 
kinship patterns which would be a threat to the operation of an individualistic type of 
occupational system. Partly, however, it serves as a counterbalance to the accent on 
neutrality in the occupational system in that it offers a field for diffuse affective 
attachments which must be inhibited in the occupational realm. 
Thus from the perspective of the institutionalization of a universalistic achievement 
value system the kinship structure and the patterning of sex roles should be considered 
primarily as adaptive structures. There is, however, every indication that they are of such 
crucial functional significance to the motivational economy of the occupational system 
itself that their institutionalization is of high strategic importance, They cannot be left 
uncontrolled, and must in some fashion be integrated with the instrumental system. 
Because of the fundamental difference of patterning, however, the relation between the 
two structures is bound to be a major focus of strain in this type of society. 
Just as the imperatives of such a social system impose rather strict limitations on the 
variability of kinship patterns, so also does it with respect to the smaller units of 
territorial community within the system. The primary basis for this is the imperative of 
free mobility within the occupational system which means that too close ties of 
community solidarity, which are inevitably diffuse rather than specific, can be a serious 
threat to the main system. Similarly with regional differentiations. Perhaps partly as a 
compensatory mechanism in this context such societies tend to develop intense diffuse 
affective attitudes of solidarity with reference to the largest unit of community, namely 
the nation. The connection between the development of industrialism and of nationalism 
is well attested. Soviet Russia in this as in so many other respects, seems to be no 
exception, in spite of its “internationalist” ideology. At the other end of the scale the 
intensity of sentiment about the “American home” may well be another compensatorv 
mechanism. One reason for this is that the conjugal family is the unit both of kinship and 
of community as the local unit of residence. It, rather than the individual, must in certain 
respects be the unit of mobility. Its solidarity is less of a threat to universalism and 
achievement values than would be that of a larger unit of community as well as kinship. 
Ethnic subdivisions within such a society are not, as such, in harmony with its main 
structural patterns and hence create strains. They do, however, often exist not only by 
“historical accident” such as immigration, but they persist in such a way as to suggest that 
they have functions. On the one hand for the members of a given ethnic group it may be 
suggested that they constitute a focus of security beyond the family unit which is in some 
respects less dysfunctional for the society than community solidarity would be; on the 
other, for the outsider they often seem to perform an important scapegoat function as 
targets for displaced aggression. Nationalism absorbs many of the motivational forces not 
only of community but of ethnic solidarity since the national is normally at the same time 
a territorial community and an ethnic unit. 
Stratification in terms of an open class system seems to be inherent in this type of 
society. In order to accord at all with the major value patterns it must be open. But some 
form not only of class differentiation in the sense of differential rewards for individuals, 
but of integration in terms of styles of life including all members of the kinship unit 
seems to be inevitable. The basis or this is above all the fact that the family must be 
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integrated into the reward system, and, therefore, that the differentials of rewards must be 
expressed in a style of life for the family as a unit, including women and children, and not 
only for the occupational status-achiever. There is, therefore, as noted above, an inherent 
limitation on absolute equality of opportunity in such a society. 
Finally, too closely integrated a religious system would be dysfunctional in such a 
society. If the orientation of such a religion were strongly other-worldly it would 
undermine motivation in the central role system—if not this, it would, like Marxism as a 
“re-ligion,” tend to shift the balance over to the universalistic-ascriptive type to be 
discussed below. The pattern of religious toleration and a diversity of denominations as in 
the American case seems to be the least disruptive structure. The state in such a system, it 
may be remarked, tends to be regarded as any other collectivity, justified only in terms of 
its service to valued goal-achievement. It may very well be, then, that the problem of 
institutionalizing collective political responsibility is one of the most serious points of 
strain in such a social system. The primary diffuse solidarities of such a society then are 
family-home, class, community, ethnic group, religious denomination, and nation. There 
is also room for an ecological system of diffuse affective attachments. These are 
exceedingly prominent in the cross-sex relationships of the “dating” period with the 
attendant romantic love complex, but tend to be absorbed into the kinship unit by 
marriage. Intrasex friendship as diffuse attachment is much less prominent, probably 
because it can too readily divert from the achievement complex. Among men it tends 
rather to be attached as a diffuse “penumbra” to occupational relationships in the form of 
an obligation in a mild way to treat one’s occupational associate as a friend also. It is 
thereby spread out, and does not form a focus of major independent structuring. The very 
fact that affectionate bodily contact is almost completely taboo among men in American 
society is probably indicative of this situation since it strongly limits affective 
attachment. 
It may be suggested that expressive orientations are less dangerous—outside the 
family—in specific rather than in diffuse forms, and that this has something to do with 
the proliferation of “entertainment” in industrial societies. In these forms the actor can 
take his gratifications piecemeal, as it were, without incurring the obligations inherent in 
diffuse attachments. 
In general, what place is occupied by the affective-expressive orientations constitutes 
a major adaptive problem for this type of social structure. The problem of the place of 
diffuseness is another such problem focus. Its connection with affectivity has already 
been dealt with. It recurs, however, in connection with the “political” functions, within 
organizations and within the society as a whole. Where the emphasis on specificity is 
strong, there will be strong inhibitions against letting approval pass too readily over into 
esteem, against imputing general superiority to an individual, a role or a class. This is 
one of the most important factors in the fluidity and openness of the class system of such 
a society. Similarly, of course, with general inferiority. It may, then, be suggested that 
leadership roles in such a society tend to be unstable, and a focus of a good deal of 
anxiety and aggression. This is one factor tending to throw the balance in an 
individualistic direction and toward an anti-authoritarian attitude. 
It was noted above that in value-orientation terms there was a tendency for such a 
society to be individualistic rather than collectivistic in its emphases. This seems to be, 
above all, associated with the connection between universalism, achievement and 
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specificity. The segregation from the fusions involved in diffuseness, either of 
generalized status ascriptions or of affective attachments, seems to be essential to the 
mobility of personnel and facilities and the allocation of rewards by achievements, which 
this pattern requires. Leadership roles, for example, are least questionable where the 
organization has specific achievement goals, rather than, as with a political organization, 
diffuse ones. This set of considerations may well, then, underlie the “economic” bias of 
American society, and the fact that political responsibility is a point of strain. 
The collectivistic direction of emphasis, then, has a tendency to pass over into the 
universalistic-ascription type which will be discussed presently. First, however, a few 
more words may be said about some directions of variation of the universalistic-
achievement type. First it is possible for the achievement goals to be non-empirical. 
Unless, however, as in the case of Calvinism, these non-empirical goals give rise to direct 
empirical implications (the Kingdom of God on Earth) which can be taken as the 
immediate goals, the effect is to displace the whole emphasis away from the occupational 
achievement complex and thus alter the character of the society profoundly. The 
activities oriented to the primary achievements can no longer be rational-instrumental but 
must assume a symbolic-ritual character. This possibility has probably been most fully 
realized in Catholic Christianity where the church has been an organization for the 
realization of non-empirical goals. This throws the main emphasis away from the secular 
instrumental complex and puts a premium on its stabilization through traditionalism 
and/or authoritarianism rather than its continuing development. By the same token the 
pressure against giving affectivity and diffuseness prominent places decreases. This may 
well have something to do with the fact that the Latin countries, with their Catholic 
background, have proved relatively unsusceptible to the development of industrial 
patterns and that in certain respects, in spite of their religious transcendentalism, they 
have leaned in a “hedonistic” direction. 
2. The Universalistic-Ascription Pattern 
It will not be possible to take space to treat the other three types of society as fully as was 
done with the Universalistic-Achievement type, but since a comparative base line has 
been established, it ought not to be necessary. 
The universalistic element has the same order of consequences here as in the above 
case, but its combination with ascription gives it a different twist. First, the emphasis 
becomes above all classificatory. There may be a secondary achievement orientation in 
that the ideal state of affairs to which action is oriented may not exist in the here and 
now, in which case there is an obligation to attempt to bring it about. If it is present, 
conversely there is an obligation to defend it against threats. Achievements, however, are 
valued instrumentally, not in themselves. Because of the universalistic quality of the 
definition of the ideal state there is a strong tendency to dualism, to drawing a sharply 
absolute distinction between conformity with the ideal and deviation from it, and in 
action terms, being “for it” or “against it.” 
This dualism appears in two distinct ways. The first is the one just mentioned, the 
dualism of attitude toward particular persons, collectivities, etc. The second is a dualism 
of locus of application of the value pattern itself. On the one hand the existing 
institutional structure—or parts of it—may be felt to embody the ideal values and be 
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sanctioned by them. On the other hand the ideal pattern may be set over against the 
existing pattern—an ideal state against a corrupt present. In either case the dualistic 
tendency is present though in a sense it seems paradoxical that the same type of value 
pattern can be involved in both extreme conservatism of certain types and extreme 
radicalism.  
Because of the universalistic element there is the same emphasis on the sphere of 
occupation and organization and its independence of kinship or narrowly defined 
community. However, there are certain important differences. First, the strong emphasis 
on classificatory qualities tends, in terms of social structure, to become an emphasis on 
status rather than on specific achievements. Hence the inevitable elaborate differentiation 
of roles where achievements are concretely of high importance and where universalistic 
criteria apply to them, tends to work out to a status-hierarchy where the accent is on what 
a given actor is rather than on what he has done.11 
Secondly, there is a strong tendency to collectivism because of the absence of 
valuation of the particularization of achievements. The ideal state tends to be defined as 
one enjoyed by the society as a collectivity, or to be achieved by it. Furthermore, it is 
easy to make the transition from an ideal state to be achieved, to the ascription of ideal 
qualities to the collectivity. 
Third, there is a tendency to authoritarianism, in that the clear conception of what is 
ideal for all makes it natural for those who have roles enjoining collective responsibility 
to “see to it” that everyone lives up to the ideal, either directly, or in making the proper 
contribution to the collective achievement. 
In more general terms, there is a strong tendency to give diffuseness priority over 
specificity. Status, then, tends not to be specific to a particular occupational role for 
instance, but tends to become very readily generalized relative to a general prestige scale. 
An aspect of this generalization of status is the tendency to ascribe qualities to the whole 
group to which an individual belongs. Since universalism precludes frank recognition of 
particularistic elements, the group, e.g. kinship or class, is held to have inherent qualities. 
Hence conceptions of aristocracy, and of ethnic, especially national qualities, are 
congenial to this orientation. Esteem tends to take precedence over approval in the reward 
system. 
Perhaps it may be said that this type is subject to peculiarly drastic internal tensions. 
There seems to be an inherent connection between achievement, universalism and 
specificity which is broken through in this case. Actual achievement must play an 
important part, the more so the more differentiated the social structure. But the fact that 
achievement is not valued for itself is a source of strain. In one respect the accent on 
collectivism may be a manifestation of this strain in that it acts to inhibit the 
individualizing tendencies of an emphasis on achievement. Furthermore there are 
particularly strong inhibitions on affectivity, centering particularly on the “honor” of 
status, either within the society or as a memter of it in general. Affective manifestations, 
therefore, tend to be relegated to even more secondary positions than in the first type. 
Especially, particularistic attachments are 
11 This is the conservative case. In the revolutionary case the same kind of status hierarchy tends to 
appear in the revolutionary movement itself, the party. 
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devalued. There is thus no real German counterpart of the American romantic love 
complex. 
Because of the strong accent on the occupational system in this case, the limitations 
placed on the size of the kinship unit and its constitution are similar to those involved in 
the first type. There is, however, an important difference in the definition of familial 
roles. The primary focus of these differences lies in the importance of status-
categorization in a diffuse sense, which above all works out in sharpness of 
categorization of the age and sex roles as they impinge on the internal structure of the 
family. Above all the feminine role tends to be defined in sharp contrast to the masculine. 
Because of the importance of discipline in the politico-occupational structures and the 
importance of affective needs, it seems fikely that this type of society will have a strong 
accent on women as love-objects and as responsive, but not as having instrumental or 
moral capacities of a high order. Combined with the general emphasis on hierarchy and 
authority in this type of society, this would seem to suggest an authoritarian family 
structure, in which the wife was carefully “kept in her place.” This is notoriously 
characteristic of the traditional German family structure. 
The reader will recognize that many of the traits being sketched here seem to fit 
German social structure. Indeed “conservative” German society seems to be one of the 
best cases of this type where the accent is on the status quo. Nazism, on the other hand 
projected the ideal state into a political future ideal, conceived to be an emanation of the 
mystically ideal qualities of the German Volk. There are also certain respects in whicn 
Soviet Russia approximates this type. 
Communism is a utopian ideal state of affairs to be realized by collective action. The 
primary status-focus revolves about the Party as the elite vanguard of the realization of 
the ideal. 
It again may be emphasized that this ideal type tends to have a “political” accent as 
distinguished from the economic accent in the American case. This is associated with its 
diffuseness and the tendency to mobilize all resources in the interest of the collective 
ideal. The combination of this politicism and universalism have something to do with the 
tendency to aggressiveness of such societies. This is accentuated by the severity of 
internal strains and the tendency to project the attendant anxiety and aggression on the 
outsider. The very effectiveness of authoritarian measures in eliminating internal 
opposition probably contributes to this aggressiveness, in that it deprives the population 
of internal scapegoats which are both relatively “safe” and which are sufficiently 
important and formidable to be “worth while” to be aggressive about. The degree of 
internal tension is such that a low level of free floating aggression would seem to be out 
of the question. 
It also follows from the general characteristics of this type that a particularly strong 
emphasis should be placed upon the state, as the primary organ of realization or 
maintenance of the ideal states of collective affairs. In a corresponding sense collective 
morality, as distinguished from individual morality, has a particularly central place. The 
wide range open to private interests in the first type is therefore felt to be a “low level of 
morality,” defined by preoccupation with self interest as opposed to the common interest. 
It appears from the above sketches that one way of broadly characterizing the 
differences between the achievement-universalistically and the ascription-
universalistically oriented types of society is to say that the first is “individualistic,” the 
The structure of the social system, III     133
second “collectivistic.” This seems broadly true and significant. What we have done is to 
give a considerably fuller analysis of the factors underlying the application of these terms 
than is current in common usage. The same is true of the terms authoritarian and anti-
authoritarian, which also broadly fit the contrast. Both pairs of terms should be 
understood to characterize derivative resultants of the major value-orientation 
components of the social system in relation to the imperatives of social integration.  
3. The Particularistic Achievement Pattern 
Turning to the third type which combines achievement values with particularism, we may 
start with the familiar implications of the achievement-orientation. The focus of this is the 
valuation of social objects for what they do rather than for what they are. The problems 
arise in connection with the content of what achievements are valued, and in what context 
of social relationships in other respects. 
The shift from universalism to particularism precludes that the primary criteria of 
valued achievement should be found in universalistic terms such as efficiency or 
conformity with a completely generalized ideal. They must, on the contrary, be focused 
on certain points of reference within the relational system itself, or inherent in the 
situation in which it is placed. It may be presumed that, as defining role-expectations, 
these are in the first instance the relational bases for the categorization of objects, namely 
biological relatedness, territorial and temporal location. There are, then, certain 
“secondary” points of reference in the structure of social relationships themselves, 
notably membership in solidary collectivities as such and relations of superiority-
inferiority. 
The element of achievement which is combined with these particularistic emphases 
precludes that the orientation to them should be predominantly passive. The achievement 
emphasis then leads to the conception of a proper pattern of adaptation which is the 
product of human achievement and which can be maintained only by continuous effort 
and if not maintained must be reachieved. At the same time the relational focus precludes 
that this achievement orientation should set goals transcendent to the system. 
The classical Chinese social structure seems to fit this pattern very closely. It can be 
said to have been organized primarily about the relational reference points of kinship, 
local community, continuity with ancestors, the ordering of hierarchical relationships, 
and a general orientation to collective morality emphasizing responsibility for the 
functioning of collectivities, all the way from the Emperor’s responsibility for the society 
as a whole, to the father’s responsibility for his family. Both instrumental orientations 
and “spontaneous” expressive orientations tend in such a system to be subordinated. 
Activities in which either is involved tend to be carried out within the diffuse solidary 
units which constitute the main structure, the instrumental activities on their behalf. 
In the first place this whole structure fits with the well-known “familism” of Chinese 
society. There is a strong emphasis on the solidarity of the kinship unit, extending beyond 
the conjugal family. This extension is above all carried out in the temporal dimension to 
emphasize continuity with the ancestors, and hence responsibility toward them. The 
exigencies of maintaining continuity in kinship terms are, however, such that the female 
line of descent is drastically sacrificed to the male, female subordination is thus primarily 
an adaptive structure. The problem of equality of the statuses of brothers, however, seems 
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to involve exigencies other than those primarily involved in kinship, namely, those of the 
achievement complex. 
The kinship unit in China has also been extremely closely integrated with territorial 
community, which is one of the reasons why land has been of such overwhelming 
importance. In the first instance this has involved the family’s land holding in the village 
community, but also the family burial grounds as symbolic of continuity with the 
ancestors. On a higher status level it has involved the kinship group’s residence in the 
town as one of the cluster of gentry families or that town. 
The differentiation of such a social system beyond the level of extreme localism, 
partly through the exigencies of integration of power, partly through the problems of 
cultural uniformity transcending the local unit, has involved also a hierarchical 
differentiation. This has tended to be directly institutionalized in a pattern congruous with 
that of kinship, first with reference to the patriarchal superiority of the land-owning 
gentry over the peasantry, partly with reference to more individualized achievement 
superiority and political authority. 
The fact that Chinese society did not remain organized in feudal terms seems to be 
connected with the achievement component in the fundamental value-orientation which 
among other things derives from the fact that heredity of status is the most drastic 
antithesis of an achievement value. At any rate the top status elements under the emperor 
were structured in achievement terms through the exami-nation system and the 
appointive status of the official. This involved an element of mobility and could 
symbolically set personal achievement goals before every Chinese boy. But the relative 
weakness of universalism in the general value-orientation was associated with the fact 
that it was a diffuse rather than a specific achievement pattern, attaining “superiority” 
rather than competence. We have already seen that the gentry class functioned as an 
adaptive structure as between this political organization and the rest of society. 
This ditfuseness in turn was connected with the fact that superiority of status was so 
closely connected with responsibility. In this sense the Chinese system tended to be both 
collectivistic and authoritarian. The weakness of universalism and the attendant 
specificity made it difficult for achievement to become individualistically oriented. There 
was a coincidence of superiority and responsibility in stricdy collective terms. The fact of 
being particularistically bound within the relational system also contributed to the accent 
on traditionalism, the acceptance of a model of propriety which was permanently binding 
and which, since it was conceived to have been realized in the past, was to be continually 
re-achieved. 
This type of system involves a far more unequivocal acceptance of kinship ties than is 
the case with either of the universalistic types. Kinship plays a central part in the whole 
hierarchical network of solidary collectivities, and is in a certain sense the prototype of 
them all. But orientations within the kinship unit are none the less structured in certain 
directions, notably in that spontaneous affectivity is strongly inhibited in favor of a 
“moralistic” attitude of responsibility for the interests of the unit. Anything like the 
American romantic love complex is excluded by this set of facts. Indeed spontaneous 
affectivity tends to be tolerated only as interstitial and constitutes one of the main foci for 
deviance. 
Instrumental orientations must either be kept under control or strongly inhibited, 
because their individualistic trends could readilv destroy the central collective 
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solidarities. It is this above all whicn channels achievement in collective directions. But 
the strong inhibition on instrumentalism has the consequence that a certain primacy of 
symbolic actions develops, a “code of propriety” which is more ritual than instrumental. 
Indeed Confucian morality, in addition to its collectivistic trend, tends to this ritualistic 
propriety rather than to what to the Western mind is an “ethical” orientation to good 
works. 
Thus the particularistic-achievement type of society has a collectivism in common 
with its exact opposite combination of pattern variables, because particularism inhibits 
the individualistic implications of achievement-orientation just as ascription inhibits 
those of universalism. On the other hand, by contrast with the rationalism of both the 
universalistic types, this type tends to be traditionalistic, in that its particularism 
precludes the placing of primary achieve ment goals outside the given relational system. 
4. The Particularistic-Ascriptive Pattern 
There remains the combination of particularism with ascription as the definition of a 
dominant social value-orientation pattern. This case has certain similarities with the one 
just discussed but also certain important differences. Because of its particularism it shares 
the tendency for the organization of the social structure to crystallize about the relational 
reference points, notably those of kinship and local community. But because of the 
ascriptive emphasis these tend to be taken as given and passively “adapted to” rather than 
made the points of reference for an actively organized system. 
One might say with such an orientation there would be a preference for a minimum of 
differentiation beyond what was essentially given in the human situation. But because of 
such exigencies as those presented by the power problem this is seldom possible. Some 
integration beyond the local community both in power and in cultural terms is nearly 
inevitable. Such larger integrative and ecological structures tend, therefore, to be 
accepted as part of the given situation of life, and to have positive functions when order is 
threatened, but otherwise to be taken for granted. There is not the same incentive to use 
such structures as the political in order actively to organize a system, they are there first 
as given facts, second as insurance against instability. 
The absence of the achievement emphasis even further inhibits the development of 
instrumental orientations and the structures associated with them than in the previous 
case. Work is basically a necessary evil just as morality is a necessary condition of 
minimum stability. Hence the overwhelming preponderance of emphasis is thrown in the 
expressive direction. These are above all the artistically oriented societies. They tend to 
be traditionalistic for two reasons, first that there is no incentive to disturb tradition; on 
the contrary a strong vested interest in its stability, second that there is a high elaboration 
of expressive symbolism which is in fact a system of conventions. It can only serve this 
function if the symbolic meanings are highly stabilized. Morality, therefore, tends to be 
focussed on the traditionalistic acceptance of received standards and arrangements. 
Morality and responsibility tend to focus in two directions. The first is with reference 
to forestalling the dangers inherent in unregulated expressive orientations which, not only 
through aggression, but through attachments which conflict with a given order, can be 
highly disruptive. The second is with reference to situational dangers to the established 
order. 
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Such societies tend to be individualistic rather than collectivistic and non- if not anti-
authoritarian, but in each case with important differences from the application of the 
same concepts where universalism is involved. The individualism is primarily concerned 
with expressive interests, and hence much less so with opportunity to shape the situation 
through achievement. There tends to be a certain lack of concern with the remoter 
framework of the society, unless it is threatened. Similarly, there is no inherent objection 
to authority so long as it does not interfere too much with expressive freedom, indeed it 
may be welcomed as a factor of stability. But there is also not the positive incentive to 
recognize authority as inherent that exists in the cases of positive authoritarianism. The 
tendency to indifference to larger social issues creates a situation in which authority can 
become established with relatively little opposition. Hence a susceptibility to 
“dictatorship” is not uncommon in such a society. The Spanish-American seems to be a 
good example of this social type.12 
The foregoing has been a mere sketch of four types of social structure. In no sense 
does it pretend to be either a thorough and systematic analysis of each type individually 
or a careful and systematic comparison of them with each other. Above all it has not even 
begun to approach the difficult analysis of mixed and transitional cases, of which there 
are undoubtedly many. It has been presented here for a very specific purpose, to give a 
sense of concrete relevance to the claim that the categories of social structure developed 
in this chapter and the preceding ones do provide a starting point for systematic 
comparative analysis and eventually the construction or a typology of social structures. 
This illustrative discussion has, we think, gone far enough to substantiate that claim. 
The types, not only in terms of direct spelling out of the implications of the basic value-
orientations, but in terms of the adaptive structures which go with them, certainly make 
sense empirically. Even on such a superficial level as the present one they stimulate many 
insights and seem to make otherwise baffling features of certain societies understandable. 
When the same basic conceptual framework is applied systematically and in detail, with 
careful checldng of empirical evidence, and when it is combined with a much more 
sophisticated analysis of motivational process, there is every reason to believe that a 
highly useful set of tools of comparative empirical analysis will prove to be available. 
Now we must leave the analysis of social structure as such and proceed to further 
development of the theory of motivational processes in the social system, the processes 
both of its maintenance and of its change. In analyzing these problems the relation 
between the social system and its roles on the one hand, and personality on the other, will 
always have to be in the forefront of our attention.  
 
12 The author has been greatly sensitized to the special features of this type of social structure and 
its culture by Dr. Florence Kluckhohn, in many oral discussions, and in her Los Atarquenos, 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertarion, Radcliffe College. 
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VI 
THE LEARNING OF SOCIAL ROLE-
EXPECTATIONS AND THE 
MECHANISMS OF SOCIALIZATION OF 
MOTIVATION 
 
THE social system is a system of action. It is a system of interdependent action 
processes. The structural aspects which have been singled out for attention in the three 
preceding chapters involve a certain mode of abstraction from this process. It is now 
necessary to fill in certain aspects of what has been abstracted from, to analyze certain 
aspects of the element of process itself in the context of the social system. For this 
purpose it is necessary to clarify further the concept of mechanism, which is here used in 
a sense parallel to its use in physiology and in personality psychology. 
A process is any way or mode in which a given state of a system or of a part of a 
system changes into another state. If its study is an object of science any process is 
assumed to be subject to laws, which will be stated in terms of determinate interrelations 
of interdependence between the values of the relevant variables. Frequently, however, the 
laws governing a process are incompletely known, or even not at all. Then it may still be 
possible to describe the process in terms of the initial and the final states, and possibly 
intermediate stages or go a step further to state empirical generalizations about it. 
A scientist studying the interdependences of variables generally isolates the particular 
process or class of them in which he is interested and treats it as a system. For some 
purposes, however, it is necessary to treat the process in question as part of a larger 
system. When this is done in such a way that interest is focused on the significance of 
alternative outcomes of the process for the system or other parts of it, the process will be 
called a mechanism. 
This concept is of the first importance in the present context. There is no reason to 
believe that there is anything relative about the laws of motivational process, beyond the 
sense in which all scientific laws are relative. But while the laws are not relative, the 
mechanisms of motivation are, because they are formulated with specific reference to 
their significances for a particular class of system. The paiticularly important point is that 
the mechanisms of personality as a system are not the same as the mechanisms of the 
social system, because, in the ways which have been set forth in this work and elsewhere, 
personalities and social systems constitute two different classes of system. In so far as 
“psychology” gives us completely generalized laws of motivational process they are as 
much and as directly applicable to processes of action in the context of the social system 
as anywhere else. But in so far as what psychology gives us is not laws but mechanisms, 
the high probability is that they are mechanisms of the personality as a system. In this 
case the presumption is that they are not directly applicable to the analysis of social 
process, but their content in terms of laws must be reformulated in terms of its relevance 
to the social system. Social systems thus do not “repress” or “project,” nor are they 
“dominant” or “submissive”; these are mechanisms of the personality. But the 
motivational processes which are involved in these mechanisms also operate in social 
systems. We are profoundly concerned with these processes, but in their relevance to the 
mechanisms of the social system. 
It is necessary to explain a little further just what this means. We may take for granted 
that motivation is always a process which goes on in one or more individual actors. We 
may speak of the “motivation” of a collectivity only in an elliptical sense as referring to 
certain uniformities in the motivations of its members, or to a certain organization of 
those motivations. But in order to select the relevant uniformities and patterns of 
organization, it is necessary to have criteria of relevance which are seldom if ever given 
in generalized knowledge of motivational process itself. It must be given in terms of 
mechanisms which involve, as part of their conceptualization, the specification of the 
types of consequences of alternative outcomes of the processes concerned which are 
significant to the social system. But in order to make this specification in turn we must be 
in a position to say in systematic terms what these consequences are. It is this 
circumstance which, in the present state of knowledge, gives the “structural” analysis of 
the social system a certain priority over its “dynamic” or motivational analysis. If we do 
not have the structural analysis we do not know where to begin dynamic 
conceptualization, because we are unable to judge the relevance of motivational 
processes and laws, above all to distinguish between mechanisms of personality and 
mechanisms of the social system. 
The first task is to set up a classification of the motivational mechanisms of the social 
system and to relate this systematically to the classifications of the mechanisms of 
personality. In another publication1 the mechanisms of the personality system have been 
classified in three categories, those of learning, of defense and of adjustment. Learning is 
defined broadly as that set of processes by which new elements of action-orientation are 
acquired by the actor, new cognitive orientations, new values, new objects, new 
expressive interests. Learning is not confined to the early stages of the life cycle, but 
continues throughout life. What is ordinarily called a “normal” adaptation to a change in 
the situation or the “unfolding” of an established dynamic pattern, is a learning process. 
The mechanisms of defense are the processes through which conflicts internal to the 
personality, that is between different need-dispositions and sub-systems of them, are dealt 
with. In the cases of complete resolution of such conflicts the mechanisms of defense 
merge into those of learning. Finally, the mechanisms of adjustment are the processes by 
which the individual actor deals with elements of strain and conflict in his relations to 
objects, that is to the situation of action. He may thus face the threat of loss of an object  
 
1 Parsons and Shils, Values, Motives and Systems of Action, Chapter II. This chapter is of first 
importance as background for the present discussion. 
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of attachment, of frustration of the attainment of a goal through situational strains and the 
like. Again, with complete resolution of situational strains and conflicts the mechanisms 
of adjustment merge with those of learning. A completely successful substitution of a 
new object for one entailing severe conflict may thus obviate the need for dependency on 
the object the loss of which is threatened.  
This way of conceiving and classifying the mechanisms of personality functioning 
implies a most important assumption which should be brought into the open. Learning as 
conceived above is a process of change in the state of the personality as a system. 
Defense and adjustment are conceived as equilibrating processes, processes which 
counteract tendencies to change the system in certain ways. There is in this classification 
no class of mechanisms for maintaining a stable motivational process in operation. In 
other words, we are assuming that the continuance of a stabilized motivational process in 
a stabilized relationship to the relevant objects is to be treated as not problematical. This 
assumption, though seldom made explicit, seems to be of very general applicability in 
psychology. It may be compared to the first Newtonian law of motion, the law of inertia, 
which states that the problems for mechanics concern not what makes bodies move, but 
what makes them change their motion, in direction or velocity. We shall assume the 
motivational counterpart of the law of inertia in the present discussion, that it is change of 
intensity or “direction,” i.e., orientation, of action which poses the problems for the 
dynamics of action theory. Hence for the social system as well as the personality we will 
not be concerned with the problem of the maintenance of given states of the social system 
except where there are known tendencies to alter those states. This principle gives us a 
clear criterion of what constitutes a motivational problem in the context of the social 
system. 
Now it must again be remembered that motivational processes are always processes in 
individual actors. Therefore, the application of the above criterion means that the 
problems of the mechanisms of the social system arise where, from our knowledge of 
individuals, we have reason to believe that there are tendencies to alter established states 
of the social system. What, then, for our immediate purposes is an established state of a 
social system, or relevant sub-system? 
The answer to this question is given in the basic paradigm of social interaction which 
has been discussed so often. An established state of a social system is a process of 
complementary interaction of two or more individual actors in which each conforms with 
the expectations of the other(’s) in such a way that alter’s reactions to ego’s actions are 
positive sanctions which serve to reinforce his given need-dispositions and thus to fulfill 
his given expectations. This stabilized or equilibrated interaction process is the 
fundamental point of reference for all dynamic motivational analysis of social process. 
It is certainly contrary to much of the common sense of the social sciences, but it will 
nevertheless be assumed that the maintenance of the complementarity of role-
expectations, once established, is not problematical, in other words that the “tendency” to 
maintain the interaction process is the first law of social process. This is clearly an 
assumption, but there is, of course, no theoretical objection to such assumptions if they 
serve to organize and generalize our knowledge. Another way of stating this is to say that 
no special mechanisms are required for the explanation of the maintenance of 
complementary interaction-orientation. 
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Then what classes of tendencies not to maintain this interaction are there? 
Fundamentally they can be reduced to two. First it is quite clear that the orientations 
which an actor implements in his complementary interaction in roles, are not inborn but 
have to be acquired through learning. We may then say that before he has learned a given 
role-orientation he clearly tends to act in ways which would upset the equilibrium of 
interaction in his incumbency of the role in question. The acquisition of the requisite 
orientations for satisfactory functioning in a role is a learning process, but it is not 
learning in general, but a particular part or learning. This process will be called the 
process of socialization, and the motivational processes by which it takes place, seen in 
terms of their functional significance to the interaction system, the mechanisms of 
socialization. These are the mechanisms involved in the processes of “normal” 
functioning of the social system. 
However, the problems of the socialization process are formulated on the assumption 
that the factors producing the equilibrium of the interaction process are stabilized with 
the exception that the requisite orientations for adequate functioning of a given actor in a 
given role have not yet been learned. But concretely this is not the case. Both within the 
individual actors as personalities and in the situation in which they act there are factors 
tending to upset the equilibrium. Changes in the situation as such may be said to present 
new learning problems and thus fall within the scope of socializa-tion. But certain 
changes arising from the personalities of the interacting factors and their reactions to 
situational changes are another matter. 
We have seen that the very structure of the interaction process provides the major 
dimension for the organization of such tendencies. They are tendencies to deviance, to 
depart from conformity with the normative standards which have come to be set up as the 
common culture. A tendency to deviance in this sense is a process of motivated action, on 
the part of an actor who has unquestionably had a full opportunity to learn the requisite 
orientations, tending to deviate from the complementary expectations of conformity with 
common standards so far as these are relevant to the definition of his role. Tendencies to 
deviance in this sense in turn confront the social system with “problems” of control, since 
deviance if tolerated beyond certain limits will tend to change or to disintegrate the 
system. Focusing, then, on the tendencies to deviance, and the reactions in the social 
system which operate in the direction of motivating actors to abandon their deviance and 
resume conformity, we may speak of the second class of mechanisms, the mechanisms of 
social control. A mechanism of social control, then, is a motivational process in one or 
more individual actors which tends to counteract a tendency to deviance from the 
fulfillment of role-expectations, in himself or in one or more alters. It is a reequilibrating 
mechanism. 
The mechanisms of social control comprise aspects of the two classes of mechanisms 
of the personality which have been called mechanisms of defense and of adjustment. 
They constitute, that is, defense and adjustment relative to tendencies to violate role-
expectations. Psychologically the particularly close relationship to the superego is 
immediately evident. It should, however, again be emphasized that though the 
mechanisms of social control comprise elements of these personality mechanisms, they 
are not the same, but are mechanisms of the social system. Just what specific systematic 
interrelations exist will have to be explored in the subsequent analysis. Of the two 
classes, however, for obvious reasons the mechanisms of personality adjustment are 
The learning of social role-expectations and the mechanisms     141
dynamically the more closely related to the mechanisms of social control. It is, after all, 
in the interrelations with social objects that both the problems of adjustment of the per-
sonality and of control for the social system, arise. On the other hand functionally, the 
mechanisms of social control are more closely analogous with the mechanisms of 
defense, since both are concerned with the processes by which a system of action is 
internally integrated, and disruptive tendencies are held in check. 
A word should also be said about the relations between the mechanisms of 
socialization and social control on the one hand and the allocative processes of the social 
system on the other. The allocation of personnel between roles in the social system and 
the socialization processes of the individual are clearly the same processes viewed in 
different perspectives. Allocation is the process seen in the perspective of functional 
significance to the social system as a system. Socialization on the other hand is the 
process seen in terms of the motivation of the individual actor. Learning to decide 
between alternatives of role-incumbency which the social system leaves open to the 
individual is certainly part of social learning and such decisions manifest the value-
orientations acquired through socialization. The process of allocation of facilities and 
rewards on the other hand is from the motivational point of view a process of acquisition 
and loss of valued object-relations by individual actors. It is thus a process of “flow” in a 
stabilized situation (e.g., of “income”) or it is a process of situational change requiring 
adjustment by the actor. The adjustments may be successfully learned through 
socialization mechanisms or they may be factors in producing tendencies to deviance and 
hence foci for the operation of mechanisms of social control. 
The present chapter will be concerned with the processes of socialization and their 
mechanisms, leaving until Chapter VII the analysis of deviance and the processes of 
social control. 
§ THE SOCIALIZATION OF THE CHILD AND THE 
INTERNALIZATION OF SOCIAL VALUE-ORIENTATIONS 
THE term socialization in its current usage in the literature refers primarily to the process 
of child development. This is in fact a crucially important case of the operation of what 
are here called the mechanisms of socialization, but it should be made clear that the term 
is here used in a broader sense than the current one to desig-nate the learning of any 
orientations of functional significance to the operation of a system of complementary 
role-expectations. In this sense, socialization, like learning, goes on throughout life. The 
case of the development of the child is only the most dramatic because he has so far to 
go. 
However, there is another reason for singling out the socialization of the child. There 
is reason to believe that, among the learned elements of personality in certain respects the 
stablest and most enduring are the major value-orientation patterns and there is much 
evidence that these are “laid down” in childhood and are not on a large scale subject to 
drastic alteration during adult life.2 There is good reason to treat these patterns of value-
orientation, as analyzed in terms of pattern variable combinations, as the core of what is 
sometimes called “basic personality structure” and they will be so treated here. Hence in 
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discussing certain highlights of the socialization of the child, primary emphasis will be 
placed on this aspect of socialization in more general terms. 
Before proceeding it may be emphasized that the socialization of the child is a case of 
socialization in the strict sense of the above definition, not of social control. What has 
sometimes been called the “barbarian invasion” of the stream of new-born infants is, of 
course, a critical feature of the situation in any society. Along with the lack of biological 
maturity, the conspicuous fact about the child is that he has yet to learn the patterns of 
behavior expected of persons in his statuses in his society. Our present discussion is not 
concerned with the fact that children, having learned these patterns, tend very widely to 
deviate from them, though this, of course, happens at every stage, but with the process of 
acquisition itself on the part of those who have not previously possessed the patterns. 
As a mechanism of the social system, the combination of motivational processes in 
question must be conceived as a set of processes of action in roles which, on the basis of 
known facts about motivational process, analytical and empirical, tend to bring about a 
certain result, in the present case the internalization of certain patterns of value-
orientation. This result is conceived to be the outcome of certain processes of interaction 
in roles. 
In order to analyze the processes then, it is necessary to have two classes of 
information available. First we must have knowledge of the processes or mechanisms of 
learning from the point of view of the actor who is in the process of being socialized. 
Secondly, we must have in mind the relevant features of the interacting role system, 
which place the socializee, if the term may be permitted, in a situation which favors the 
relevant learning process. The assumption is that mechanisms of socialization operate 
only so far as the learning process is an integral part of the process of interaction in 
complementary roles. Thus not only the socializing agents but the socializee must be 
conceived as acting in roles. At the instant of birth, perhaps, the infant does not do so. 
But almost immediately a role is ascribed to him which includes expectations of his 
behavior. The behavior of adults toward him is not like their behavior toward purely 
physical objects, but is contingent on his behavior and very soon what are interpreted to 
be his expectations; thus “the baby is expecting to be fed.” It is only when this mutuality 
of interaction has been established that we may speak of the socialization process. Purely 
physical care of the infant in which he has no role but is merely a passive object of 
manipulation is, if it ever exists, not socialization. 
In Values, Motives and Systems of Action five cathectic-evaluative mechanisms of 
learning were distinguished and systemically related to one another. All of these are 
relevant to the present context and what they are and how related must be briefly 
reviewed here. In the background stand the cognitive mechanisms of discrimination and 
generalization. The five are reinforcement-extinction, inhibition, substitution, imitation 
and identification. The first three do not necessarly involve orientation to social objects, 
while the last two do. 
Reinforcement-extinction is the name given for the most general relation between the 
gratifying-depriving features of the outcome of a behavioral process, and the strength of 
2 The commonest apparent type of exception is that explained by ambivalence in an earlier 
orientadon system. In such a case there may of course be dramatic changes of overt behavior. 
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the tendency to repeat it under appropriate conditions. The broad law is that in general the 
receipt of gratifications will tend to strengthen the pattern while that of deprivations will 
tend to weaken it. This generalization should, of course, be carefully interpreted in the 
light of the many different meanings in the content of gratifications and deprivations and 
the complex interrelations of need-dispositions in the personality system as well as the 
significance of many variations in the conditions. A simple “hedonistic” interpretation is 
clearly inadequate. 
The second mechanism is inhibition, which means simply the process of learning to 
refrain from carrying out the action motivated by a given need-disposition, in the 
presence of an appropriate opportunity for gratification, regardless of what happens to the 
“affect” involved. There is a fundamental sense in which inhibition is the obverse of, and 
inherently linked with, learning itself. For unless complete extinction of previous need-
dispositions were immediately given with every new step of learning, learning would be 
impossible, for the attachment to the old pattern would be unbreakable. Inhibition is thus 
in one direction the process of breaking through motivational inertia. 
The third general mechanism is substitution, which means the process of transferring 
cathexis from one object to another. Substitution obviously involves inhibition, in the 
form of renunciation of cathexis of the old object, but in addition it involves the capacity 
to transfer, to “learn” that the new object can provide gratifications which are more or 
less equivalent to the old. Thus in the most general terms “progress” in learning means, 
first, at least enough reinforcement to prevent extinction of motivations, second, capacity 
to inhibit the need-dispositions which block new orientations, and third, capacity to 
accept new objects, to substitute. 
Closely connected with these cathectic-evaluative mechanisms are the primarily 
cognitive mechanisms of discrimination and generalization. Discrimination is the very 
first condition of the construction of an object-world, and must continue to operate 
throughout all learning processes. Generalization on the other hand, by providing 
awareness of the common attributes of classes of objects, is an indispensable condition of 
substitution, and of higher levels of organization of an orientation system. Above all, 
generalization is essential to the cathexis of classes of objects and even more of abstract 
categories and cultural objects, i.e., symbols, as such, hence to any process of successive 
substitutions building up to these cathexes, including processes of symbolization. 
Probably the acqui-sition of at all generalized patterns of value-orientation involves this 
mechanism deeply. 
Imitation is the process by which specific items of culture, specific bits of knowledge, 
skill, symbolic behavior, are taken over from a social object in the interaction process. In 
one sense then it may be conceived as a process of short cutting the process of 
independent learning, in that alter is able to show a shorter and easier way to learn than 
ego could find by himself. Of course imitation presumably must prove rewarding in some 
sense if the act to be learned is to be reinforced. But above all imitation does not imply 
any continuing relation to the “model,” or any solidarity attachment. 
Identification, on the other hand, means taking over, i.e., internalizing, the values of 
the model. It implies that ego and alter have established a reciprocal role relationship in 
which value-patterns are shared. Alter is a model and this is a learning process, because 
ego did not at the beginning of it possess the values in question. Identification may be 
subclassified according to the type of values and the nature of the attachment to alter. The 
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most important variations would be according to whether it was a specific or a diffuse 
attachment and whether it was an affective or love attachment or a neutral or esteem 
attachment. In any case this is obviously the most important of the learning mechanisms 
for the acquisition of value patterns. 
We may now turn to the features of the interaction process itself, as a complementary 
role structure, which are important for the socializing effect of the operation of the 
learning processes just reviewed. The socializing effect will be conceived as the 
integration of ego into a role complementary to that of alter(s) in such a way that the 
common values are internalized in ego’s personality, and their respective behaviors come 
to constitute a complementary role-expectation-sanction system. 
The first point to mention is that, prior to and independent of any identification, alter 
as an adult has certain control or the situation in which ego acts, so that he may influence 
the consequences of ego’s actions. Put in learning terms, he may use these to reinforce 
the tendencies of ego’s behavior which fit his own expectations of how ego should 
behave, and operate to extinguish those which are deviant. Corresponding to the learning 
mechanisms of reinforcement-extinction, then, we may speak of socialization 
mechanisms of reward-punishment, the particular and specific orientations to ego’s 
behavior which tend to motivate him to conformity and dissuade him from deviance from 
alter’s expectations.3 These are to be conceived in abstraction from alter’s functioning as 
a model either for imitation or for identification. 
However, rewards and punishments obviously operate to induce inhibitions and 
substitutions. The simplest motivation for an inhibition presumably is learning that 
gratification of a need-dispositon will bring deprivational consequences.4 So far as these 
consequences have been imposed by a social object contingent on ego’s action they 
constitute punishments. For substitution, on the other hand, presumably a combination of 
rewards and punishments is, if not indispensable in all cases, at least an optimum; namely 
the punishment of continued retention of the old object, combined with rewarding of 
cathexis of the new. 
Secondly, alter may operate not only as a reinforcing-extinguishing agent but as a 
model for imitation. In addition to imposing contingent consequences on ego’s specific 
acts he may hold up a model, which in turn becomes the focus of reinforcement-
extinction processes, however actively they may or may not be carried out by alter’s own 
action. In this case we may say that alter as an active model adopts the role of a “teacher” 
and because the term fits directly, we may speak of socialization by “instruction” as the 
implementation of the mechanism of imitation by the socializing agent. In the learning  
3 It is of course possible for ego to reward or punish himself, given motivation to do so, which 
impfies internalization of the relevant value-orientations. 
4 There are many complex problems of the psychology of learning involved here which it is desired 
to leave open: For example Solomon’s studies of avoidance conditioning seem to show a quite 
different pattern from the “classical” reinforcement experiments. It is extremely important not to 
beg any of these questions. The aim of the present sketch is to place some of the problems of the 
psychology of learning in the context of their possible significance for the social system. This is 
done essentially by analyzing the role-structure of the socialization process. It is hoped that 
sufficient parsimony is observed on the psychological side to avoid commitment to dubious 
generalizations. 
The learning of social role-expectations and the mechanisms     145
context the term imitation emphasizes what happens when there is a model for 
imitation. In the socialization context the fact that a model of a given type is provided to 
“instruct” ego is just as much the focus of attention. Thus attention is directed to the 
specific role of alter as well as to ego’s learning processes as such. 
Finally, the mechanism of learning (generally in addition to the others in a complex 
process) may be identification. For identification to take place there must develop a 
further feature of the interaction relationship of ego and alter. In addition to what alter 
does in the sense of his overt discrete acts with their reward-punishment significance, and 
to what he offers in the sense of patterns for imitation, alter’s attitudes toward ego 
become the crucial feature of the socialization process. We have seen at a number of 
points how crucial this step in the integration of an interactive system is. Indeed it is in 
this way that we have defined an attachment, namely an orientation to alter in which the 
paramount focus of cathective-evaluative significance is in alter’s attitudes. Overt acts 
thereby come to be interpreted mainly as “expressions” of these attitudes, that is, as signs, 
or even more as symbols of them. 
When a reciprocal attachment has been formed ego has acquired, as it was called in 
Chapter IV, a “relational possession.” He acquires a “stake” in the security of this 
possession, in the maintenance of alter’s favorable attitudes, his receptiveness-
responsiveness, his love, his approval or his esteem, and a need to avoid their withdrawal 
and above all their conversion into hostile or derogatory attitudes. 
The generalizations about motivational processes which are summed up in what is 
called the mechanism of identification apparently imply the extremely important 
generalization, we may perhaps say theorem, that value-orientation patterns can only be 
internalized from outside5 through reciprocal attachments, that is, through ego becoming 
integrated in a reciprocal and complementary role relative to alter whicn reaches the level 
of organization and cathectic sensitivity which we call that of attachment and a common 
value pattern involving loyalty. The third of the basic classes of mechanisms of 
socialization, then, we may call the mechanisms of value-acquisition with all the 
implications as to the nature of the process, not only within the personality of ego, but in 
terms of his interaction with alter, which have been outlined above.  
This sketch of the significance of the process of identification is extremely elementary 
and leaves many crucial problems unsolved. The stress has been placed on the building 
up of a pattern of values common to ego and to alter, ego being considered as acquiring 
the values from alter through identification. This leaves open, however, several crucial 
problems concerning the processes of differentiation of such a value-system. Above all 
the roles of ego and alter are generally complementary and not identical. There is, 
therefore, an element of common value but equally an element of differential 
applicability of the common value element to ego and to alter. Ego as a small child is 
clearly not expected to behave exactly as alter as an adult does. Furthermore, ego and 
alter may be of opposite sex, thus introducing a further differentiation. 
On this basis we mav distinguish the following elements in the value-patterns acquired 
by ego from alter through identification; a) the common value-orientation in sufficiently 
general terms to be applicable both to ego’s role and to alter’s and hence, presumably 
5 There may, of course, be creative modifications from within the personality. 
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more broadly still, e.g., to the family as a whole, etc. This would take the form of 
allegations that such and such things are right or wrong, proper or improper, in rather 
general terms; b) alter’s expectations—in value-orientation terms for ego’s behavior in 
his role, e.g. differentiated from alter’s by age and possibly by sex and perhaps otherwise; 
and c) the complementary expectations for the definition of alter’s role. 
There is still a fourth element involved in the possible differentiation from the roles of 
either ego or alter of third parties, e.g., the father if alter is the mother, and finally a fifth 
in that ego’s role is not static but expected to change in the process of his “growing up”—
so that a valuation relative to his own future is very much part of his value-acquisition. 
The complex problems involved in these differentiations will be briefly touched upon in 
the subsequent discussion but their analysis can at best only be begun. 
Of course many features of the actual process of socialization of the child are obscure, 
especially the factors responsible for differences in outcome, and for pathologies. 
However, using the above conceptual scheme it will be worthwhile to attempt a brief 
sketch of some of the highlights which at least can provide the points of departure for 
some hypotheses, if not the codification of established knowledge. It should be 
remembered that our concern here is with the acquisition of value-orientation patterns, 
and factors which may be responsible for the internalization of different types of value-
orientation pattern. Hence our primary focus will be on mechanisms of value-acquisition 
through identifications. 
There are throughout two terms to the analysis, namely the role of the socializing 
agent and of the socializee. In the latter case there are three primary classical attributes of 
the infant, his plasticity, which is simply a name for his capacity to learn alternative 
patterns, his sensitivity, which may be interpreted to be a name for his capacity to form 
attachments in the above sense, and his dependency. The last is, given the first two, the 
primary “fulcrum” for applying the leverage of socialization. The infant, as an organism, 
is helpless and dependent on others for the most elementary gratifications of food, 
warmth and other elements of protection. 
The socializing agent is, therefore, inherently in a position to begin the process of 
socialization by being the agent of rewards and, implicitly at first, then explicitly, of 
punishments. The beginning orientation of the infant very soon must include awareness 
of the role of the adult in this most elementary sense. It is, then, the securing of the 
leverage of the infant’s motivation to secure the specific rewards of being fed, kept warm, 
etc. and avoid the corresponding deprivations6 which constitute the first beginning of his  
6 Just as in the case of the more specific processes of learning, many problems arise concerning the 
more specific significances of particular infantile needs and their handling in the course of 
socialization, including degrees of leniency and severity with respect to such matters as weaning 
and toilet tiaining and the significance of the timing of discipline in such areas. Againwe cannot 
attempt here to go into these problems in detail but can only attempt to provide a general 
framework of role analysis within which these detailed problems may be approached. It may, 
however, be tentatively suggested that if the processes of identification are as important as the 
present approach seems to indicate, the presumption is that these specific details of child-training 
practice are likely to be primarily significant in thcir capacity as expressions of the attitudes of the 
socializing agents, rather than through their independent intrinsic effects. It seems probable that the 
strong emphasis on the latter in some circles has been colored by seeing the socialization process in 
terms of a reinforcement theory of learning alone without reference to the processes of interaction 
in roles which are of primary interest to the present discussion. 
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playing a role as distinguished from being merely an object of care.7 Certain elements of 
this care come to be expected to be contingent on conformity with alter’s expectations, 
starting with respect to such responses as crying, smiling, or coming to get something 
(after learning to walk). 
It is probable that the basis of attachments begins to be laid down berore much 
imitation occurs, because it takes considerable maturation before the infant has high 
capacity for imitation. It is probably of great significance that, except in disorganized 
conditions, there is relatively little direct and early frustration of the infant’s fundamental 
physiological needs. The primary frustrations come with the necessity to make 
substitutions for the original objects—e.g., weaning. But certain other gratifications 
coming from pleasant physical contact and the like are especially likely to be contingent 
on the adult’s attitudes toward the infant, and thus on his own behavior. This is probably 
a main basis of the strategic significance of erotic gratifications and needs in human 
personality, that their genesis in physical contact with the mother, through suckling, 
fondling, etc. is likely to be a most prominent focus of role-expectation contingency at an 
early stage of socialization. Then by a series of substitutions an adult structure of erotic 
need-dispositions gets built up. 
In any case generalization from the particularity of rewarding acts on alter’s part plus 
early dependence is the process of genesis of early attachments. Perhaps the first thing to 
be said about the earliest attachments is that they are in the nature of the case primarily 
affective if only because the infant does not yet have the capacity for inhibition which 
underlies affectively neutral orientations. It seems to be completely established that 
inhibition must be learned, and how, when, in what contexts and subject to what 
limitations is one of the most important problem areas of socialization theory. 
Secondly, there is the question of the temporal priority of specific and diffuse 
attachments, in the pattern variable sense. Both are, if we assume reward-punishment for 
particular acts as the primary starting point, results of processes of generalization. But the 
generalization from the specific act to the category of action of which it is an example 
seems tentatively to be the more elementary one. Hence one would expect that an 
attachment to the mother as for example, the source of food gratifications, would be the 
first type of attachment. The generalization to a diffuse attachment in which she is the 
person who “cares for” ego, not merely in the sense of ministrations but of attitudes, 
requires a further step. The duality of meaning of the word “care” in the language would 
appear to be significant. 
Granting both sensitivity and dependency, there is still a problem of the mechanisms 
by which this generalization takes place. It may be suggested that here again the erotic 
sphere plays a particularly strategic part. Precisely because of many of the practical 
exigencies of infant care, bodily contact with the mother plays an important part in the 
reladonship. Though as psychoanalytic theory has emphasized, the oral, anal and even 
urethral zones have in early childhood special erotic potentialities, it may well be that the 
more significant property of the erotic sphere is its diffuseness. The specific acts of care, 
such as feeding, have in a certain sense an instrumental character; as such their 
7 The existence of genetically inborn social-relational needs may remain an open question here. If 
they exist this provides additional motivation to role-assumption. 
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significance may not be confined to the fact that they provide a favorable basis for 
building up response needs as distinguished from reward needs and generalizing these to 
the person of alter rather than to the particular context or class of acts. Much of the 
significance of the erotic sphere may thus rest on the fact that it is a favorable bridge 
between reward and response, in that, from the dependence on erotic rewards, especially 
the diffuser ones of affectionate bodily contact, the path to diffuse attachment can most 
readily be entered upon. 
If this interpretation is correct, it would seem to follow that though specific fixation on 
specific erogenous zones would ordinarily occur in the normal socialization process to 
some degree, the more extreme fixations which play a prominent part in pathological 
syndromes should be treated as consequences of some disturbance of the normally more 
diffuse functions of erotic interest. It is suggestive that erotic fixation on parts of ego’s 
own body may indicate disturbance of security of a diffuse erotic interest in relation to 
alter. This would make oral and anal eroticism more significant as secondary aspects of 
libidinal development than as the primary foci of it. 
If the foregoing analysis is correct even the most elementary attachment of a specific 
response character means that the step to role-playing in the full social system sense has 
been taken. There is already a common value pattern shared by ego and alter, namely the 
valuation of their mutual attitudes of affection, such that particular acts are treated as 
“expressions” of the appropriate attitudes, not simply as discrete rewards and 
punishments. There are definite norms of appropriate behavior on both sides. The 
dependence of this development on capacity for generalization is clear. 
Such an attachment means that the child is not merely receptive to the responses of 
alter, but has learned to respond himself, for example, by smiling and “cuddling up.” But 
at about this point another of the most fundamental alternatives of socialization patterning 
opens out. The child has an obvious interest in eliciting both rewards and responses from 
the adult. But there is an enormous inequality in realistic capacity to perform. In this 
context the socialization process may take the turn of encouraging ego in passivity, an 
orientation which is in a sense appropriate to his helplessness, or it may encourage him in 
building up the more symmetrical reciprocity of receptiveness and response, if not of 
concrete reward-actions. Indeed it would seem that oecause of the inherent inequality in 
the latter sense the only real possibility for motivating an active orientation lay in 
encouraging responsiveness as well as receptiveness on the child’s part, that is, rewarding 
it both with discrete acts and with enhanced receptiveness and responsiveness on alter’s 
part. It is clearly through internalization of the values expressed in attitudes along this 
dimension that orientation, in terms of the variable of ascription-achievement, tends to be 
built up. This may, for instance, be extremely important to the development of the 
achievement values of American Society. 
It seems highly probable that early diffuse attachments, particularly to the mother, 
constitute the focus of what is sometimes called the security system of the child. Security 
in this sense may be taken to mean that there is a certain stabiliaation of his system of 
orientation, by virtue of which the child is able to develop a certain tolerance of 
frustration. But the price of this security is, in the early attachments, a certain 
enhancement of dependency. This may be culturally variable in that the presence of 
mother surrogates mitigates the degree of dependency on the one attachment, but 
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ordinarily this does not involve a difference of pattern as between the objects of 
attachment from which new values could be learned 
The tolerance of frustration, which becomes possible within a diffuse love attachment, 
seems to provide a major clue to the further significance of such an attachment, namely 
as a lever for imposing the learning of new values. Part of the frustration to which a child 
is exposed is inherent in the physical and other aspects of the situation, but a substantial 
part of it consists of disciplines, whether administered to the chid deliberately or not, 
which may be considered to be mechanisms of socialization. 
The uses to which the leverage of frustration tolerance is put will vary with the nature 
of the roles for which individuals are being socialized, which in turn are very different in 
different societies. Making allowance for this variability, however, we may concentrate 
the discussion on some considerations relevant to the processes of acquisition of some of 
the value-patterns not directly involved in the diffuse love relation of mother to small 
child. These are above all the independence necessary to an autonomous achievement 
orientation, the capacity for affective neutrality, for universalism and for functional 
specificity independent of the direct gratification interests of childhood, especially in 
affectively neutral contexts. These are admittedly value-patterns of particular significance 
in the adult role-system of our own society, but they have varying kinds of relevance in 
other societies. 
Success in making the transition from dependent status in a diffuse mother attachment 
to a more “grown up” stage depends on two primary sets of conditions. The first is the 
combination of objects of identification offered by the situation in which the child is 
placed, the value patterns they embody, and their relations to each other in the earlier 
stages, especially the relations of the two parents. The second is the set of conditions 
which provide a psychologically favorable situation for the process of identification to 
operate. 
The second is not primarily our concern but a few things may be said about it. The 
first of these favorable conditions apparently is adequate security in the above sense. In 
the first instance this centers on the mother. One may, however, say that, for the father to 
serve as an important identification object, he must be included in a solidarity system 
with the mother, so that neither is the child excluded from the mother-father solidarity 
nor the father from the mother-child solidarity—for purposes of simplicity we may omit 
reference to siblings. It is from his inclusion in this diffuse solidarity system, the family 
as a collectivity, that the child derives his primary “support.” 
Secondly, there must be an imposition of disciplines which, given the starting points, 
constitute frustrations of the child’s already established need-dispositions, especially 
certain needs for immediate gratification, and his dependency needs. It may be surmised 
that these will include not only ad hoc frustrations but will, at critical points, include 
failure of alter to respond to ego’s established expectations; what had become established 
as legitimate expectations from alter at one stage of childhood, are not responded to at the 
next stage. 
Ego may respond to these frustrations with adjustive mechanisms; indeed, to some 
degree he certainly will. But these must not become frozen in combination with defense 
mechanisms so that the socialization process is blocked, so that, for instance, alienative 
need-dispositions become established. It would seem, then, that certain adjustive 
responses to the pressure of frustration of expectations would have to be treated 
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permissively, in the sense that they are “tolerated” by alter without jeopardizing ego’s 
security. If the attachment were specific to the need-disposition context in question, 
alter’s failure to reciprocate would necessarily jeopardize the security of the attachment, 
but by virtue of the latter’s quality of diffuseness it is possible for alter to show in other 
ways that the attitude of love has not been disturbed. Just what the balance in detail of 
failure to reciprocate, of permissiveness, and of expression of diffuse love should be, will 
vary with the kinship system and the roles for which ego is being socialized. It also 
involves problems of psychological process on which our knowledge is fragmentary, and 
the available evidence cannot be reviewed here. 
Finally, it may be said that the frustration involved in the refusal to reciprocate ego’s 
expectations must be balanced by a promised reward for the fulfillment of alter’s 
expectations, that is, for learning the new orientation. If a diffuse love attachment is 
already given, and if we maintain that relational rewards are by this time the most 
fundamental, we may see that specific significances attach at this later stage to the 
attitudes of approval and esteem on the part of alter. These can above all be the 
conditional elements in the reward system which are manipulated by the socializing 
agents, along with specific gratification-rewards. 
In our own society, particularly, this throws a considerable light on the problem of 
“conditional love.” If capacity for independent achievement is to be learned, there must 
be a conditional element in the reward system. Ideally it is not the parent’s love attitude 
which is conditional, but his approval for specific performances. A capacity to segregate 
these two aspects would be a condition of parental adequacy. But under certain 
conditions this segregation will tend to break down, and the love, not merely the 
approval, become conditional. This may be expected, if it is sufficiently severe, to have 
pathogenic consequences for the child. 
It may be noted that these four prerequisites, security, discipline (implying 
frustration), permissiveness, and affectively neutral relational rewards are also 
characteristic of the psychotherapeutic process, and in this capacity are deeply involved 
in the equilibrium of the social system. There are fundamental differences which will be 
commented upon at the proper points, but it is important to note that socialization, 
psycnotnerapy and other mechanisms of social control are intimately interdependent. 
These relationships will be further analyzed in the following chapter and in Chapter X 
below. 
Within this framework it is interesting to look at the possible significance of the 
differentiation of the two parental roles in the socialization process, above all with 
reference to the question, why is a father important? Even if his participation in the 
routine care of the child is minimal! That he is extremely important is indicated again by 
the erotic factor and by the intricate geometry of sex role identification and of erotic 
attachments. It is highly suggestive that normal heterosexuality is institutionalized in all 
known societies, hence that homosexuality is with few exceptions tabooed, and that there 
is a universal incest taboo within the principal solidary kin-ship group, which universally 
includes the conjugal family. We presume that to a significant degree this patterning is 
learned through socialization, is not therefore a sample manifestation of the “sexual 
instinct.” 
Precisely in this connection the difference between psychotherapy and socialization is 
suggestive. The small child whose security rests primarily on his attachment to his 
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mother has not yet learned the value-orientations of higher levels of maturity. We may 
suggest that acceptance of certain pressures to take further steps in maturing, with their 
attendant frustrations, is in such circumstances less disturbing if the responsibility for the 
pressure can be divided between the parents and hence does not come primarily from the 
central love-object. With all the variability of sex role from society to society, it can be 
said to be universally true that the adult masculine role is less implicated with detailed 
child care than the feminine, and is more implicated with prestige and responsibility in 
the wider society beyond the narrow kinship circle. 
The fact of the father’s solidarity with the mother makes it possible, therefore, for him 
to be the symbolic focus of certain pressures on the child. The situation can be defined in 
the terms that, “you have to do this because your father wants you to,” and the mother 
will support the father in this but still be less directly involved. Security in the mother 
relation is less likely to be jeopardized by this pressure because she does not have to take 
the full onus of the pressure on herself. There is, of course, room for wide variations in 
the ways in which this influence is concretely exerted and the responsibilities are divided, 
but this seems to be a common element. 
It seems to be significant that in the geometry of erotic attachments, in the case of both 
sexes, the sacrifice of the erotic element in the attachment to the mother seems to figure 
prominently in the “price” which has to be paid for growing up. It is a critical fact that 
children of both sexes start with a primary attachment to the mother which, since Freud, 
we know contains a prominent erotic element. The boy has to renounce the erotic element 
of his mother-attachment in favor of an adult heterosexual attachment which must, 
however, be outside the family of orientation. The heterosexual orientation remains, but 
the particular object, indeed class of objects in the case of the mother surrogates, e.g. 
older sisters in our society, other kinswomen in others, must be renounced. Generally this 
renunciation must be in favor of a generation mate. The common phenomenon of men 
being sexually interested in younger women, but seldom older women, might even be 
interpreted as a reaction formation against incestuous wishes, connected as they are with 
dependency needs. Seen in this perspective the Oedipus conflict of the boy may be 
regarded as connected with the pressure to renounce in certain respects the expectations 
of his infantile attachment-role vis-à-vis his mother, rather than with sexual rivalry in the 
ordinary sense. The father is symbolically identified as the source of the pressure, in part 
no doubt because the boy cannot bring himself to believe that his mother would “do this 
to him.” In the more general sense of course both parents are merely manifesting their 
attitudes of what is expected of a “big boy.” 
It may be presumed that in this situation the relational rewards mentioned above are 
above all connected with the masculine role-identification of the boy, they thus not only 
include accepting the generalized values of both parents, which it may be presumed in the 
normal case they share, but involve particularizing those values in application to himself 
by his coming to understand that he must grow up to be a man, in a normative sense. It is 
the approval and esteem of both his parents for his demonstrations of masculinity which 
forms one of the main foci of his socialization at this point. He therefore identifies with 
his father in a double sense; first, in that he shares the values in general and for his age 
group of both parents, and second, that he accepts the norm that their application to him 
should be in the differentiated role of a boy as distinguisked from that of a girl. In our 
society at least the prolonged “latency period,” with its evidences of compulsive 
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masculinity, and its strict segregation of the sexes, not by adult decree but by peer-group 
pressure, as socially patterned phenomena, strongly suggests that the learning process in 
this case is heavily involved with complicated adjustive processes. 
The case of the girl shows an interesting combination of similarities and differences. 
The “danger” of retaining her infantile status is not that of identification with the wrong 
sex role, but failure of capacity to form an adequate attachment to the opposite sex. Her 
father is presumably the prototype of the masculine object for her as he is for her brother. 
But again the incest taboo forbids a simple transfer of erotic attachment from the mother 
to the father, there must be renunciation first of the mother attachment, second of an 
infantile erotic attachment to the father, and then development of a mature attachment to 
a man. This involves a complex combination of identifications with the mother and with 
the father. In terms of sex role, of course, the prescription is for acceptance of the role of 
the mother, hence identification with her in this sense. But there must still be the process 
of emancipation from the infantile mother-attachment. It may be presumed that 
identification with the father plays a crucial part in this, but because of the 
complementarity of the sex roles it may be relieved of certain of the pressures operating 
in the case of the boy. It may be presumed that because of the pressure to renounce the 
mother-attachment there is a tendency to transfer the erotic needs to the father, but this in 
turn is inhibited by the implications of the incest taboo. It may well be that this blocking 
is a fundamental focus of feminine resentments against men. But the important point is 
that for the girl as well as the boy the father constitutes an important focus of the pressure 
to grow up, to renounce infantilism, and hence to learn the value orientations of the adult 
world of the society; in both cases attachment to the mother is a barrier to this learning, 
and the father’s intervention constitutes a lever to pry the child loose from this 
attachment. 
It may be inquired what, from the present point of view, is the crucial difference 
between the role or sexuality in the infantile mother-attachment and in normal adult 
sexuality? Adult sexuality is fitted into a context of acceptance of adult values and roles 
generally while infantile sexuality is not. On the infantile level eroticism is an integral 
part of, and symbolizes, the total role in which security rests; on the adult level it is put in 
its proper place in the larger complex of values and roles. A man is “worthy” to enjoy an 
erotic love relationship only in so far as he lives up to the general value-pattern for the 
masculine role in the society, as he attains requisite levels of competence, responsibility, 
etc. Similarly a woman must accept her familial role, her attachment to a fully masculine 
man not a mother figure, and the responsibility of socializing her children in terms of the 
general value system, as a condition of being loved in the sense which is an altered 
repetition of the infantile prototype. It is this integration of the erotic needs with the adult 
value-system of the society which defines the essential difference between normal adult 
sexuality and “regressive” sexuality. At the same time the powerful force of erotic need-
dispositions on the normal adult levels testifies to their crucial role in the socialization 
process. It is at least strongly suggestive that though these needs can be shaped and 
integrated with adult roles they are too deeply rooted to be eliminated. The relevance of 
this situation to the prevalence of the empirical clustering of social structures about the 
kinship system, which we discussed in the last chapter, is evident. 
An essential part of this process is the progressive introducdon of new patterns of 
value-orientation. The stress on particular patterns will vary greatly in different social 
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systems, and their incidence will be differently distributed between different roles. But 
the greater responsibility of the adult in all societies, as compared with the child, means 
above all that the capacity for inhibition, hence for affectively neutral orientations, and 
for achievement must be developed to some important degree. Also universalism is by no 
means negligible in any society, for example, with reference to technical efficiency. 
It may be suggested that identification with the father is critically important, especially 
with reference to these components of a value-orientation system in all societies, but the 
more so the more these latter value-patterns are institutionalized. There are also crucial 
questions as to how far the mother role must also be altered in conformity with varying 
emphases on different components in the system of value-orientation. The necessity of 
this is given in the requirement that both parents share a common value system and in its 
terms show solidarity vis-à-vis their child. Only this solidarity permits the leverage of 
socialization relative to the early mother-attachment to operate. 
One of the most interesting features of the socialization process of the child, as 
reviewed in terms of the acquisition of value-orientations as formulated by the pattern 
variables, is the hierarchy of capacity for and incidence of the principal value-patterns. 
From this point of view the affective orientations are the first and in a sense easiest to 
acquire because of their direct relation to infantile  
dependency and gratifications. Affective neutrality is more difficult, and needs to be 
motivated by diffuse affective attachments. At the same time it requires emancipation 
from too great exclusiveness of these attachments. Universalistic orientations would 
appear to be the most difficult to acquire. Activity-passivity, which is related to 
achievement-ascription, and specificity-diffuseness on the other hand are not so directly 
related to this hierarchical scale except that one may perhaps say that passivity is more 
“primitive” than activity, and that affective specificity is more primitive than affective 
diffuseness, since it involves a lower level or generalization. 
This hierarchy clearly is related to the phenomena of regression which have concerned 
personality psychologists so greatly. The orientation element, which is most difficult to 
acquire and which in a sense depends on the most complex set of prerequisite conditions, 
is, at least under certain types of strain, likely to be the first to break down. Furthermore it 
is one with relation to which the socialization proces is most likely to go wrong, since it 
involves the most complex prerequisite and hence around which more of the neurotic 
type of defensive and adjustive mechanisms are likely to cluster. 
This structure of the value-orientation patterns relative to the socialization process, 
sketchy as its presentation has been, is clearly of the first importance for understanding 
the functioning of social systems, of different types. It is clear from the preceding chapter 
that different types of society and sub-system, because their role-orientation patterns are 
built up of different combinations of the pattern variables, impose very different sorts of 
strain on the socialization process and on the personality types which result from it. They 
are, hence, vulnerable to different types of strain in different ways. 
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§ BASIC PERSONALITY STRUCTURE: MODAL CLUSTERING 
AND DIVERSITY 
WE HAVE seen that each one of the pattern variables is intimately involved in that 
aspect of the socialization process which concerns the acquisition of value-orientation 
patterns. It has been possible, in a rough way, to show that each of them may present 
crucial alternatives at different stages of the socialization process, and that it is within the 
possibility of variation of the role taken by alter to swing the balance one way or the 
other. Of course what has been presented above is in this respect a very crude sketch. 
These alternatives in fact appear not once but many times, and there are very complex 
combinations of influences emanating from the role-expectations of the various 
socializing agents. But this sketch has been sufficient to show the relevance of the 
pattern-variable scheme to the analysis of socialization, and the kind of theoretical 
approach which would be indicated to carry the analysis farther with genuine empirical 
rigor. 
It follows, then, from the above analysis that in principle any one of the major pattern 
variable combinations can become internalized as a result of socialization processes and 
presumably, though this question has not been explored here, without a primary part 
being played by recourse to the operation of mechanisms other tnan the learning 
mechanisms, that is, without “neurotic” complications. At least the indications are very 
strong indeed that there is no one humanly “normal” pattern of internalized value-
orientation so that all others could be considered to be “neurotic” deviations from it; for 
example some pattern of the “mature personality” in general. 
It seems to be without serious qualification the opinion of competent personality 
psychologists that, though personalities differ greatly in their degrees of rigidity, certain 
broad fundamental patterns of “character” are laid down in childhood (so far as they are 
not genetically inherited) and are not radically changed by adult experience. The exact 
degree to which this is the case or the exact age levels at which plasticity becomes greatly 
diminished, are not at issue here. The important thing is the fact of childhood character 
formation and its relative stability after that. 
Secondly, if the above account of the process of value-acquisition is correct only in its 
broadest lines, it follows that the combination of value-orientation patterns which is 
acquired must in a very important degree be a function of the fundamental role structure 
and dominant values of the social system. 
This statement needs to be qualified in two ways. First, as we shall show presently, it 
cannot be a function only of this fundamental role structure. Secondly, the roles in which 
socialization takes place are predominantly kinship roles, and we have seen that these are 
in certain structural respects among the less variable as between primacies in the values 
of the pattern variables. 
We are then justified in concluding that the weight of evidence is strongly in favor of 
the existence and importance of an element of “basic personality” as Kardiner has called 
it, which is a function of socialization in a particular type of system of role relationships 
with particular values. Patterns of value-orientation play a peculiarly strategic part both in 
the definition of role-expectation patterns and in personality structure. Hence it may be 
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concluded that it is the internalization of the value-orientation patterns embodied in the 
role-expectations for ego of the significant socializing agents, which constitutes the 
strategic element of this basic personality structure. And it is because these patterns can 
only be acquired through the mechanism of identification, and because the basic 
identification patterns are developed in childhood, that the childhood structure of 
personality in this respect is so stable and unchangeable. 
The value-orientation patterns are so crucial in this regard because they are in fact the 
principal common denominator between personality as a system and the role-structure of 
the social system. If the whole analysis of action systems presented up to this point is 
correct this must be the strategic set of features of personalities which is most directly 
shaped by socialization processes. The same analysis of action, however, enables us to 
introduce certain very important qualifications and limitations relative to the concept of 
basic personality structure. 
The most important is that such a concept must be interpreted to refer to a companent 
of the normal personality structure in a society, not to that personality structure as a 
concrete entity. Secondly, such a personality structure cannot be uniform for a whole 
society, but it must be regarded as differentiated with regard to those status-
differentiations in which kinship groups function as units within the same society, and 
also by sex within the same classes of kinship units. 
We assume that all normal early socialization of children occurs within the context of 
kinship, though often, of course, supplemented by other agencies such as schools and 
peer groups. The fundamental lines of differentiation in socialization patterns will then be 
by sex within any given status group, and relative to the more general role-structure in 
which the parents are involved. The fact that it is the status differentiations which involve 
kinship units as units which are significant means that class, community and ethnic 
differences would be the most important within the same society. We must speak, then, 
of broad differentiations of basic personality structure between major types of societies, 
and of narrower differentiations by these status categories within the same society. 
But even so the basic personality structure will be only one aspect not only of the total 
concrete structure of the personality, but of its concrete value-orientation aspect. This is 
because of a variety of factors. In the first place no two human organisms are alike by 
genetic constitudon. Therefore the same influences operating on different genetic 
material will not necessarily bring about the same result It is a case analogous to that of 
the same beam of light refracted through different prisms; the spectra will not be 
identical. 
But, secondly, it is the concrete constellation of reciprocal role relationships which 
constitutes the socializing infiuence, and within the same broad status groupings of the 
society these are different in a variety of ways. One of the most obvious is the age, sex, 
birth-order composition of kinship units. Even though there is a broad similarity of 
pattern, in detail the relationship of a first child and a second child to the mother is never 
identical, first, because the mother is older when the second child is born, second, 
because of the presence of the first child. The relation of a second child to the mother is 
never quite the same if the first is a brother as it is if it is a sister, and so on. These 
variations may be almost random within certain status-groups, and their consequences 
thus “iron out,” but they nevertheless produce differences of result for pepple who are, 
broadly, being socialized for the same adult roles. There is also, thirdly, the fact that the 
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individual idiosyncrasies of the socializing agents enter in. It is the concrete reciprocal 
role relationship to the particular person in the particular situation which influences the 
learning process, and this may be more or less “typical,” no two cases are absolutely 
identical. 
It must be kept in mind that a personality is a distinctive action system with its own 
focus of organization in the living organism and its own functional imperatives. Given 
the initial diversity of genetic constitution, plus the diversity of situational influences, 
including the combination or role-interactions, it would be strictly impossible for 
socialization, even in a relatively uniform milieu, in terms of major differentiations of 
social structure, to produce a strictly uniform product. The diversity of personality 
structures of those occupying the same status in the social structure, which is one of the 
best attested facts of clinical observation, is thus not fortuitous but is fundamentally 
grounded in the nature of the relations between personality and the social system. The 
two systems of action are inextricably bound together, but they not only are not, they 
cannot be identical in structure or in the process of functioning. 
This diversity of personality structures relative to the role structure of the social 
system implies that we cannot rely on the building up of basic personality structures 
alone to explain the fundamental motivational processes of social systems. There are, it 
would seem, three further places we must seek. The first of these is to the capacity of the 
individual to make rational adaptations to the exigencies of his situation. This capacity is 
clearly along with genetic endowment a product of the processes of socialization in 
which identifications and value-acquisition will have played a prominent part. Once given 
the value-orientation patterns of the personality as internalized these processes of rational 
adaptation are not theoretically problematical to the sociologist and will not be further 
treated here. 
Second we must look for additional mechanisms of socialization than the acquisition 
of basic value-orientations as sketched above, and third, where motivation to deviance 
exists, for mechanisms of social control. The latter will be deferred to the following 
chapter, but before approaching the former a few further remarks may be made about 
types of basic personality structure and their relations to the distribution of variations 
from them. 
The facts concerning the nature of the acquisition of value-orientations, which we 
have reviewed, make it quite clear that the empirically observed diversity of concrete 
personality types cannot, relative to the dominant value-pattern system of the society or 
subsystem of it, vary at random. The point of reference for analyzing the distribution will, 
of course, have to be the relevant institutionalized pattern-type. This, it is to be 
remembered, will always be differentiated by sex role. The “modal personality type” for 
a social system or sub-system then will be that which predisposes to conformity with the 
major role-expectations of the sex role patterns in that part of the society, will be that is, 
the type which, in personality terms, is most congruous with these expectations. 
The variability from this modal type may be, in principle, analyzed with respect to any 
one or any combination of the pattern variables. Where the modal type is achievement-
oriented some individuals may incline to passivity; where it is also universalistically 
oriented some may, while retaining the achievement-orientation, incline to particularism 
and so on. Hence the permutations and combinations of Table 2 should be kept in mind 
for reference purposes in this type of analysis. The strength of the socialization 
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mechanisms is, however, sufficiently great so that it would seem very improbable that the 
completely antithetical types would be as common as those which varied from the modal 
type with respect to one, or possibly two, of the variables. 
In addition to this general consideration, however, something can be said about 
specific factors which would tend to influence the distribution of more or less variant8 
types. Of these, three may be mentioned. First, the source of the deviation from the modal 
type may have been an identification with a model alternative to that which might be 
regarded as normal. Of course in these terms there are many different shadings possible 
because of the diversity of concrete adult personalities in any child’s situation. But some 
of these alternatives may be relatively definitely structured. Perhaps the most obvious of 
these possibilities is the identification with a model of the wrong sex, so far as sex-role 
orientations are concerned, since both sexes are so readily available and so crucially 
important. This is apt to be a highly complicated matter, with, for instance, connections 
with the problem of homosexuality. But apart from such considerations, the value-pattern 
elements in the character for example of the parent of opposite sex may be taken over 
instead of those of the parent of the same sex. Thus in a given population one would 
expect to find that a certain proportion of the men leaned toward the value-patterns 
appropriate to the feminine role in that society or sub-system and vice versa, For 
example, in a sector of our own society, where universalistic-specific values are 
particularly prevalent, a minority of men might lean more in the particularisticdiffuse 
direction, hence be more inclined to assume roles primarily emphasizing informal 
organization. 
Cross-sex identification is, of course, by no means the only possibility of finding an 
alternative role model. There may well be other, slightly variant persons of the same sex.9 
Here perhaps particularly uncles, aunts and substantially older siblings may be highly 
important if they are substantially different from the parent of the same sex. Also in a 
complex and heterogeneous society like our own, an identification process started in such 
a direction may well take on association with various sub-cultures within the society, 
including perhaps the ethnic. Such a society offers a rich fund of alternative value-
patterns, often without being defined as radically deviant. 
The second direction in which the distribution of variant personality types may be 
organized is that of the “hierarchy of regression possibilities” discussed above. The 
important process here would not be regression itself, but the failure in the course of 
socialization to make some of the last steps successfully. This would seem to apply 
particularly to universalistic orientation trends and the affectively neutral-specific 
combination. Regression to particularistic orientations is one of the most important 
possibilities in a universalistically oriented role-system, and further “overemotional” 
types in situations which call for affective neutrality are familiar. A failure on these levels 
may, of course, be a result of failure in the early years to achieve a diffuse affective 
attachment to the mother, but it might be manifested in these other types of orientation 
context. It should be kept in mind that the relevant structure of the regression hierarchy  
8 The term variant in a meaning similar to this has been used by Florence Kluckhohn. Cf. 
“Dominant and Substitute Profiles of Cultural Orientation,” Social Forces, May, 1950. 
9 Which may, of course, relative to the modal type, include the parent of the same sex. 
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will vary according to the value-orientation pattern in question; it is not constant for 
all types, not even for the sex roles within a social sub-system—thus the manifestation of 
affectivity by crying in certain types of situation is “childish” for a man, but not for a 
woman. It must, of course, also be kept in mind that we are here speaking of regression in 
relation to the order and conditions of acquisition of value-orientation patterns, not of 
object-attachments as such. Though the two are, of course, closely related, the fact that 
psychoanalysts particularly so often have the latter in mind when speaking of regression 
should not be a source of confusion. Indeed the failure to distinguish these two things is 
characteristic of much psychoanalytic thinking. The capacity, through generalization, to 
abstract a value-orientation pattern from the original object through identification with 
which it was first acquired, is obviously one of the most important results of successful 
socialization. 
It is highly probable that no process of socialization occurs without an important part 
being played by the special mechanisms of defense and adjustment. But this exposition 
has deliberately attempted to abstract from such considerations in order to throw the 
operation of the mechanisms of socialization into full relief. It seems obvious, however, 
that in seeking role-models alternative to the parent of the same sex and in failing to 
attain what is for the role system in question the normal order of steps of value-
acquisition, that it is extremely likely that such mechanisms will be involved in the total 
process in important ways. Here attention will, however, be called to only one important 
aspect of their operation. We have seen that conformity-alienation is inherently a primary 
dimension of all interaction systems. The assumption of a role by the socializee means 
ipso facto that he comes to be faced with a conformity problem, and therefore the 
development of an alienative predisposition toward alter’s expectations is always an 
immediate possibility. Those elements of such alienation which are built into the 
personality in the course of the elementary socialization process we may call the primary 
alienative (and conversely conformative) need-dispositions. Both the mechanisms of 
defense and those of adjustment, where such a need-disposition exists, may be various. 
These will be analyzed more fully when the problems of deviance and social control are 
taken up. But here it may merely be noted that alienation is always a possible product of 
something going wrong in the process of value-acquisition through identification.  
It may be presumed that in the genesis of alienative need-dispositions the negative 
affect is in the first instance directed against the object of attachment as a person. But the 
phenomenon of interest here is the more generalized alienation from the value-patterns 
involved in the role-expectation. This, then, would motivate the actor to avoid conformity 
with these patterns, whenever encountered, either by withdrawal or by actively seeking a 
counter-orientation. This can be a source of motivation to seek alternative identifications 
and may also reinforce regressive tendencies. In any case the possibilities of primary 
alienation are among the most important factors giving direction to the distribution of 
variability from the modal personality type. 
What will be called secondary alienation is not built into the primary value-orientation 
patterns of the personality, but is a consequence of the fact that a personality with a given 
value-orientation pattern in his character structure is faced, in a specific role, with role-
expectations which are uncongenial to his need-dispositions and that, therefore, he is 
motivated to try to avoid conformity with them, though of course this component of his 
motivation may be outweighed by others such as a fear of the consequences of sanctions. 
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Even without primary alienative need-dispositions the diversity of personality types 
within a given role-system is such that further mechanisms would be necessary in order 
to secure the level of uniformity of behavior which is required by most roles in a social 
structure. There are three sets of facts, however, which cut down considerably the need 
for further mechanisms on the socialization level. These may be briefly mentioned before 
taking up the latter. 
First, there are the mechanisms of social control, which operate to secure conformity 
with role-expectations in spite of need-dispositions to avoid that conformity. The simplest 
and most obvious of these are the reward-punishment mechanisms which may give 
sufficient rewards for conformity and punishments for deviance to tip the balance in 
favor of conformity. This aspect of reward and punishment will, however, have to be 
taken up later. 
Secondly, to a widely varying degree for different roles and in different social 
systems, there is institutionalized a range of tolera-tion, so that conformity does not need 
to mean absolute uniformity of behavior. Put a little differently, along with prescriptions 
and prohibitions, there are also permissions. Very often, however, there is a certain 
relativity in the permissiveness in that there may be, as some anthropologists say, 
“preferred patterns,” that is, a hierarchy among the permitted ones. Perhaps the most 
important case of this is that where there are differentiated levels of achievement within a 
role, as is true for example of most modern occupational roles. Then there will be 
differential rewards correlated with the differential achievements, so that the actor whose 
grade of achievement is low, while he may not be deviant, is still “paying a price,” in that 
he fails to get the higher rewards, both, for example, in money earnings and in approval. 
Finding his place on such an achievement ladder may, however, constitute a tolerable 
adjustment for a variant personality, and this is an important kind of flexibility in the 
relation between the social system and the individual. Of course this is still more sure 
where the place occupied within the permitted range is a “matter of taste” without clear 
hierarchical distinctions. 
Finally, the third element of flexibility is the very important one, which again varies 
from society to society, of the existence of a system of alternative role-opportunities so 
that there is no one set of role-expectations which every individual who starts at a given 
status-point must conform with or pay the cost of deviance in sanctions. There seems to 
be little doubt that in a complex and mobile society like our own, one of the major 
sorting-out factors between alternative role-opportunities is to be found in differences of 
the value-orientation patterns of different personalities. When the major family status 
factors have been taken into account, and such obvious performance-capacity factors as 
I.Q., there is still a substantial residual variance with respect to occupational career 
orientation.10 It seems highly probable that one of the major factors in this residual 
variance is the variability of basic personality structure within the population concerned, 
which is not a function of the modal role-expectation patterns of their initial status.  
10 This has been clearly demonstrated in an unpublished study of the social mobility of high school 
students in the Boston area by S.A.Stouffer, Florence Kluckhohn, and the present author. 
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§ THE SITUATIONAL ROLE-SPECIFICATION OF ORIENTATIONS 
THESE three types of mechanism of accommodation in the social system to the non-role-
adapted diversity of personality types do not, however, even taken together, account for 
actual motivation to the degree of conformity with role-expectations normally found in a 
stable social system. In addition to sheer rational adaptation to the exigencies of 
situations, there is still another highly important set of mechanisms of socialization which 
may be called the situational role-specification11 of orientations. 
It may be recalled that the constellation of value-orientation patterns, which we have 
called basic personality structure, has in particular two features. First, being defined only 
in pattern variable terms, it is extremely general. Second, the identifications out of which 
it has been constructed are early identifications, which in the great majority of cases are 
superseded before adulthood. These two facts are closely connected. If there are general 
criteria of maturity, one of the most important is probably the combination of the stability 
of basic orientation patterns with relative flexibility of object choice, and action patterns, 
that is, relatively high capacity for substitution and reality testing. In this sense, as well as 
in the sense that attachments have concretely changed, it is necessary for the adult to 
become emancipated from his childhood identifications. 
But in this transition it is necessary for the actor to acquire more specific orientations 
relative to the specific situations and expectations of his adult roles; there is a further 
process of socialization on a new level. A very important part of this consists in the 
acquisition of the more complex adult culture of sophisticated knowledge, technical 
skills, and canons of expressive orientation, tastes and standards of taste. It may be 
presumed that in detail the paramount learning mechanism in these acquisition processes 
is imitation, since in the higher societies the level of complexity and sophistication of 
what has to be learned is such that individual creativity as the primary process is out of 
the question. It is, of course, above all about this complex cultural content that the 
processes of formal education come to be organized. 
But this is not to say either, that identification ceases to be an important learning 
mechanism on this more mature level, or that it is only specific cultural content which 
still has to be learned. 
First let us taken an example, which will be developed more at length in a later chapter 
in other contexts. Suppose we have an individual in whom the general value-orientation 
pattern of achievement-universalism, specificity, neutrality and collectivity-orientation is 
well established in his basic personalitv structure. First, as a male, he must learn that a 
man is expected, when he “grows up” to become the incumbent of an occupational role, 
to “do a job,” to “earn his living” and very probably to support a family. He learns that 
the occupational system is hierarchically graded, and that if he is properly ambitious for 
“success” he should aim to reach one of the higher levels in the occupational system. We 
have, then, the connection of a highly generalized achievement-orientation with the much 
more specific, but still very generalized goal of success in an occupational system. 
11 Specification aud specificity in the present usage should not be confused with specificity in the 
pattern variable sense. The context should make the distinction clear. 
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The basic personality orientation patterns are indeed a function of the social system in 
which the individual was socialized. But they are too general directly to embody the 
specific structure of the situation as a complex of alternative role-opportunities or the 
specific cultural definitions of what constitutes occupational success. The father may, in 
this respect, also be a highly important role model, but much more in terms of his specific 
role in the occupational system and his specific attitudes toward his own and other 
occupations and toward the specific context of what is meant by success. If the father 
were an American physician on the one hand, or a Chinese gentleman-scholar on the 
other, it would make a very important difference on this level, in part at least, 
independently of the father’s significance as a primary role-model on the level previously 
discussed. Resorting to an alternative role model would, on this level, not have quite the 
same significance as on the primary level. For example, in American society upward 
mobility is to a degree institutionalized. If a father in the lower status levels is ambitious 
for his son, and other conditions are given, he might well be a highly appropriate primary 
role model and a completely inappropriate secondary role model for the son. 
The degree of specificity of the orientation may be still further increased. Within this 
rather general orientation to occupational success the individual in question may incline 
toward a professional career and within that toward the medical profession. In this case 
he must, of course, orient himself to an extremely complex process of formal training, but 
also toward the definition of the specific role of physician (and the many sub-types within 
it), to what success in medicine or the relevant branch means, and the like. 
Or we may take a different example. A need-disposition for diffuse affective 
attachments is presumably a component of the basic personality structure of all normal 
people in our society. But besides this orientation structure, much needs to be learned for 
adjustment, tor example, to the role of marriage in our type of society. The predisposition 
to seek an object of the opposite sex and to fuse erotic gratifications in the diffuse 
attachment may be regarded as given in the basic personality structure. But the status of 
marriage, the responsibility for children, the standards with respect to an acceptable 
home, the mores with respect to the style of life of a married couple, and all the rest are 
not directly derivable from the basic personality structure. Certain patterns in basic 
personality structure are, of course, important prerequisites for a successful marriage, but 
the specific definition of the role and its specific values is another matter. 
Every society then has the mechanisms which have been called situational 
specifications of role-orientations and which operate through secondary identifications 
and imitation. Through them are learned the specific role-values and symbol-systems of 
that particular society or sub-system of it, the level of expectations which are to be 
concretely implemented in action in the actual role. 
Relative to the orientations of basic personality structure these are much more specific. 
But they are generalized in another sense in that they inculcate definitions of expectation 
which apply to all incumbents of the type of role in question in the particular social 
system. Thus this set of mechanisms has two primary functions. First is the specification 
of more generalized motivational orientation patterns to the point where they connect up 
with the sufficiently concrete definition of the situation in the actual social system 
actually to motivate conformity with concrete role-expectations. The second is, in 
combination with the system of sanctions and mechanisms of social control, to 
counterbalance the variability of basic personality structure, so that a level of uniformity 
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emerges which would not be possible were concrete adult role-orientations a simple and 
direct manifestation of the basic personality structure.12 Of course this second function, 
the motivation of uniformity of role-behavior, is only possible because there is an 
important range of flexibility in the average personality. The “determination” of character 
in the early process of basic personality formation is not a pre-determination of all future 
behavior in detail, but only of a basic directional orientation. There is still considerable 
plasticity so that, when allowance has been made for ranges of toleration and alternatives 
of role-opportunity it is only those toward the extremes of the range of variability of 
basic-personality structure who are not variant but deviant, in the sense that their need-
dispositions not merely make it a bit harder to conform, but psychologically impossible. 
Of course this line between the variant and the deviant is, in most societies, by no means 
rigid and many factors of post-childhood experience may throw the balance one way or 
the other. There are also mild and/or temporary deviances which do not place the 
individual in an irrevocably deviant role, but may afford some relief from the pressures to 
conformity. 
It is to be presumed that with respect to the role-specification mechanisms as with 
respect to those of value-acquisition, there is, in a given social role-system, a hierarchy of 
leaming stages. Thus from a variety of points of view in our society experience in the 
course of formal education is to be regarded as a series of apprentice- ships for adult 
occupational roles, even apart from the degrees to which the actual content of instruction, 
e.g., arithmetic and linguistic skills, can be directly used there. Thus to a much higher 
degree than in the family, in school the child learns to adjust himself to a specific-
universalistic-achievement system. He is brought into explicit competition with his 
classmates, and his standing with respect to the achievement orientation pattern is overtly 
symbolized in grades, as well as in the other rewards and punishments administered by 
the teacher, and in her attitudes. So far as the child accepts the role-expectations of the 
school system, attainment of good marks, which is one form of success, becomes what 
may be called a situationally generalized goal. This is a point at which a great many 
possible motivational factors may converge. One child may become highly interested in 
the subject-matter he is learning itself, another more interested in the favorable attitudes 
of the teacher, still a third in surpassing his classmates. But these different motivations 
may all converge on a common direction of actual behavior, namely the striving for 
marks. This illustrates how the social system operates to socialize different personality 
orientations so that in spite of the diversity of their basic personalities, they may still 
fulfill the same set of role-expectations, at least within the 
12 It may be noted that neglect of such considerations is one of the most serious shortcomings many 
of the views current in the “Culture and Personality” school of thought where there is an attempt to 
connect culture patterns and child training practices in such a direct way. First, this view does not 
allow for the fundamental fact of the variability of basic personality structures as a direct result of 
socialization in the same “culture” or structured role system. Secondly, however, it fails to see the 
significance of the second great class of socialization mechanisms. It tends to think of the role-
behavior of the adult as the direct “acting out” of need-dispositions on the basic personality 
structure level, thus treating institutions apart from the details of child-training practices as 
epiphenomena. This view is implicit in Kardiner’s concept of the distinction between “primary” 
and “secondary” institutions. 
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limits of tolerance. Of course it must not be forgotten that there are those who fail to 
fulfill these expectations altogether. But that is another story. 
There is, then, a sense in which the school system is a microcosm of the adult 
occupational world, and experience in it is a main field of operation of the second stage 
mechanisms of socialization, the specification of role-orientations. There are, of course, a 
whole series of stages within this before full adult status is achieved. Here only one 
further aspect will be mentioned, that of the place of new identifications. It seems 
probable that the predominance of women teachers in the early grades in American 
school systems is important not merely because of the fact that on comparable levels of 
training and technical competence they can be secured to work for less pay than men, and 
thus save economy-minded school boards and tax-payers money. There is probably 
considerable significance in the role of the woman teacher as an object for identification, 
obviously a significance connected with the process of emancipation from earlier 
attachments to the mother.  
It is suggested that this importance lies in a delicate balance between similarities to 
and differences from the mother. The fact of being a woman and of having a kindly, 
protective attitude toward the children is the most important similarity. A woman can by 
and large permit herself greater tenderness and solicitude than can a man. But there are 
also striking differences. The teacher is responsible for a class of some twenty or more 
children. They are almost of an age and therefore much more directly in competition with 
each other than siblings are, even in large families. The teacher cannot give each one the 
solicitude that would be normal in a mother. Moreover the relation is focused on the 
specific content of the curriculum; it is not general supervision and care, and it is sharply 
restricted to the school period. It is much more universalistic in content and specific in 
focus than the relation to the mother. Moreover the child does not have the same level of 
rights by ascription that he has vis-à-vis his mother; he can more readily be held to 
achievement standards. 
We know that dependence on the mother is particularly intense in the American 
kinsnip system, and we also know that emancipation from that dependence is particularly 
important for the adult in an achievement-oriented individualistic society. Too abrupt and 
drastic a transition might involve intolerable strain with neurotic consequences. The 
woman teacher as an identification figure may therefore perform a very important 
function in American socialization. 
To connect with the mother it is significant that the teacher be a woman; but it may be 
equally important that she should not be too much like the mother, or there would not be 
any new element in the pattern of her influence on the child. Perhaps this situation has 
something to do with the prevalence of the “irrational prejudice” against married women 
as teachers. Symbolically at least, since they are or should be mothers, for teachers to be 
married women might be dimly felt to be too close an assimilation between the mother 
role and the teacher role. Perhaps the traditional American “old maid” school teacher has 
her functions. 
Finally, it may be remarked that a very important step in respect to identifications as 
well as otherwise comes with the transition to “secondary” education, now usually in 
Junior High School. This is the breaking up of the one class per school grade into a 
different class—and teacher—for each subject. Then the child no longer has the one 
identification figure for his school life, he can no longer speak of “my teacher” but only 
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of “my English teacher” and “my science teacher.” This is another big step toward the 
acquisition of universalistic orientations, in that the focus is on competence in the subject 
matter rather than the more diffuse, general, and hence parent-like superior knowledge 
and standing of the teacher. The teacher approaches the role of a technical expert, not of a 
general prestige and authority figure. It is perhaps significant, that it is at this point that 
the American child generally first encounters men as teachers to a significant degree. 
It should be clear that socialization does not in this sense cease with the attainment of 
adult status. Societies differ a great deal of course in the degree to which they call upon 
their members for major role changes after the childhood period, but many, like our own, 
do so to a considerable extent Even to take one nearly universal example, namely 
marriage, the content of the role is continually changing, partly as a function of the 
individual’s own age and that of his spouse. The childless stage of marriage means in fact 
a different role from that which is assumed with the advent of children. The number and 
ages of the children change the character of the role, as of course happens drastically in 
our society when the “stage of the empty nest” is reached. Similarly in those occupational 
roles which have a typical “career line,” the expectations shift quite substantially as new 
stages in the career are reached. Here one of the most important problems of adjustment 
is that concerned with starting a career in a position of low responsibility and in the 
course of it coming to assume large responsibilities. In one phase it is a shift from 
subordination to many people to superordination over many. It is well known that such 
shifts place considerable strains upon individuals, but it remains a fact that many 
accomplish them successfully; they can hardly do so without undergoing a complicated 
leaming process. 
Finally, many societies are involved in processes of social change. Such changes may, 
even over the span of active adult life, be considerable, so that the expectations of an 
early period must be considerably readjusted to meet the requirements of a later one. 
Here again the process can be successful only through the operation of learning 
mechanisms in the context of socialization, of further role specification of orientations.  
§ AN EXAMPLE: THE “PROFIT MOTIVE” 
IN CONCLUSION we may develop a somewhat fuller illustration of the operation and 
functions of the mechanisms of situational role-specification of orientations by examining 
certain aspects of the place of the so-called “profit motive” in modern liberal societies. 
The popular term is placed in quotation marks because in the light of the present 
theoretical analysis of role-motivations it is apt to be somewhat misleading. Some 
psychologists have spoke of a primary acquisitive drive or instinct. Whatever the major 
orientation pattern of the modern “businessman” may be, it is not in any simple sense a 
manifestation of such a drive. 
The profit motive is rather, in the above sense, a situationally generalized goal which 
is learned in the course of what has been called the secondary socialization process. It is 
not general to human beings, but is very specifically culture-bound to certain types of 
roles in specific social systems. It is not bound to any particular basic personality type,13 
though in certain respects it is certainly more congenial to some than to others. Its 
situational generalization, however, has precisely the function of making it a possible 
The learning of social role-expectations and the mechanisms     165
common orientation of action deriving from a diversity of “psychological” motivational 
roots, and combinations of them. 
The structural focus of the orientatioin to profit is, of course, the phenomenon of 
instrumental exchange, which, as we have seen, has some place in every social system. 
Since there is in the structure of the situation inherent motivation to secure relatively 
advantageous terms in exchanges—not to be so oriented in any sense could be 
compatible only with the extreme of masochism, or of drastic other worldliness, and even 
there one might say that the masochist sought advantage in what others considered to be 
disadvantageous.  
In any case, then, in this most general sense the profit motive is “endemic” in all social 
relationship systems. 
However, differentiation of the instrumental complex, its segregation from diffuse 
solidarities and above all the development of money, enormously extends the range of 
relevance of exchange. The availability of money as a generalized medium of exchange 
makes it possible through the securing of advantageous monetary terms to enhance the 
means available to gratify all need-dispositions with reference to which purchasable 
means may be important. In a market economy like ours the range of monetary 
purchasability is extremely wide. It is particularly important to be clear that the relevance 
of this range of exchangeability has virtually nothing to do with what is ordinarily 
considered the “ethical quality” of the goals to which monetary resources are a means. 
Thus every religious movement seeks to “raise money,” that is to make a profit, for its 
particular purposes, just as much as the man who wants to bet his earnings on the races or 
to drown his sorrows in drink. To have more money rather than less is simply, with only 
a few exceptions, to be in a more advantageous position to realize whatever goals the 
actor may have in mind. In this sense the “profit motive” is nothing but a primary aspect 
of what may be called “practical rationality.” 
But, of course, this is not all. Means-objects inevitably acquire symbolic significance, 
and the quantifiability of money as a possession means that money lends itself peculiarly 
to the symbolization of prestige. Since it is useful, in one sense its possession is 
inevitably a reward as well as being a facility for the attainment of other rewards. Hence 
money, income, or wealth, i.e., resources convertible into or measurable in money terms, 
are, in an economy with a high development of monetary exchange, an important reward 
symbol. As such profit may be a measure of otherwise valued achievement acquisition, or 
it may be a direct goal of success-striving, so that other forms of achievement content 
become instrumental to monetary gain. 
Further, there are complex relations between money as a reward symbol and other 
components of the reward system, money as a symbol of achievement being one. Another 
obvious one is the connection between monetary resources and the style of life, in such a 
way that money is the means of purchasing valued items of the style of life, but 
conversely, the display of style of life items may be a way of telling the public that one 
has a large income—the case whicn Veblen called “conspicuous consumption.” 
13 One of the cruder versions of the idea that it does manifest such a type is the conception of some 
psychoanalytic amateur sociologists that “capitalism is a manifestation of the “anal character.” 
There is certainiy a grain of truth in this idea, but hardly more. It completely overlooks the focal 
problems of the organization of the social system. 
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Incidentally among certain Bohemian groups this relationsnip is inverted, the style of 
life is, among other things, meant to advertise that the actor is contemptuous of the “flesh 
pots” of the bourgeois world, that he accepts and glorifies “honorable poverty.” 
Whatever the range of variability with respect to these symbolic significances of 
money income and earnings, there is in a developed market economy—even in 
socialism—as we have noted, a strong tendency for integration of the income scale with 
the general prestige scale of the social system. This aspect must in turn be integrated with 
certain possibilities of orientation to monetary gain, which are inherent in the structure of 
the situation in a system of instrumental division of labor. The following possibilities 
may be noted: 
1) The interest in gain may be a purely personal orientation, the actor merely taking 
advantage of an opportunity presented in the situation. Such opportunities necessarily 
arise in a money economy. 
2) It may become a feature of an institutionalized role for an individual who is as such 
a unit in an ecological complex of market relationships. There are two principal sub-types 
of this, a) where he is an artisan or independent professional practitioner who has to 
engage in financial transactions for disposal and acquisition of facilities, but these are 
conditional to his main occupational goal which is to “produce” or to “provide service”; 
and b) where he is an independent “businessman,” e.g., a merchant, whose role is 
institutionally defined as to “make money.” 
3) It may be orientation in a membership role within a collectivity. In any collectivity, 
most roles are not primarily oriented to profit-making; they are oriented rather to 
cooperation in the sense of Chapter III. Cases would be professional technicians or 
ordinary “workers.” Only certain representative roles, which are concerned with 
mediation of the affairs of the collectivity vis-à-vis the outside situation can be oriented 
to profit. These again are of two main types. a) In a collectivity which as a unit is not 
oriented to profit, the problems of exchange for disposal, remuneration and provision of 
facilities still remain. Roles may be specialized relative to these functions. When it 
becomes an obligation of the role to secure advantageous terms on behalf of the 
collectivity, the incumbent is oriented to profit. Examples would be the treasurer of a 
university or a hospital. b) In a collectivity, which as a unit is oriented to profit, a 
“business firm,” profit has primacy as the paramount obligation of the top executive 
roles. But in botn these cases profit-making becomes the role-obligation of a role on 
behalf of the collectivity; it is not orientation to “personal gain” in the usual sense. 
The question of the orientation of the individual actor to the collectivity in which he 
participates presents still a further structural aspect of the problem. He must secure his 
personal remuneration and must settle terms with the collectivity, with respect to the 
assumption or continuation of his role within it. This is, of course, the place where 
personal orientation to profit can operate in relation to organizations in the occupational 
world. There is naturally a connection between the “value” of a man’s services to the 
collectivity and the terms he is able to secure for his services to it. But the connection is 
seldom simple and direct, and certainly when he occupies one of the above two types of 
roles he generally does not put his earnings on behalf of the firm or organization directly 
into his own pocket. 
There is, thus, a whole range of possible significances of orientation to financial 
“gain” in a market economy. But the most important common denominator of these is not 
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motivational iri the usual sense, it is not a “propensity of human nature.” It is, rather, an 
aspect of the structuring of the situation of action. It concerns a hignly generalized mode 
of action in which a highly generalized class or advantages is to be sought, which funnels 
all manner of motivations into a common channel. On the level of structure there is a 
wide variety of different role elements which are articulated in different ways into the 
monetary market system. These are, first, the purchasing interests of “consumers,” a 
purely “instrumental” interest. Second, the disposal interests and facility-procuring 
interests of independent “producers,” though they may be only secondarily oriented to 
“making money.” Third, the interests of employed persons in securing income through 
the contract of employ-ment. Fourth, the orientation of independent individuals to 
making money “on their own.” Fifth, the role of conducting market transactions on behalf 
of an organization, though the organization is not primarily profit-oriented and sixth, the 
corresponding type of role where the organization is primarily profit-oriented. Only four 
and six are in any usual sense “capitalistic” or “profit making” orientations. 
But in addition to these aspects of the problem we have the symbolic place of money 
income in the reward system of the society, as a symbol of achievement and of success, 
and of course as a means of exercising power. 
We can speak properly of individuals as oriented to profit, then, so far as by 
socialization they have become integrated within this system of role-expectations and 
situational opportunities. Within any given role in the system there is room for a variety 
of different nuances of personal orientation, of different attitudes toward money in each 
of the many different respects in which it enters into the structure of the situation. But as 
the basis of a uniformity of the orientation of action the profit motive is a situationally 
generalized goal, its generality comes from its place in the definitian of the situation, and 
the integration of this with the individual’s orientations, not from any pre-socialization 
features of the motivation of the individual. 
It is, furthermore, not of the same order of generality as the orientation-directions 
which are grounded in the elementary structure of the interaction relationship, such as the 
need-dispositions for affection, for security or for a sense of adequacy. It is precisely this 
difference which justifies treating the profit motive as a “secondary” product of the 
socialization process. There are many societies where, even in the most general non-
monetary sense, orientation to favorable exchange terms has a relatively minimal 
significance. For it to acquire a significance remotely approaching that in the modern 
industrial type of society, even in its socialist version, means that relatively specific 
features of the specific social structure have to be incorporated into the orientation of the 
personality on the secondary socialization level. There has to be a role-specification of 
orientations going far beyond the most generalized basic personality orientations of the 
primary socialization level, and to a certain extent cutting across them. It is by such 
mechanisms that motivation adequate to the more detailed role expectations of a social 
system, perhaps particularly those involved in the adaptive structures which are not direct 
manifestations of the primary value-orientations, are built up. 
The above, as has several times been noted, treats only one half of the problem of 
motivational process in the social system. The other half is the analysis in motivational 
terms of the sources of tendencies to deviance, and the mechanisms of their control. To 
this we now turn.  
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VII 
DEVIANT BEHAVIOR AND THE 
MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
 
IT HAS been evident from the beginning of this work that the dimension of conformity-
deviance was inherent in and central to the whole conception of social action and hence 
of social systems. One aspect, that is, of the common cultural patterns which are part of 
every system of social interaction, is always normative. There is an expectation of 
conformity with the requirements of the pattern, if it be only in observing the conventions 
of a communication pattern, for example, by speaking intelligibly. The complementarity 
of expectations, on which such great stress has been laid, implies the existence of 
common standards of what is “acceptable,” or in some sense approved behavior. In the 
preceding chapter we have dealt with the processes by which motivational structures 
required for behavior in conformity with such normative social expectations are built up. 
We must now turn to the other side of the coin, the processes by which resistances to 
conformity with social expectations develop, and the mechanisms by which these 
tendencies are or tend to be counteracted in social systems. 
It is a cardinal principle of the present analysis that all motivational processes are 
processes in the personalities of individual actors. The processes by which the 
motivational structure of an individual personality gets to be what it is are, however, 
mainly social processes, involving the interaction of ego with a plurality of alters. Thus 
the sectors or the motivation of the individual which are concerned with his motivation to 
deviant behavior, are the outcome of his processes of social interaction in the past and the 
whole problem must therefore be approached in social interaction terms. In the analysis 
of deviance as well as of socialization we must focus on the interactive processes as it 
influences the orientation of the individual actor in his situation and in orientation to the 
situation itself, including above all the significant social objects, and to the normative 
patterns which define the expectations of his roles. 
Deviance and the mechanisms of social control may be defined in two ways, 
according to whether the individual actor or the interactive system is taken as the point of 
reference. In the first context deviance is a motivated tendency for an actor to behave in 
contravention of one or more institutionalized normative patterns, while the mechanisms 
of social control are the motivated processes in the behavior of this actor, and of the 
others with whom he is in interaction, by which these tendencies to deviance tend in turn 
to be counteracted. In the second context, that of the interactive system, deviance is the 
tendency on the part of one or more of the component actors to behave in such a way as 
to disturb the equilibrium of the interactive process (whether a static or a moving 
equilibrium). Deviance therefore is defined by its tendency to result either in change in 
the state of the interactive system, or in re-equilibration by counteracting forces, the latter 
being the mechanisms of social control. It is presumed here that such an equilibrium 
always implies integration of action with a system of normative patterns which are more 
or less institutionalized. 
It is clearly the conception of deviance as a disturbance of the equilibrium of the 
interactive system, which is the more important perspective for the analysis of social 
systems. But we must still be quite clear that it is essential to be able to follow this 
analysis from the level of ascertaining uniformities in the processes of change in the 
structure of the social system, to that of analyzing the relevant motivational processes in 
the personalities of the individual actors. Hence there is always also a reference to the 
first context implied. 
It should also be made clear that there is a certain relativity in the conceptions of 
conformity and deviance. These are concepts which refer to problems of the integration 
and malintegration of social systems and sub-systems. It is therefore not possible to make 
a judgment of deviance or lack of it without specific reference to the system or sub-
system to which it applies. The structure of normative patterns in any but the simplest 
sub-system is always intricate and usually far from fully integrated; hence singling out 
one such pattern without reference to its interconnections in a system of patterns can be 
very misleading, e.g., the judgment that a person who tells a “white lie” as a way out of a 
conflict situation is a “dishonest person.” Similarly the concrete individual actor never 
acts in one role only, but in a plurality of roles and situations, with complex possibilities 
of variation in the expectations and tensions to which they subject the actor. Furthermore, 
there is the problem of the time sector which is taken as relevant to the analysis of a 
system. Actions are mortised together in time sequence as well as in other respects, and 
conflicts can focus on time-allocation as well as on the conflicting claims of different 
interaction-partners. 
These are all problems of the first importance and must be made as clear and explicit 
as possible. Nevertheless the fact remains that all social action is normatively oriented, 
and that the value-orientations embodied in these norms must to a degree be common to 
the actors in an institutionally integrated interactive system. It is this circumstance which 
makes the problem of conformity and deviance a major axis of the analysis of social 
systems. The fact that in its working out it is highly complex, does not imply that it can 
be safely ignored or cannot be satisfactorily analyzed. The crucial significance of this 
problem focus derives as we have seen from two fundamental considerations; first that 
the frame of reference of action makes the concept of orientation a primary focus of 
analysis and second, the fact that we are dealing with the “boundary-maintaining” type of 
system, which defines what we must mean by the concept of integration of the system.  
§ INTERACTION AND THE GENESIS OF DEVIANT MOTIVATION 
LET US go back then to the fundamental paradigm of social interaction including the 
assumption, stated at the beginning of the last chapter, that a stably established interactive 
process, that is, one in equilibrium, tends to continue unchanged. We will further assume 
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that ego and alter have, in their interaction, developed mutual cathectic attachments to 
each other, so that they are sensitive to each other’s attitudes, i.e., attitudes are 
fundamental as sanctions, and that the interaction is integrated with a normative pattern 
of value-orientation, both ego and alter, that is, have internalized the value-pattem. We 
have stated many times that such an interaction system is characterized by the 
complementarity of expectations, the behavior and above all the attitudes of alter 
conform with the expectations of ego and vice versa. 
This paradigm provides the setting for the analysis of the genesis of motivation to 
deviance. Let us assume that, from whatever source, a disturbance is introduced into the 
system, of such a character that what alter does leads to a frustration, in some important 
respects, of ego’s expectation-system vis-à-vis alter. This failure of the fulfillment of 
ego’s expectations places a “strain” upon him, that is, presents him with a problem of 
“adjustment” in the terms which we have used. There are always, we may presume, three 
terms to this problem. First ego’s expectations in the interaction system are part of his 
own system of need-dispositions which in some sense press for gratification. Second, 
these expectations are organized to include an attachment to alter as a cathected object, 
and third the value-pattern governing the relationship has been internalized and violation 
of its prescriptions is directly a frustration of some of ego’s need-dispositions. In so far as 
the adjustment problem is “serious,” in that alter’s disturbing behavior is more than 
momentary and in that it touches some strategic area of ego’s orientation system, ego will 
be forced to restructure his orientation in one or more of these three respects. He can first 
restructure his own need-dispositions, by inhibition and by one or more of the 
mechanisms of defense, such as simply repressing the needs which are no longer 
gratified. He can, secondly, seek to transfer his cathexis to a new object and relieve the 
strain that way and, finally, he can renounce or seek to redefine the value-orientation 
pattern with which alter is no longer conforming. 
In any one or more of these three directions there may be resolution of the strain by a 
successful learning process; ego may learn to inhibit his need-disposition, he may cathect 
a new object which will fulfill his expectations, or he may extinguish or alter the value-
pattern. This would be the obverse or alter abandoning his changed behavior. In either 
case equilibrium would be re-established, in one case with a changed state of the system, 
in the other with a restoration of the old state. 
But another outcome is possible, and in many cases very likely. That is that, in one or 
more of the above three respects, a “compromise” solution should be reached. Our 
primary interest is not in the internal integration of the personality but in ego’s 
adjustment to social objects and to normative patterns. Hence first, ego may not abandon 
his cathexis of alter by substituting an alternative object, but may retain his cathexis, but 
this cathexis can no longer be “undisturbed.” Ego must have some reaction to the 
frustration which alter has imposed upon him, some resentment or hostility.1 In other 
words the cathectic orientation acquires an ambivalent character, there is still the need to 
love or admire alter, but there is also the product of his frustration in the form of negative 
and in some sense hostile attitudes toward alter. In so far as this happens of course ego is 
put in an emotional conflict in his relation to alter. Similarly, the integration of ego’s  
 
1 Another very important phenomenon of reaction to strain is the production of phantasies. 
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expectations with the value-pattern has been disturbed by alter’s failure to conform with 
it, the pattern may be too strongly internalized for ego to be able to abandon it and accept 
one in conformity with alter’s behavior. Here again ego may develop an ambivalent 
attitude structure, at the same time adhering to the normative pattern and resenting the 
“cost” of this adherence in that it involves him in conflict with alter and with aspects of 
his own personality. 
There are many complications involved in the possibilities of handling the strains 
inherent in such an ambivalent motivational structure. For our purpose, however, they 
may be related to two fundamental alternatives. The first is repression of one side of the 
ambivalent structure so that only the other side receives overt expression. If it is the 
negative side which is repressed, ego will continue to be attached to alter and/or to be 
motivated to conform with the normative pattern in question. If the positive side is 
repressed, conversely ego will tend to abandon his attachment to alter, in the sense of 
giving it overt expression, and to refuse to conform with the normative pattern. The 
second fundamental possibility is for ego to try to find a way to gratify both sides of his 
ambivalent motivation  
Presumably in the same concrete relationship this is impossible2 since the two are in 
conflict. But in a more extensive and complex interaction system there may be such 
possibilities either because contexts and occasions can be segregated, or because it is 
possible to find alternative objects for one or both sides of the need-disposition structure. 
This latter possibility will become very important to the discussion of the social 
structuring of deviance later in this chapter. But for the present let us adhere to the 
simpler case. 
The negative component of such an ambivalent motivational structure relative to a 
system of complementary expectations will be called an alienative need-disposition, the 
positive component, a conformative need-disposition. It should be noted that in these 
theoretical terms alienation is conceived always to be part of an ambivalent motivational 
structure, while conformity need not be. Where there is no longer any attachment to the 
object and/or internalization of the normative pattern, the attitude is not alienation but 
indifference. Both social object and pattern have become only neutral objects of the 
situation which are no longer a focus of ego’s cathectic need-system. The conflict in such 
a case would have been solved by full resolution, through substitution of a new object, 
through inhibition or extinction of the need-disposition, and/or through internalization of 
a new normative pattern. 
Where alienative motivation is present, but the conformative component is dominant 
over the alienative, we may speak of compulsive conformity, where on the other hand the 
alienative component is dominant over the conformative, we may speak of compulsive 
alienation. The psychological reasons for using these terms are not far to seek. The 
essential point is that ego is subject not only to a strain in his relations with alter, but to 
an internal conflict in his own need-disposition system. Precisely because he has a  
2 It is of course possible within limits through time allocation. At certain times ego’s resentment 
may break through into hostile acts (including verbal) and the positive attitude then regain 
ascendancy. 
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negative feeling toward alter, but at the same time a powerful need to retain his relation 
to alter and to the normative pattern, he must “defend himself” against his need to express 
his negative feelings, with the attendant risk of disturbing his relation to alter still further 
or provoking him to retaliatory action, in the more extreme case, of losing alter. This is, 
indeed, in relation to social interaction relationships, the basis of the defense mechanism 
of reaction formation. The pattern is to “accentuate the positive,” to be compulsively 
careful to conform with what ego interprets as alter’s expectations (which by 
institutionalization are also his own) so as to minimize the risk of disturbing the 
relationship still further. 
Conversely, if the alienative component is dominant, the fact that the attachment to 
alter as a person and to the normative pattern is still a fundamental need, means that ego 
must defend himself against the tendency to express this need-disposition. He must 
therefore not only express his negative reaction, but be doubly sure that the conformative 
element does not gain the upper hand and risk his having to inhibit the negative again. 
Therefore his refusal to conform with alter’s expectations becomes compulsive. This 
defense against the repressed component is in both cases the primary basis of resistance 
against the abandonment of “symptoms,” even though they involve ego in serious 
negative sanctions in his social relationships. 
It is here that we have the focus of the well-known vicious circle in the genesis of 
deviant behavior patterns, whether they be neurotic or psycho-somatic illness, criminality 
or others. It may be presumed that the reaction of ego to the change in alter’s behavior, 
which resulted in resort to adjustive and defensive mechanisms involving ambivalence, 
will be in some way complementary to the change alter introduced. For example, alter, 
instead of recognizing the merit of a piece of work ego has done, may have shown 
marked disapproval, which ego felt to be in contravention of the value-pattern with 
respect to competent achievement shared by both. Ego reacted to this with resentment 
which, however, he repressed and became compulsively anxious to secure alter’s 
approval. This compulsive element in ego’s motivation makes him excessively 
“demanding” in his relation to alter. He both wants to be approved, to conform, and his 
need for approval is more difficult to satisfy because of his anxiety that alter may not give 
it. This in turn has its effect on alter. Whatever his original motivation to withhold the 
approval ego expected, ego has now put him in a position where it is more difficult than it 
was before for him to fulfill ego’s expectations; the same level of approval which would 
have sufficed before is no longer sufficient. Unless a mechanism of social control is 
operating, then, the tendency will be to drive alter to approve even less, rather than more 
as ego hopes. This will still further increase the strain on ego and intensify his 
resentment, hence, if the alienative component does not break through, it will add to the 
compulsiveness of his motivation to seek approval through conformity with alter’s 
expectations. The pressure of ego’s conflict may also of course lead to cognitive 
distortion so that he thinks that alter’s expectations are more extreme than they really are, 
and that therefore he is being held to intolerable standards. 
This is the essential structure of the generation of cumulative motivation to deviance 
through the interaction of complementary ambivalences in the motivational systems of 
ego and alter. Of course this is a highly simplified and abstract paradigm. The “direct 
line” of development of the vicious circle could not empirically proceed far without some 
modification for two sets of reasons. First the need-dispositions of ego and alter which 
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are the focus of the developing conflict are only parts of a complicated system of need-
dispositions in the personalities of each. The alterations in these parts growing out of the 
interaction process would lead to repercussions in the rest of the personality systems 
which would modify the development of the interaction itself. Secondly, the interaction 
of ego and alter on which we have focused is only a sector of a larger system of social 
interaction which involves other actors than ego and alter, and perhaps their interaction in 
other roles. These complications must duly be taken into account, and are of course 
extremely important for the mechanisms of social control. But the vicious circle in the 
interaction of two actors is the fundamental paradigm of the genesis of the motivation for 
deviant behavior. 
§ THE DIRECTIONS OF DEVIANT ORIENTATION 
WE MAY now return to the question of what are the most important further 
differentiations in the direction of deviant motivation itself, whether it be in the 
compulsively conformative or alienative direction. Two such further differentiations 
appear to be particularly important. In the first place, the differentiation between activity 
and passivity, is of generally recognized psychological significance.3 If the conformative  
 
3 There may be a variety of aspects and sources of this distinction. For present purposes it may, 
however, be regarded as a direct derivative of the fundamental paradigm of interaction itself. The 
conformity-alienation dimension of possible deviance concerns, as we have just seen, the 
orientation of any actor to the pattern aspect of the established system of expectations—or any part 
of it—which is institutionalized and internalized in the interaction system. Activity-passivity, on 
the other hand, is the dimension concerned with one primary aspect of the mutual orientation of ego 
and alter to each other as objects. The point of reference is, as always, a stabilized system of 
interaction. The concept of “activity” defines deviation from the role of an actor in this stabilized 
process in the direction of taking more “initiative,” of taking a larger degree of control over thc 
interaction process, than the role-expectations call for. “Passivity,” on the other hand, is the 
obverse, it is the direction of taking less initiative, of letting alter control the situation and himself, 
to a larger degree than the role-expectations call for. 
There is a third dimension of the possibilities of deviance, which will be discussed presently. This 
concerns relative primacies, in the orientation of the actors, as between the pattern element and the 
social object element of the interaction system. A stabilized interaction system always involves a 
balance between these. This balance can be upset, on the one hand by giving a greater primacy to 
the pattern—either by insisting on conformity or by alienative resistance to it—on the other hand to 
orientation to alter as a social object positively or negatively. All three of these dimensions are thus 
grounded in the essential structure of the interactive relationship system. 
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and the alienative types each be subdivided according to whether the orientation is 
primarily active or passive, we derive the following four-fold classification: 
This classification is of interest, not only because of its direct derivation from the analysis 
of the interaction paradigm, but because it restates, from the motivational point of view, 
in essentials the classification put forward some years ago by Merton in his well-known 
paper on Social Structure and Anomie.4 What Merton calls“conformity” is clearly what 
we here mean by the equilibrated condition of the interactive system without conflict on 
either side or alienative motivation. Merton’s “innovation” and “ritualism” are our two 
compulsively conformative types, while “rebellion” and “retreatism” are clearly the two 
alienative types. Since Merton’s paradigm was formulated in terms of relations to 
institutionalized goals and means, it is interesting to find that the active emphasis puts the 
primary stress on goals—as its relation to the achievement pole of the pattern variable of 
ascription-achievement would lead one to expect—while the passive empnasis puts the 
stress on means. In each case, however, we may infer, the compulsive element puts a 
strain on genuine conformity with institutionalized expectations, but in the two cases the 
primary incidence varies. We may surmise that Merton’s paradigm is most readily 
applicable to a social system where achievement values are prominent, then because 
achievement goals are highly institutionalized, the actively ambivalent person can find 
the easiest “way out” in accentuated goal striving. Where ascriptive values were 
institutionalized, especially in combination with particularism, this outlet would largely 
be closed. Because of this element of culture-boundness of the Merton paradigm, and 
because of the inclusion of the motivational element, we may presume that the version 
presented here is the more general one, of which Merton’s is a very important special 
case. 
The second further differentiation of the directions of deviant motivation which needs 
to be introduced concerns the possibility of differentiation between focusing on one or 
the other of the two fundamental components of the interactive system beside ego’s own 
need-disposition system, namely alter as a person, i.e., a social object, and the normative 
pattern which integrates their interaction. Both are, as in the case of ambivalence, 
inevitably involved. But there may be dominance of compulsive concern in one direction 
or the other. The introduction of this further differentiation yields the eightfold 
classification presented in Table 4. 
Where the conformative element is dominant and ego’s primary concern is with his 
relations to alter as person, anxiety focuses on disturbance of the relation, on the 
possibility that alter may turn his favorable attitude into an unfavorable one and may 
aggressively punish ego or withdraw from the relationship. There are, funda-mentally, 
two ways in which ego can seek to cope with the situation, in relation both to his own 
anxiety and to alter. He may, if he is actively oriented, seek to put alter in a position 
where it is impossible for him to do anything but fulfill ego’s expectations, that is, to 
dominate him. If, on the other hand, he is passively inclined, he may seek to protect his 
interest in the relationship by acquiescing in alter’s every wish, lest failure to do so 
jeopardize the relationship, that is, he may be submissive to alter. 
 
4 Revised and extended version in his Social Theory and Social Structure, Chapter III. 
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 TABLE 4 
 
If the alienative component of ego’s motivation is dominant he is by definition less 
concerned with preserving alter’s favorable attitudes than he is with expressing his 
alienative need-dispositions. Hence in the active case he will tend to act aggressively 
toward alter, to “pick a fight” with him relatively regardless of the risk of alienating alter, 
to seek a “showdown.” If, on the other hand, he is passively inclined, his tendency will 
be, not aggressively to force a “showdown” but to avoid exposure to uncongenial 
expectations on alter’s part, to be compulsively independent, in the extreme case to break 
the relationship altogether by withdrawing from it. The four cases may be grouped 
together by saying that both dominance and submission are expressions of a compulsive 
dependency need, to avoid losing alter as an object at almost any cost, while 
aggressiveness and passive compulsive independence have in common that they are 
motivated by a compulsive need for independence, a need to avoid giving way to the 
dependency need at almost any cost. 
Turning to the cases where the normative pattern is the primary focus of the conflict, 
on the conformative side we may differentiate according to activity and passivity, a 
compulsive need to enforce the norm on alter, and a compulsive need for perfectionistic 
observance on the part of ego himself. An alternative to compulsive enforcement on alter 
is, for the actively oriented, to develop a compulsive achievement drive for himself. He 
may of course manifest both tendencies as in the familiar case of the compulsive achiever 
who is merciless in his demands on his subordinates. The passively inclined will tend to 
evade demands for active achievement or control and focus his compulsiveness on the 
details of conformity-expectations. 
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Finally, wnere the alienative component is dominant, the active type is the 
“incorrigible,” the one who flouts rules and laws apparently “for its own sake,” whose 
attitude is “try and do anything about it.” The passive type on the other hand tends to 
evasion of conformity with the normative pattern, to do his best to avoid situations in 
which the expectations can be implemented, or sanctions applied. 
These are, of course, definitions of the direction of deviant tendencies. First it must not 
be forgotten that they are always relative to a particular set of complementary role-
expectations, to a particular alter or class of alters, and to a particular normative pattern 
or sub-system of them. In some cases the ambivalence may, in the personality of the 
actor, be highly “localized” in its application. But it may also under certain circumstances 
become more or less highly generalized, transferred by substitution from the original 
objects and normative patterns. In the extreme cases we may have personalities with a 
highly generalized need-disposition for rebellion or for withdrawal. It is not possible to 
go into all the complications here. 
Secondly, of course, the actual behavior patterns which will result are not a function 
only of the ways in which deviant motivation comes to be built into the motivational 
structure of the personality, but of the nature of the situations in which the actors are 
placed. As noted, this always involves third persons, and also a variety of features of the 
normative pattern system and the sanction system. What we have presented is only the 
barest beginning of a dynamic analysis of these complex processes. Some of the further 
complications will have to be analyzed as we proceed. 
The differentiation between alter as a social object and the normative pattern itself as a 
focus of strain and of compulsive motivation throws light on a common differentiation in 
psychological discussion. We may say that the need for security in the motivational sense 
is the need to preserve stable cathexes of social objects, including collectivities. 
Tendencies to dominance or submission, aggressiveness or compulsive independence, 
then, may be interpreted as manifestations of insecurity. The need for a feeling of 
adequacy on the other hand, we may say, is the need to feel able to live up to the 
normative standards of the expectation system, to conform in that sense. The compulsive 
enforcer, the perfectionist, the incorrigible and the evader, then, could be interpreted as 
motivated by a sense of inadequacy. Of course both are concretely involved in every 
action system. Many complex resultants are possible. But these seem to be the 
fundamental points of reference for analysis of these processes. Insecurity and 
inadequacy are by the same token the primary foci of anxiety. 
The distinction is of course analytical. Probably a stable interactive relationship 
without common value-patterns is not empirically possible, hence both aspects are always 
involved in the same concrete relationship. Nevertheless it is an analytical distinction of 
farreaching importance in the theory of action and can help us greatly to focus our 
analysis both of the sources of alienative need-dispositions and of the directions and 
mechanisms of deviant behavior tendencies. We may say then in general terms, that 
alienation from social objects tends to focus on problems of security, on anxiety about 
being able to count on their receptiveness-responsiveness or their love, approval or 
esteem, while alienation from normative patterns as such tends to focus on a problem of 
adequacy on one or both sides of the interactive relationship, that is, ego’s own capacity 
to fulfill the expectations of conformity, or alter’s capacity (including motivation) to do 
so, or both. In the case of threats to security the focus of anxiety is the problem “can I 
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count on him, or might he ‘let me down’?” In that of threats to adequacy the focus is on 
the other hand the problem “Is there any use in trying?” either because “I don’t think I 
can do it” or “Even if I do, he probably won’t do his part” so that expectations of the 
rewards of conformity may be frustrated. In both cases alienation should be regarded as a 
reaction to “disillusionment,” the feeling that it just isn’t any use in ego trying to do his 
part, because “what do I get for it?” 
It should be kept clear that the problem of adequacy is not restricted to the cases where 
achievement-orientations as distinguished from ascriptive are involved in the normative 
patterns in question. There may be very important performances involved in living up to 
an ascriptive pattern, as of the obligations of a given status. Of course where the value-
pattern itself places a special emphasis on achievement as such the problem of adequacy 
is accentuated, and alienation from achievement-expectations may be a particularly 
important possibility. 
There is an important source of asymmetry in the motivational structure of the need 
for security. This is the consequence of the overwhelming importance of infantile 
dependency, and hence of the asymmetrical structure of early attachment relationships. 
We may say that very generally there are underlying need-dispositions to regress into 
passive dependency. It would seem that on the whole compulsive independence is more 
common as a reaction formation against these passive dependency needs than the other 
way around, dependency needs as a reaction formation against independent, assertive 
needs. However important such a generalized source of “skewing” of the logical 
possibilities of deviant orientation, it is certainly overlaid by the pressures of particular 
types of social situations and cultural patterns. For example the reaction to latent 
dependency needs may be particularly important in the dynamics of a society like our 
own where the expectations of individualistic achievement are particularly pronounced. 
There is an important relation between the classification presented in Table 4 and the 
pattern variable affectively-neutrality. This becomes evident with respect to dominance 
and submission. In both cases ego’s primary concern is assumed to be to protcct himself 
against threats to disrupt the relationship. To do this he tries to manipulate sanctions, to 
make it “worth while” to alter to fulfill his expectations. These sanctions can, however, 
assuming that attitudes are the crucial ones, be of two main types according to the 
affectivity-neutrality variable. On the positive side they are the responsiveness and love 
attitudes, on the one hand, those of approval and esteem on the other. Domination 
through love seems to be what happens in what is sometimes called “maternal 
overprotection.” On the other hand the “authoritarian” father presumably dominates 
mainly through the affectively neutral sanctions. 
The relation to value pattern elements also differs according to the affectivity-
neutrality variable. Where the affectivity pole has primacy the dominant values must be 
those of expressive symbolism. Where, on the other hand, neutrality has dominance they 
will be either instrumental or moral. On this basis the types where the focus of 
compulsive motivation is on norms may also be subdivided; dius compulsive 
enforcement may be that of standards of taste, as in the case of the mother who is very 
rigid in enforcing good manners on the part of her child, or it may be on standards of 
efficiency or of morality. An example here would be a parent who held his child to 
excessively high standards of achievement, e.g., punishing him for making only a normal 
record in school and the like. 
The social system     178
The specificity-diffuseness variable is of course also involved in the definition of the 
sanctions which operate in these compulsive motivation systems in interaction. The 
cnaracter of the motivational picture will vary also as a function of this variable. 
It was shown in the last chapter that internalization of these generalized normative 
patterns involves the process of identification with the relevant significant alters. In the 
light of its relevance to the problem of alienation it should be clear how important is the 
basic classification of types of attachment and hence of modes of identification, in terms 
of these two pattern variables of specificity-diffuseness and of affectivity-neutrality. A 
normative pattern is not an actor, it cannot react to ego’s action, only another actor, an 
alter, can do that, The normative pattern cannot, as an object of cathexis, therefore be a 
source of direct and immediate gratification, it serves gratification interests only 
indirectly through organizing and sta-bilizing ego’s own personality system and through 
influencing the gratifications he receives in interaction with the situation, notably of 
course the alters in it. Perhaps this is what primarily we mean as the significance of the 
“internalization” of patterns as distinguished from the “enjoyment” of cathected social 
and physical objects. 
The implication of these considerations would seem to be that where orientation to a 
normative pattern as such has clear primacy over that to alter as a person, the orientation 
will have to be affectively neutral. Conformity with the pattern cannot be immediately 
and directly gratifying in itself. But the most direct and immediate rewards which are 
possible for conformity are the attitudes of the significant persons, alter’s and ego’s own, 
that is, their approval and esteem. This is of particularly crucial significance to the 
problem of social control since approval and esteem, both external and internal, that is, 
ego’s own self-approval and self-esteem, may be regarded as the first-line stabilizing or 
control mechanisms of the social system, that is, the most immediate mechanisms of 
motivation to conformity with normative patterns. The establishment of sensitivity to the 
attitudes of approval and esteem, again both external and internal, is one of the most 
fundamental requirements of adequate socialization of the individual and serves as the 
central core of his system of motivation to conformity. It is here, then, that the alienative 
need-dispositions are most directly dangerous to the stability of a social system. They 
will consist in “not caring what they think,” or at least turning to alternative persons with 
other attitudes for approval and esteem. 
There is, however, a complex kind of interdependence between these attitudes of 
approval and esteem and the types of attachment where affectivity has primacy, the 
receptiveness-response and love types, as they have been called. The probability has been 
pointed out in the last chapter that only the establishment of such attachments provides an 
adequate motivational basis for the acceptance of the affectively neutral types of 
orientation, hence for the higher levels of disciplined organization of the personality 
which is in turn essential to adequate performance in many roles in a complex social 
system. This indeed itself constitutes a form of organization and of focusing of 
gratification interests, especially in the diffuse love type, where a fundamental reciprocity 
of orientation is established, which can form a highly important stabilizing factor in some 
parts of social systems, and plays a particularly important part in the socialization 
process. Hence the type of alienation where the focus is on the actor as a person rather 
than on the normative pattern, is also highly important. It takes the form of aversions to 
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particular types of expected specific receptiveness and response, and to the personality of 
alter as a whole, in the extremer cases what we would call “hate.” 
There are certain important empirical connections which can immediately be 
discerned when these variations in the character of the sanction system are taken into 
account. In general the normative patterns defining the larger framework of the social 
relationships system tend to be affectively neutral, particularly where certain kinds of 
value system such as our own universalistic achievement pattern predominate. In such a 
case the most imperative demands for conformity would appear to be found relative to 
the patterns themselves, that is, to “impersonal” expectations as of efficiency in 
achievement, acting “according to the rules” and the like. It would seem likely, then, that 
the pressures of the system of social control would tend to deflect deviant tendencies into 
channels which would be relatively less threatening to the system. In general deviance 
relative to persons in intimate relationships is probably less threatening than relative to 
value-patterns as such. Furthermore, the withdrawal direction is less threatening when 
alienation predominates than is the rebellious direction. Hence compulsive independence 
would be expected to be very common in such a social system, especially since 
submissiveness contravenes a fundamental implication of the value system relative to 
independence. 
Perhaps two further aspects of the psychology of deviant behavior should be briefly 
commented upon before turning to a more explicit and systematic discussion of certain 
situational problems. It is clear that, whichever of the basic alternatives in dealing with 
them is taken, the presence of important alienative need-disposition elements implies an 
important element of conflict on the personality level in the social system. This means 
that either the alienative or the conformative need-disposition elements must frequently 
be repressed, or at least relatively dissociated from whichever is the dominant orientation 
component. It is well-established that, if the relevant need-disposition has not been fully 
extinguished, it will tend to find some outlet, however indirect. The mechanisms of 
displacement and projection perhaps formulate the most important types of such outlet. 
But the very fact that the connection between the object of a displaced affect and the 
need-disposition from which it arises—and even more so in the case of projection—is 
intrinsically so loose, means that there is normally a considerable instability in the object-
cathexes and motivational imputations involved. This seems to be the most important 
basis for the existence of what is often called “free-floating” affect. By virtue of the fact 
that the appropriate need-dispositions exist, and that their normally appropriate object-
cathexis is blocked, such affect may be conceived as “seeking” a second-choice 
appropriate object. There is a certain relative unsatisfactoriness in any such choice which 
is available, hence readiness to transfer to still another. The affect may be love-readiness, 
aggression, passive evasiveness relative to norms, or any one of a variety of other types. 
But the common feature is the fluidity and instability of the cathexis. In turn the urgency 
of the need for cathexis may lead to a compulsive intensity of the cathexis once achieved, 
the very intensity of which, however, is a symptom of its instability. The relevance of 
such considerations to such phenomena as romantic love attachments or group prejudice 
scarcely needs to be pointed out. In general it comprises the cases where the affective 
intensity can be shown to be “over-determined” relative to any intrinsic significance of 
the object. 
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Secondly, the elements of conflict involved in the presence of alienative need-
dispositions clearly have implications for the structure of cognitive orientation. The 
obvious point is the relevance of the mechanism of rationalization to coping with the 
attendant strain on the cognitive level. Rationalization is an adjunct and instrument of 
repression in that cognitively it denies the existence of a conflict and attempts to present a 
consistent picture in accord with approved normative standards of proper motivational 
orientation. There are many possible “devices” to which rationalization may resort in 
order to make the actor’s behavior and attitudes plausible and acceptable, such as the 
appeal to “extenuating circumstances,” the imputation of exaggerated deviance to alters 
and the like, but they have in common an element of cognitive distortion of what, in 
terms of the cognitive culture which is predominantly institutionalized, is the appropriate 
and adequate explanation and justification of action. Again the relevance of these 
considerations to the genesis and structuring of ideologies needs no further comment at 
this time.  
§ SOME FURTHER SITUATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE GENESIS 
AND STRUCTURING OF DEVIANCE 
WE MUST now supplement the above considerations about the roots of alienative need-
dispositions in the personality, and the processes of mutual stimulation of these alienative 
tendencies in the interaction process with an analysis of certain crucial features of 
normative patterns themselves and their variability. The problem of conformity cannot be 
dissociated from a consideration of that with which conformity is expected. 
The most fundamental classification of the components of normative patterns which is 
derived from the pattern variable scheme need not be further discussed just now. Here 
only a few observations on points of relevance to the present context are necessary. The 
first point to emphasize is that the ways in which “pressure” is exerted on the 
motivational system of the actor will vary as a function of the kind of pattern with which 
he is expected to conform. 
This is in the nature of the case a very complicated field. Yet considerations such as 
those advanced in the last chapter relative to the process of socialization would make it 
seem likely that in spite of socio-cultural variations some types of value-pattern impose 
inherently greater strains on most human beings than others; some such factor is for 
example essential to the meaning of the concept of regression. For present purposes we 
need not consider whether the principal sources of these strains are to be found in 
constitutional features of the human organism or in certain constants of the process of 
socialization. A good example is the degree of stress on affective neutrality. 
There is a sense in which as we have seen, all normative patterning involves an 
element of affective neutrality, in that as was noted, conformity with a normative pattern 
cannot in itself be a source of direct and immediate gratification. However, some types of 
normative pattern impose the disciplines of affective neutrality far more stringently and 
over far wider segments of the action system than do others. Some on the other hand 
seem more concerned with the organization of and selection among direct gratifications, 
rather than their postponement or diversion from particular contexts. These are above all 
the patterns which organize social relationships to a high degree about diffuse love 
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attachments, and further stabilize expressive activities in terms of relatively definite and 
rigorous systematization of expressive symbol and action systems, as for example in a 
large amount of ritual and etiquette. On the other hand our own society, with its very 
strong instrumental emphases and very long-range planning, puts a strong accent on 
affective neutrality and requires exceptionally high levels of discipline in certain respects. 
Somewhat similar considerations, as we have seen, apply to achievement patterns and 
to universalism. Indeed in this respect the latter is probably the more fundamental. This 
seems to derive above all from the fact that universalistic requirements cut across the 
particularism of attachments to persons. The fundamental importance of the latter in all 
human socialization seems to be established beyond question. Hence where patterns 
involve a prominent universalistic emphasis, it is necessary not merely to inhibit certain 
“natural” cathectic tendencies, but to transcend them, in the sense of developing a 
capacity of cathexis of all members of a universalistically defined class of social objects 
and correspondingly to internalize the valuation of abstract principles. This latter step is 
thus, in the universalistic case, possible only through a special elaboration of the 
development of “secondary” motivational structures. 
The upshot of all this is that one focus of strains consists in the difficulty of 
conformity with the expectations involved in the particular type of pattern in question. In 
general this difficulty can be analyzed in the same fundamental terms which were used 
above. It will, that is, involve elements of ambivalence and conflict. 
It is highly probable that there is a commonly human component in this motivational 
difficulty of fulfillment of certain types of expectations, but it is equally clear there is a 
component deriving from particular combinations with other elements. One example will 
suffice to illustrate the point. American society certainly requires an exceptionally high 
level of affectively neutral and universalistic orientations, both of which are, it would 
appear, intrinsically difficult of attainment. But because of the conditions of socialization 
in the isolated conjugal family, it seems probable that particularly middle class males 
develop a strong dependently tinged love need. This is itself a powerful lever for 
motivating the acceptance ot disciplines. But tnis is a source of additional strains because 
in so many of the crucial masculine roles in our society this is almost the last need which 
can be directly gratified. Indeed the opportunities for gratification of a dependency 
component are inherently extremely limited for the American adult, except in deviant 
patterns. The American must therefore go farther in the process of socialization than 
many others for two sets of reasons: first, because he must reach higher levels of affective 
neutrality and universalism, and second, because he has a more strongly developed set of 
dependence needs from which he must become emancipated. This seems to be one of the 
focal points of strain in American society. 
There is a second important range of problems concerning the difficulty of conformity 
with a normative pattern which focuses in the nature of the pattern itself. This concerns 
the question of how far the expectations of conformity are or are not specific and 
detailed. We have emphasized the importance of the fact that all normative patterns are to 
an important degree generalized relative to the particularity of the situations in which 
they apply. But there are enormous variations in the degree to which this is true. In 
proportion as the pattern becomes more generalized and hence “abstract” the problem of 
“interpretation” becomes accentuated. In other words, the actor faces the problem not 
only of living up to the expectations of his role, assuming that he knows exactly what 
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they are, but of knowing just what is expected of him. In a society like our own there is 
an extensive proliferation of highly generalized rules and hence of difficulties in their 
interpretation. It may be noted that one of the primary functions of the legal profession is 
to advise clients on what their rights and obligations are. That the client should know 
them without expert advice is by no means to be taken for granted in a complex society, 
especially where certain of the normative pattern system, those embodied in the 
formal law, are being continually changed by new legislation as well as by other 
processes. 
Psychologically the importance of this element of indefiniteness of expectations wnich 
derives from the generality of norms, lies in the element of uncertainty which it 
introduces into the orientation system. To the relevant degree the actor is confronted with 
an “unstructured” situation in which he must take responsibility for an independent 
solution. We know that this factor is particularly difficult to tolerate for some types of 
personality, especially we may surmise, the compulsive conformists. By increasing 
anxiety, the impact of indefiniteness of expectations in this sense may be a factor in 
deepening the vicious circle of progressive motivation to deviance. It may also provide 
loopholes for those whose motivational pattern leans to non-conformity, in that the very 
indefiniteness of the expectation makes it impossible to draw a rigid line between 
conformity and deviance, since this is a matter of “interpretation.” In particular it is 
possible to utilize such a loophole to go a little farther in each of a succession of instances 
until imperceptibly the “spirit” of the norm comes to be violated even though no one has 
been able unequivocally to point out where the “letter” was transgressed. 
It may be pointed out that one important aspect of this problem of specification of 
expectations concerns distribution of activities between occasions. One of the reasons for 
its importance is that every social system has certain “safety valve” patterns, situations 
and occasions where there is an element of extra “permissiveness” or license for behavior 
which would on other occasions not be tolerated. A good example is the tradition of 
Hallowe’en in our society, with its greater permissiveness for mildly aggressive and 
destructive “pranks” than is ordinarily granted, Such extra permissiveness stands in a 
certain sense in contravention of some of the more general normative patterns of the 
society and raises the uncomfortable question of whether the society “really means it” 
that conformity with the general rule is expected. The point is that if there is special 
permissiveness on some occasions, why should it not be extended to other occasions? In 
such cases normally there is clearly a limit beyond which the behavior in question would 
become seriously threatening to the stability of the social system. But this “limit” is a 
more or less broad zone; it is not a clearly defined line. 
An important special case of the indefiniteness of expectations concerns those roles 
where there is a graduated scale of possible achievement or performance. Here the 
potentially disturbing question is “how much is enough?” In the nature of the case not 
everyone can be capable of the highest achievement, even if what this consists in is 
clearly defined. But there is an expectation that one must “do his best.” The problem is 
always to some degree open whether falling short of a level higher than actually achieved 
was due to factors the actor could not be expected to control or whether he “didn’t try 
hard enough.” 
It seems clear that this type of normative expectation pattern sharply accentuates what 
has been called the problem of “adequacy” by the very fact that adequate performance is 
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not specifically defined but only by such vague formulae as “doing your best” or “making 
the most of your opportunities and resources.” We may surmise that in such a situation 
the active compulsive conformist, the compulsive performer, will tend to be unduly 
“ambitious,” to try to do so much that there can be no possible doubt that it is enough. 
The passive compulsive conformist on the other hand will tend to try to cut down the 
definition of enough to terms which in his anxiety he feels able to cope with, perhaps by 
laying overly strong emphasis on perfection in minor details at the cost of the larger 
achievements. The overtly alienative types on the other hand will find in this situation 
loopholes for justifying an achievement drive to goals or by means which are dubiously 
within the rules, or altogether outside, or for taking a “sour grapes” attitude that they 
“never had a chance.” These latter cases of course in their alienative attitudes shade into 
repudiation of the whole system. 
What has been outlined above takes account only of the most elementary beginnings 
of the complexities of the normative pattern system with which an actor may be 
confronted. A next step in complication is taken when in addition to the problem of 
interpretation of specific expectations there is introduced the problem of the applicability 
of alternative norms. This type of problem is most clearly seen in the case of a developed 
legal system, where quite clearly one of the most important functions of the courts is to 
determine which of a plurality of rules or precedents “governs” in a particular case. This 
possibility of “conflict of rules” is inherent in the nature of a system of generalized 
norms, and becomes a more acute problem in proportion to their generality and 
complexity. This is because generality implies abstractness, and abstractness means that 
one rule does not alone “cover” the concrete case, since the case will inevi-tably have a 
variety of aspects to which a corresponding variety of generalized norms is relevant. But 
if more than one norm is intrinsically applicable it is clear that there must be some order 
of precedence among them. 
The general impossibility of “having your cake and eating it” which underlies the 
general significance of the pattern variables in systems of action is particularly relevant 
here. In any at all well integrated institutional system the major decisions of precedence 
will be made for the individual actor through the institutionalization of norms and hence 
lie beyond his control. Thus although both the particularistic loyalties to kinsfolk and the 
universalistic obligations to reward technical competence are institutionalized in our 
society, an actor who is in a position of responsibility in an occupational organization is 
not at complete liberty to favor his relatives at the expense of people of superior technical 
competence. But this major settlement of the order of precedence of normative patterns, 
which is essential to social stability, does not go all the way. There are still areas of 
genuine doubt open to the decision of the individual actor, within which his own need-
disposition structure may swing the balance between alternatives. This accentuates the 
“unstructured” character of the situation, posing problems again for the compulsive 
conformists and providing loopholes for the alienated. It is important to note that we are 
not yet here speaking of the cases where there is a conflict between clearly defined 
expectations, but only of that where there is a lack of clear definition of what the 
expectations are. 
The facts we have just reviewed about the indeterminacy often present in the 
normative definition of expectations, raise certain problems about the operation of 
sanctions. 
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The most fundamental distinction relative to sanctions which we have made is that 
between the specific, discrete acts of alter which influence ego’s situation of action on the 
one hand, and alter’s attitudes toward ego and his actions on the other. Attitudes as 
sanctions imply either attachment to alter as an object of cathexis or internalization of the 
normative pattern alter is “enforcing” or both. They constitute the central core of the 
sanction system of a role complex and organize it into a system. Through them specific 
sanction-acts acquire, in addition to their “intrinsic” significance the “meaning” of 
expressions of these attitudes. From the point of view of the stabilization of the reciprocal 
interaction system, alter’s acts then either “confirm” ego’s feeling that his actions are 
“right” and manifest the “proper attitude” or serve as a warning that they are “wrong” and 
alter expects him to “mend his ways.” 
All this is stated in terms of the “norm” of a fully integrated and stable interaction 
complex. But there is a variety of ways in which rifts in this integrated structure may 
develop on the side of the sanction system. They are essentially to be interpreted in terms 
of the elements which have already been discussed. Alter is subject to the same kinds of 
strain, deviant need-dispositions, uncertainty, lack of definiteness of expectations and the 
like as is ego. Therefore, in addition to the fact that ego is faced with an unstructured 
situation in terms of the normative pattern system itself, there is the possibility that alter’s 
reactions to ego’s action will be systematically biased relative to the norm. 
It has been clear at many points that under certain conditions the interactive system 
operates to organize the motivational systems of the actors in such a way as to build up 
motivation to conformity with the expectations of a shared system of normative patterns, 
and that sanctions in such a “normal” case operate to reinforce this motivation. But the 
factors we have just discussed open the door to a range of variability on ego’s part where 
within limits the question of conformity vs. deviance cannot be unequivocally settled. 
The question is whether alter’s reactions are such as to tend to “bring ego back” toward 
the modal point in the range relative to the normative pattern structure, or to motivate him 
to diverge more widely toward one extreme of the range, with the possibility of a vicious 
circle developing which carries him “over the line.” 
It is clear from our discussion of alienation that an element of motivation to 
conformity is always present and important. Then the question is whether the sanction 
system operates to strengthen this element of an ambivalent structure of need-dispositions 
or to weaken it and/or strengthen the alienative component. The problem is far too 
complex to permit doing more than indicating a few starting points here. 
The most important consideration for present purposes is the effect of the 
indeterminate elements of the pattern and of sanctions on the tendency of ambivalent 
motivation in the interaction process to lead to a cumulatively deepening vicious circle of 
intensification of the alienative components. Under what conditions will this vicious 
circle operate and under what different conditions can sanctions operate to nip such 
developments in the bud. First we may say that an element of unstructuredness in the 
expectation system, deriving either from indefiniteness in the definition of normative 
patterns or their application, or from uncertainty as to how alter will react to a given 
action of ego’s or both, opens the door to the beginning of a vicious circle. This is simply 
because action is allowed to deviate further from a modal norm without counteracting 
forces coming into play than would otherwise be the case. Here we see immediately that 
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from the point of view of stability as such there are certain advantages in the type of 
social pattern which maximizes the detailed specification of role-expectations. 
We may assume that if alter’s motivational pattern is fully integrated with the norm 
and has sufficient “resiliency” not to be thrown out of equilibrium by the strain put upon 
it by ego’s incipient deviance, the sanctions he will impose will tend to be such as to tend 
to re-equilibrate ego’s action with the norm. There is of course a wide range of variation 
of the possible specific elements involved, but broadly we may assume first that on the 
one hand alter will tend to act in such a way as to influence ego’s situation in the 
direction of making it advantageous for ego in reality terms to return to conformity, and 
second that alter’s attitudes will be such as, without ambivalence, to show his disapproval 
of the direction ego’s action is taking. At the same time, there will tend to be acts on 
alter’s part which serve as mechanisms of tension release to ego, such as “laughing off” 
ego’s compulsive exaggerations of an issue, of insistence on his own “rights” in the 
situation, or perhaps his compulsively conscientious insistence on too literal fulfillment 
of his obligations. Of course a variety of combinations of these three types of sanction 
elements may be involved. 
On the other hand, if alter’s own motivational structure is ambivalent with reference to 
the relevant conformity problem, he and ego may start “working on each other” in such a 
way as to build up the vicious circle. It would seem that this can work out through either 
of two principal types of process, with enormous variations in detail. In the first place 
they can tend to become “partners in crime.” Alter’s and ego’s alienative need-
dispositions, that is, may match each other, so that instead of imposing negative sanctions 
for ego’s deviant tendencies, and driving ego to alienation from him, alter tends to act in 
such a way as to reward them. This may provide sufficient impetus to the already 
incipient trend, to cancel out the effect of negative sanctions from other quarters and 
build up an emotional vested interest in the deviant patterns through the alienative need-
dispositions underlying them. 
The second type of process operates through the intensification of conflict. Alter’s 
ambivalent structure may be such that he is compulsively driven to impose unduly drastic 
negative sanctions on ego as a defense against his own repressed deviant need-
dispositions and to deny him opportunities of tension release. If there is in ego an already 
establisned alienative need-disposition, this exaggerated punishment of the 
manifestations of his alienative needs may accentuate the conflict and actually stimulate 
the alienative need. This is usually, one may surmise, further accentuated by ego sensing 
that alter is ambivalent and somehow “secretly” approves his deviant tendencies and 
would like to reward them. The effect of this process of intensifying the conflict is to 
block the “road back” for ego, to make it most difficult to resolve his conflicts in a 
conformative direction. It is clear, in the light of the discussion above, that it is the 
compulsive conformist types of personality which as alters are likely to have this kind of 
effect on ego. 
There are of course many further possible complications of the vicious circle process. 
A person who is in conflict will attempt a variety of “escape” maneuvers, one class of 
which will be, in the light of the strain in his relation to the one alter, to turn to another. It 
is thus, as we have noted, often possible to gratify both sides of an ambivalent need-
disposition structure in a limited way by cathecting different objects in terms gratifying to 
each side. In determining such outcomes much will depend on the structure of the 
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situation and of the sanction system outside the particular ego-alter relationship we have 
singled out for analysis. A strained relationship with any one alter can often be 
counteracted by “good” relationships in other directions. At present, however, it is not 
possible to attempt to follow out all these complications. All we can do is to point out that 
the outcome will depend on ego’s place in the total relevant inter-action system, not 
merely on his particular relation to one alter. Furthermore, the interaction in question is a 
process in time, and much will depend on the sequence of the various phases of the 
temporal process, especially the timing of the incidence of various sanctions from various 
quarters on ego. Thus one consequence of secrecy is to delay or eliminate some otherwise 
operable sanctions. 
In any case, and whichever of these main routes to deviance has been taken, the 
essential phenomenon from the motivational point of view is the emotional “investment” 
of the actor in his deviance. Internally this is what, in the particular case of the neuroses, 
psychiatrists often call his “secondary gain,” which he cannot give up without help 
because of the serious disturbance of the internal “economy” of his personality which this 
would entail. Externally, vis-à-vis alter, the counterpart of secondary gain is the 
expectation of frustration by significant alters if the deviant pattern is given up. This 
expectation may be grossly unrealistic; indeed, when severe conflict is involved an 
element of distortion of reality is inevitable. But this is not the point; the anxiety resulting 
from such expectations is real enough. The compulsively independent person for example 
is afraid to enter into attachments because of the expectation that alter is likely to “let him 
down” in some way. The compulsive nonconformist equally is afraid to live up to 
institutional expectations for fear he will in fact be punished rather than rewarded for it—
the question is always in some sense “what does it get me?” 
It would seem that underlying this expectation of deprivation is always some 
prototype of a previous deprivation experience. Ego at some time actually did feel that an 
object of attachment let him down-whether he was realistically justified in this feeling or 
not. This would thus seem to be the primary basis of the significance of childhood 
experiences, as emphasized in psychoanalytic theory, that they provide the early 
prototype of the deprivational experiences (and of course also gratifications) around 
which anxiety (and hope) focus. Unless these anxieties about repetition of the feared 
deprivation are somehow allayed, it is not motivationally possible for ego to give up his 
deviant need-dispositions, because to him the alternative means the expectation of 
actualization of the dreaded eventuality.  
This problem of the secondary gain of deviance is a primary focus of the mechanisms 
of social control as we shall see later. In terms of the structure of what, in the present 
sense is the sanction system, these mechanisms must operate in one of two fundamental 
ways. The first is to “nip in the bud” the incipient tendencies to deviance, so as to prevent 
the building up of a vicious circle. The second is to “break through” the vicious circle, by 
somehow lessening ego’s investment in his alienative need-dispositions. As mechanisms 
or the social system it is clear that the structure of alter’s role vis-à-vis ego is the focus of 
both orders. of mechanism of social control. A mechanism of social control after all only 
acquires a function when ego “has a problem” in the sense that he cannot without 
difficulty be expected to overcome the tendencies to deviance by himself by “will 
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power.”5 It is the impact on him of his relations to others which is the focus of the 
problem. But in analyzing this we must always bear in mind that the distinction of ego 
and alter is only a distinction between points of reference. Every alter who may be an 
“agent of social control” to ego, is at the same time an ego who may have his own 
problems of tendencies to deviance. The full analysis of the problem can only be attained 
on the level of treatment of the interactive system as a system, not by isolating any one 
personality. This is the fundamental difference between the sociological and the 
“clinical” point of view.6 
In all this, of course the “reality factors” in the situation must not be overlooked. On the 
more naïve level, actual deviance as distinguished from motivation to deviance, is a 
function of whether it is realistically possible to “get away with it,” or whether in some 
sense it “pays.” It is of course possible, and frequently happens, for the sheer compulsion 
or the severity of sanctions to forestall the acting out of deviant motivation and to limit its 
consequences in various ways. In the last analysis force is an infallible means of the 
prevention of any human action, as we have pointed above. These aspects of the problem 
should by no means be minimized, and will be given some further attention below. But 
from the point of view of the central dynamics of the social system they are not the core 
of the problem. The core is to be found in the balance of forces which is involved in the 
building up and the counteraction of motivation to deviance, that is, of the alienative 
component of the need-disposition system. This follows from the whole conception of the 
social system set forth in this work. If any empirical justification of this statement is 
necded at this point perhaps mention of the enormous and tragic willingness of 
compulsively motivated people to “punish themselves” in the sense of incurring sanctions 
and deprivations which, if they were “sensible,” they could easily avoid, will suffice. 
There is one further point about the system of sanctions which needs to be made 
before taking up the matter of role conflict itself. This is that the immediacy and the 
certainty of sanctions has a significance similar to that of the degree of the definiteness of 
expectations. Uncertainty as to how alter will react is a factor in the “unstructuredness” of 
the situation which is directly comparable with and often concomitant with uncertainty as 
to what the normative pattern itself requires. Indefiniteness in the normative pattern will 
be conducive to reciprocal uncertainty about sanctions on both sides of the interactive 
relationship; this is one of the main reasons why it is so important. 
There is, however, another crucial factor in uncertainty of sanctions, namely the 
adequacy or inadequacy of communication. Alter’s reaction, that is, is a runction of what 
he believes he is reacting to. In the extreme case therefore sanctions will drop out 
completely if alter is not aware of what ego has done. Such phenomena as the anonymity 
of urban society find part of their importance here. But short of this extreme, alter’s 
cognition of ego’s action may be partial or distorted or both, either because of his own 
motivation to distort or because of other impediments to full communication. This is a 
fact which obviously contributes to the possibility of vicious circles getting under way, 
since they may go some distance before alter’s awareness of the situation permits his 
5 Of course coercive measures of various sorts can operate to prevent ego from acting out his 
deviant need-disposition without altering their structure. Thus the custodial hospitalization of 
chronic mental patients may prevent them from disturbing others in their normal interactive circles. 
6 This is not to say that the theory of personality does not involve factors independent of the 
interactive system. 
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 “normal” reaction pattern to come fully into force. By this time it may be too late for it to 
have the effect which it would have had at an incipient stage. The problem of the “levels” 
at which cognitive processes operate is particularly important here. Sometimes alter may 
“sense” a feature of ego’s orientation which he cannot “pin down” in explicit cognitive 
terms. How far this is adequate cognition is a complex and open question. 
The remoteness which is antithetical to immediacy of sanctions may be of at least two 
types, first to immediacy in time, second, to that in the relationship system. It seems to be 
well established in learning theory that the timing of contingent gratifications and 
deprivations is a highly significant feature of the learning process. If the consequence in 
the form of alter’s appropriate reaction is too long delayed—as for instance by difficulties 
of communication—the effect may be very different, particularly in weakening the 
control effect from that of the same reaction at an earlier time. This is obviously because 
the forces favorable to the deviant pattern may have had a stronger effect the longer they 
have operated without counteraction. 
The concept of “closeness” of social relationship is not a simple one. But there seem 
to be no doubt that alters are differentiated in terms of their degrees as well as types of 
significance to ego, and that the force of a sanction is therefore a function of its source in 
this respect as well as in others. Of the many significant problems in this area only one of 
special sociological significance will be mentioned. “Formal organization,” means the 
allocation of both expectation-definition and enforcement functions to differentiated 
roles. The incumbents of these roles cannot, in the nature of the case, stand in close 
“primary” relationships to more than a small minority of those to whom their decisions 
and actions constitute important definitions of the situation and sanctions. They must by 
and large come to be accepted by virtue of extensive generalization to the authority of 
generalized normative patterns as such and the acceptance of status-definitions 
independently of the personality of the incumbent. These alters, the persons in authority 
whom ego does not “know personally” play a crucially significant part in the sanction 
system of any complex social system and the problems of the motivational mechanisms 
involved in the acceptance of their “authority” are of central significance for many of the 
problems of social control, It may be that the well-known phenomena of the 
discrepancies between formal and informal organization can be fruitfully approached in 
terms of the motivational difficulties involved in social control “at a distance,” We shall 
maintain that this is the case and that the conflicts over the formal sanctions of formal 
organization and informal participations should be treated as special cases of role 
conflict. 
§ ROLE CONFLICT AND THE GENESIS OF DEVIANCE 
THE consequences of the factors in the genesis of deviant motivation and behavior so far 
dealt with may be and often are compounded by the factor of role conflict. By this is 
meant the exposure of the actor to conflicting sets of legitimized role expectations such 
that complete fulfillment of both is realistically impossible. It is necessary to 
compromise, that is, to sacrifice some at least of both sets of expectations, or to choose 
one alternative and sacrifice the other. In any case the actor is exposed to negative 
sanctions and, so far as both sets of values are internalized, to internal conflict. There 
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may, of course, be limited possibilities of transcending the conflict by redefining the 
situation, as well as of evasion as for example through secrecy, and segregation of 
occasions. 
Role conflict in this sense is continuous with the elements of uncertainty and 
malintegration which have already been discussed. This is particularly true of the conflict 
of rules, and of exposure to alters who though not explicitly deviant, “stretch a point” in 
their reaction to ego. The beginnings of a role conflict may thus be present in the 
difficulty of living up both to the expectations of one alter who interprets a norm in the 
direction of a “perfectionistic” compulsive conformity pattern, and those of another who 
is also in close interaction with ego, and who stretches the same normative pattern to the 
verge of active rebellion, both of them expecting active reciprocation from ego. 
There is a certain endemic potentiality of role conflict inherent in the fact that any 
actor has a plurality of roles, which involve differences of pattern, thus of relations to 
alters whose interests and orientations mesh with ego’s in different ways. These 
differences have to be adjusted by an ordering or allocation of the claims of the different 
role-expectations to which the actor is subject. This ordering occurs by priority scales, by 
occasion, e.g., time and place, and by distribution among alters. There are thus always a 
variety of activities which have their appropriate partners, which would not be 
appropriate with other partners, and which have their appropriate time and place. This 
allocative ordering of any given actor’s role-system is often delicately balanced. Any 
serious alteration in one part of it may encroach on others and thus necessitate a whole 
series of adjustments. 
In the present context it is particularly important to note that a deviant motivation 
component relative to one set of role-expectations will have a tendency to upset this 
delicate balance. Thus a compulsive need to excel in an occupational role may cause the 
actor to encroach on times appropriately allocated to kinship roles, and make him feel 
that he is exposed to a conflict of expectations as between his boss and his wife. This may 
in turn accentuate elements of strain in his marital relationship with the possibility that 
this should lead to stimulation of the deepening of the vicious circle from there on. 
But the source of the conflict may not be ego-made. It may be imposed upon the actor 
from the malintegration of the social system itself. Not all social malintegration belongs 
in this category, there may for example be conflicts between groups with no overlapping 
membership. But, even here, in the pattern sense, there may well be role conflict because 
only part of the role-pattern defining participation in each group justifies the expectations 
of the group vis-à-vis the adversary group. This would, for example, be the case in white-
negro relations in the South (and in less accentuated form throughout the United States). 
This may be put as a conflict of roles in that for example the white man has in his role as 
American citizen internalized participation in the universalistic values of the wider 
society, the “American creed,” but also as a Southerner in the pattern of “white 
supremacy.” The conflict can, however, be mitigated in that he relatively seldom has to 
act in roles where the significant alters hold up the conflicting expectations to him in such 
a way that he must directly choose. He deals universalistically in some contexts for 
example vis-à-vis white colleagues in his occupational sphere, and particularistically vis-
à-vis negro-white situations. This segregation is essential to minimize the strain. This 
situation may be regarded as a main basis of the Southern resentment against “northern 
interference” in the race problem. It introduces an active conflict of the expectations of 
The social system     190
significant alters whose differences cannot be ignored. This forces a decision which the 
segregation of contexts has tended to make it possible to evade. 
The significance of role conflict as a factor in the genesis of alienative motivation 
should be clear from the above. Exposure to role conflict is an obvious source of strain 
and frustration in that it creates a situation incompatible with a harmonious integration of 
personality with the interaction system. There must be external frustrations, internal 
conflicts or both, in the severer cases always both. Indeed what, on the interaction level if 
not the fully developed social role level, is exposure to conflicting expectations of some 
kind may be presumed to be the generic situation underlying the development of 
ambivalent motivational structures with their expression in neuroses, in deviant behavior 
or otherwise. 
When, however, the element of conflict is present on the level of institutionalized role-
expectations, a further elemcnt is introduced which can be of great significance. The fact 
that both sides of the conflicting expectations are institutionalized means that there is the 
basis for a claim to legitimacy for both patterns. As distinguished then from alienative 
need-dispositions which are clearly stigmatized by the moral sentiments common to ego 
and alter, and later, hence are the foci of feelings of guilt and shame, there is the 
possibility of the justification of the alienative as well as the originally conformative 
motivation. 
On one level this should serve as a factor in the intensification of internal conflict, and 
therefore call for greater pressure to resort to defensive and adjustive mechanisms. An 
example would be the “touchiness” of the Southern white with regard to outside 
interference. But the obverse of intensification of conflict is that in a certain sense the 
defenses against overt deviance are greatly weakened if the alienative need-disposition 
(from the point of view of one of the given expectation patterns) is given a basis of 
legitimation. Both internal sanctions and those from significant alters are weakened. Then 
on the one hand role conflict can be seen to be very important as a source of motivations 
leading to social change, through some sort of undermining of the motivational bases of 
an established order which includes the provision of motivationally acceptable 
alternatives. On the other hand this possibility is poten-tially so dangerous to the stability 
of a given institutional system that it may be presumed that one of the major functions of 
the mechanisms of social control is to forestall the establishment of a claim to legitimacy 
for the expression of need-dispositions which are alienative relative to the major 
institutionalized patterns of the social system. Of course the establishment of such a 
“functional need” of the social system does not in any way explain the actual structures 
and processes related to it. But it does serve to focus our attention on certain points in the 
motivational equilibrium of the social system in such a way that our attention will be 
called to certain problems of the determination of processes which might otherwise have 
been overlooked. 
§ THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 
TENDENCIES 
WE MAY now turn to a consideration of the principal ways in which the factors in 
deviant behavior which have been reviewed tend to “structure out” in types of concrete 
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pattern forms in the social system. Since deviance is always relative to a given 
institutionalized value-pattern system the starting point for this analysis is to be found in 
the classification of the main directions of deviant orientation developed in the earlier 
part of the chapter. 
It will be held that the cases of conformative dominance, where the compulsiveness of 
conformity and the accompanying skewing of orientation shows the presence of 
alienative motivational components are definitely to be treated as deviance. The overtly 
alienative and compulsively conformative tendencies are most emphatically part of the 
same dynamic system and must be treated together. 
We then of course differentiate deviant orientations further according to the active-
passive distinction, and for certain purposes still further according to whether the primary 
focus is on alter as a social object or on the value-pattern itself. 
We will first take up the case of purely individualized deviance, that is, the deviance 
of ego which is not shared by alter. We will then proceed to consideration of the case 
where two or more actors share a deviant pattern, thus forming a sub-collectivity over 
against those who remain integrated with the institutionalized system. We shall also 
consider the corresponding compulsively conformative types. Finally we will be 
concerned with the further factor of indeterminacies, conflicts and differences of level of 
institutionalization of the value system and its attendant ideology, providing a basis for a 
claim to legitimacy for the deviant sub-collectivity. 
First then, let us assume that an overtly alienatively oriented ego is isolated in that the 
significant alters in his situation are all oriented to conformity with the institutionalized 
expectations. There is no company available to constitute the nucleus of a deviant sub-
group nor any alternative institutionalized pattern which is congenial to legitimacy. 
Even under these highly simplified assumptions we can recognize the roots of certain 
empirical types of deviant patterning in a society like ours. In a very broad way we may 
say that the actively alienated person is predisposed toward individualized crime. By 
virtue of his active orientation he is inclined to defy sanctions, to challenge others to “do 
something about it.” This of course leaves altogether open the question of what specific 
kinds of norms he is oriented against, and what other motivational complications may be 
involved. It should also be clear that such a person is not necessarily deviant in all 
respects. In particular, his active orientation may well be part of the institutionalized 
culture—he may be very much achievement-minded, but be under compulsion either to 
achieve goals defined as illegitimate or to achieve acceptable goals by means which are 
in contravention of the institutionalized normative patterns. 
On the other hand the passively oriented anti-conformist may be predisposed to such a 
pattern as “hoboism,” to a maximal avoidance of implication in the positive expectation 
system of the society. The hobo, we may presume, is above all concerned to protect his 
freedom, and is willing to pay what others would consider an exorbitant price for it. 
Above all he wants to be let alone to live his own life the way he wants to live it without 
recognizing any obligations to anyone. The person who has economic resources for a 
comparable freedom without sacrificing ordinary living standards may be a 
psychologically comparable case; this is perhaps one factor in “Bohemianism.” Perhaps it 
would be legitimate to place the schizophrenic as the extreme case in this direction, in 
that he cuts himself off from the ordinary interactive relationship nexus to an extreme 
degree and retreats virtually completely into his own private world. 
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In both these types of cases we have abstracted from complicating combinations with 
other orientational factors. Illness, in our society, is undoubtedly motivated to a high 
degree and therefore may legitimately be regarded as a type of deviant behavior. There is 
little doubt that illness belongs predominantly in the passive-alienative category. But 
there seem to be at least two other features of the sick role. First there is an element of 
dependency, which in terms of our analysis means an element of conformative 
motivational orientation. Illness is predominantly a withdrawal into a dependent relation, 
it is asking to be “taken care of.” It uses disability as the basis of legitimation of this 
claim. Since, unlike hoboism, illness implies the assertion of a claim upon others, it 
provides, as we shall see, a point of “leverage” for social control which is not so readily 
available without the underlying conformative motivational structure. Put a little 
differently, the sick person emphatically does not “burn his bridges” vis-à-vis the 
institutionalized system. Furthermore the combination of both a dependency need and an 
alienative element in a generally passive orientation is psychologically readily 
understandable. Indeed it is hard to see how one coul one could exist without at least 
some admixture of the other. 
In an actively oriented personality, similarly, the occurrence of a strong aggressively 
alienative element is also certain to be combined with a conformative aspect of the need-
disposition structure. The acting out of the actively defiant component in social 
situations, however, obviously maximizes the pressure of the sanction system, since the 
rebel virtually makes it impossible for others not to try to suppress his deviance. Such a 
role as that of illness, in which the passive avoidance of obligations and overt 
dependency on others are combined, is therefore closed to him. But a motivational 
equivalent of the combination of alienative and conformative elements in illness is 
possible if the rebel can “team up” with others. This possibility will be taken up 
presently. 
The individual who has strong compulsively conformative need-dispositions 
constitutes a type whom it is more difficult to identify in the usual terms as clearly 
deviant. As we have seen, however, he does definitely skew his behavior relative to 
institutionalized expectations. The actively oriented sub-type seems to have in our society 
at least two principal variants, or foci of emphasis, as we have seen. One is the 
compulsive achiever who places excessive demands on himself and on others, and who 
may also show his alienative motives by excessive competitiveness, an incapacity to 
tolerate normal challenges to his security and adequacy. The other focus is the 
enforcement of his will and of normative patterns on others. He is the person who makes 
it his business to see that others toe the mark in excess of normal institutional 
expectations. The passive type on the other hand is best represented by the perfectionist 
or ritualist in Merton’s sense. He evades normal fumllment of expectations by making 
every excuse not to “stick his neck out.” 
The next factor to be taken up is the possibility that ego can team up with one or more 
alters. In the active overtly alienative case this is exemplified above all by the criminal or 
delinquent gang. Such a gang has two obvious advantages over the situation of the 
individual criminal who “goes it alone.” First, organization is by far the most effective 
way of coping with the overt sanctions which this pattern of deviance is the most certain 
to provoke. Second, ego and alter obviously by their partnership in crime reinforce each 
other’s alienative need-dispositions. This greatly weakens the attitudinal sanctions of the 
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normal institutionalized structure in that each has an alter to whom he can turn for 
approval of his action to offset the disapproval of the rest of society. 
But more than this the deviant is thereby enabled to act out both the conformative and 
alienative components of his ambivalent motivational structure. To do this he must of 
course make the substitution of the pattern of the deviant sub-culture for that of the main 
social system. But having done this he can be compulsively conformative within the 
deviant sub-group at the same time that he is compulsively alienated from the main 
institutional structure. 
The most important point is the opportunity provided by the existence of a deviant 
collectivity for ego to be overtly alienative vis-à-vis the relevant parts of the 
instutionalized system and at the same time conformative vis-à-vis the expectations of 
fellow gang members. Here the compulsive quality of the need to conform should be kept 
in mind. This fact may have an important bearing on various features of such delinquent 
sub-culture groups, such as the extreme concern with loyalty to the group and the 
violence of the condemnation of “ratting.” The need for ego to feel that he is a member of 
a group which is genuinely solidary and which he can “count on” is compulsively 
intensified. 
This may become a peculiarly acute focus of strain for another reason. Our previous 
analysis would suggest that if the alienative need-disposition is combined with a strongly 
active orientation, the conformative component would, in relation to persons, tend to be 
oriented in a dominating and norm-enforcing direction. But clearly too widely distributed 
dominance is incompatible with the functional needs of a solidary group. The very fact 
that such a group must enforce a stringent discipline because it is in danger vis-à-vis the 
outside society, may mean that it is peculiarly shot through with internal strains, because 
more than in most groups it selects members who have a need to dominate which under 
the conditions of the group many of them cannot express. There is an impression that 
overt struggles for leadership break out especially readily in such groups and that they are 
peculiarly subject to “fission.” If this is true it may be associated with this situation. 
There seem to be two main directions in which such tension may be mitigated. One is 
to “sublimate” the need for active conformism from dominance over persons within the 
group into the channel of excelling in the types of achievement which, in terms of the 
group norms, are the most valued. This may have something to do with the motivation to 
extraordinary risk-taking in such groups-such achievement is of course also a possible 
path toward the validation of a claim to leadership, that is, to a dominant role within the 
group. The second direction is the recruitment into the group of persons who are suited to 
play roles complementary to those of some of the more dominant group members. This 
phenomenon would seem to be very common; the presence in such groups of rather 
passively inclined and generally obedient types, who tend to be submissive to the 
dominant members. In certain sectors of the society such roles may be alternatives to that 
of illness. 
Thus from a certain point of view the roles of passively isolated avoidance-withdrawal 
and of active “criminar destructiveness and rebelliousness may be considered the polar 
antithesis in the structure of deviant behavior. When the conformist component of the 
ambivalent motivational structure is given opportunity for acting out along with the 
alienative, the former pattern tends to shift into the pattern of illness, the latter into the 
criminal or delinquent gang or sub-culture. These, however, are clearly ideal types and 
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fail to take account of many complicating factors. Thus it is altogether possible for the 
passively inclined personalities to form a sub-cultural group which instead of actively 
defying the institutionalized patterns and their personal bearers, asks essentially to be “let 
alone” to work out their patterns “in their own way.” This seems to be the case with 
various exotic religious sects. Such roles may well be alternatives to that of illness. They 
also usually involve elements of active defiance here and there, but very likely as a 
secondary phenomenon. This would be true, for example, of Jehovah’s Witnesses, This is 
understandable in the light of the general ubiquity of ambivalence in the motivation of 
deviance. 
To attempt to enter into the many possible complications of this order would, 
however, lead too far afield for the very general purposes of the present analysis. We 
have so far introduced two major components in the structuring of actual deviant 
behavior; first, the basic nature of the alienative need-disposition structure, and second, 
the availability in the social situation of roles which would mesh in with the 
complementary need-dispositions of others, especially in such a way as to enable the 
deviant to “eat his cake and have it” in the sense that within limits both sides of the 
ambivalent structure can be acted out. This is the salient feature of illness and the 
delinquent gang as deviant patterns. Hoboism and individual criminality are perhaps less 
important empirically precisely because they do not permit such a combination to a 
comparable degree. 
These two patterns are susceptible of further differentiation in terms of whether the 
primary alienative orientation is directed against normative patterns as such or against 
social objects, e.g., persons. With respect to individualized crime the obvious distinction 
is that between crimes against persons and crimes against “law and order” or objects that 
symbolize normative rules. The prevalence of crimes against property in the pattern of 
urban delinquency is highly suggestive in this connection. This focus of differentiation 
can be readily extended to the delinquent sub-culture. One type of gang may be more 
concerned with punishing the types of people (including collectivities such as rival 
groups) who have incurred the wrath of its members. Another type may be more oriented 
to stealing. Most cases are presumably mixed, but the question of relative primacy may 
nonetneless be significant. 
With regard to the passively oriented types, again the distinction seems significant. 
Hoboism in our society, and such variants as Bohemianism, seem to be above all oriented 
to passive evasion of obligations to live up to “the rules.” Perhaps the schizoid direction 
of mental pathology on the other hand is more focused on avoidance of attachments to 
persons.7 When we turn to the types which combine outlets for both alienative and 
conformist components, again a distinction seems important. Illness seems particularly to 
involve orientation to dependency on persons, for understandable reasons perhaps mainly 
“mother figures” or physicians as “father figures.” The conformative component may on 
the other hand be expressed more in relation to the adequacy context in terms of a 
passively ritualistic conformism with pattern expectations, thus being a “good patient.” 
This is clearly a complex field. There are many possible subtle combinations of the 
motivational elements we have considered here. They can, however, be used to generate 
hypotheses which should to a significant degree prove susceptible of empirical test. 
7 Demareth’s findings are suggestive here. Cf. N.J.Demareth, Adolescent Status and the Individual, 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1942. 
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The compulsive conformist does not face the same problems of overtly breaking with 
the institutionalized value system as in the alienative case, indeed by definition the 
balance of motivational forces is opposed to this. There is, however, the possibility that 
such compulsive conformists will interact with each other in such a way that, relative to 
the main institutionalized value-pattern the expectation-sanction system becomes skewed 
so that there will be a typical pattern of deviance which is reinforced in the same way as 
in a deviant sub-culture, but without overt break by the formation of a new collectivity. 
Certain features of the dynamics of group prejudice seem to fit here. Vis-à-vis the 
members of an outgroup, our major value-patterns call for an attitude of universalistic 
evaluation and treatment and tolerance for their own achievement-goals and needs within 
certain limits. Since Jews are admitted as legitimate members of the society the major 
value-pattern prescribes this type of attitude on the part of Gentiles toward Jews. What 
we call anti-Semitism constitutes in this respect a deviation from conformity with these 
features of the institutionalized value-system, especially in a particularistic direction. 
The hypothesis that the displacement of aggression on the Jew as a scapegoat object 
plays a part in anti-semitism has become almost a commonplace of social science. But 
from the point of view of the Gentile group this constitutes deviant behavior since the 
Jew is by the main value-pattern entided to the same universalistically tolerant behavior 
as any fellow Gentile. Hence there is a strong pressure to “rationalize” his special 
treatment by such allegations as that he “does not compete fairly,” and that he cannot be 
counted upon to be honest or loyal. Discrimination against him is thereby subsumed 
under the universalistic value system. So long as this type of legitimation is accepted and 
mutually reinforced within the Gentile group, or a sub-collectivity within it, we can have 
a reinforced pattern of deviant behavior without any individual having to accept the 
normal price of deviance in the form of an overt break with his institutionalized role and 
the risk of negative sanctions. Indeed, if the process goes far enough it is the person who 
conforms with the main value-pattern who is subject to negative sanctions. 
The compulsive conformist is in this situation able to accomplish the same splitting of 
the components of his ambivalent motivation as in the case of the member of the 
delinquent gang. The latter had to transfer his conformative needs to the deviant suo-
group. The case of the anti-Semite is the obverse—the displacement of his alienative 
needs outside the group onto a scapegoat outgroup. 
An analogous type of process would seem to be involved in what is sometimes called 
bureaucratic “ossification.” According to Merton’s description of the bureaucratic 
personality, he would in our terms be characterized as predominantly a passive 
compulsive conformist. If the situational exigencies of role-performance in certain types 
of organization, and/or the process of selective recruitment of personnel in such roles, 
operate consistently in the direction of putting a premium on skewing the main 
achievement-values in the direction of “playing safe” and “not sticking one’s neck out,” 
there may well be a cumulative process, so that the “bureaucratic subculture” becomes in 
fact deviant without any overt break with the main institutionalized values. It would seem 
that such a process of cumulative skewing offered one very important possibility for 
social change since it avoids or minimizes some of the most obvious resistances to such 
change. 
What happens to the alienative component of the motivation in this case is less 
obvious than in that of anti-Semitism. It would seem that it was concentrated on passive 
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resistance to the fulfillment of the normal expectations of the role. Once again this shows 
that the passively oriented person is not under the same pressuie to split ambivalent needs 
as is the active. 
We may now turn to the question of the significance of the availability of a claim to 
legitimacy for the pattern of deviant behavior. It should first be pointed out that this is a 
relative matter, since on one level the very existence of complementary roles involves 
values common to the interacting role-partners. Thus the willingness of an alter to take 
care of a sick person represents in itself a partial legitimation of the latter’s illness; he is 
not in this particular relationship to be “punished” but “helped.” Similarly in the 
delinquent gang the “partner in crime” is the focus of a partial legitimation. The gang has 
its own code and sanctions. Without the support of this partial legitimation the motivation 
to the pattern would be greatly weakened. 
The problem hence concerns the extension of the claim to legitimacy to a wider field. 
In the case of illness this is blocked by the conditional nature of the legitimation of the 
sick role which is granted in terms of the wider value-system. The claim to be taken care 
of is made contingent on admission that it would be a good thing to get well as 
expeditiously as possible. In the case of the delinquent gang on the other hand the 
legitimation is limited to the sub-culture, which by definition is in overt conflict with the 
wider value-system. 
There seem to be two main possible types of situation which would further the 
extension of this claim to legitimation of an alienative pattern. One is the existence in the 
actual social situation of a conflict of patterns, such that ego is in a position to select a 
legitimate alternative to the one against which he is alienated. If this alternative is part of 
the expectation system of the actual interaction complex in which ego is involved, he is 
already subject to role-conflict in the sense discussed above and the present analysis thus 
constitutes a continuation of the discussion of that subject. He may deal with the conflict 
by seeking to escape the interaction situation in which the original pattern is 
institutionalized and move into the one in which the alternative prevails—a very common 
process in a complex society.8 
The second type of situation is that in which there is a sufficient indefiniteness in the 
definition of the original pattern-expectations so that it is possible for ego without overt 
deviance to “interpret” the pattern in conformity with his deviant needs. These two are of 
course ideal type cases. In fact alternative expectation patterns normally shade into each 
other without sharp discontinuities, especially along certain paths of transition. Thus a 
certain “liberalism” of religious orientation may be an alternative to “fundamentalism.” 
Ego’s parental home may be strongly fundamentalist in its orientation, but his parents 
value education highly. This enables him to go away to college where he comes into 
contact with a liberal set of expectations. If he can segregate this college situation from  
8 This is one of several points at which the theory of “reference groups” becomes of great 
importance to the analysis of social systems. Ego is conceived as standing at the point of 
intersection between a system of interactive participations. Within limits the institutionalized 
patterns of his roles permit him freedom of choice as to which shall have priority, Beyond these 
limits conflicting expectations may be forced upon him. The structure of alternatives open to him is 
an essential component in the determination of his behavior. Cf. Merton and Kitt’s paper in Merton 
and Lazarsfeld, Eds., Continuities in Social Research. 
Deviant behavior and the mechanisms of social control     197
his parental home, e.g., by not talking about it when he is home for vacations, he can 
make the transition without an open break which would entail an overt definition of his 
attitude by his parents as deviant. He has achieved a legitimation of what in terms of the 
parental values was a deviant need-disposition. In general the presence of these bridges of 
common value-orientation between alternative patterns is one of the most important 
phenomena in this field. 
The legitimation of a deviant pattern immediately shifts it from the status of an 
individual to that of a collective phenomenon.  
Those whose orientations reciprocally legitimate each other constitute a collectivity 
which is a sub-system of the social system. It is obvious that when an individual has 
attained this type of interactive support it becomes immensely more difficult to 
undermine his motivation to deviance. Very simply his deviance is strongly rewarded. 
In general two other sets of factors contribute to the further strengthening of deviant 
motivations which have an anchor in legitimation within a collectivity. The first of these 
is the degree of difficulty of stigmatizing the sub-culture pattern as illegitimate in terms 
of the wider value system. This is a function of the relative prominence of what have teen 
called the “bridge” elements between the two value-systems. Thus at one end of the scale 
the delinquent sub-culture, though it may have a strongly enforced code within itself, is 
relatively weak in bridges to the wider value system. The elementary security of property 
and the person are such widely and deeply institutionalized values that delinquent gangs 
do not readily find allies outside their own numbers. Moreover, on the relevant levels, 
these value-patterns are not seriously ambiguous. At the other end of the scale a “leftist” 
political movement has many such bridges. Most of the “ideological issues” which define 
the difference of value systems concern highly abstract and general formulae which are 
open to much “interpretation.” Moreover, many of the abstract formulae, such as the 
desirability of “social justice,” of “democracy” or of “peace” are shared in common. Who 
is to say whether one interpretation is more legitimate than the other? Movements which 
exploit the generalities and ambiguities of dominant value-systems and their 
accompanying ideologies are hence particularly difficult to control by any means which 
involves depriving them of the claim of legitimacy. 
The second set of factors which further the claim to legitimation is that involved in the 
development of a strong defensive morale of the deviant group. This is the homologue of 
the secondary gain of the individual neurotic, and may in fact be psychologically 
continuous with it in that the mutual support of the group members in their deviance adds 
both to their investment in the maintenance of the deviant pattern and to the risks of 
abandonment of it. This is true on rational levels, but also on non-rational and 
unconscious levels. The anxiety as to what would happen if the deviant pattern were 
abandoned is greatly strengthened by clear and unequivocal attitudes on the part of the 
other members of the group; ego would be clearly a traitor who was guilty of letting them 
down if he abandoned them or questioned the legitimacy of their position. This situation 
tends to favor transferring ego’s security needs to his fellow group members; in short, 
attaching the motivational factors involved in any institutionalized role-system, to 
conformity with the norms of the deviant sub-cultural collectivity. 
To a certain degree these two factors in the legitimization problem are antithetical to 
each other, in that defensive morale is in part a function of the clear definition of conflict, 
The social system     198
thus of having “burned bridges.” The deviant sub-group which is making the most of its 
claims to legitimacy will not in general tend to maximize the possibilities of heightening 
the defensive morale of its members by accentuating the radicality of their differences 
from the main value-system too much. However, especially by the path of interpretation, 
there is an important possibility of making the best of both these worlds, namely by 
turning the tables on the wider society and declaring the latter’s value-orientations to be 
illegitimate in its own terms. The full-fledged revolutionary or prophetic religious 
movement generally does just this. But even so this procedure is seldom carried out as 
radically as might be thought possible. The fact that ambivalent motivational structures 
are involved is clearly shown by the very common vacillation between on the one hand 
an attitude almost of pleading to the outgrouper to recognize the devotion of the deviant 
to the “real” values of the society and their applicability to him, and on the other the 
expression of violent aggression toward the same outgroupers. For example the 
Communists certainly often auite self-consciously exploit the patterns of freedom of 
speech and the like in liberal societies, but certainly in the rank and file there is 
widespread feeling that in justice they have a right to expect every “consideration” from 
the law. But at the same time that they insist on this right they indulge in wholesale 
denunciation of the “system” of which it is an institutionalized part. The rationalistic 
tendencies of our common sense thinking easily obscure the ambivalent character of the 
motivations involved in such a movement. It scarcely seems possible, considering the 
processes of recruitment and the position of such a movement in our society, that very 
many of its members should be anything but deeply ambivalent about the position they 
have taken. This ambivalence would be expected to be manifested in inconsistencies of 
attitudes and behaviour as well as in the well-known fierce defensiveness whenever the 
legitimacy of their position is questioned. Where the Communist ideology has been 
institutionalized in a Communist state the situation may, of course, be quite different. 
With reference to the claim to legitimacy, there is one further consideration of such 
general significance that it requires a brief discussion here. This is the place occupied in 
all cultural traditions of complex societies by a “romantic-utopian” element which is 
partly and in some sense equivocally institutionalized. The origins of this element appear 
to lie in the fundamental fact that every social system imposes disciplines on its 
component individual actors, and that these disciplines are never completely and fully 
accepted in the sense that they are fully integrated in the personality structure of the 
actors without alienative elements and hence ambivalence. There is always the element of 
wishing that this did not have to be, and there are always elements of fantasy about states 
of affairs where the frustrating restrictions do not apply, where everything is, in this wish-
fulfillment sense, as it “ought” to be. What the content of this romantic-utopian element 
will be will depend on what particular disciplines are enforced in the society and the 
complex psychological reactions to these disciplines at all levels of the process of 
socialization. 
The ways in which such elements may be handled in a cultural tradition are also 
various. Some of them may be expressed in artistic form in such a way as to divorce them 
drastically from the possibility of the implication of commitments in action. However 
important and authentic the frame of reference of the “problem of meaning” undoubtedly 
is in relation to religion, the displacement of frustrated wishes into the transcendental 
sphere seems to be one exceedingly common if not universal component of religions, for 
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example the conception of a state where complete and perfect psychological security will 
exist, where the infallible love of God makes up for the deficiencies of finite human love, 
or where the element of coercion which to some degree seems to be inherent in human 
societies, is thought to be totally absent.  
Some of these elements, however, find their way into definitions of the desirable in 
concrete social relationships, and under certain circumstances the ethically obligatory. 
They seem to play a prominent part in most “charismatic” religious and political 
movements, certainly in the Western world. The fact that much of our cultural tradition 
derives from the institutionalization of the values and ideologies of such movements—
notably the various branches of Christianity and the rationalistic-revolutionary “ideas” of 
the Enlightenment—means that these elements have played a very prominent part in the 
cultural tradition of Western society. 
This, in addition to the high incidence of generality of norms implied in a 
universalistic value system, is one of the principal reasons why the element of generality 
and ambiguity is so prominent in our patterns of value-orientation. An open break with 
the symbolic formulae on which great social structures have been founded would involve 
a very high cost indeed. The easier way has been to meet the exigencies of realistic 
situations by interpretation, thus the wish to be free from any coercion whatever, and the 
idealization of such a state, shifts into some such conception as “freedom under law.” 
This adaptation by interpretation, however, leaves what may be called a latent 
reservoir of legitimation possibilities in the more radically romantic or utopian elements 
of the cultural tradition. A movement which utilizes these can attach in many cases to 
exactly the same symbols as the institutionalized culture uses. Thus such symbols as 
freedom and justice may receive interpretations incompatible with the functional needs of 
the institutionalized order. But, precisely in tenns of the approved cultural tradition, it is 
not possible to stigmatize these interpretations out of hand as illegitimate. Taking 
advantage of these latent legitimation possibilities is one of the most important 
characteristics of deviant movements. 
This becomes all the more important when it is seen that such definitions of the 
situation may well have important correspondences with the motivational patterns present 
in a population. The alienative elements are part of it. But it is particularly important that 
linking with firmly established symbols of the cultural tradition makes it possible to a 
degree to eat your cake and have it. The basic pattern is to put the established values and 
status-persons “in the wrong” with respect to what purports to be the value-system they 
themselves subscribe to. This can be particularly effective, not only because general 
formulae have to be restricted in a realistic direction by interpretation, but because every 
complex social system is in fact shot through with conflicts and adaptive patterns with 
respect to whatever value-system it may have. The utopian deviant can then almost 
always derive a profound self-justification from the question “do you really mean it?” 
with respect to the obligation to conform to an ideal pattern. He puts himself in a highly 
favorable light by saying or implying “You merely pay lip service to this ideal, I will 
show that I really intend to act upon it.” It may be suggested that this is one of the points 
at which the modern liberal-individualistic type of society is most vulnerable to a 
breakdown of its system of social control. The diversion of deviant motivational elements 
into alternative channels would seem to be particularly important in such a society. 
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Before closing this section it should be noted that the above discussion of the social 
structuring of deviant behavior has been illustrated almost entirely in terms of the 
American or at most the modern Western institutional structure and value-system. It 
would lead too far afield to attempt to develop corresponding illustrations of the main 
deviant possibilities for other principal types of social structure. There is no reason to 
doubt that the conceptual scheme developed here for statement of the problems and 
approach to their solution is, with proper adaptation, equally applicable to the analysis of 
deviance from any type of value pattern and within any type of institutional structure. 
In many other respects the above analysis is very incomplete. It should suffice, 
however, to show how the analysis of the genesis and consequences of deviance can be 
fitted into the general scheme of the analysis of social systems with which we are 
concerned. 
§ THE MECHANISMS OF SOCIAL CONTROL 
THE theory of social control is the obverse of the theory of the genesis of deviant 
behavior tendencies, It is the analysis of those processes in the social system which tend 
to counteract the deviant tendencies, and of the conditions under which such processes 
will operate. Like the theory of deviance, it must always be stated relative to a given state 
of equilibrium of the system or sub-system which include specification of the normative 
patterns institutionalized in that sub-system, and the balance of motivational forces 
relative to conformity with and deviance from these patterns. 
Hence the stable equilibrium of the interactive process is the fundamental point of 
reference for the analysis of social control just as it is for the theory of deviance. But our 
attention will be focused on one aspect of the interactive process, the forestalling of the 
kinds of deviant tendencies we have analyzed earlier in the chapter, and the processes by 
which, once under way, these processes can be counteracted and the system brought 
back, in the relevant respects, to the old equilibrium state. This latter is, of course a 
theoretical point of reference. In empirical fact no social system is perfectly equilibrated 
and integrated. Deviant motivational factors are always operating, and become 
established so that they are not eliminated from the motivational systems of the relevant 
actors. In that case the mechanisms of social control account not for their elimination but 
for the limitation of their consequences, and for preventing their spread to others beyond 
certain limits. 
There are such close relations between the processes of socialization and of social 
control that we may take certain features of the processes of socialization as a point of 
reference for developing a framework for the analysis of the processes of control. The 
preventive or forestalling aspects of social control consist in a sense of processes which 
teach the actor not to embark on processes of deviance. They consist in his learning how 
not to rather than how to in the positive sense of socialization. The re-equilibrating 
aspects on the other hand are a special case of the learning process in that they involve 
the unlearning of the alienative elements of the motivational structure. 
Perhaps the key to the relationship of the two sets of processes is to be found in the 
fact that both socialization and social control consist from one point of view in processes 
of adjustment to strains. the strains either may eventuate in deviant motivation or, 
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previous strains already having done so, a secondary strain may be introduced into the 
system by the pressure on it of the established deviant motivations. 
Strain, we may assume without going into all the psychological complexities, 
provokes four main types or components of reaction namely anxiety, fantasy, hostile or 
aggressive hitting-back or hitting-out reactions, and defensive measures in the sense of 
attempts to limit the deviation from ego’s expectations and/or restore the status quo ante. 
Indeed all the reactions may on one level be interpreted in the latter light, but at a more 
differentiated level it is useful to distinguish these elements. Effective measures of 
control must in some sense operate on all these elements of the motivational structure. 
One whole important class of such measures operates only on the level of dealing with 
overt behavior. These are the measures which by compulsion, and by appeal to rational 
decision through coercion or inducement, prevent certain actions or deter from them or 
from carrying them beyond narrow limits. The empirical significance of these aspects of 
the social control system is not to be doubted, but our concern is with the subtler 
underlying motivational aspects. 
The first element of any social control mechanism in the latter sense may be called 
“support.” Its primary direct significance is in relation to the anxiety component of the 
reaction to strain, to give a basis of reassurance such that the need to resort to aggressive-
destructive and/or defensive reactions is lessened. Support may be of various kinds, but 
the common element is that somewhere there is the incorporation or retention of ego in a 
solidary relationship so that he has a basis of security in the sense of the above 
discussions. The stability of the love attitudes of the mother in critical phases of 
socialization is one fundamental type of case. The collectivity-orientation of the therapist, 
his readiness to “help” and his “understanding” of the patient is another. These types 
differ fundamentally as role-pattern types and yet they have this common element. In one 
sense the consequence of support is to localize the focus of strain, by making it possiole 
for ego to feel that his insecurity is not “total” but can be focused on a limited problem 
area for adjustment. 
Quite clearly, however, the element of support cannot be unconditional in the sense 
that whatever ego does is met with a favorable response from alter; in that case there 
could be no control exerted over ego’s motivation; he would be directly rewarded for 
continuing and possibly extending his deviance. 
Support could not be effective as reassurance if there were no element of 
permissiveness relative to the pattern system from which ego deviates. We may say that 
people under strain are, whether alter is fully aware of it or not, expected to deviate in 
some ways and to some extent, to do and say things which would not be tolerated if the 
circumstances, or their own states were wholly normal. (The child is understood to be 
under strain in “having to learn.”) In general this permissiveness is to be interpreted as 
toleration of “natural” reactions to the frustration of expectations. These will of course be 
of one order if alienative motivation has not become established, and of another order if it 
has. This is the basis for a fundamental differentiation of types of mechanisms of social 
control, namely, whether it is necessary to cope with the vicious circle phenomena or not. 
Permissiveness, must, however, be strictly limited if it is not to lead to the 
encouragement instead of the forestalling of the vicious circle. Hence there is a balance 
between areas of permissiveness and of restriction on it. The most fundamental form of 
the latter may, in the light of our analysis, be seen to be the refusal of alter to reciprocate 
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certain of the expectations which ego develops under the pressure of his anxiety, his 
fantasies, his hostility and his defensiveness. Indeed support itself is in one sense a 
refusal on alter’s part to “justify” ego’s anxieties by reacting as ego fears that he might. 
Similarly, alter will refuse normally to reciprocate ego’s hostility by being hostile in 
return, or will for example not accept either dominance or submission from ego. The 
most fundamental difference between a vicious circle-building reaction on alter’s part 
and a social control reaction seems thus to be the combination of permissiveness with the 
discipline of refusal to reciprocate. Exactly in what areas this combination will operate 
and how the balance will be held will vary with the nature of the strains to which ego is 
exposed and with the role structure of the interaction system. There is, however, the 
common element that the refusal to reciprocate, like the support, is legitimized in terms 
of the institutionalized value patterns which in this case we may assume ego has 
previously internalized. 
With respect to all three basic aspects, support, permissiveness and restriction of 
reciprocation, there is a further important distinction between the extents to which alter’s 
action is consciously manipulative or is not. Many of the most fundamental elements of 
social control are built into the role structure of the social system in such a way that 
neither ego not alter is conscious of what goes on. Their functions are wholly latent 
functions. On occasion, however, one or more of them may be manipulated with greater 
or less awareness of what the actor is doing. These are deliberately imposed sanctions, 
and may touch any one of the three aspects of the control problem we have distinguished. 
Again in line with our previous analysis we may hold that the most fundamental elements 
of this manipulation concern the “relational rewards,” that is, alter’s attitudes of love, 
approval and esteem. There are of course other extremely important aspects of the control 
relationship, notably the control of communication, but the attitude elements must, it is 
clear, have a critically important place. 
The process of psychotherapy is the case in our own society where these fundamental 
elements of the processes of social control have been most explicitly brought to light. For 
certain purposes, as we shall point out a number of times, it can serve as a prototype of 
the mechanisms of social control. It should not, however, be forgotten that psychotherapy 
has a number of special features not shared by many other mechanisms involving the 
same fundamental elements. First, it is carried out in a professional role of a specialized 
type, and qualifications must be made for the differences of this role structure from those 
involved in many other types of social control. Secondly, in its classic form, it is carried 
out in a one-to-one relationship of two persons, not a group interaction process, whereas 
many mechanisms operate through more complex group situations. Third, the cultural 
patterns of scientific knowledge of psychological processes and, hence, the value-
standards of scientific objectivity play a prominent role not to be found in many other 
cases, and, finally, the therapist extends his conscious manipulation of the situation and 
of the reward system in the light of his own theory, much farther than the case for many 
other types of mechanism. 
It should immediately be evident on general grounds that the most fundamental 
mechanisms of social control are to be found in the normal processes of interaction in an 
institutionally integrated social system. The essentials of these processes have been 
analyzed and illustrated throughout the earlier chapters of this work. Hence it is necessary 
here only to add a few points. The central phenomena are to be found in the institutional 
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integration of motivation and the reciprocal reinforcement of the attitudes and actions of 
the different individual actors involved in an institutionalized social structure. These 
considerations apply to any one pattern of role-expectations. But institutionalization has 
integrative functions on various levels, both with reference to the different roles in which 
any one actor is involved, and to the coordination of the behavior of different individuals. 
The latter has been dealt with in a number of contexts. 
A few remarks, are, however, in order in the former context. The individual engages in 
a wide variety of different activities and becomes involved in social relationships with a 
large number of different people whose relations to him vary greatly. One of the primary 
functions of institutionalization is to help order these different activities and relationships 
so that they constitute a sufficiently coordinated system, to be manageable by the actor 
and to minimize conflicts on the social level. There are two particularly interesting 
aspects of this ordering. One is the establishment of a time schedule so that different 
times are “set aside” for different activities, with different people. “Time off” from 
occupational obligations on Sundays, holidays, vacations, etc. is one example. The fact 
that there is a time for each of many different activities—and also a place—keeps the 
claims of each from interfering with those of the others. In fact a society so complex as 
ours probably could not function without relatively rigid time scheduling, and the 
problem of the cultural values and psychological need-disposition structure of such a time 
organization is of great importance. We know that in many societies the motivational 
prerequisites for fitting into such a time-orientation do not exist. 
A second major area is the establishment of institutionalized priorities. Especially in a 
relatively free and mobile society it is inevitable that people should become involved in 
situations where conflicting demands are made upon them. It is quite obvious that such 
situations are sources of serious potential conflict. This can be minimized if there is a 
legitimized priority scale so that in choosing one obligation above the other the individual 
can in general be backed by the sentiments of a common value system. It is indeed in 
areas where this scheme of priorities is indefinite or not well integrated that loopholes for 
deviance are most common. One ex-ample of such a potential conflict may be cited. A 
physician has peculiarly sharply emphasized obligations to his patients. But he also has 
important obligations to his family. Far more than in most occupations he is often called 
away at times when the family has important claims on him—meal times, evenings when 
social engagements may be scheduled, etc. The institutionalized expectation of the 
priority of the claims of patients is indispensable to the physician in dealing with his wife 
on such an occasion. As Merton has so well analyzed, the exposure to situations of such 
conflict without clearly institutionalized priorities of obligations is a very important 
aspect of anomie. 
The above considerations do not however concern mechanisms of social control in a 
strict sense though they describe essential aspects of the background on which we must 
understand the operation of such mechanisms. When we turn to the consideration of 
normal social interaction within such an institutionalized framework as a process of 
mutually influenced and contingent action we see that a process of social control is 
continually going on. Actors are continually doing and saying things which are more or 
less “out of line,” such as by insinuation impugning someone’s motives, or presuming too 
much. Careful observation will show that others in the situation often without being 
aware of it, tend to react to these minor deviances in such a way as to bring the deviant 
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back “into line,” by tactfully disagreeing with him, by a silence which underlines the fact 
that what he said was not acceptable, or very often by humor as a tension-release, as a 
result of which he comes to see himself more nearly as others see him. These minor 
control mechanisms are, it may be maintained, the way in which the institutionalized 
values are implemented in behavior. They are, on a certain level, the most fundamental 
mechanisms of all, and only when they break down does it become necessary for more 
elaborate and specialized mechanisms to come into play. 
Beyond the scope of such mechanisms there are points in the social system at which 
people are exposed to rather special strains. In a good many such cases we find special 
phenomena which have been interpreted to function at least in part as mechanisms for 
“coping” with such strains with a minimum of disruptive consequences for the social 
system. Two types may be briefly discussed. One is the type of situation where because 
of uncertainty factors or specially acute adjustment problems there is exposure to what, 
for the persons concerned, is an unusual strain. In general the field of religion and magic 
yields many examples of this. The problem of uncertainty in the health field and of 
bereavement are good examples. The reactions which such unusual strains tend to 
produce are of the character noted above. They both include potentially disruptive 
components and are unstructured in relation to the social system. In the case of 
uncertainty, as in gardening in the Trobriands, one of these may be discouragement, a 
general tendency to withdrawal. Similarly in the case of bereavement, there may be a loss 
of incentive to keep on going. Ritual on such occasions serves to organize the reaction 
system in a positive manner and to put a check on the disruptive tendencies.9 
One aspect of such ritual patterns is always the permissive one of giving an 
opportunity for “acting out” symbolically the wishes and emotional tensions associated 
with the situation of strain. It provides opportunities for a permissive relaxation of some 
of the disciplines of everyday life which are characterized in part by a relatively strict 
pressure to reality-orientation. But at the same time it is by no means a completely free 
and untrammeled opportunity for expression. Action is on the contrary strictly channeled 
into culturally prescribed forms, which prevent “wandering all over the lot.” It is a 
conspicuous feature of such rituals that they are communally prescribed and thus give the 
support of emphasizing group concern with the situation. They also symbolically assert 
the dominant value attitudes, thus in the case of death for instance the importance of the 
survivors going on living in terms of that value system, redefining the solidarity with the 
deceased in these terms: it is “what he would have wished.”10  
9 Almost the classic analysis of this type of function of ritual is Malinowski’s analysis of funeral 
ceremonies in Magic, Science and Religion. As Kroeber, op. cit., notes, however, there are still 
important problems of the universality of the relationship between such strains and ritual which 
must be further studied. 
10 We shall discuss in the next two chapters some of the ways in which the religious orientation of a 
society can be of the first importance with reference to its general system of values in the secular 
sphere. The control mechanisms in certain areas of special strain tend in tuin to be integrated with 
both. This is the essential difference between the view of religion taken here and that of Kardiner in 
The Individual and His Society. The latter tends to treat it overwhelmingly as a 
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A slightly different type of structuring of behavior which is certainly in part significant 
as a mechanism of control is what may be called the “secondary institution.” The 
American youth culture is a good example. Like ritual it has its conspicuous permissive 
aspect, so much so that it shades over into explicit deviance. In this permissive aspect it 
also may be regarded as primarily a “safety valve” of the social system in that attempting 
to keep youth completely in line with adult disciplines would probably greatly increase 
the strains of their position. But it also has more positive control aspects. One of these is 
the integration of the youth culture with major institutional structures, mainly in the field 
of formal education. This not only brings it under direct adult supervision, but it 
legitimizes some of the patterns, for example athletics and dances. In spite of the deviant 
fringe, the existence of such a legitimized core undoubtedly keeps down the total amount 
of deviance. 
Finally there are certain “self-liquidating” features of the youth culture which are 
relatively hard to identify but probably quite important. In a variety of ways, through the 
experience of youth culture activities and relationships the individual in the optimum case 
goes through a process of emotional development to the point where he ceases to need 
youth culture and “graduates” into full adult status. Of course in this as in many features 
of our social control system there are innumerable “miscarriages.” But broadly speaking 
it is extremely probably that on the whole the net effect tends to be emotionally 
“maturing.” For example, the very insistence on independence from adult control 
accustoms the individual to take more and more responsibility on his own. In the youth 
culture phase he tends to substitute dependency on his peer group for that on the parents, 
but gradually he becomes emancipated from even this dependency. Similarly in the 
relations of the sexes the youth culture offers opportunities and mechanisms for 
emotional maturation. The element of rebellipusness against the adult world helps to 
emancipate from more immature object-attachments, while certain features of the “rating 
and dating” complex protect the individual during the process of this emancipation from 
deeper emotional involvements “projective system” which expresses motivational 
elements which are blocked by the disciplines of secular life. This is undoubtedly one 
major aspect of the matter, but only one. 
than he is yet able to accept. The very publicity of such relationships within the peer 
group serves as such a protection. Thus the youth culture is not only projective but also 
exposes the individual passing through it to positively adjustive influences.11 
11 Suggestive evidence of the importance of the youth culture in this connection is given in 
Demareth’s study of a sample of schizophrenics. An early “maturity” of interests combined with 
lack of participation in youth culture activities was highly characteristic of the group. Not one of 
the 20 had established satisfactory heterosexual relationships on a youth culture level. It may well 
be that without the youth culture there would be many more schizophrenic breakdowns. See 
N.J.Demareth, Adolescent Status and the Individual, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1942, It is also suggestive that one element of alcoholism for men may be connected 
with over-involvement in the youth culture and failure to become emancipated from it at the proper 
time. The alcoholic may be in part an adolescent wtio is unsuccessfully trying to be an adult. 
12 It may be remarked that this is true not only of the “frivolous” youth culture which has been 
predominant in the United States, but also of the “serious” 
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It will be noted that the above mechanisms operate within the framework of socially 
legitimated interaction. Within the normal processes of nipping of minor deviances in the 
bud of course no differentiated social structures are involved at all. In the case of “safety-
valve” mechanisms like ritual, and of secondary institutional patterns, there are special 
social structures. These entail a limited permissiveness for modes of behavior and types 
of emotional expression which would be tabooed in ordinary everyday life, e.g., the 
display of “grief” at funeral ceremonies. But this permissiveness is rather narrowly 
limited, and it is of the greatest importance that it operates within a system of interaction 
which is continuous with the main institutionalized social structure, differing from it only 
with respect to occasion, or as in the case of the youth culture, to stage in the 
socialization process. The behavior is emphatically not stigmatized as deviant, but is 
legitimized for people in the relevant situations. They are treated in the present context 
because of their relevance to the control of potentially deviant motivational elements. 
Thus it is clear that some balance of permissiveness and its restriction is maintained. 
Support is clearly given through the institutionalized legitimation of the patterns in 
question and the resulting solidarity. Generally speaking, however, there is little 
conscious manipulation of sanctions. 
It has been noted several times that secondary institutions like the youth culture shade 
into actual deviance.12 It may next be noted that there are in a complex society many 
phenomena which are either on the edge of deviance or in important respects shade off 
into what is definitely deviant. These resemble secondary institutions except that the 
legitimacy of their broad status is moie in question, the society often being seriously 
divided about it. One of the most striking of these is gambling. E.C.Devereux has 
recently made by far the fullest sociological study in this field yet attempted.13 The 
conclusion of a careful analysis is that it would be seriously disruptive to the society 
either to attempt to suppress gambling radically or to remove all the restrictions on it. On 
the one hand gambling performs important functions for large classes in the population, 
very similar to those of magic, as a kind of acting out of tensions which are symbolically 
at least associated with the economic sphere. On the other hand the values and sentiments 
which in one connection justify or rationalize the objections to gambling play a highly 
significant role in the general value system, and full permissiveness to gambling could 
not be allowed without undermining these values in other important spheres. 
It may be that in view of this situation, to call gambling a “mechanism of social 
control” is stretching a point. But the existence of such behavioral phenomena, is 
intimately connected with the problem of social control, and not merely in the aspect of 
deviance from certain values. At the least it can probably be said that it is not merely a 
symptom of social disorganization, but of a social structure which is sufficiently elastic, 
even at the expense of serious cultural conflict, to relieve strains by permitting a good 
deal of this type of behavior, and yet to keep it sufficiently within bounds so that it is not 
too disruptive in the opposite direction. Devereux’s analysis at least suggests that it is a 
mechanism for expressing and thus releasing strains related to the economic context 
which, if this outlet were completely closed, might be diverted into other more  
youth culture. This undoubtedly played an important part in the Nazi movement in 
Germany, and in this as in other countries contributes significantly to the recruitment of 
radical political movements and some religious sects. It is interesting that the deviant 
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fringe of the frivolous youth culture shades off into delinquency, crime, etc., while that of 
the serious version shades into movements for social change which strongly emphasize 
the claim to legitimacy. 
13 See E.C.Devereux, Jr., The Sociology of Gambling, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1949. 
dysfunctional channels. It is notable that gambling of certain sorts like “playing the 
numbers” is particularly prevalent among the economically disadvantaged groups. 
Whatever the verdict on the basis of better knowledge on the question of the 
functional significance of such semi-deviant activities as gambling may turn out to be, 
this case calls attention to a most important more general consideration. This is the 
functional importance to the society of certain phenomena which from one point of view 
constitute imperfections in its cultural or institutional integration. One of these is the 
delicate balance involved in our pattern of religious toleration. Certainly in a broad sense 
religion is closely related to the integration of the social system, and the ideal type of a 
fully integrated society of a certain kind would have one completely integrated religious 
system. This is true, but at the same time the attempt to integrate the religious structure of 
our society in that way, unless it came about by a gradual process probably involving 
profound changes in other respects, would undoubtedly be highly disruptive, perhaps to 
the point of precipitating civil war. In the circumstances the very looseness of the 
religious integration is functionally important.14 
Other examples which have been or will be discussed are the limitations on formal 
controls and status-rankings. There are many others. In such a situation there is great 
functional importance in relative insulation of many sub-systems of the larger society 
from each other by occasion or otherwise. In the absence of such insulating mechanisms 
it would not be possible to prevent the conflicting elements from direct confrontation 
with each other, resulting in the transformation of a latent into an open conflict. 
In personal relations “tact” is such an insulating mechanism. It consists in the calculated 
avoidance of expressing certain sentiments and of the raising of certain questions which, 
if they had to be directly faced, might disrupt the relationship system. There is a gradual 
shading off from tact to the “white lie” which makes it pos- sible, often by tacit mutual 
agreement, to keep potentially conflicting things apart 
Anonymity also serves this function. In general the segregation of both activities and 
population elements does so. It is true that this segregation often breaks down social 
controls which operate successfully in smaller less internally differentiated communities. 
But there is another side to the picture; they also make possible the coexistence of 
potentially conflicting elements. The importance of this for the kind of flexibility which 
permits change is clear. Traditionalism in the sense which is obstructive even of desirable 
changes is very generally associated with a kind and degree of integration which 
mobilizes the f ull force of control mechanisms against almost any kind of innovation. A 
society in which there is a good deal of “disorganization” and “pathology” is almost 
14 The individualism of a social system which institutionalizes a universalistic-achievement value 
system precludes religious integration of the type either of an authoritarian established church or of 
the traditionalistic fixity of many nonliterate religions. 
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certainly the necessary price of dynamic openness to progressive change. The balance 
between flexibility and disorganization is delicate. 
With consideration of the functional significance of insulation we have introduced 
mechanisms which presuppose that alienative motivation relative to some parts of the 
social structure has come to be established. The first class of mechanisms we shall 
consider in this connection are, given its existence, concerned with limiting its impact on 
the rest of the social system. 
The insulation mechanisms just spoken of may thus be interpreted as having the 
function of preventing potentially conflicting elements in the culture and social structure 
from coming into the kind of contact which would be likely to lead to open conflict or to 
exacerbate it—conflict is kept relatively latent. These apply in so far as a structuring on 
the collective level has already taken place. The mechanisms which may be summed up 
as isolating, on the other hand, have the function of forestalling even this structuring, and 
the development of appropriate cultural patterns around which it could be built. There are 
therefore two primary facets, the prevention of the formation of group structures with 
their greater intrenchment of deviance, and the prevention of a successful claim to 
legitimacy except perhaps in specifically limited ways. 
The two leading patterns in our society which exemplify this set of mechanisms in 
different ways are those of crime and of illness.  
In the case of crime the primary emphasis is on the deprivation of the claim to 
legitimacy, and even where the prevention of group structures has not been successful the 
illegitimacy of the acts generally has been maintained. Thus it is important to realize that 
the purely negative aspect of criminal behavior is only part of the story. The criminal is 
not merely one who refuses to conform, but in refusing to do so in certain ways he is 
placed by others in his situation in a specific institutionally defined role. That is, both the 
role expectations applied to the performer of a criminal act from then on and the sanction 
system are quite specifically structured so as to “push” the deviant into a certain type of 
position. 
Undoubtedly the structure of this sanction system in the case of crime has deterrent 
effects, except in the cases where the vicious circle of motivational structuring discussed 
above has gone too far for them to be effective. But it may be asked why, apart from 
merely keeping the criminal out of circulation, does society go on punishing even where 
the vicious circle exists and it will not “cure” the criminal. Durkheim was the first to 
point out clearly that punishment had another highly significant set of functions than the 
immediate “protection” of society. It is, in a sense, a ritual expression of the sentiments 
which uphold the institutionalized values which the criminal has violated.15 This ritual 
expression serves to consolidate those sentiments and above all to strengthen them in that 
part of the population which has positive but latent motivations to the deviance being 
punished. Punishment is thus a kind of declaration that “you are either with us or against 
us,” and tends to mobilize the sentiments of solidarity with the group in the interest of 
continuing conformity. A good deal of it therefore is not directed at the criminal himself, 
but at the others who potentially might become criminals. Of course where the underlying  
 
15 See Emile Durkheim, Deux lois de l’èvolution pènale. 
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sentiment system in the populations contains serious elements or ambivalence, 
punishment may well take on the character of “overreaction.” Furthermore, because it so 
drastically deprives the deviant of support and narrows if not eliminates the sphere of 
permissiveness the criminal role is in general not conducive to reintegrating the deviant 
with the social system. Both confession of guilt and expiation through punishment may, 
however, operate in this way if the break is not too drastic.  
An extreme case of this isolating function characteristic of our type of criminal role 
seems to be found in some cases of the use of black magic or sorcery in non-literate 
societies. It is often extremely difficult to draw the line between social legitimation of 
such activities and their illegitimate use in connection with deviant private interests and 
grudges. But there do seem to be cases where the fact that a man has been attacked by 
sorcery is subtly legitimized by the community and its support withdrawn from the 
victim. The sanctioning of counteractive white magic in the community may be 
considered in such a context as a declaration in favor of the victim rather than his 
attacker. Warner goes so far as to suggest that the psycho-somatic consequences of this 
isolation or withdrawal of support by the community account for the apparently 
authenticated cases of actual death by black magic.16 
The definition of acts as criminal is the type case of the very broad category of 
mechanisms of control of the most familiar kind, where normative patterns are 
“enforced” by the attachment of specific negative sanctions to their violation, and by the 
differentiation of roles with the specific functions of implementing this enforcement, 
administrative officials of various sorts, including policemen, courts, and the like. The 
importance of these mechanisms is of course not to be underestimated. How they operate 
is, however, in general terms so well known, that it is not necessary to discuss them 
further here. It is through their relation to the subtler types of control mechanism that the 
problems of greatest sociological interest arise. Among the most important functions of 
such enforcement agencies is the limitation of the spread of the deviant tendencies which 
they define as illegitimate. 
One difficulty of organized enforcement measures may be pointed out here. The 
specialization of the enforcement roles brings their incumbents into close connection with 
criminals who are themselves generally organized. If crime is important enough to 
necessitate elaborate enforcement organization it is unlikely that the interaction will be 
entirely one sided. It is likely that “concessions” to the criminal element will be made 
which from the point of view of the “function” of the enforcement agency must be 
defined as “corrup- tion.” The enforcement agent is in a position similar in some respects 
to the foreman in industry. Such corruption is likely to appear wherever enforcement on a 
recalcitrant population is necessary, e.g., in dictatorships. 
In the ideal type case it may be said that the definition of the deviant as a criminal 
overwhelmingly emphasizes the negative side. It constitutes a kind of extrusion from the 
social group, with little concern for his retum. He is used rather in a sense as a 
“scapegoat” on whom to project sentiments in such a context as to strengthen the 
16 See W.Lloyd Warner, A Black Civilization. See also E.E.Evans-Pritchard, Azande Witchcraft, 
and Clyde Kluckhohn, Navaho Witchcraft. 
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institutionalized values. What happens to him becomes secondary. Certain modern trends 
of criminological practice, where the “remedial” aspect enters in, however, shade over 
into the case of illness. 
As will be analyzed in some detail in Chapter X, the sick role is also an institutionalized 
role, which shares certain characteristics with that of criminality but also involves certain 
very important differences. Instead of an almost absolute illegitimacy, the sick role 
involves a relative legitimacy, that is so long as there is an implied “agreement” to “pay 
the price” in accepting certain disabilities and the obligation to get well. It may not be 
immediately obvious how subtly this serves to isolate the deviant.17 The criminal, being 
extruded from the company of “decent” citizens, can only by coercion be prevented from 
joining up with his fellow criminals, for the various types of reasons and with the results 
discussed in the last section. The conditional legitimation of the sick person’s status on 
the other hand, places him in a special relation to people who are not sick, to the 
members of his family and to the various people in the health services, particularly 
physicians. This control is part of the price he pays for his partial legitimation, and it is 
clear that the basic structure resulting is that of the dependence of each sick person on a 
group of non-sick persons rather than of sick persons on each other. This in itself is 
nighly important from the point of view of the social system since it prevents the relevant 
motivations from spreading through either group formation or positive legitimation. It is 
especially important that the motivational components which cannot be expressed in the 
deviant behavior itself, in this case tend to tie the sick person to non-deviant people, 
rather than to other deviants, unlike the delinquent gang as analyzed above. 
But again, the sick role not only isolates and insulates, it also exposes the deviant to 
reintegrative forces. Through psychotherapy, wnether it be deliberate or not, in the sick 
role an actor is exposed to a situation where forces can be brought to bear which are 
capable of breaking through the vicious circle of the generation of deviant motivation. 
The role of therapist, therefore, can in a certain sense serve as a prototype of the 
mechanisms of social control in this more radical sense. It is quite clear that much of the 
therapeutic effect is attributable to certain of the features of institutionalized role of the 
physician (in modern Western society) and only part of it to his deliberate therapeutic 
measures. 
It is partly because of its intimate involvement in the motivational balances of the 
social system that the role of the physician will be more fully analyzed in Chapter X 
below. Hence, only a few highlights of its social control aspect will be mentioned now, to 
be more fully examined at that time. The criminal role, precisely because of the 
overwhelmingly negative character of its emphasis, tends notably to fail in this respect. 
Above all two factors are lacking which come into the therapeutic relationship, first the 
element of support in exchange for the obligation to get well, the positive attitude of 
helping the patient with its various ramifications in accepting him as a person and 
understanding rather than condemning him. Secondly, therapy provides permissive 
opportunities for expressing under carefully controlled conditions the distorted and 
alienative components of the patient’s motivational system. 
17 So far as illness is motivated it may be considered a type of deviant behavior. 
Deviant behavior and the mechanisms of social control     211
In other words to a considerable degree the criminal tends to be “written off” so far as 
a constructive social role is concerned, the sick person is not. Some would say that in the 
shift from the definition of many deviant acts as criminal, to that as pathological, an 
element of “softness” enters in which makes control ineffective. This is by no means 
certain, but in any case presents problems beyond the range of the present discussion. At 
least the pathological definition would appear in general to provide much greater 
opportunity for reintegration than the criminal even though its preventive functions may 
not be so effectively performed. Also it may be remarked that there may be some serious 
difficulties in the attempt to combine the two to the degree which has become common in 
recent criminological practice. It is not, however, possible to explore this problem further 
here. 
Just as the isolation of the individual deviant may be regarded as the extreme form of 
insulation of potentially conflict-producing elements from other parts of the social 
system, so there is every reason to believe that therapy in the context of the medical or 
most closely related types of relationship is not an isolated phenomenon. This would be 
more likely to be the case if psychotherapeutic effects were solely a function of the 
deliberate operations of the therapist as an applied scientist. But we shall see in Chapter 
X that this is most definitely not the case. 
If the therapeutic effect of the doctor-patient relationship is “built into” the social 
structure of that relationship independently of deliberate planning, it should be built into 
other parts of the same social structure. That this is true in some degree of such 
phenomena as “faith healing,” and in non-literate societies of magical treatment of the 
sick, has come to be widely recognized. But the identification of cognate elements of our 
own social structure may be facilitated by a more explicit analysis of the structural factors 
which are conducive to this functional result 
This can be stated as an application of the general conditions of the reintegration 
processes of social control as outlined at the beginning of the present section. First, the 
collectivity-orientation of the therapist and the definition of his function as to “help” the 
patient give the basis for the element of support. Second, the definition of the patient as 
“sick” gives the basis for the element of permissiveness, he cannot be “held responsible” 
for his condition and/or certain things he says and does in it. Third, however, certain of 
the professional features of the role enable the therapist to refuse to reciprocate many of 
the patient’s tendencies in interaction with him, notably through the pattern elements of 
specificity and affective neutrality. Finally, his definition as a technically competent 
expert gives him the opportunity to manipulate the reward system. His approval in 
particular has meaning to the patient because of his professional authority, which is 
anchored in the values of the social system.  
An essential part of the leverage of the therapeutic process is the discrepancy between 
the patient’s own definition of the situation—in “transference”—and the standards 
institutionalized in the professional role. 
Details of the structure will vary enormously but it is suggested that functional 
equivalents of these four features of the physician’s role can be found in a wide variety of 
other parts of the social structure.18 The problem then is to apply these generalized 
patterns with the appropriate modifications more widely to a variety of phenomena 
outside the therapeutic field. The unit of the reintegrative process need not be the 
individual actor—it may be a sub-collectivity such as a deviant gang. 
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The generality of application of the first criterion scarcely needs further comment. 
Complete break with institutionalized values is not a common phenomenon but a limiting 
case, and the closest approaches to it are those which involve being “pushed out” as in 
the case of the criminal, rather than purely spontaneous alienation. Very generally then it 
is safe to assume that there are analogues to the element of support given by acceptance 
of an obligation to help the sick person to get well. The question is how these 
opportunities are mobilized in actual control mechanisms. Space will not be taken to go 
fully into these here. It may, however, be suggested that some of the rationalistic and 
utopian elements of the value tradition have this significance in reverse, as it were, in that 
they have sufficient common ground with the institutionalized values so that by 
“interpretation” it is possible to find a bridge back to these more generally 
institutionalized values. Thus both individuals and movements which start out relatively 
radical have a tendency to the attenuation of this radicalism and to a relative assimilation 
to the going system. What is widely decried in radical circles as the tendency to “sell out” 
may from the point of view of the system as a whole be interpreted as a process of 
“getting well.” Essentially the same may be said of many sectarian movements in 
religion. Though from the point of view of their fanatical adherents “secularization” is by 
definition giving in to the devil, from the point of view of the social system it may 
indicate the progressive ascendancy of the institutionalized values.  
In this connection it should be noted that as the dynamically related opposite of this, 
religious movements and often their political derivatives have a very general tendency to 
define the issue between “god” and “mammon” or “spirituality” and “materialism,” as 
though there were no positive moral values whatever involved on the side opposed to the 
particular movement in question. The institutionalized values are from this perspective 
not values at all, but only “self-interest” or the temptations of the “flesh.” It may be 
strongly surmised that the very radicality of this repudiation of the institutionalized 
values against which such movements are in revolt involves a reaction-formation against 
the values to which adherents of the movement are in fact deeply attached. It is positive 
evidence of the above contention. Such reaction-formation is necessary because the 
definition of the situation is often such that a deviant movement must not only attack the 
“abuses” of the system it opposes but precisely its highest achievements and the values 
which underlie them. Thus some branches of Christianity have attacked not only 
prostitution and sexual license, but the highest ideal of conjugal love, conceding only that 
“it is better to marry than to burn.” The very value conflict necessitated by such 
repudiations helps explain the radicality of such movements once well embarked on the 
vicious circle of deviance. Nevertheless the common value element which makes a bridge 
back possible is always present to a significant degree. 
The refusal to reciprocate deviant expectations seems to be most definitely 
institutionalized in our society relative to “private” motivations in the universalistic and 
functionally specific patterns of office and status and their consequent separation of the 
“office” or other institutionalized status from the “person” of the incumbent. The office 
gives him the justification of not responding in kind to many things the people he has to 
18 Some aspects of these problems have been previously analyzed in the author’s paper 
“Propaganda and Social Control,” Essays, Chapter XIII. 
Deviant behavior and the mechanisms of social control     213
deal with do and say. This is even true of political and executive office which must 
carry routine responsibilities for going decisions. But there are also institutionalized in 
our society various judicial organs which are kept farther aloof from the give and take, 
the courts being the most conspicuous example. The relative inaccessibility of a high 
executive seems to be important in this general connection, because he can then choose 
his own ground in dealing with most others, and can use them in the context of his 
“office” in both senses, where the dignity and authority of his status is symbolically 
emphasized. 
Barnard, in discussing the process of executive decision, lays considerable stress on 
the importance of the decision when and whether, and when not to decide.19 It may be 
surmised that very often the decision not to decide is in effect the refusal to be “drawn 
in“to a reciprocity of interaction which would, if participated in too much, jeopardize the 
dignity and independence of the office. It is also well known that the executive must take 
great care in the regulation of his personal relations, particularly if they are with people 
with whom he also has official dealings. In general, this insulation from particularistic 
reciprocities may be held to be one of the very important functions of the 
institutionalization of universalistic and functionally specific patterns. It puts the 
incumbent of a status institutionalized in such a pattern in a position to exercise certain 
types of both manifest and latent control functions which would not be possible in 
another type of role. 
The element of permissiveness is also prominent at various points in our society as 
well as in the religious and magical rituals of other societies, as already noted. Perhaps 
the most conspicuous example is the institutionalized right of “partisanship.” In the 
political area this is particularly marked, of course. People are not merely permitted but 
positively encouraged to let their views be known and to discuss them with a high degree 
of freedom. This is also a conspicuous feature of our educational system, in that both 
students and colleagues are encouraged to state their views. The confession in certain 
religious organizations, particularly of course the Roman Catholic church also belongs 
here. Many types of organization also attempt, probably increasingly, to set up channels 
for the expression of grievances and suggestions. Also counseling systems which directly 
permit such expression under the guarantee of anonymity are becoming more common. 
Another feature which is connected with permissiveness is the projection on important 
figures and institutional symbols of attitudes which are more or less unrealistic and not in 
the long run tenable. These are both positive and negative. The high executive in par-
ticular is blamed for many things for which he could not possibly be responsible, but 
equally “gets the credit” when things go well. 
In both these respects permissiveness in our society goes so far that, if attention were 
directed only to what is said and done within its sphere, it would hardly seem possible 
that the society could survive. Thus one political party during a political campaign 
solemnly assuies the pubfic that their opponents are totally unfit to govern, that the values 
they represent are antithetical to all “true” Americanism, etc. But when their rivals come 
into office nevertheless, on the whole the excitement subsides, and the members of the 
first party somehow find it possible to go on living in the society and performing their 
normal role-obligations. Even a President of the opposite party is still the President of the 
United States with all the dignity of that high office. 
19 The Functions of the Executive. 
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This sugsests th suggests that there is not only permissiveness, but a set of 
mechanisms which tend to counteract and limit that permissiveness. One set of these 
prevents certain elements of the institutional structure as noted above from being “drawn 
in” to the controversies. Office is never treated exclusively as the “political plum” of a 
partisan group but has its aspect of responsibility for the common welfare. In a certain 
sense attainment of office tends to “acculturate” successful candidates to its expectation 
system so that they do in fact play the role to a significant degree. 
Furthermore, in certain contexts and on certain occasions the actions and words of 
persons in office are ceremonialized as expressing the sentiments and values common to 
the group as a whole. In function relative to the sentiment systems of the people involved 
these may sometimes be compared to the “interpretations” of the psychotherapist 
It will also be shown in Chapter X that collectivity-orientation plays a very important 
part in validating the position of the therapist. It may be suggested that this is capable of 
generalization, that throughout the social system the elements of collectivity-orientation 
have important functions in the more general contexts of social control. It is first notable 
that within organizations, authority is always institutionalized in collectivity-oriented 
terms, even though the organization-purpose is primarily defined in self-orienjted terms 
as in the case of a business firm.  
Secondly, it is certainly important, that as distinct from political parties which closely 
approach the definition of wanting to “get into office” as such, political office itself is 
strongly defined, whatever the behavorial pattern, ideally in collectivity-oriented terms. 
Third, there are, even in a “capitalistic” society, very important organizations and 
structures which are also defined in coflectivity-oriented terms, as devoted somehow to 
the common welfare. Certainly in terms of social control one of the most important 
classes of these is the university. Its role as the carrier of the institutionalization of much 
of the cultural tradition which will be discussed in the next chapter, would almost 
certainly not be possible without this feature of its pattern, with its intimate connection 
with the values of objectivity and impartiality. 
On the other hand it may well be that one of the important reasons why the business 
class has failed to consolidate its posidon as a national elite in a sense closely 
approaching that of a “governing class” is that its primary role has been defined in “self-
oriented” terms, thus exposing it too readily to the charge that power would not be 
exercised as “responsibility” but as exploitation. The public confidence necessary to 
facilitate a “therapeutic” function may be incompatible with such a definition of the role. 
A deviant movement which opposes the “profit system” on moral grounds has relatively 
easy going if there is nothing to counteract the profit symbol. 
It is not meant to press the similarity between psychotherapy and other mechanisms of 
social control too far. Certainly there are just as important differences as there are 
similarities, but the relationship seems to be sufficiently close, and the common factors 
sufficiently general, so that these similarities can provide important leads to the 
recognition and analysis of the operation of control mechanisms which as such are by no 
means obvious to common sense. What we have presented is, however, only a few 
suggestions about the problems. An immense amount of research will be necessary in this 
field. 
Deviant behavior and the mechanisms of social control     215
The most important general conclusions are that without deliberate planning on 
anyone’s part there have developed in our type of social system, and correspondingly in 
others, mechanisms which, within limits, are capable of forestalling and reversing the 
deeplying tendencies for deviance to get into the vicious circle phase which puts it 
beyond the control of ordinary approval-disapproval and reward-punishment sanctions. 
The therapeutic function is perhaps the best understood case of which this is true. But it 
has been shown that this therapeutic function is not by any means dependent only on 
applied science, but also on certain features of the social structure. It is argued that if this 
be true it would be very strange if these broad features and their broad functional 
significance were confined to the one very specific context of illness and its treatment. It 
has been possible to suggest a few avenues of extension of the relevance of these 
features, but not to analyze them adequately. 
There is no pretense that in this final section of a long cnapter anything like justice has 
been done to the exceedingly complex subject of the mechanisms of social control. It has 
been possible to do no more than scratch the surface. Fragmentary as it is, however, this 
treatment will have served its purpqse if it has been possible to show with some 
convincing illustrations, that there are in fact important unplanned mechanisms in the 
social system which in a sense “match” the inherent tendencies to socially structured 
deviance, with some few intimations of the directions research must take if it is to unravel 
the intricacies of the operation of these mechanisms. 
In conclusion, perhaps a few general summary propositions, which bring together 
what is most essential in this analysis, may be stated. 
1. The conformity-deviance “dimension,” or functional problem, is inherent in socially 
structured systems of social action in a context of cultural values as analyzed in this 
volume. 
2. The relevance of tendencies to deviance, and the corresponding relevance of 
mechanisms of social control, goes back to the beginning of the socialization process and 
continues throughout the life cycle. 
3. Except in a highly qualified sense at the very beginning of life the tendencies to 
deviance are not random relative to the structure of the cultural norms and the social 
action-system, but are posi tively structured. 
a. The need-dispositions of personality structure are a resultant of interaction in the 
socially structured role system from birth on, and whether conformative or involving 
an alienative component relative to role-expectations, are structured rela-tive to the 
role system of the society. This structure of need-dispositions may be taken at any 
moment in time as one of the components determining the behavior of the individual. 
b. Whatever the “fit” or lack of it between structure of need-dispositions and role-
expectations, individuals in social situations are exposed to a whole series of 
“structured strains” which may further accentuate the difficulty of conformity. Such 
strains tend to be reacted to in terms of a special set of psychological propensities and 
mechanisms, the mechanisms of defense and of adjustment. This set of circumstances 
further structures the tendencies to deviance. 
4. The tendency to deviance is finally also conditioned by the objective opportunities 
provided in the social system, in the structuring of which the “loopholes” in the system of 
social control are particularly important 
The social system     216
5. Every social system has, in addition to the obvious rewards for conformative and 
punishments for deviant behavior, a complex system of unplanned and largely 
unconscious mechanisms which serve to counteract deviant tendencies. Very broadly 
these may be divided into the three classes of a) those which tend to “nip in the bud” 
tendencies to development of compulsively deviant motivation before they reach the 
vicious circle stage, b) those which insulate the bearers of such motivation from influence 
on others, and c) the “secondary defenses” which are able, to varying degrees, to reverse 
the vicious circle processes. 
6. Structured deviant behavior tendencies, which are not successfully coped with by 
the control mechanisms of the social system, constitute one of the principal sources of 
change in the structure of the social system. This set of problems will have to be taken up 
in Chapter XI below. 
APPENDIX 
Since the completion of the manuscript of this chapter, there have been some further 
developments in the underlying paradigm for the analysis of deviance and social control. 
Rather than attempting to revise the manuscript to make a place for them, it seems best 
to state them in extremely succinct fashion in a brief appendix to it. 
It will be remembered that four essential conditions of successful psychotherapy were 
stated above, which served as prototypes of the corresponding elements in other 
mechanisms of social control. These were support, permissiveness for the expression of 
deviant expectations, denial or reciprocity for these deviant expectations, and conditional 
manipulation of sanctions, notably the relational rewards, in this connection. The 
question arises of what the systematic relations between these elements may be, and what 
in turn is the relation of the resulting paradigm to that defining the directions of deviant 
orientation. 
The element of support clearly concerns the mutual cathexis of the actors in an 
interactive relationship. The therapist, for example, supports his patient so far as he 
cathects him, that is, holds the positive attitude toward him which is relevant to the role in 
question. He treats him as a full-fledged member of the collectivity, which in this case is 
that composed of therapist and patient. This appropriate measure of support may be 
deviated from in either of two directions. On the one hand under-support consists 
essentially in withdrawal of the positive cathexis, or its conversion into hostility. This is 
essentially what psychiatrists mean by “rejection.” On the other hand, support may be 
given, but by reciprocating alter’s deviant expectations or overtures in contravention of 
the normative pattern defining ego’s role. In this case, again to use psychiatric 
terminology, the therapist will have allowed himself to be “seduced” by the patient. 
Rejection places the patient outside the solidary interactive relationship altogether. 
Openness to seduction, the therapist’s seducibility on the other hand, disturbs the 
equilibrium by creating a strain between the cathectic aspect of the relationship and the 
normative pattern structure, which certainly should be conceived to be internalized in the 
therapist, and presumably to some degree in the patient. 
This set of circumstances establishes a relation between support and its directions of 
deviance on the one hand, and the permissiveness-denial of reciprocity pair of conditions 
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on the other. These latter two conditions together define the optimum balance of attitudes 
relative to the normative pattern itself. Permissiveness, if it is to have positive therapeutic 
effect, is conditional on it not involving the therapist in reciprocation of the deviant 
expectations. Then the proper attitude with respect to the normative pattern also may be 
deviated from in either of two directions. On the one hand the requisite permissiveness 
may not be granted, the norms may be overliterally and stringendy enforced. On the other 
hand reciprocity may be granted where it should not be, that is, there may be an 
avoidance of taking responsibility for upholding conformity with the norm. 
The purport of these considerations is that effective social control is dependent on an 
integration of two main factors, the cathexis of the individual actor as a social object, that 
is, of support, and taking responsibility for upholding of the normative pattern. Each may 
be deviated from in either a “too much” or a “too little” direction. Hence, according to 
whether the cathectic aspect or the “pattern responsibility” aspect is the primary focus, 
there are four primary ways of deviating from this optimum balance, two in the negative, 
“rejecting” direction, two in the direction of “overfulfillment” of alter’s expectations. 
These relations may be diagrammatically represented as follows: 
 
It will be seen that this paradigm is built on two of the fundamental variables which 
entered into the eightfold table of directions of deviance given on page 259 above, 
namely conformity and alienation on the one hand, social-object focus and pattern focus 
on the other. If the third of the variables included in the table is introduced, it has the 
effect of subdividing each of the four types of deviance from the optimum attitude pattern 
for social control into two sub-types. It is clear that, by this path we arrive again at the 
same list or eight major directions of deviant orientation which was set forth in the 
previous table, as follows: 
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 The fourth element of the social control paradigm was the conditional manipulation of 
rewards. This does not as such find its place in the above classifications, but serves as a 
link between the other elements. The bestowal and withholding of such sanctions can be 
used as an instrument to swing a balance in situations of uncertainty at various stages of 
the process in question. 
It seems to be a very important conclusion that analysis of the directions of deviance 
under the pressure of strains on the interactive relationship, and analysis of the conditions 
of reducing strain through processes of social control, have turned out, independently, to 
involve the same fundamental paradigm. The difference between the approaches in the 
two cases lies primarily in the fact that in developing the paradigm of the directions of 
deviance, following Merton, we laid, after the conformity-alienation dimension itselr, our 
stress on the activity-passivity distinction, and introduced the distinction between focus 
on social objects and on patterns, only as a “secondary” basis of variation. In the 
paradigm for the analysis of mechanisms of control, on the other hand, this latter proved, 
along with conformity-alienation, to be the major axis. Only when this fact was seen, and 
the third variable of activity-passivity also introduced, was it possible to see that the two 
paradigms directly converge with each other. Both in fact are ways of stating both the 
conditions under which strain will be imposed on an interactive relationship, and under 
which such strain can be mitigated. Or, put a little differently, one states the conditions of 
strain, the other the conditions of successful re-equilibration of the interactive system 
when subjected to conditions of strain. 
It should be clear from the discussion throughout Chapter VII that use of 
psychotherapy as an example is for purposes of convenience only. The paradigm we have 
set forth is or general significance for analysis of the mechanisms of social control. It is 
above all important to note that it is independent of the particular role-structures of the 
interaction relationship.  
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VIII 
BELIEF SYSTEMS AND THE SOCIAL 
SYSTEM: THE PROBLEM OF THE “ROLE 
OF IDEAS” 
 
THE most fundamental relations of the cultural tradition to the social system have 
already been set forth. Indeed these are so fundamental to any analysis of any phenomena 
of action, that it would have been altogether out of the question to attempt to carry the 
theory of the social system to the points reached in the foregoing chapters without 
working out these fundamental problems of the place of cultural patterns. Hence the task 
of this chapter and the following one is, taking these fundamentals for granted, to develop 
certain more specific problems of the interdependence of the cultural elements with those 
of the other components of the social system somewhat farther. 
We have seen that the patterns of value-orientation are particularly central to the social 
system. Because of this fact, and of the way in which we have developed its implications 
through use of the pattern variable scheme, it may be said that, except for the context of 
social change which will be taken up in Chapter XI, we have already, on the level 
appropriate to the present study, covered the field of the sociology of value-orientations. 
Hence this and the following chapter will concentrate on the other two principal 
components of cultural traditions, the present one on systems of beliefs or ideas, and the 
following on systems of expressive symbols. First, however, a brief recapitulation of the 
general place of culture in action systems and the bases of the classification of its 
components will help orient the reader to the subsequent discussion. 
Culture, in terms of the conceptual scheme of this work, consists, as we have seen, in 
patterned or ordered systems of symbols which are objects of the orientation of action, 
internalized components of the personalities of individual actors and institutionalized 
patterns of social systems. The terms in which cultural phenomena are analyzed are, as is 
the case with any other components of the phenomena of action, theoretical constructs 
which the social scientist uses to order his observations, formulate his problems and 
provide a conceptual framework for his interpretations. The general maxim that “all 
observation is in terms of a conceptual scheme” applies to the observation of what we 
call cultural patterns just as much as to any other aspect of systems of action. It is a set of 
abstractions from the concrete phenomena of social aption processes. 
The keynote of the conceptualization we have chosen is that cultural elements are 
elements of patterned order which mediate and regulate communication and other aspects 
of the mutuality of orientations in interaction processes. There is, we have insisted, 
always a normative aspect in the relation of culture to the motivational components of 
action; the culture provides standards of selective orientation and ordering. 
The most fundamental starting point for the classification of cultural elements is that 
of the three basic “functional” problem-contexts of action-orientation in general, the 
cognitive, the cathectic and the evaluative. It is fundamental to the very conception of 
action that there must be pattern-complexes differentiated with respect to each of these 
major problem contexts. These considerations provide the basis for the initial 
classification of cultural pattern types, namely belief systems, systems of expressive 
symbols, and systems of value-orientation. 
The fundamental relation of belief systems to social action processes can be most 
clearly brought out by referring back again to the paradigm of interaction. We pointed out 
in introducing that paradigm in Chapter I that one of the fundamental functions of the 
common culture which develops was communication. Without a sharing and a relative 
stability of meanings, the complementarity of expectations would not be possible. This 
applies preeminently but not exclusively to cognitive symbol systems. Furthermore even 
in this aspect of the culture a normative element is always present in the orientation, since 
observation of the conventions and standards of the language and belief system is a 
condition of communication. 
In general action terms “reality-testing” is the obviously paramount function of 
cognitive orientation. This includes of course the accuracy and adequacy of the cognition 
of alter as an object—and ego’s own self-knowledge. But in the context of interaction 
there is another aspect, the sharing of beliefs. Beliefs like other elements of culture, are 
internalized as part of the personality of the actor who holds them. That there should be a 
common belief system shared by ego and alter is in certain respects as important as that 
the beliefs should be adequate to reality outside the particular interaction system. Because 
of this duality of functional reference it is not uncommon for cognitive distortions to have 
positive functions in an inter-action system and thus for them to be resistant to correction 
in terms of pressures of reality. Put a little differently, if ego and alter share a distorted 
belief-about the physical environment or about third parties, if ego corrects his belief to 
bring it closer to reality while alter does not this introduces a strain into the relations of 
ego and alter. 
This integrative function of common beliefs in systems of inter-action will concern us 
at many points in the present chapter, but in so far as the cognitive interest has clear-cut 
primacy the primary focus is “existential.” The primary “pure type” of cognitive 
orientation, then, is what we may call the system of existential beliefs. It is necessary then 
to subdivide this category into empirical and nonempirical beliefs. The distinction is 
simply that ideas or beliefs will be called empirical when, in terms of the major 
orientations of the cultural tradition of which they are a part, they concern processes 
which are defined as subject to understanding and manipulation in a pattern of “practical 
rationality,” that is, in terms of what we call empirical science and its functional 
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equivalents in other cultures.1 Contrasted with empirical beliefs or ideas in this sense 
are non-empirical beliefs concerning subjects which are defined as beyond the reach of 
the methodology of empirical science or its equivalent in the culture in question.2 
Empirical ideas or beliefs may be subdivided according to the classes of objects to 
which they apply. In terms of the theory of action these are the classes of objects in the 
situation of action as they have been discussed in the foregoing chapters. For present 
purposes we may distinguish four main classes, namely physical objects (including 
organisms) or “nature,” individual actors, or personalities, collective actors or 
collectivities and cultural objects themselves. For certain purposes it may be important to 
distinguished organisms from other pnysical objects, as we have seen in the classification 
of points of reference for the categorization of actors as objects in Chapter IV above. 
Empirical beliefs about all classes of objects, however, have in common the fundamental 
fact of the relevance to their cognition of the methodological canons of science, though 
these are often not explicit in the culture in question. 
The category of non-empirical beliefs is avowedly residual. That there should be such 
a category as part of a cultural tradition seems to be inherent in the frame of reference of 
action. In its existential reference we may refer to this as the “philosophical” belief 
system of the culture. It includes beliefs about “supernatural” entities: gods, spirits and 
the like, and about alleged properties of natural objects, personalities and collectivities, 
which are not subject to what, in the culture in question, are the canons of empirical 
knowledge (i.e., the cognitive value-standards). In terms of modern science, they are 
beliefs which are neither verifiable nor disprovable by the procedures of science, which 
thus cannot be relegated to the categories of ignorance and/or error according to its 
standards. 
As we have said there may be a primacy of purely cognitive in- terest in relation to 
patterns of cognitive orientation. The type of actions which meets this criterion has been 
called “investigation.” If the problems under investigation are empirical we may speak of 
“scientific investigation”; in so far as they are non-empirical we may speak of 
“philosophical investigation.” In the latter will be included investigation of the logical 
and epistemological presuppositions of empirical knowledge so long as it is not questions 
of verifiable empirical fact and its theoretical generalization which are at issue. 
 
1 The work of Malinowski, among various others, can be held effectively to have disposed of the 
allegation, represented by Lévy-Bruhl and his followers, that primitive man had a “pre-logical” 
mentality such that what we call empirical knowledge and the corresponding rational techniques 
had no place in his thought or action. Every culture includes an element of “empirical lore” which 
is the precursor of what we call scientific knowledge. Cf. B.Malinowski, Magic, Science and 
Religion. 
2 This is not of course to say that the actors in another cultural tradition are aware of and apply our 
canons of scientific relevance and validity. It is rather to say that in every system of action there is 
to be found the equivalent of the line we draw between empirical and non-empirical ideas. Thus 
Malinowski’s Trobriander, though he believes magic to be essential to the success of his gardening, 
does not confuse the efficacy of magic with that of empirical technology. He does not beleve it is 
possible to make up for bad technology by more and better magic. 
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Cognitive primacy is also, as we have seen, maintained in a relative sense when a 
specific goal is given, and the problem is raised of the most effective ways of attaining 
that goal, and of the “cost” involved in terms of the sacrifice of alternatives. This is what 
we have called instrumental orientation. Given the goal, the action Problem is still purely 
cognitive, and the solutions are hence subject to the primacy of cognitive standards with 
appreciative and/or moral considerations being subordinated. Apparent exceptions are 
accounted for by the fact that the particular goal must fit into a larger orientation system, 
and that in the cost of attaining a goal may be included the sacrifice of appreciative or 
other evaluative interests. Once these questions are raised it is of course not possible to 
decide them according to purely cognitive criteria, but cognitive criteria are decisive in 
determining what the issues are, and what the price of attaining the goal will have to be. 
This introduction of expressive and evaluative considerations, when the means to a 
given goal are being weighed, indicates the next important elaboration of the analysis of 
belief-systems. This is the point at which a cognitive problem is no longer purely 
existential but involves, in Max Weber’s term, a “problem of meaning.” A problem of 
meaning in this sense always includes existential problems, empirical and/or non-
empirical. But in addition to the existential problem is that of “what of it?” from the point 
of view of bearing of the existential considerations on the interests of actors, individual 
and/or collective. Because of inherent features of the structure of action systems, this 
meaning-reference has in turn a double aspect, a cathectic and an evaluative aspect. The 
first consists in the assessment of the cathectic significance for the relevant actors, of the 
actual or alleged existential states of the situation, past, present, or predicted future, an 
assessment which in the last analysis is referable to what we have called the gratification-
deprivation balance of the personality. The second concerns the evaluative assessment of 
its bearing on the value-realization of the action-system in question. So far as an 
individual actor is fully integrated, that is, his motivational needs and his values are fully 
synthesized, the cathectic and evaluative aspects come to the same thing. In the case of a 
collectivity, however, there may have to be sacrifice of the interests of some component 
individuals in the interest of the collective values.3 
It seems justified to adopt the term evaluative beliefs as parallel to that of existential 
beliefs. When, therefore, a problem of meaning in the above sense is involved in addition 
to the existential problem of “what is the state of affairs,” we shall speak of evaluative 
belief systems.4 
It will, therefore, prove necessary to treat belief systems in terms of a double 
classification. On the one hand we must distinguish empirical and non-empirical 
references, on the other hand, existential and evaluative significance or relevance to the 
system of action. The combination of empirical and existential is clearly the case of 
science and its proto-scientific counterparts. That of nonempirical and existential we have 
already designated as philosophy, also, of course, making allowance for the fact that 
below certain standards of explicitness and logical articulation it might be better to speak 
of proto-philosophy. 
3 This is essentially the distinction which Pareto made between “utility” for and of a collectivity. 
Cf. The Mind and Society, Vol. IV and Structure of Social Action, Chapter VII. 
4 This is essentially what Kluckhohn (in his chapter in Toward a General Theory of Action) means 
by Value-Orientations as distinct from Values. 
 
Belief systems and the social system     223
When we turn to the evaluative category we may make a parallel distinction. Where 
the primary reference is empirical we may speak of ideology. The only difficulty with 
this term is that it refers primarily to the belief system shared by the members of a 
collectivity, and for some purposes it may in the theory of action be important to speak of 
this aspect of the belief system of an individual actor. When the individual actor is the 
point of reference we shall try to avoid this difficulty by speaking of a “personal 
ideology.” Finally, when the primary reference is non-empirical we may when the 
problems of meaning are of paramount significance speak of religious ideas, as 
distinguished from philosophical.  
According to this view, then, there is a fundamental symmetry in the relations, on the 
one hand, of science and ideology, on the other of philosophy and religious ideas. In both 
cases the transition to the evaluative category means a change in the “stake” the actor has 
in the belief system, it means the transition from acceptance to commitment. The primary 
question is no longer that of interest in whether a proposition is “true,” but, in addition to 
that, in a commitment to its implications for the orientation of action as such. We have, 
thus, by another route, come back to the distinction made in Chapter II between 
acceptance of a cultural pattern and commitment to it. This has very important 
implications for differences in the relation of the pattern in question, in this case a belief 
system, to the action system, notably for what is meant by its institutionalization in a 
social system. 
We shall deal with each of these four major types of belief system in turn, coming at 
the end of the chapter to a brief discussion of the problem of general classification of 
types of belief system on another plane, that of orientation content. 
§ EXISTENTIAL EMPIRICAL BELIEFS AND THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 
OUR treatment of empirical belief systems will be divided into four parts. First will come 
a brief discussion of the general status of empirical knowledge in social systems. Second, 
a very important special case will be taken up, that of the institutionalization of scientific 
investigation as a type of role-function. Third, a few problems about the application of 
empirical knowledge on the scientific levels in practical affairs will be discussed and 
finally, fourth, there will be a discussion of social ideologies. 
There can be no possible doubt of the importance of “empirical lore” as part of the 
cultural tradition of every social system. Without a relatively high development of this 
component, we could not speak of a human society at all. Language and the 
transmissibility of culture of course open up the possibility of the cumulative growth of 
empirical knowledge or lore. 
Throughout a very large proportion of human societies, however, notably but by no 
means exclusively in non-literate societies, there are, as compared to the development of 
modern science, sharp re-strictions on the rate of the development of empirical 
knowledge and even on the acceptance of available knowledge or its use in instrumental 
contexts. These restrictions seem to have to do primarily with the integration of such 
knowledge with the other elements of action in such ways that investigative interests are 
inhibited. 
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The very immediacy and urgency of practical instrumental needs itself constitutes a 
oasis of inhibition. The conditions of scientific advance seem to lie in two main 
directions: first, the abstraction and generalization of knowledge, and second, the 
development of special investigative procedures. Neither of these is possible to a high 
degree under the pressure of immediately urgent practical needs. Under such conditions 
the development of knowledge will tend to be tied down to the immediately relevant 
context, and to readily available procedures. It takes the specialization of roles in these 
directions to make notable and rapid developments possible. But in “primitive” 
conditions this possibility is not even cognitively realized, to say nothing of the other 
institutional prerequisites being absent. 
Closely related to these considerations are those involved in the need of the social 
system for stabilization both of its relationship system and of its cultural orientations. To 
take one example, the prevalance of magic in non-literate societies seems to be associated 
with the element of uncertainty in the success of practical endeavors. But precisely 
because magic provides a non-empirical cognitive orientation to the unknown and 
uncontrollable factors in the situation, which is in certain respects motivationally 
gratifying and functionally positive for the social system, the existence of magical beliefs, 
as Firth clearly points out,5 inhibits the development of rational empirical knowledge, 
because the two are in direct competition and are incompatible with each other. In other 
words, a system of empirical beliefs, which is bordered on every hand by magical beliefs, 
is by that fact strongly inhibited from further development. It tends to be stabilized in a 
status quo. 
The same is true of various other aspects of a complex socio-cultural system. There is, 
as we have seen, always a set of vested interests in the maintenance of a status quo. 
Development of empirical knowledge is always upsetting to some vested interest. Hence, 
unless it is positively institutionalized in itself, it is likely to develop only slowly and 
sporadically, in spite of the fact that on the other side there is an obvious interest in its 
development. Perhaps above all it is relevant to note that magical beliefs snade into and 
are integrated with religious beliefs. The latter are apt to be strongly institutionalized in a 
social system and strongly integrated with the power and reward systems of the society. 
Unless the religious system is itself both strongly dynamic rather than traditionally 
oriented, and is dynamic in a manner favorable to empirical investigative interests, it also 
is likely to have an inhibitory effect on the growth of the empirical stock of knowledge. 
Closely associated with these aspects of the problem is that of the ways in which 
instrumental and investigative interests are bound in with predominantly expressive 
interests. The very immediacy of instrumentally urgent needs mentioned above is likely 
to be associated with a general orientation to immediate gratifications and expressive 
activity, and hence to the relative minimization of the kinds of discipline which are 
associated with, indeed essential to, a high development of instrumentally oriented 
action-patterns. The primary disciplines in non-literate societies, as in many literate ones, 
are more likely to be associated with such affective-diffuse types of role-obligation as  
 
5 Cf. Raymond Firth, Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori, Chapter VII. 
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those of kinship than with the universalistic, specific and affectively neutral patterns of 
the modern type of occupational role. It is in the very nature of the higher developments 
of empirical knowledge, that the pursuit of investigative problems must be 
universalistically oriented, that the reaching of remoter implications implies a high level 
of affectively neutral discipline, and that specialization—hence specificity of role 
function—is essential to success. The very fact that this type of role pattern does not 
develop on a large scale except under rather special conditions has much to do with the 
relative stagnation of the development of empirical knowledge in so many societies. 
In view of these facts, the high development of science in our own type of society 
poses important problems of the relation of the investigative interest to the rest of the 
social system. To this problem we now turn.  
1. The Institutionalization of Scientific Investigation 
THE difference between science and empirical lore, and the corresponding difference 
between scientific investigation and empirically cognitive problem-solving on a common 
sense level, are gradual and in a sense relative. What was the technical science of 
yesterday has in certain respects become the common sense of today -as in the case of the 
heliocentric theory of the solar system or the germ theory of disease. But though the 
borderline is indistinct, in fundamental pattern there is a sharp difference. The generality 
of science far transcends the boundaries of particular practical fields of instrumental 
interest, and cuts across many of them. The role of the scientist becomes technical and his 
specialized interests and procedures are of “no use” except for his own specialized 
purposes. The knowledge he possesses is only with difficulty if at all accessible to the 
untrained layman. The ultimate judgment of it must lie with his professionally qualified 
peers. Thus, the status of any given item of knowledge, as belonging to science or to 
common sense, may be doubtful. And the variations between these two types is a matter 
of degree. But the distinction is nonetheless vital. 
The basic norms of scientific knowledge are perhaps four, empirical validity, logical 
clarity or precision of the particular proposition, logical consistency of the mutual 
implications of propositions, and generality of the “principles” involved, which may 
perhaps be interpreted to mean range of mutually verified implications.6 Very specific 
propositions of particular fact may be held to be verified with a certainty approaching 
absoluteness. The more general the proposition the less that order of approach to certainty 
in the sense that it is inconceivable that it should ever have to be modified, is possible. 
But science “progresses” in proportion as it is possible to relate very particular facts to 
generalized systems of implication.  
6 The reader may for purposes of orientation to the general nature of science and its processes of 
development, be referred to James B.Conant, On Understanding Science. Some of the best 
treatments of sociological problems relative to science are to be found in R.K.Merton, Social 
Theory and Social Structure, Part IV. Also thc author’s Structure of Social Action, especially 
Chapters I and XIX contains some relevant discussions. Cf. also “The Institutionalization of Social 
Science and the Problems of the Conference,” Chapter XIV of Perspectives on a Troubled Decade. 
Published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, 1950. 
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Hence it is not possible to use only the one criterion. It would be generally admitted 
that analytical mechanics before the relativity and quantum era was in some sense a more 
“advanced” science than botanical taxonomy, even though the “meaning” of many of the 
generalized propositions of mechanics was in certain respects seriously in doubt, and 
taxonomy ordered enormous numbers of facts, with very little in its logical structure 
which was questionable or controversial. 
There is, therefore, not merely the question of whether or not a given item of 
knowledge “belongs” to science, but implied in the term used above, “basic norms,” is 
the implication that there are levels of scientific advancement. Moreover this 
advancement does not consist only of discrete additions to existing knowledge of facts, 
but of the relation of this knowledge of fact to systematization and generalized theoretical 
analysis. This gives us the sense in which science, specifically on the cultural level, is a 
dynamic thing. Its inherent structure is one of variant levels of advancement. Such a type 
of culture element contains, in its relation to action, an inherent element of instability. 
There is always the possibility that someone will make a new discovery. This may be 
merely a specific addition to knowledge of fact, in which case it will simply be fitted in 
with the rest in its proper place. But it may be something which necessitates the 
reorganization to a greater or less degree, of the systematized body of knowledge. 
This growth-oriented dimension of scientific knowledge as a part of culture is of 
particular interest here. For this ties in with action; scientific innovation is not a culturally 
automatic process, but is an action process, and as such involves all the fundamental 
elements which are relevant to the analysis of action-processes. 
There is, however, as Kroeber has brought out with particular clarity,7 an inherent 
element of “cultural structure” which provides a partial but very important set of 
determinants of this process. For precisely as a cognitive system the body of scientific 
knowledge, in any given field at a given time, is definitely structured. Advance does not 
and cannot take place in random fashion in all directions at once, i.e., unselectively. It is 
structured by the intrinsic cultural features of that knowledge. Certain problems are 
inherent in this structure. Facts which are discovered may be more or less relevant to 
these problems. Even if discovered by chance, the consequences of a discovery are thus a 
function of the way in which it fits into the structure of existing knowledge, and its 
problem-structure. The possibilities inherent in any given knowledge-system and related 
problem-structure are not random and infinite, but finite and specifically structured. 
There will then be a determinate process of working out the possibilities inherent in a 
knowledge structure the building of which has once begun, until these possibilities have 
finally become exhausted. Kroeber uses this type of analysis most convincingly to show 
that creativity in scientific advance, as well as for example in the arts, is not a simple 
function of the supply of biologically gifted individuals, but depends on the job there is 
for them to do. By exactly the same token it cannot be simply a function of favorable 
states of the social structure. This is authentically a cultural factor. 
Empirical knowledge is an essential part of all action, particularly when the 
instrumental aspect is highly developed. There is hence an inherent interest not only in 
the application of such knowledge, but in its further development. But at the same time 
we have seen that there are strongly counteracting factors of such a character that 
7 See A.L.Kroeber, Configurations of Culture Growth, and Anthropology, 1948 Edition. 
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unless investigation becomes the primary technical function of specialized roles, the 
advancement of knowledge is often very slow and halting. Perhaps the most fundamental 
reason is that for the “practical man” the primary focus is on the attainment of the 
immediate goal itself, and knowledge constitutes simply one of the available resources 
for achieving it. But, furthermore, practical action tends, for a variety of reasons, to be 
imbedded in a matrix of non-rational orientation patterns (including the functional 
equivalents of magic) which, because they are not directly empirically grounded, can 
only be stabilized by being traditionalized. Indeed the general pressure toward 
stabilization of a system of action militates against the advancement of knowledge 
because this obviously has many repercussions besides making the effective attainment 
of the particular goal more feasible. Also the practical man does not have a direct interest 
in the further ramifications of a scientific body of knowledge beyond his immediate 
sphere of practical interest. All this is attested by a considerable amount of tension 
between scientists and practical men even in the fields where science has been most 
successfully applied. 
These reasons why the practical man develops resistances to himself pushing the 
advancement of empirical knowledge forward are also in turn connected with the fact that 
beyond certain points this advancement only becomes possible through the kinds of 
technical means which involve specialization of roles. Knowledge itself becomes 
technical, and takes long training to master. Furthermore, investigation is a process which 
requires special skills which in certain respects go beyond the mastery of the bases in 
established knowledge from which any given phase of the process starts. Hence the above 
considerations about the way in which changes in empirical knowledge impinge on any 
system of social interaction, become even more cogent when the place in a differentiated 
instrumental complex of the specialized role of scientific investigation is taken into 
account. 
First, the technical nature of specialized science means that there develops what may 
be called a communication gap. The scientist is inevitably dependent on “laymen” for 
support and for the provision of facilities. But in circumstantial detail the layman is not 
technically competent to judge what the scientist is doing, he has to take it “on authority.” 
This general situation is accentuated by the fact that there is often a large gap between the 
frontiers of scientific investigation and the practical results which the practical man can 
most readily appreciate, understand and use. This is particularly because the cognitive 
structure of science is such that the ramifications of scientific problems cannot be 
restricted to the solution of the kind of applied problem area in which a practical man is 
interested. He, therefore, from his own perspective often does not have the basis for 
seeing that what the scientist is doing is of “any use.” 
Such a communication gap between roles always creates a problem of control. Besides 
the question of why an activity should be supported, which doesn’t seem to be of any 
particular use, there are two types of foci of anxiety. In the first place the scientist must 
do a good many things which impinge upon others. Partly these things are just “queer” 
and their motives seem to be unfathomable. But sometimes they are potentially 
dangerous to some laymen, e.g., explosions in the chemical laboratory, and partly they 
impinge on touchy areas of sentiment. Thus, the dissection of cadavers by anatomists and 
medical students long had to be carried out surreptitiously and today, with all the prestige 
of medical science, some religious groups permit autopsies only in the few cases where it 
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for a purpose which as a layman he does not understand. This is frequently the case in 
social science research, e.g., in interviewing subjects. 
Along with having to secure facilities from others in ways which impinge on their 
interests and sentiments, the scientist is faced with a good deal of anxiety about the 
implications of the results of his work. This is particularly true because the crucial 
significance of generality of implication of science means that it is not possible to limit 
these implications to the solution of clear-cut and limited practical problems. This is 
perhaps particularly important in relation to the ideological, philosophical and religious 
fields. The motives of adherence to ideological and religious ideas are usually differently 
structured from those of belief fn the simpler bits of empirical lore; the very fact that the 
elements of the situation involved present such extremely difficult cognitive problems 
and yet the affective interests in a clear-cut definition of the situation are so strong, makes 
that clear. But certainly no large-scale development of science is possible without some 
important impingement and hence in part an upsetting effect, on ideological and religious 
positions which play an important part in the cultural tradition. 
In general the practical man is hedged in by considerations which make only relatively ad 
hoc and limited resources available for him to make use of. Where the operations of 
scientific investigation may involve far-reaching repercussions on the sentiment system 
of a society, it is unlikely that the major impetus for such a development will come alone 
or even primarily8 from practical “interests.” At the least practical interests will have to 
be combined with a cultural situation which lends prestige to the relevant types of activity 
on bases other than their promise of improvements of practical efficiency. 
This appears very definitely to be the case with science. The place of science in 
Western society is part of the ascendancy of a cultural tradition which involves a hign 
valuation of certain types of rationality of understanding of the empirical world, on 
grounds apart from the promise of practical applicaoility of the results of that 
understanding. Once such valuation is established and built into the institudonal system, 
it comes to be strongly reinforced by the practical fruits, once science has been permitted 
to develop far enough so that these fruits have become relatively impressive. In all 
probability only when such a combination has become firmly established does it become 
possible for scientific investigation to acquire the level of prestige which it has enjoyed in 
the modern Western world. But even here there are many elements of ambivalence in 
public attitudes toward science and the scientist, which are expressed in much irrational 
and some relatively rational opposition to his role.9 
8 The wielder of political power is the most obvious exception since he often cannot avoid such 
repercussions. 
9 Thus an article in the Vienna Presse, which the author happened to sec while in Austria in the 
summer of 1948, argued with the utmost seriousness that it would have been a good thing for 
civilization had the Church in the long run won out against Galileo, that is, had the development of 
modern science been suppressed. The argument was that science had opened a Pandora’s box with 
the contents of which humanity was unable to cope, and a kind of intellectual authoritarianism 
which would limit investigation to fields known to be “safe” was the only solution. Who is to say 
that there is no force in such an argument? 
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trying to limit the use of animals in scientific research are well known. Scientists may also impose 
burdens on the layman if only by even asking him to give some of his time 
      Their judgment, particularly toward and beyond the fringes of their technical 
competence, is often highly fallible, and things are said in the name of science which are 
very far from meeting the standards of scientific demonstrability, or short of that, 
showing the degree of tentativeness and suspension of judgment which is indicated in the 
light of the deficiencies of the evidence. From this professionally internal penumbra there 
is a shading  
off into the ideas about scientific matters current among the lay public, where pseudo-
science is much more prolific. It is important to note that the conditions under which 
science could have a well-established place in the social system are such that the presence 
of this pseudo-scientific penumbra seems to be inevitable. It can, of course, to a degree be 
limited and controlled, and in fact is, but it seems unlikely that it can be eliminated. 
In the broadest possible sense, the most important feature of the Western cultural 
tradition as a bulwark of science is its strong universalistic trend. This means in the first 
instance a strong emphasis on the importance of knowledge, an emphasis evidenced for 
instance in the stress on rational theology in all the most important branches of 
Christianity. That the hospitality to science was greatly increased in the “ascetic” 
branches of Protestantism, as compared to the Catholic tradition, is shown by Merton’s 
analysis of the religious situation in England at the time of the great scientific 
developments of the 17th century.10 
The valuation of knowledge in a secular direction greatly increased in post-mediaeval 
times, connecting with the revival of interest in and prestige of the traditions of classical 
antiquity. Eventually, in the Western world the doctrine that a gentleman ought to be an 
educated man, first as part of his ascribed aristocratic role, gradually shifted until it has at 
least become true in more recent times that an educated man was to be considered a 
gentleman, that is, knowledge became the most important single mark of generalized 
superiority. This is, of course, a highly schematic statement of a very complex 
development. 
The primary core of the Western tradition of higher education as the mark of the 
gentleman was in its earlier phases humanistic rather than scientific, though the place of 
mathematics is of considerable importance. But the great tradition of humanistic learning 
shares many features with science, above all the respect for impartial objectivity and 
hence for evidence; in the first instance shown in the concern for the authenticity of 
historical and literary texts, which is by no means so prominent in many other great 
literate traditions. The humanistic scholar in this sense was in many respects the 
precursor of the scientist and is of course today his colleague in the most highly educated 
sector of the population. 
In the most modern era this cultural tradition has above all become embodied in the 
university as its principal institutionalized frame. Not least important of the facts about 
the modern university is that it combines the highest levels of development of the f 
unctions of pure scientific investigation in the same basic organizational complex with 
10 Robert K.Merton, Science and Society in 17th Century England. 
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the humanistic branches of learning which have formed the primary core of the most 
highly rationalized part of the great expressive cultural tradition of the West. This 
includes, of course, theology as the rational foundation of religious beliefs. Furthermore, 
of course, it is highly significant that a large part of the fundamental training function of 
the major branches of applied science, especially in medicine and engineering, has 
become an integral part of the university. 
Apart from the institutionalization of the specific role of the scientist as such, which 
will be commented upon presently, this situation has the great importance of directly 
integrating the role of the scientist with those of the other principal “experts” in major 
branches of the cultural tradition. The scientist has the support of being considered part of 
the same cultural complex which includes the humanities. Not least important, he shares 
with them the function of educating the primary elite elements of the oncoming 
generation in the society. In so far as the doctrine is upheld that in general the “leading 
men” of the society should be educated men in the modern sense, their elite status carries 
with it commitment to a value-system of which the values of the scientist, and the 
valuation of his activities and their results, form an integral part. This integration of 
science, both with the wider cultural tradition of the society, and with its institutional 
structure, constitutes the primary basis of the institutionalization of scientific 
investigation as part of the social structure. It means that the scientist shares the status in 
the universities with the other key groups who are primary culture bearers and on terms 
such that the values of science come to be inculcated in the value-system of society 
generally through the education of its primary elite elements. Without this it is highly 
doubtful whether even at its most recent stages of development, the interest of practical 
men in the fruits of science could alone long sustain scientific investigation as the 
function of a major type of specialized social role. 
In more specific terms, it is first important to note that status on the faculty of a 
university gives the scientist a clearly institutionalized role with all its concomitants. In 
terms of modern organization in the occupational field, it gives him both a source of 
remuneration for himself and of course his family, and a “market” for his products, 
through putting him in relation to students and professional colleagues and providing or 
encouraging publication channels for his work. It provides him by and large with the 
increasingly necessary but expensive facilities for his work, and the framework of the 
allimportant cooperative relationships with colleagues and others. By giving him an 
“orthodox” occupational role, it gives not only him, but members of his family, an 
acceptable status in the society, e.g., he “earns a living.” Moreover, the university, both 
through its general prestige and sometimes through specific administrative action, serves 
to protect his freedom to carry out his function in the face of forces in the society which 
tend to interfere with it.11 
11 The fact that mechanisms of social control sometimes fail to operate successfully is no evidence 
that they do not exist, or are not effective in other connections. 
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The occupational role which the scientist occupies, with its center of gravity in the 
university, is an integral part of the general occupational system. Moreover it is of the 
special type we have above called a professional role.12 The fact that it shares the pattern 
elements of universalism, affective neutrality, specificity and achievement orientation 
with the occupational system in general does not require special comment here. But it is 
worth while to call attention to the fact that as a professional role it is institutionalized 
predominantly in terms of collectivity—rather than self-orientation. 
There seem to be two primary contexts in which self-orientation in the scientific world 
would tend to be seriously dysfunctional. One is the implication of the saying 
“knowledge is power.” It is indeed true that in a sufficiently large number and 
strategically important type of cases the discoveries of the scientist would, if 
uncontrolled, put him in a position to interfere with the interests and sentiments of others. 
These others, the “public,” are in need of protection in the whole field of the uses of 
science. A major factor in this need lies in the gap in communication between expert and 
layman occasioned by the technical character of science. The layman is unable to protect 
his own interests in a “market situation.” Thus, in a certain sense, the scientist is 
institutionally endowed with authority, he is recognized as “an authority” in his field, and 
the general analysis of the functional reasons for the association of other-orientation with 
authority applies. 
The second dysfunctional possibility is that of the “monopolization” of knowledge in 
its bearing on the process of scientific advancement itself. Such monopolization would 
not only restrict the rate and spread of scientific advance, by making it more difficult to 
build on what others had done, but it would also seriously interfere with the social control 
mechanisms of science intemal to itself. It is a cardinal fact that the scientist is, through 
discussion and publication, exposed to the criticism of his professional colleagues to an 
unusual degree, including the checking of his results through replication on the part of 
others. The idea that a “scientist’s theory is his castle” which must not be trespassed 
upon, except on terms laid down by himself, would be incompatible with this discipline 
which is so important to the maintenance of standards of objectivity.13 Finally, it should 
not be forgotten that the scientist requires “privileges” from his fellow men. Collectivity-
orientation certainly does much to validate his claims to them. Thus, when the social 
scientist requests information in an interview the subject may very likely ask, “why do 
you want to know this?” The legitimation, which must be explicit or implicit in the 
answer, is that it is in the interests of the advancement of knowledge, not the personal 
“axe to grind” that the interviewer may conceivably have. Often explicit safeguards 
against misuse of information, i.e., generally “personal” or “partisan” rather than 
scientific use, have to be given.  
12 There are, of course, many possibilities of dysfunctional phenomena developing when scientific 
investigation is thus institutionalized. Thus exposure to the criticism of colleagues may be 
associated with a tendency to sterile pedantry and perfectionism in detail which sacrifices the 
importance of bold ideas. In general the minimization of refined competitive ratings in university 
faculties—the treatment of the “company of scholars” as a “company of equals”—may be 
interpreted to be an adaptive structure with the function of counteracting some of these 
dysfunctional tendencies. Cf. Logan Wilson, The Academic Man. 
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The above discussion has dealt only with certain aspects of the institutionalization of 
the process of scientific investigation in a social system. It has not treated the very 
complex problems of the repercussions of the results of this process in the rest of the 
society; something about this subject will have to be said in Chapter XI below in 
connection with the problems of social change. It has, however, become evident that, 
important as the cultural aspects of science are, the concrete processes of its development 
will depend very heavily on the ways in which these are related to the other elements of 
the social system, some of which, of course, consist in other than scientific aspects of the 
cultural tradition. The possibilities inherent in a cultural configuration are, as Kroeber has 
so brilliantly shown, one essential element of scientific development. But these 
possibilities may remain undeveloped unless the cultural pattern element comes into the 
proper articulation with the institutional structure of the social system. 
The most important single consideration is that the function of investigation, above all 
in “pure” science, should become the primary functional content of a system of fully 
institutionalized roles, roles which are necessarily occupational in type. This requires the 
support of an institutionalized cultural tradition broader than that of science itself, as well 
as of the more immediate patterns defining the relevant role-type. It involves all the 
elements of the social system which are relevant to the place of that cultural tradition in 
the society, in its non-scientific as well as its scientific aspects. The “obvious” intrinsic 
merits of science, as seen by the modern rational mind, are by no means sufficient to 
account for the fact that the scientist has in fact acquired a fully institutionalized role in 
modern Western society. 
2. The Institutionalization of Applied Science 
JUST as scientific investigation, though an inherent possibility of rational action, does 
not develop far unless it is institutionalized as part of the role structure of the social 
system, it cannot be taken for granted that even available scientific knowledge will be 
utilized in practice unless the roles in which it is utilized are equally institutionalized. An 
example of this institutionalization, that of modern medical practice, will be analyzed in 
some detail in Chapter X below. Here only a few brief remarks about the setting of the 
problem will be introduced. 
In the first place very generally the kinds of technology in which sophisticated science 
plays an important part are those which take the “long way around.” They involve 
approaching the attainment of an empirical goal by the use of elaborate equipment, 
training of personnel, and complex organization. They develop to any great extent only 
when there is a basis for the acceptance of the disciplines necessary for the functioning of 
that type of social structure. Not least of these is a fundamental fact about the 
instrumental division of labor. This is the very simple fact that the incumbent of the 
ordinary differentiated role in such a system cannot, in the nature of the case, have a 
direct gratification-interest in the immediate results of the bulk of his activity in the role. 
He must work for goals of which others are the primary direct beneficiaries, often even 
then only after a long series of further steps in the process of “production” following his 
own contribution. He must look for his own gratifications in two other directions. First, 
he has “remuneration” for his role-activities, which in a complex society like ours above 
all takes the form of money income contingent on his role performances but also includes 
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various symbolic rewards such as prestige and honors. Secondly, he has the gratifications 
derivable from the activities themselves, including the complex of social relationships in 
which they are performed. These we call by such terms as pride of workmanship, concern 
with self-respect and with the approval and esteem of others. They involve the cathexis of 
affectively neutral value patterns. Of course the affectively positive cathexis of persons 
with whom there are occupational associations is also very generally involved, but this 
must be a specifically limited and controlled cathexis if it is not to interfere with 
occupational performance. 
The acceptance of scientifically grounded technologies in general fits into this context. 
It involves pressing these general features of an elaborate division of labor farther than 
they would otherwise be pressed. Above all, perhaps, it is important that the persons who 
must in the nature of the case perform the roles of implementing the technological ideas, 
cannot normally themselves be the immedi-ate beneficiaries of the results. Hence the 
problem of motivating such innovations must be approached in the same general terms as 
those of motivating any further elaboration of the division of labor. It must either be in 
terms of the “self-interest” of the incumbent in possible remuneration, which almost 
always involves an uncertainty factor, or it must be in terms of the motivational 
significances of achievement values or collectivity obligations without direct regard to 
the enjoyment of the immediate results. Very generally it may be said that the latter class 
of motivational elements almost certainly outweigh the former in significance. 
The applied scientist, if we may call him such, is subject to most of the difficulties 
which beset the investigator. There is the same communication gap, in that his technical 
competence can be appreciated by the layman only in the light of results which can only 
be demonstrated after he has been “given a chance,” or through non-logical mechanisms 
associated with the prestige of his knowledge, its sources and associations. There is the 
same set of factors which everywhere operate to oppose innovation because it threatens 
to upset the equilibrium of an established system of social interaction. As a major aspect 
of this, there is the fact that the applied scientist must often “interfere” with the interests 
and sentiments of those on whom his activities impinge, who are sometimes the direct 
beneficiaries of his functions and sometimes not. 
These are the types of considerations which help to account for the fact that in most 
societies technological innovation has, in spite of its obvious benefits, often been 
surprisingly slow and halting, and that even in our own, where it has become 
institutionalized to a very high degree, it generates very substantial resistances in many 
fields. These resistances imply in general that there will be a high degree of technological 
development only where there is the same type of support from a broader general cultural 
tradition, and its principal modes of institutionalization as we discussed for scientific 
investigation itself. Here we may again note that in our society the highest levels of 
technology are rooted in the universities, and share the support of the latter with scientific 
investigation as such. In the case of medicine, which will be discussed below, it is not too 
much to say that American medicine scarcely could be said to have come of age as a field 
of applied science until, not much more than a generation ago, it became established that 
the norm for medical education was the university medical school, and that the norm 
again for medical research was to be found in the laboratories of sucn schools and of the 
teaching hospitals associated with them. Thus the scientific focus of medical practice, the 
training of the practitioner, the fountainhead of scientific innovation directly applicable in 
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medicine, and the general cultural tradition of which all science is a part, have become 
organized about the university as the principal trustee of that tradition, as the focus of its 
institutionalization. What is true of medicine is broadly true of the other principal fields 
of applied science. 
In addition, of course, the institutionalization of applied science lequires a direct role 
structure which is “adequate” to its functional needs. In the modern Western world this 
has taken place mainly in terms of the professional type of role. It will be argued in 
Chapter X in connection with the specific material about medical practice that, by and 
large, the conditions necessary for the application of science to practical affairs on a large 
scale would not be compatible with any other of the major types of role structure. The 
reasons for this contention will be summed up and generalized after the evidence on this 
particular professional group has been presented. 
In general, then, we may hold that applied science, like scientific investigation itself, 
requires quite definite conditions in the structure of the social system, as well as the 
cultural prerequisites in the form of the adequate state of existing knowledge. Knowledge 
does not “apply itself,” no matter how advantageous to the society the results may, to our 
Western mind, appear. It gets applied only through the mechanisms of institutionalization 
of roles within which the requisite combinations of motivational and cultural elements 
can develop. Only by becoming in this sense incorporated into the structure of the social 
system, thus coming to constitute more than a body of “ideas,” does empirical knowledge 
acquire the basis for a major influence on action. 
3. The Institutionalization of Ideologies 
IN DEALING with scientific investigation we were concerned with a type of action 
where cognitive interests had unquestioned primacy. In the case of the practical 
applications of science a goal is given, but subject to this given goal, on the instrumental 
level cognitive interests still have primacy. When we move to the consideration of 
ideologies we are no longer dealing with cognitive primacy, but with evaluative primacy. 
It may be noted that it is impossible for there to be a type of belief system where 
expressive interests have clear primacy, for there the cognitive interest would be 
subordinated to the expressive and we would have a system of expressive symbols, not or 
beliefs. The cognitive interpretation of the meaning of these symbols on the other hand 
would, as a type of action interest focus, become a process of investigation which would 
bring it over into the realm of cognitive primacy again. 
An ideology, then, is a system of beliefs, held in common by the members of a 
collectivity,14 i.e., a society, or a sub-collectivity of one-including a movement deviant 
from the main culture of the society-a system of ideas which is oriented to the evaluative 
integration of the collectivity, by interpretation of the empirical nature of the collectivity 
and of the situation in which it is placed, the processes by which it has developed to its 
given state, the goals to which its members are collectively oriented, and their relation to 
the future course of events. In so far as the cognitive interest has clear primacy the belief 
system is scientific or philosophical. Such belief systems may contribute to the building  
14 Since our concern is with the social system we shall not deal here with personal ideologies. 
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of an ideology, indeed always do, but solely as an object of such a paramount interest the 
belief system does not constitute an ideology. Similarly so long as it concerns only 
interpretation of a situation in terms relevant to the attainment of a given specific goal, 
e.g., victory in war, the belief system is a set of instrumental beliefs. To constitute an 
ideology there must exist the additional feature that there is some level of evaluative 
commitment to the belief as an aspect of membership in the collectivity, subscription to 
the belief system is institutionalized as part of the role of collectivity membership. There 
is a great variation in the mode of this institutionalization as well as its degree. It may be 
completely informal, or it may be formally enforced as subscription to a specified text 
with sanctions for deviance enforced by a specific agency. But as distinguished from a 
primarily cognitive interest in ideas, in the case of an ideology, there must be an 
obligation to accept its tenets as the basis of action. As distinguished from a purely 
instrumental belief there must be involvement of an idea that the welfare of the 
collectivity and not merely attainment of a particular goal hinges on the implementation 
of the belief system. 
What we are here calling an ideology has its central focus in the empirical aspects of 
the interpretation of the nature and situation of the collectivity. But it is in the nature of 
the case that these empirical elements should be combined with and shade off into non-
empirical elements at the points where justification of the ultimate goals and values of 
collective action become involved. A system of religious ideas, on the other hand, rests 
primarily on the non-empirical premises of its belief system and “works back” as it were, 
from these to their implications for the empirical nature and situation of the collectivity. 
The statement that the orientation of an ideology is toward the “evaluative integration 
of the collectivity” is in need of interpretation. By this is not meant that the actor who 
subscribes to the belief system needs to have a sophisticated theory of what integrates the 
collectivity, but only that it is felt that the welfare of the group is bound up with 
maintenance of the belief system and its implementation in action. It can readily be seen 
that a belief system toward which such an attitude is held in common must in fact acquire 
integrative significance for the collectivity. 
The primary emphasis of this volume has been on the integration of social systems at 
the level of patterns of value-orientation as institutionalized in role-expectations. These 
patterns of value-orientation are elements of the cultural tradition, but are only part of it. 
Man is a cognizing animal, and so his values do not exist apart from beliefs which give 
them cognitive meaning. The dimension of cognitive orientation to the situation is just as 
essential to a total system of cultural orientation as is that of value-orientation to the 
choice-alternatives of action, and is analytically independent of it, but of course also 
interdependent with it. 
Furthermore, of course, the general strain to consistency in a cultural tradition, the 
more so the more highly “rationalized” it is, means that in general the value-orientations 
tend to be relatively consistent with the belief system. The question of cause and effect is 
not at issue just now, interdependence may be assumed. 
Since there must be relative consistency in the value-orientation patterns of a 
collectivity—though perfect consistency is not possible—this consistency must extend to 
the system of beliefs which give cognitive meaning to these value-orientations, again 
imperfectly to be sure. If ideological beliefs and value-patterns are, as assumed, 
interdependent, relative stability and consistency of the belief system has the same order 
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of functional significance as do stability and consistency of the value-orientation patterns. 
Hence there must be a set of beliefs, subscription to which is in some sense an obligation 
of collectivity membership roles, where the cognitive conviction of truth and the “moral” 
conviction of rightness are merged. Again this integration may well be and generally is, 
as we shall show, imperfect. An approximation to it is, however, of high significance to a 
social system. 
Ideology thus serves as one of the primary bases of the cognitive legitimation of 
patterns of value-orientation. Value-orientation patterns, it will be remembered, always 
constitute definitions of the situation in terms of directions of solution of action-
dilemmas. It is not possible in a given situation to give primacy both to technical 
competence independent of particularistic solidarities, and to the particularistic solidarity, 
and so on through the list of dilemmas. So far as this is possible in empirically cognitive 
terms, an ideology “rationalizes” these value-selections, it gives reasons why one 
direction of choice rather than its alternative should be selected, why it is right and proper 
that this should be so. 
The importance of this function of cognitive legitimation may be derived from two 
sources, the general importance of cognitive orientation in action, and the need to 
integrate this with the other components of the action system. Given the importance of 
the cognitive interest, cognitive deficiencies in the belief system constitute a source of 
strain. The relative significance of the value-of “truth” in a value system may vary over a 
wide range. But it cannot be said that a human action system can exist in which in a 
radical sense “it does not matter” whether the cognitive propositions which are current in 
the society are believed to have any cognitive validity in any sense. Such a situation 
would be radically incompatible with the empirical relevance of the frame of reference of 
action. 
As we have seen the sharing of common belief systems is a condition of the full 
integration of a system of social interaction. Cognitive differences are thus sources of 
strain, but so also are cognitive inadequacies. 
The “trend to rationality” has a status in the frame of reference of action which is 
cognate with that of the “optimization of gratification.” By definition it is nonsensical 
within the frame of reference to conceive an actor as preferring an increment of 
deprivation to a gratification unless there were a balancing gratification elsewhere in the 
system. Similarly, when confronted by a choice between a more and a less adequate 
belief according to cognitive standards, it is nonsensical, in terms of the frame of 
reference, to conceive the actor as preferring the less adequate, that is “error” to ‘truth.’ 
‘This is true unless the strain introduced by the feeling of cognitive inadequacy is 
balanced by an interest in another direction which would have to be sacrificed—e.g., in 
the sharing of beliefs. 
Rationalization is in this sense an inherent “directionality” of the action process, like 
entropy in classical mechanics. It is so in the nature of the conceptual scheme, not as an 
empirical generalization. This poses the problem, as in the case of gratification, of the 
balances of forces which may facilitate this process, impede it or even counteract it. But 
it always requires motivational “force” to impede or counteract the tendency to 
rationalization. The empirical problems are to locate the relevant forces in the action 
system and their relations to each other. It is thus quite possible for the cognitive interest 
to be drastically inhibited by its relations to other elements of action, as we have 
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repeatedly pointed out. Furthermore there may be very powerful and nence effective 
motivations to cognitive distortion. But nonetheless belief in cognitive validity is a 
functional necessity of action systems. Further, where that belief is possible only at the 
sacrifice of cognitive value standards, this fact constitutes an element of strain in the 
action system in question. 
The significance of the function of legitimation comes to a head in the relation of 
ideology and religious ideas to the social system. This is simply because when we speak 
of ideologies we are dealing with a case where the cognitive interest does not have the 
degree of segregation from other elements of the action system which is possible in the 
cases of investigation and instrumental application of knowledge in specialized roles and 
with respect to specific goals. Cognitive legitimation of value-orientations is a matter of 
the integration of cognitive values with the other elements of the social system. 
The cognitive content of ideologies may involve any one or all of the classes of 
situational objects discussed above, namely physical objects, personalities, collectivities 
and cultural objects. Beliefs about the world of nature are certainly an essential part of the 
cultural tradition of any social system, and necessarily acquire ideological as well as 
purely cognitive-investigative or instrumental significance. The elaboration and 
generalization of this belief system is particularly important. Only in a few societies, of 
course, are sophisticated scientific levels of such elaboration of high ideological 
significance. The importance which such belief systems have acquired on the ideological 
level is one of the salient facts of the modern world. Beliefs about the heliocentric view 
of the solar system, about Darwinism and the principle of natural selection, about 
genetics and the problems of human inequality will serve as examples. 
There is a special significance of the content of scientific knowledge in the ideology of 
scientists as members of professional collectivities. Tentativeness is, of course, an 
essential part of the value system which governs the role of the investigator. But equally 
the acceptance of evidence in accord with the canons of investigation, and of the 
implications of such evidence, is part of that same value system. Hence in a special sense, 
subject of course to the ultimately tentative character of all scientific findings, there is an 
obligation on the scientist to accept the validity of scientific findings and theories which 
have been adequately demonstrated. The extreme skeptic of the variety who when faced 
with the direct evidence stubbornly insists that “there ain’t no such animal” cannot be a 
good “citizen” of the collectivity of scientists. Thus not only is there in the value-system 
of science commitment to the canons of scientific procedure, but there is commitment to 
a system of beliefcontent which is part of the obligation of the role of scientist. The fact 
that the beliefs may be modified in the light of new scientific evidence does not alter this. 
In spite of the importance of beliefs about empirical “nature” in the general cultural 
tradition, and their special importance for the ideology of natural scientists, for 
understandable reasons the more prominent content of social ideologies is to be found in 
beliefs about personalities, collectivities and cultural objects. Indeed we may say that the 
social ideology focuses in beliefs about the collectivity itself, with the other content-
categories entering in largely in terms of beliefs about the significance of and the 
relations of personalities and cultural objects to the collectivity. Thus the problem of 
“collectivism” vs. “individualism” as an ideological problem concerns the mode of 
integration of the individual personality system with the collectivity. 
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In general it is clear that the cognitive standards of ideological legitimation of value-
orientations must be the same as the canons of scientific validity. By definition the most 
developed empirical knowledge in any field at a given time is the state of science in that 
field. Hence the ultimate authority for the validity of any ideological tenet as a cognitive 
proposition must be a scientific authority. But the very fact that ideology unlike science 
has as integrative functions in the social system involving relations to many other 
interests than the cognitive interests of scientists, means that these standards will very 
generally not prevail in the determination of what beliefs will actually be held. If they do 
not, there have to be adjustive mechanisms which are homologous with the mechanism of 
rationalization in the personality system. 
Because of the central place of the sciences of action in relation to the subject matter 
of social ideologies, the problem of the relations of the social sciences to ideology is as is, 
of course, well known particularly acute. Even more than in the case of natural science, 
because of this fact the high development of social science is subject to a special set of 
conditions of integration in the social system. 
It may be noted that an ideology is an empirical belief system held in common by the 
members of any collectivity. The focal type of case of course is the ideology which 
serves to legitimize the value-orientation patterns central to a stable society. These are, in 
the most fully institutionalized sense, the established beliefs of the social system. In any 
complex social system there will, of course, be differentiation on the ideological level 
between various sub-collectivities of the larger society. There is room for a considerable 
amount of this differentiation without any of the sub-ideologies being treated as explicitly 
deviant. 
In the last chapter, however, in dealing with deviant behavior we called attention to 
two types of cases of variability beyond the range of this order of sub-collectivity 
differentiation. The first is what was there called the deviant sub-culture. Here, as 
illustrated by the case of the delinquent gang, there is an explicit lack of appeal to 
legitimation in terms of the values and ideology of the wider society, there is an open 
“state of war.” But within the deviant collectivity there is very definitely a value-system 
and hence an ideology. This ideology will always include a diagnosis of the basis for the 
break with the main society and its value system. For example, there will be such beliefs 
as that “you can’t win” in the wider society, that “they’re out to get you” and the like. It 
will also involve an ideology of the relationship system within the deviant collectivity, as 
for instance to why leadership and discipline should be accepted, and as to why “ratting” 
cannot be tolerated. In such cases of an open break with the value-system and ideology of 
the wider society we may speak of a “counter-ideology.”15 
The second case is that of the deviant movement which seeks legitimation in terms of 
the institutionalized value-system, but by giving its own “interpretation” of the value-
system and its accompanying ideology. This is in general what “radical” movements do. 
Precisely because of the tension involved in the degree of break with the main society to 
which they have become committed, the ideological preoccupations of the members of 
such movements are likely to be very intense. They have both the interest in convincing  
 
15 In a sense similar to Lasswell’s use of the term “counter-mores.” 
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themselves and in winning proselytes. It is crucially important for them to believe and to 
convince others that the aspects of the established society—such as “capitalism”—against 
which they are in revolt, can be defined as illegitimate in terms of a common set of 
beliefs and values. 
In the light of the tensions involved in these situations and the motivational elements 
which are, as was shown in the last chapter, likely to be involved in either of these two 
types of deviance, it is not suiprising that the beliefs of such deviant collectivities often 
show signs of compulsiveness in the psychological sense. The believer must be protected 
against any challenge to his belief, not least from within himself. On high levels of 
generalization, as in the thought of radical “intellectuals,” this is very likely to take the 
form of the “closed system.” There are likely to be pseudological devices by which the 
general formulae of the belief system can be believed to yield a “satisfactory” answer to 
any question, so that the possibility of damaging evidence turning up need not be a source 
of anxiety. Of course, compulsive conformity with an institutionalized ideology may lead 
to the same order of cognitive distortion. The antithesis to the orientation of science is too 
patent to need elaboration. 
These two cases of the ideology of more or less explicitly deviant collectivities serve 
to call attention to some of the bases of cognitive distortion in conformist ideologies. In 
Motives, Values and Systems of Action (Chapter III) it was shown in some detail why it 
was not possible, in a complex social system, for a single pattern-consistent system of 
value-orientation to be completely and evenly institutionalized in all of the roles within 
the social system, Because of the intimate reladon between value-orientation patterns and 
ideologies, this element of imperfection of integration in the value-system will pose 
cognitive problems on an ideological level. For example in our society the universalistic 
achievement values embodied in the occupational system are undoubtedly very strongly 
emphasized. But at the same time kinship ties and the solidarities which are most closely 
connected with kinship are also highly valued. There is an element of rank-ordering of 
these values but it is not fully adequate to solve the conflicts. Thus we have more 
deviation from the ideal of equality of opportunity than we feel altogether comfortable 
about. 
It was stated that, in the nature of the case, integration of the social sysem is the 
primary function of its common ideology. Hence where there is an element of 
malintegration in the actual social structure the tendency will be for the ideology to 
“gloss it over” and “play it down.” Fully to “face-up” to the reality of the importance of 
conflicting elements in the value-system and in the realistic situation, e.g., with respect to 
the prevalence of some types of deviant behavior, would be a threat to the stability of the 
society. In these respects, relative to conflicting elements within the social system, 
ideologies have functions directly homologous with those of rationalization in the 
personality system. 
It may be noted that this statement applies just as much to the ideology of a deviant 
movement (or sub-culture) as it does to that of a stabilized social system. There may, in 
fact, be even stronger pressure to selectivity of emphasis in such an ideology than in an 
“official” one, because of the greater insecurity of the position of the adherents of the 
movement, both with respect to their own internal conflicts and with respect to 
legitimation vis-à-vis the larger society. 
The social system     240
A second source of the cognitive distortion of ideologies lies in the needs of “mass 
psychology.” The importance of this set of factors will vary greatly with the character 
and size of the collectivity in question. But in so far as the ideology must serve to unify 
large numbers and these are not competent in the intellectual fields covered by the 
ideology, there will ordinarily be a tendency to “vulgarization” in the well-known ways. 
Oversimplification is perhaps the keynote of this distortion. Very simple slogans and pat 
formulae will tend to have a prominent role, and will gloss over the intellectual 
complexities of the field.16 
Finally, the strongly evaluative reference of ideologies tends to link in with the 
“wishful” or romantic-utopian element of motivation which is present in every social 
system. There will generally, it may be inferred, be a tendency to ideological distortion of 
the reality in the direction of giving reign to the wishful element. In the case of the 
ideological legitimation of the status quo it will tend to overidealization of that state of 
affairs. In the case of a deviant movement it will tend to include a romantic-utopian 
component in the definition of the goals of the movement. Conversely there is a tendency 
to paint the contrast of the idealized state of affairs, and what it is compared with, in 
exaggeratedly black and white terms. To a “conservative” ideology there tends to be a 
sensitivity about any suggestion of imperfections in the status quo. To the “radical” the 
institutional status quo against which he is in revolt may appear to be very nearly 
radically evil, precisely because of the probability that he is compulsively motivated to 
rejection of it because of the part played by his genuine attachment to the status quo. 
It is likely, then, that ideologies will become the symbolic battleground of some of the 
principal elements of tension and conflict within a social system. In the nature of the 
case, there would seem to be an inherent tendency to polarization, to the development of 
vicious circles which is part of the general vicious circle tendency analyzed in the last 
chapter. By the same token this process of ideological polarization must be subject to 
mechanisms or social control. Traditionalization and authoritarian enforcement are 
obvious possibilities, it may be surmised. Another in the modern type of society operates 
through the linking of ideologies with the institutionalized pursuit of the intellectual 
disciplines dealing with their subject matter. 
In this perspective it becomes clear that the social sciences have a particularly crucial, 
and in certain respects precarious position relative to the ideological balance of the social 
system. On the one hand the more important soeial ideologies cannot avoid concern with 
the subject matter of the social sciences, nor can the latter simply avoid problems which 
touch on ideological interests. But on the other hand, the circumstances in which 
ideologies are developed and operate are such, that it seems practically impossible to 
avoid the presence of an important area of conflict between the two major types of 
cognitive interest. The cognitive distortions which are always present in ideologies, often 
compulsively motivated, will tend to be uncovered and challenged by the social scientist. 
Some of the results may be accepted, but only painfully and with allowance for a process 
of assimilation and adjustment over time. Because of this situation there will, more or 
less inevitably, be a tendency for the guardians of ideological purity in a social system to 
be highly suspicious of what social scientists are doing. 
16The phenomena of “sharpening” and “leveling” familiar in the work of social psychology are 
prominent here. 
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Indeed it is not surprising that the two non-rational mechanisms of stabilization of 
ideological orientations, which we have several times mentioned, traditionalization and 
authoritarian enforcement of an “official” creed, are so very commonly encountered in 
this field. The “liberal” pattern of freedom of thought, which both permits ideological 
controversy and free interplay between the scientific and the ideological levels, is the 
exception, and certainly depends for its stability on a rather delicately balanced 
combination of conditions in the social system. It may, however, also be a highly 
important condition for many elements of the potentiality of growth of societies, as it is 
obviously a prerequisite for the flourishing of social science.  
§ THE RELATION OF NON-EMPIRICAL BELIEFS TO THE SOCIAL 
SYSTEM 
NON-EMPIRICAL belief is, as has been noted, a residual category. But, in the light of 
the development of modern philosophy, it may be claimed that this is more than just an 
arbitrary assumption. At many points in the theory of action the methodological canons 
of modern science are found to constitute a fundamental substantive point of reference. 
This is true of the standards of instrumental efficiency of action, and of the judgment of 
cognitive distortion in relation to rationalizations and ideologies. 
Science may thus be treated as the major axis of our analysis of cognitive problems. In 
so far as this is the case it is legitimate to use it as a negative as well as a positive point of 
reference, to define deviations as well as correspondences. 
In these terms the first major distinction to be called attention to is that between 
deviation from the standards of empirical science within the scope of their applicability, 
and problems and beliefs which fall outside the scope of scientific applicability. The 
former comprise the categories of ignorance and error.17 The one important thing to 
establish about them here is that the beliefs which fill these gaps in positive empirical 
knowledge are not properly won-empirical beliefs but are scientifically inadequate 
empirical beliefs. They may be summed up in the category of “pseudo-science.” 
Non-empirical beliefs by contrast concern those cognitive problem areas which are 
inaccessible to scientific method or the equivalent cognitive value-standards in the 
culture in question. These may be classed in two categories. The first is the “problem of 
knowledge,” the second the problem of cosmology, or that of “being.” The essential fact 
about the problem of knowledge in the present context is that science yields substantive 
empirical knowledge which is evaluated by a given set of the canons of its validity. From 
a logical point of view, then, scientific knowledge becomes a closed system which it is 
not possible to break out of by scientific procedures. In scientific terms it is possible only 
to add to the fund of scientific knowledge itself, to refine and perfect within the closed 
circle. 
What is left unanswered is the radical question of “How is empirical knowledge itself 
possible?” What are the conditions in the nature of the universe on which it depends? 
17 This problem area has been exhaustively analyzed in the Structure of Social Action, and need not 
be further gone into here. 
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This is, of course, the question to which Kant addressed himself, and which has 
preoccupied the modern theory of knowledge. It is not our province to go into the 
technical philosophical problems of epistemology, but merely to note that this problem 
area constitutes one of the two major foci of the boundaries of scientific-empirical belief 
systems. In every system of non-empirical beliefs there will, if rationalization has 
proceeded far enough, be beliefs as to the grounding of empirical knowledge and its 
relations to non-empirical knowledge. An example is the theory of the relations between 
revelation and natural reason, which has played such an important part in much of 
Christian theology. 
The second problem area is that of cosmology or being. Science of course gives us 
substantive knowledge of empirical phenomena. But it is only here that the philosopnical 
problem begins. It is essentially the problem, given empirical belief-systems and their 
place in human action, what are the implications of these facts for the cognitive problems 
which are not solved by scientific procedures? Are the other aspects of experience 
besides empirical cognition relevant to a “theory” of the nature of the cosmos? Is 
“nature,” perhaps defined as that which is knowable by empirical science, the wnole of 
“reality”? What is the relation of “life” to inanimate nature, of human personality to the 
organic world, etc.? 
This is in a sense an area of “problems of meaning.” But this sense of the term should 
be distinguished from the sense in which that term was used in the preceding section. 
There the key fact was the bearing of a belief on the interests of actors, specifically the 
cathectic and evaluative interests. Here the context is so far purely cognitive. But it does 
involve the extension of the area of cognitive interests beyond the circle of empirical 
knowledge and problems, to include the substantive problems of “what of it” in a 
cognitive sense. 
It could be argued from a certain point of view that the above very brief statement of 
the main non-empirical problem areas is “culture bound” because empirical science does 
not have the same relative position in other cultures as it does in that of the modern 
Western World. This is, of course, empirically true, and yet it does not seem to be a 
serious source of difficulty. The question at issue is not the relative empirical importance 
of the different components of the cultural tradition, but the definition of their logical and 
theoretical relations to each other. There is every reason to believe that the same 
fundamental components can be found in all cultures. If science (i.e., empirical 
knowledge) is such a universal component, no matter how primitive its development in 
some cultures, there should be no theoretical objection to using it as a point of reference 
for the definition of its relations to other components within the frame of reference of 
action. Only the strictly positivistic position, which claims that there is no other cognitive 
orientation but that of science, hence that all of what are here called non-empirical beliefs 
should be classed as error, seems to be really culture-bound in this sense. 
In principle the same order of problems arise in defining the relations of philosophy, 
as non-empirical cognitive orientation, to social systems as must be faced in the case of 
science. We may speak of them under the three corresponding headings, of the problem 
of the institutionalization of philosophical investigation itself, of the institutionalization 
of “applied philosophy” and, finally, of the evaluative synthesis between non-empirical 
beliefs and the non-cognitive interests of action. This latter category, which we shall call 
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that of religious ideas, corresponds to that of ideology on the empirical side. It will 
receive the bulk of our attention in the following discussion. 
Philosophical investigation, as distinguished from the general imbeddedness of 
philosophical problems and considerations in any system of action, can, it would seem, 
proceed only under conditions if anything even more specialized than those underlying 
the development of scientific investigation. For the most part there would, in this field, 
seem to be no “practical utility” of specialization which corresponds closely with that to 
be derived in the instrumental division of labor from specialization which reaches the 
point of differentiating out the investigative function to the point of its becoming the 
content of a special role-type. In general it seems safe to say that differentiation of 
specialized cognitive roles in the sphere of religious interest is probably a prerequisite of 
extensive development in the philosopnical direction. This is essentially because the 
cognitive problems inherent in the problems of the “meaning” of a religious tradition 
usually constitute the principal points of departure for a movement of philosophical 
speculation. 
The case of classical Greece might at first sight appear to be an exception to this 
statement. It is true that the development of Greek philosophy itself took a secularizing 
direction, and that the Greek Polis was notable for the lack of special influence of a 
priestly class, especially as compared with the other societies in the Near East in the 
period. Nevertheless the special religious aspect of the Polis is a feature of it well known 
to historians. There is a sense in which every citizen was a priest. And certainly the 
ideational content of the religious tradition, as set down in the Homeric poems and in 
Hesiod, and elaborated in the later literature, especiallv the drama, was most intimately 
involved in the development of philosophy. It is probably fairest to say that the Greek 
case was characterized by a special kind of religious development, not that it occurred 
independently of religion. On the other hand the place of the religious background in the 
two other most prominent movements of philosophical speculation we know, that of 
Hinduism and Buddhism in India, and that of the Western World, is too obvious to need 
further comment. 
The Western case, however, in its modern phase, presents a further complication. 
Building on the Greek heritage, sophisticated empirical knowledge and its 
systematization by the 16th century reached a point where the problem of knowledge 
relative to the canons of science began to assume a central place. It may be presumed that 
the prominence of this point of reference was dependent both on a prior development of 
empirical knowledge, and on a religious tradition in which the problem of the status of 
empirical “nature” had a prominent place. At any rate the “philosophy of science” is 
obviously of central importance in modern Western philosophy. 
Perhaps even more, then, than in the case of science, the development of philosophy 
depends on its articulation with a favorable cultural tradition. But at least as much as in 
the scientific case it must be a special kind of a cultural tradition. It must be one in which 
the values involved in cognitive endeavors as such have a high place, and which at the 
same time can tolerate considerable departures from strict traditionalism. As we shall see, 
because of the prominent part played by expressive interests and by certain types of 
symbolism in religion generally, there tends to be a very strong strain to traditionalism in 
the religious field, and anything approaching ascendancy of a class of religious specialists 
in the social system often has the effect of traditionalization of virtually the whole of the 
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culture. Thus there is a sense in which the professional philosopher is apt to be even more 
disturbing and threatening to the other elements of the society on which his thought 
impinges, than is the case with the scientist.18 
Generally speaking the resistances to the development of philosophy as a specialty are 
so formidable that it would appear that only a cultural tradition, in which the pressure to 
the solution of non-empirical cognitive problems is very strong, could counteract them. 
This pressure can also, of course, be aided by a balance of power within the society such 
that the classes with the strongest interest in checking philosophical developments are in 
turn checked by a delicately balanced relation to others. 
Thus in India the great philosophical development, culminating in the Buddhist 
movement, seems to have been associated with a balance between the two associated but 
distinct classes of the Brahmans and the Ksatriyas. After the latter vvere substantially 
eliminated by foreign invasion the philosophical development soon practically stopped, 
and the religious trodition became the highly stereotypcd one we know as Hinduism. In 
the case of Christianity it is very doubtful whether a rational theology, which could form 
the seeding bed of a great philosophical tradition, could have gotten really started if the 
philosophical tradition of the Greeks had not been still alive in the territory into which the 
movement spread, and certain elite classes thus been committed to a favorable attitude 
toward philosophy. 
These problems are of great significance for the whole question of the “role of ideas” 
in social change. If the culture and social structure of the Western World had not 
developed in such a way that scientific investigation had become institutionalized in a 
distinctive pattern of specialized roles, science, which after all is a body of “ideas” and 
nothing else, could riot have acquired the enormous influence which it is now having on 
social developments, both through technological applications and through its relation to 
ideologies. Similarly, if a body of religious ideas is to have a great influence on social 
change, its “chances” are at least greatly enhanced, if as a cognitive structure it has 
acquired the levels of clarity, logical articulation and profundity of reasoning and insight, 
which it seems probable that only a sophisticated tradition of professional philosophical 
thinking can give. It is no more likely that the great influence of Christianity, of 
Hinduism or of Buddhism would have come about only through the activities of the 
“practical men” of religion, the administrators of cults, of church organizations, the 
curers of souls, or even the prophets, than is the case with the practical men of everyday 
affairs, who we all agree would not by themselves have created modern science. The fact 
that the solutions of the cognitive problems are “there” to be found, and that it would 
from some point of view “be a good thing” if they were found, does not account for the 
fact that a great tradition of ideas in fact develops. 
The problem of “applied philosophy” as homologous with applied science presents 
considerable difficulties, and only a few tentative suggestions can be offered here. 
Perhaps the simplest type of case is that where the philosophy is on the border lines of 
science rather than of religion. Indeed the logician and the mathematician are so much on 
this border line that it is often unimportant to attempt to distinguish them from scientists. 
The application of their work is in the first instance to science itself, then in turn to  
18 Even in Greece, Socrates was condemned to death. 
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A different case is that of the relation of philosophy to ideolo-gies. Precisely because 
the ideological uses of scientific ideas are apt to be general rather than specific, and 
because of the evaluative element in ideologies, it is natural that in a society where there 
is a developed philosophical tradition, there should have to be some kind of articulation 
between the philosophical tradition and the current ideologies. In the Western World 
philosophy has, of course, played a very important part in the genesis of ideologies. All 
extensive and highly articulated ideologies root in the doctrines of some branch of the 
philosophical tradition and tend to borrow prestige from it. 
This relation is particularly important because of the central position of the subject 
matter of the social sciences in the content of modern ideologies. The social sciences 
have not so far been as well articulated as the natural sciences, nor as firmly grounded in 
empirically established knowledge. This situation, combined with the inherent 
involvement in evaluative problems, has helped account for the prominent place of 
philosophical ideas in ideological movements. Indeed, it is only recently, if now, that it 
has come to be no longer possible to say in social science circles that “it all depends on 
your conception of human nature.”19 The meaning of such a statement traditionally has 
been that a philosophical interpretation of the nature of man, independent of scientific 
evidence, a”philosophical anthropology,” is the ultimate determinant of ideological 
beliefs in the social field. 
The sense in which there is often dubiously legitimate “intrusion” of philosophical 
considerations into the proper field of science, particularly social science, in relation to 
ideologies, should not be allowed to obscure the positive functions of philosophy in this 
connection. It can rather generally be said that given the state of social science 
knowledge, in many fields up to the present, and certainly for the past, philosophical 
articulation of many problem areas has been the only alternative to either 
traditionalization or authoritarian enforcement as a stabilizing mechanism. A relatively 
high intellectual level of the philosophical tradition may thus in this connection have 
played a very important part as a protection of the “liberal” tradition in Western culture. 
The essential point is that the inherent nature of the problems leads into high levels of 
complexity.  
It is quite beyond the powers of the “man in the street” to deal with such complex 
cognitive problems in any orderly way which has a semblance of rationality. The social 
sciences have not yet contributed nearly as much as they are intrinsically capable of. 
Philosophy has filled the gap which would otherwise have had to be filled by one or the 
other of the predominantly non-cognitive mechanisms.20 
19 This was a favorite statement of the late Professor H.J.Laski. 
20 Competent observers seem to be of the opinion that in the recent Communist movement there has been a 
marked decline in the intellectual level of Marxist thought as compared with the days of the revolutionary 
ferment, before and shortly after the Russian Revolution. It may be suggested that this is probably partly at least 
a result of tbe extent to which the Communist parties have resorted to authoritarian enforcement of doctrinal 
orthodoxy, relatively regardless of cognitive considerations. This is a loss to the “liberal” tradition of Western 
thought even though the Marxists who have been “squelched” would have written far more which was properly 
considered philosophical rather than scientific. The point is the cutting off or the opportunity and the social 
conditions for cognitively interested activity in any form. To the present-day Communist the lelevant question 
about a proposition’s “rightness” is not, can it be defended on intellectual grounds, but is it in accord with the 
official party line? The belief in Stalin’s infallible intellectual superiority may be regared as a compensatory 
mechanism. 
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      These considerations are extremely important to an understanding of the place of the 
“intellectuals” within the social system. Their presence is, of course, possible and 
important only when there is a highly elaborated cultural system in the belief area. 
Science, applied science, ideology, philosophy and religious beliefs are all necessarily 
articulated with one another, and in certain respects shade off into each other. The 
institutionalization of any one of these types of cognitive interest, in relatively specialized 
roles, is possible only with the presence of a “penumbra” of beliefs and persons holding 
them and/or interested in them, who do not quite belong to the core of the role type. 
There are the “core” professional scientists, the amateur scientists, and the public 
“interested in scientific ideas.” There is established scientific knowledge, tentative ideas 
at the forefront of scientific growth and the fringe of pseudoscientific beliefs, some of 
them held by scientists themselves. Similarly there are “ideologists” closely identified 
with the revelant scientific fields, and others who are only “spokesmen” for partisan 
interest groups. There are highly technical professional philosophers and an immense 
welter of people who talk the language of philosophy with greatly varying degrees of 
competence and cognitive  
disinterestedness. Over against the mass of the population who have only secondary 
symbolic and instrumental interests in cognitive problems this whole group should, in 
certain respects, be classed together. Many of the features of their belief systems are not 
in strict accord with the cognitive standards of the core professional groups. Nevertheless 
it is probable that the currency of such pseudoscientific and pseudo-philosophical beliefs, 
and of a class of people who more or less specialize in purveying them, generally has 
positive functional significance for the type of social system in which science and 
philosophy are institutionalized. They help to absorb and channel the strains which are 
inevitably involved in the existence of specialized and esoteric cognitive activities in a 
society. It is also, of course, evident that they can constitute the principal sources of 
ideological legitimation of deviant movements. 
Religious Belief Systems 
RELIGIOUS beliefs may here be characterized as the non-empirical homologue of 
ideological beliefs. By contrast with science or philosophy the cognitive interest is no 
longer primary, but gives way to the evaluative interest. Acceptance of a religious belief 
is then a commitment to its implementation in action in a sense in which acceptance of a 
philosophical belief is not. Or, to put it more accurately, a philosophical belief becomes 
religious in so far as it is made the basis of a commitment in action. This seems to be the 
primary meaning of Durkheim’s dictum about religion “c’est de la vie sérieuse.” 
Religious ideas may be speculative in the philosophical sense, but the attitude toward 
them is not speculative in the sense that “well, I wonder if it would make sense to look at 
it this way?” 
Religious ideas, then, may be conceived as answers to the “problems of meaning” in 
both of the senses discussed above. On the one hand they concern the cognitive definition 
of the situation for action as a whole, including the cathectic and evaluative levels of 
interest in the situation. This they share with ideological beliefs. On the other hand, 
however, they also must include the problems of “meaning” in the larger philosophical 
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sense, of the meaning of the objects of empirical cognition, of nature, human nature, 
society, the vicissitudes of human life, etc. From the point of view of integration of the 
social system, therefore, religious beliefs constitute the paramount focus of the 
integration of the cognitive orientation system in its implications for action. 
Evaluative orientation has been treated throughout this volume as the synthesis of the 
cognitive and the cathectic interests of actors. In relation to a total system of action, a 
personality or a social system, we have spoken of this as the moral aspect of orientation 
interest. Religious beliefs then are those which are concerned with moral problems of 
human action, and the features of the human situation, and the place of man and society 
in the cosmos, which are most relevant to his moral attitudes, and value-orientation 
patterns. 
It is this connection with the moral aspect of integration of the system of action, in its 
social system rather than its personality application, which constitutes the basic insight of 
Durkheim’s analysis of the sociology of religion in the Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life. The same thing was clearly seen, though not made quite so explicit, by 
Max Weber. Religious beliefs, then, are systems of cognitive orientation relative to 
problems of meaning in the double sense noted above, and acceptance of which is treated 
as a moral obligation by the actor. This may be a purely personal obligation, but the case 
of interest at present is that where it is a part of social morality, that is, the belief system 
is institutionalized as part of the role-system of the collectivity, whether it be a sub-
collectivity or a total society. 
It is apparendy the combination of the moral-evaluative aspect of religious 
orientations, with certain features of the philosophical nature of non-empirical belief 
systems, which underlies the place in religions of the conception of the “supernatural.” 
Put very briefly, the moral aspect yields what Durkheim called the sacred character of 
entities with a specifically religious significance. These are, as he said, entities toward 
which men show the same fundamental attitude of respect which they show toward moral 
obligations. In so far as these entities have cognitive significance then, they must be 
connected with the cognitive legitimation of moral norms and sentiments. They must be 
concerned with the explanation of the meaning of these norms and obligations. By virtue 
of their sacredness these entities are assimilated to moral norms, and sharply dis-
tinguished from instrumental facilities toward which a very different attitude is held. 
As Durkheim pointed out, many empirical entities like material goods, buildings, 
places, clothing, and certain individuals at least under certain conditions are objects of 
this attitude of respect for the sacred. But in so far as this attitude is cognitively 
rationalized, it does not tend to be in terms of their empirical properties in the context of 
the “order of nature” in the sense of the range of ideas from empirical lore to science. It is 
rather in terms of a “world” of entities distinct from the empirical, or at least of 
“principles” which are not directly involved in the conception of an empirical world. 
These entities serve somehow to explain the “meaning” of the sacredness of sacred 
things, and their relation to ordinary human interests. Since philosophy very generally 
conceives of non-empirical entities and forces which are different from the empirical 
order of nature, the “reality” underlying and explaining the sacredness of sacred things is 
located in this “area.” These two circumstances taken together seem to constitute the 
principal basis for the genesis of the conception of a “supernatural” order, which is in 
some sense distinguished from or set over against the “order of nature.” The supernatural 
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order thus gives cognitive meaning to the moralevaluative sentiments and norms of an 
action system, not in the sense that either the sentiments or the cognitive beliefs have 
causal priority but that they tend to be integrated with one another, and that this 
integration is importantly related to the stabilization of the system. 
This is only the simplest and most elementary account of the factors in this aspect of 
the situation of the social system. It does not in the least imply that only when there is a 
sophisticated conception of the “order of nature,” in the sense in which that has 
developed within Western science and philosophy, does this analysis apply. It means only 
that the distinction between the order of nature and the supernatural in Western thought is 
a kind of methodological prototype of the relationship, an analytical model. On both sides 
there may be a low level of cognitive organization, as would be true of many if not most 
non-literate societies. Also, of course, the conceptions on the two sides and that of their 
relation to each other may be very different from that in Western thought. In most 
Oriental philosophies, for example, the “supernatural” is held to be immanent rather than 
transcendental in our sense. Philosophically the duality then applies to realms or phases 
of “manifestation” rather than to the philosophical conception of more ultimate “reality.” 
But the duality on this manifestation level still needs to be rationalized in cognitive terms. 
There may even, as in Marxist thought, be an attempt to fuse the two, projecting the 
“supernatural” into a conception of the “dialectic” process of history. The fundamental 
criteria embodied in the conception of a system of entities, which are not strictly 
“scientifically” knowable and which serve as the cognitive rationalization of moral 
sentiments of a collectivity, still apply. In this sense there is a component of religious 
belief, as well as of ideology, in Marxism, as to be sure there is also in liberal 
individualism. In so far as ideology ranges into philosophical problem areas, where 
beliefs cannot be directly derived from the empirical beliefs of the culture, it merges into 
religious belief. The conception of religious belief put forward here is thus by no means 
identical with what is traditionally called religion in our own culture. 
A further set of circumstances important to the understanding of the place of religious 
beliefs concerns what Max Weber called the moral “irrationality” of the situation of 
human life. The conceptual scheme developed in this volume, with the broad empirical 
verification it receives in many directions, tends to confirm his view that in terms of any 
pattern-consistent value-orientation system there are bound to be situations and 
circumstances which make complete realization of the expectations developed, when that 
value system is internalized and institutionalized, impossible, This problem has been 
extensively analyzed in Chapter III of Values, Motives and Systems of Action, and at 
various points in the present volume and the main reasons for the above statement need 
not be repeated here. The consequence is that in any case there are considerable elements 
of frustration and conflict left over relative to any given institutionalized value system. 
Perhaps to our optimistic mentality the most difficult thing to realize is that this is 
especially true if the value system is consistent and highly institutionalized—though it is, 
of course, also true of “disorganized” societies. But clearly the “optimum” situation for 
human adjustment, if indeed such an optimum can be defined at all, does not lie at the 
pole of maximum institutionalization of a rigorously consistent value-system. 
There is always a complex variety of mechanisms in the social system which mitigate 
the severity of these frustrations and conflicts. Some of them have been briefly touched 
upon in analyzing the mechanisms of social control. Thus premature death, if not the 
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mortality of men in general, is surely a frustrating phenomenon, not only prospectively 
for the victim but for the survivors who have been attached to him. It is a situation calling 
for an emotional readjustment, and a cognitive rationalization. Similarly discrepancies 
between effort and reward, the fact that conformists with normative expectations do not 
always fare better than those who do not conform, and many other types of cases. Above 
all the “problem of evil” and the problem of “meaningless” suffering are focal points in 
this situation of strain. 
If this general analysis be accepted, then it seems to follow that man’s knowledge of 
the empirical world, and the expectations oriented to and by his knowledge, cannot alone 
constitute adequate mechanisms of adjustment. Any other adjustment patterns, however, 
must involve a cognitive component, as well as an evaluative, in that it is precisely the 
failures of the actual situation to conform with evaluative sentiments which constitute the 
focus of the adjustment problem. 
The pressure in such a case is to a cognitive-evaluative orientation scheme, which can 
comprise both the successfully institutionalized and expectation-fulfilling aspects of the 
value-system, and the “irrational” discrepancies. It seems almost inevitable that such an 
inclusive orientation scheme must include reference to supernatural entities in the above 
sense. Just what the place of this reference may be, how related to the conception of the 
order of nature, and just what the structure of attitudes toward institutionalized social 
obligations will be, is subject to wide variations, only a few of which can be briefly 
mentioned here. 
For sociological purposes it is, as so often, convenient to take the orientation to the 
given institutionalized order of things as the major point of reference, realizing of coursc 
that this orientation may in turn be in part a result of prior religious orientations. The 
complications arising from this fact will be dealt with briefly below. 
In these terms the system of institutionalized values may be basically accepted or 
rejected. In the former case the problem is that of how the discrepancies between 
expectations in terms of the institutionalized value-system and the actual course of events 
are handled in the belief system. There seem to be two primary possibilities. In the first 
case the conception of a supernatural order is utilized in order to delineate a 
“compensatory” re-equilibration, an Ausgleich in a transcendental sphere, in the 
commonest case, in a life after death. Then it is possible to conceive that unmerited good 
fortune and undeserved suffiering will be compensated somewhere. The popular 
conceptions of Heaven and Hell obviously fit into this pattern. By this means the moral 
economy of human society is rounded out, and the sources of strain involved in 
“meaningless” discrepancies between what the institutionalized system through its 
ideology says ought to happen to people, and what in fact does, are ironed out. 
In such a case, of course, the question remains open of how solid the basis of 
credibility in this compensatory balancing out may be. This type of pattern also probably 
tends to be associated with a relative traditionalized stabilization of the social system, the 
institutionalized expectations of which are fundamentally accepted. This pattern seems to 
be the fundamental one of institutionalized Catholic Christianity, in so far, that is, as the 
given institutional order really is accepted. In the earlier phases of Catholicism, and in 
sectarian movements within the church from time to time, the balance has tended to shift 
to radical rejection of the institutionalized order, making the earning of salvation the 
overwhelmingly dominant orientation, and treating conformity with institutionalized 
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expectations as altogether secondary if not reprehensible. A similar pattern with certain 
differences has also existed within Lutheran Christianity. 
The second possibility is that where the institutionalized system itself is conceived as 
containing the potentiality of improvement in such a way as progressively to reduce the 
area of such discrepancies. This is in general the solution of the modern Western 
“progressive” orientation. It tends to project the compensation of the discrepancies, not 
into a transcendental sphere, but into a future state of the social system itself. Since, 
however, this future state almost inevitably must wait for full realization until after the 
lifetime of the current generation, the question of the personal compensation of living 
individuals remains imperfectly solved. It somehow has to take the direction of the 
internalization of norms in such a way that gratification is derived from the feeling of 
contributing to the realization of a “worth-while” goal, even though the individual actor 
himself will not experience its realizadon. Hence, though usually submerged, there tends 
in fact to be a non-empirical element in the cognitive rationalization of such an 
orientation, a belief in the “supernatural” possibilities of social development itself. 
It is important to note that the above two orientations are in a kind of direct 
competition with each other, in that projection of compensation for discrepancies into a 
transcendental sphere or state can readily be interpreted to mean that any attempt 
realistically to reduce the discrepancies themselves is either superfluous or somehow 
contrary to a sacred order of things. Thus, for example, in many of the more conservative 
Catholic societies high mortality in the earlier years of life tends to be accepted as “God’s 
will,” which it either is not possible to attempt to do anything about or, even, it is held, 
might be contrary to religion to do so. The “progressive” attitude that premature death is 
a problem to be solved by medical or other measures is clearly in conflict with this 
resigned acceptance. At the same time the discrepancy problem is sufficiently serious so 
that it cannot be assumed that the “progressive” orientation is always adequate to achieve 
a general minimization of tension. It is, however, intimately associated with the levels of 
rationality found in the cultural belief system generally, notably in the place given to 
science and to its technological applications. 
There is, empirically, a gradual shading off from either of the above two types of 
acceptance of the institutionalized value system, into its rejection. This is in the nature of 
the case since the problem of discrepancy is the starting point of the present discussion, 
and while value patterns may be accepted, not everything which empirically happens 
within the system where they are institutionalized can be. Rejection, when it begins to 
predominate, may, like acceptance, be oriented in either one of the two major directions 
which have been discussed. In the one case rejection of the institution-alized value 
system may be rationalized in terms of transcendental considerations, in the sense that 
man’s relation to the “supernatural” world takes evaluative priority over his relation to 
the empirical including the social situation, and the two are held to be in fundamental, 
irrecancilable conflict. In the most usual senses this is the case where “salvation” from 
the “world” is conceived to be the essential goal of human life, and the “world” is held to 
be, not merely of secondary value, but positively “evil.” This is the definition of the 
situation for the radical religions of salvation. In its most radical form this position 
would, of course, if taken literally, eliminate all motivation for the fulfillment of role-
expectations in the secular social community. It has most frequently appeared as the ideal 
orientation for a select religious elite rather than for the “laity.” 
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The other basic type of orientation is to project the alternative to the rejected 
institutionalized order into the empirical social world itself. In the nature of the case this 
must be a future social order, since by definition the orientation is in conflict with the 
existing society. It may or may not coincide with an actual or alleged previous state. This 
is the “revolutionary” solution. 
In this case, as in that of “progressivism,” the question arises of how far this “utopian” 
future state is cognitively rationalized in terms of empirical considerations. Precisely 
because, in the Western World, revolutionary utopianism has arisen in a cultural milieu in 
conscious opposition to the transcendentalism of traditional Christianity, it has tended to 
be in the “positivistic” tradition itself, and claim to state a position demonstrable by the 
methods of empirical science. It seems, however, legitimate to suggest that in ract a 
supernatural order in the above sense plays a central role in this type of orientation, that 
the “dialectic” and other such entities are more like “providence” than the proponents of 
“scientific socialism” are wont to admit. Certainly by the criterion we have set forth 
above, the attitude of respect, they qualify as sacred entities. 
The supernatural element may, of course, be explicit. This was the case with 
Calvinism, in the aspects to which Max Weber called attention. The essential cognitive 
pattern is the belief in a Divine mission of man, to work for the establishment of the 
Kingdom of God on Earth. Though the conception of salvation is very much part of 
Calvinist theology, it is pushed out of the position of con-stituting a direct goal of action. 
As decided by God through Predestination it becomes the badge of membership in the 
appointed company of saints who share the responsibility for implementing the Divine 
will. The field of action, then, is exclusively oriented in “this world” with the sole 
exception of the very scant Calvinistic forms of religious observance of which teaching 
the true doctrine is the central focus, though prayer plays a certain part. 
The existence of conceptions of a supernatural order raises the question of what types 
of action exist in relation to it. The general integration of cognitive orientation and the 
goal-directedness of action is such that beliefs in a supernatural order could not very well 
have the importance which is here being attributed to them, unless they figured in goal-
directed action. 
What type of action will “make sense” depends of course on what the nature of the 
supernatural order itself is believed to be. There seem to be three principal types of such 
“techniques” of directly putting the actor into relation to supernatural entities. The first is 
ritual, which depends on the conception of the relevant aspects of the supernatural as 
constituting an order the “laws” of which can be understood and adapted to, in a way 
which is essentially analogous to instrumental manipulation of the empirical world. Then, 
the problem is to “do the right thing” in order to bring about the desired goal-state. If the 
right thing is done this will come about automatically through the operation of the 
mechanisms and processes of the supernatural order. Ritual may be classed as religious in 
so far as the goal sought is non-empirical, magical, so far as it is empirical. 
The second type of action may be called supplication. It depends on the conception of 
the relevant supernatural entity as itself an actor who must make a decision about what to 
do in relation to ego. Ego’s “technique” then is to try to influence the decision in a 
direction favorable to the realization of his goal. Prayer in the Christian sense obviously 
falls in this category, but so does most “sacrifice.” For this to make sense the supernatural 
must be conceived as a “personal,” decision-making entity. 
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Finally the third type, “contemplation” operates on the actor’s own state of mind in 
such a way as to make him “receptive” to the supernatural influence. It may have more of 
a cognitive emphasis in the direction of coming to “understand,” or more of an expressive 
emphasis on a state of feeling. This type tends to be associated with the conception of the 
supernatural as impersonal and diffuse, not as operating according either to the pattern of 
decision-making of actors or to “laws” on the analogy of empirical nature, but as 
something qualitatively different from either action or nature. It is the conception most 
conspicuously found in the “mystical” religions such as early Buddhism and Taoism. 
Closely related to all three of these techniques, but particularly important in relation to 
contemplation, is the whole field of techniques of control, which in the most general way 
may be said to be oriented to the prevention of “interference” from the personality, from 
the body and from others, with the proper relation to the supernatural. These techniques 
may take the form of deliberate frustration of major gratification needs. Only when they 
go beyond the point of imposing disciplines, to that of inflicting ‘mortification,” should 
they properly be called “asceticism.” Admittedly the line is exceeding difficult to draw, 
empirically at least. 
All belief systems naturally consist of symbols. However, the question arises of 
whether there may not be certain special features of the place of symbolism in systems of 
religious belief, which require at least calling attention to. 
For this purpose we may return to the methodological canons of science as our major 
point of reference for the analysis of belief systems in general. The stricter doctrines of 
scientific methodology would seem to hold that only the observational results of very 
strictly defined operational procedures could legitimately claim to constitute “reality” 
references as such. Everything else is “construction” on the part of the scientist, most of 
which of course comes from the cultural tradition in which he works. This everything 
else, of course, includes the logical framework of “conceptual schemes” within which 
observations are made and interpreted. But very generally in the history of science it 
contains much more; it contains whole systems of “models” of “what the empirical 
entities are like.” Thus protons and electrons have been conceived as miniature spherical 
particles, the atom as a miniature solar system. The introduction of such “realistic” 
models is psychologically the essential aspect of the “reification” of scientific theories, 
and the models con-stitute in practice an essential element of the belief systems which in 
a cultural sense we call science. These reified “models” of aspects of the empirical world 
may be said to constitute “intermediate symbolism.” They are not the methodologically 
purified minimum verified content of scientific knowledge, but something in addition 
which aids in “grasping” that minimum content, which makes the ideas of science 
“credible.” Once established in a scientific tradition such intermediate symbolism may on 
occasion constitute a serious barrier to further scientific progress. 
That these models have been in some sense “believed in” by scientists of the highest 
levels of professional respectability is beyond question. In all probability the strict 
observance of the canons of the methodological purists is, as a standard for the actual 
belief systems of working scientists, psychologically impossible. But in any case if such 
models play an important part in science itself, it is quite clear that this part is greatly 
enhanced in the popular belief systems about the empirical world. Even within the sphere 
of those popular beliefs most nearly sanctioned by science certainly there is an enormous 
amount of such intermediate symbolism. Thus presumably the man in the street does not 
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really “believe” that most “solid” objects contain far more “empty space” than they do 
“matter.” 
The symbolism which is so prolifically developed in religious belief systems should in 
its cognitive references be considered as intermediate symbolism in this sense. 
“Anthropomorphism” and “animism” are obvious examples. The psychological functions 
of believing that God is “an old man with a long white beard” or that the “devil” has 
horns and a tail are altogether similar to those of believing that an electron is a spherical 
solid particle of “matter,” that is, a little round ball. It makes it possible to have a concrete 
image to fill an essential place in the cognitive orientation system. 
However, intermediate symbolism seems to be more extensively proliferated in the 
religious field than in the empirical, for two sets of reasons. In the first place, the 
imposition of strictly cognitive standards of the acceptability of concrete images is more 
difficult in the non-empirical field than in the empirical. Logical reasoning is available as 
a cognitive controlling device, but direct observation in the scientific sense by definition 
is not. In the second place, religious beliefs are evaluative in orientation as well as 
cognitive. They are a way of ordering the whole action system in certain respects, and 
hence the kind of cognitive primacy which might maximize control in terms of cognitive 
standards is seldom present. 
Nevertheless, in the religious traditions where there has developed a philosophical 
tradition of a sophistication at all comparable with that of modern science, much at least 
of this intermediate symbolism has dropped away. Thus Plato no longer believed in the 
existence of the Homeric Gods in a literal sense, and certainly not in all the tales that 
were told about them in the mythological tradition. Similarly in sophisticated Christian 
theology anthropomorphism has been pretty well eliminated, though not, of course, in 
popular belief. In general it may be said that in religious systems which have reached 
sophisticated philosophical levels, there is an inevitable tension between the 
philosophical objections to elaborate intermediate symbolism and the popular need for it. 
More will have to be said about this subject in connection with expressive symbolism 
below. 
Before discussing such symbolism, however, a final word must be said about the other 
side of the “causal chain” as between religious beliefs and the institutionalized social 
order. The starting points which we took in analyzing the problems of religious belief 
systems were, following Max Weber, the inevitable discrepancies between the 
expectations institutionalized in a social value system, and certain features of the actual 
course of events. The relation between them is such that the religious belief system not 
only “rationalizes” an existing and independently given set of institutionalized value-
orientations, it must to a greater or less degree be itself constitutive of it. This much 
follows directly from the tendency to pattern-consistency in the cultural tradition as a 
whole. 
There is, however, as we have seen, always more or less tension involved in such 
actual relationships within the social system. This tension may, under certain 
circumstances, work out so that a system of religious beliefs, for example one oriented to 
radical salvation, becomes the cultural focus of an important movement of social change. 
In so far as such a movement becomes a collectivity and wins converts there immediately 
arises the question of the consequences of the institutionalization of these beliefs and the 
value-orientations implied in them for the collectivity and for the social system beyond it, 
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In so far as the belief system becomes institutionalized, belief in the transcendental locus 
of values and goals becomes itself part of the social situation, and, therefore, 
paradoxically it would seem, part of the empirical world. Members of the society face the 
very practical fact that conformity with the expectations defined by the transcendentally 
oriented religious beliefs is institutionally expected and all the principal elements of the 
sanction system come to be mobilized about the upholding of this conformity. “Worldly 
interests,” are thereby inevitably enlisted in the motivation of religious conformity, but by 
the same token, the pursuit of religious values inevitably becomes implicated in worldly 
affairs, for example, if religion is taken seriously enough, the “church,” or its functional 
equivalent, inevitebly acquires prestige and power in a “worldly” as well as a “spirituar 
sense. The outcome is likely to be a highly unstable equilibrium in which it is unlikely 
that the religious orientation itself will remain entirely unchanged for long. This “paradox 
of institutionalization” applies equally to radically utopian belief systems and the 
corresponding value-orientations. The problems of this area will be somewhat further 
discussed below in connection with social change, but in the main they must be relegated 
to the more specialized study of the sociology of religion.  
§ THE INDEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE OF BELIEF 
SYSTEMS AND VALUE-ORIENTATIONS 
BELIEF systems and systems of value-orientation are both parts of the cultural tradition 
and, as such, there is pressure for them to form a consistent system of patterns. They are, 
however, anchored as it were in different foci of the action system. Belief systems 
involve an independent orientation to a “reality” which has properties independent of the 
actor who attempts to understand it cognitively. He cannot by willing or wishing make it 
what he would like it to be but must, in the structure of his beliefs, in some sense “adapt” 
himself to it. Patterns of value-orientation, on the other hand, formulate the directions of 
choice in the dilemmas of action. They are “guided” by beliefs, but only partially 
determined by them since they are ways of organizing the totality of interests involved in 
the system of action, interests which are cathectic and evaluative as well as cognitive. 
The commitment involved in a value-orientation is not only a commitment to accept 
cognitively the logical consequences of a set of cognitive beliefs, though it may and 
almost always will include this, but it is also a commitment to a selection among the 
opportunities for gratification possible in the situation, the striving for some but equally 
the sacrifice of others which, with a different value-orientation, might have been possible. 
Value-orientation patterns are, as we have seen, points at which organization relative to 
all the dominant factors of the action system come to focus, adaptation to “reality” 
through cognition, the gratificationinterests of the actor, the commitment to patterns of 
expressive symbolism, and the functional exigencies of the social interrelationship 
system.  
In judging the mutual interdependence of beliefs and value-patterns it is, however, 
important to distinguish two fundamental types of “reality,” that is, classes of object, to 
which the beliefs are oriented, namely, physical objects and social objects or systems of 
action. The essential point is, of course, that in the case of physical objects what the 
objects are at any given moment is not in any sense a function of beliefs. In so far as they 
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have been modified by previous action, are, that is, to some extent, “artifacts,” this 
modification process has, of course, been a function of action, and hence of the beliefs of 
the agent of this modification as one element of action. Social objects, on the other hand, 
are at a given moment pardy a function of their beliefs (not those of the observer). In the 
case of the individual actor it is his beliefs, in that of a social system, those shared by its 
constituent actors. This difference in turn defines a fundamental difference in possibilities 
of influence of the two classes of objects. A physical object may be modified by the 
action of a human being upon it, and this action may be influenced by his beliefs. But it 
cannot be modified by attempting to alter the object’s beliefs, since it has none. A social 
object may, however, be modified not only by a process involving the beliefs of the actor 
attempting to modify it, but by his attempting to alter its beliefs since these constitute one 
critical aspect of what the social object is. 
In relation to physical objects, then, human beliefs can basically vary only with 
reference to two sets of considerations. The first of these is the cognitive validity of the 
beliefs, the second their “meaning” for human interests. The cognitive processes are, as 
we know, interdependent with the other elements of motivational process so that concrete 
beliefs about physical objects may, as we have seen, be distorted by the influence of the 
non-cognitive components of action. Thus, whether external nature is or is not 
“controllable,” and to what degree in the interest of human goals, is a purely cognitive 
problem, and beliefs about it are correct or incorrect. However, as a function of other 
than cognitive interests there may be “biases” introduced into cognitive belief systems in 
this sphere, including those which are a result of value-orientations. Thus, a universalistic 
achievement value-orientation will tend to maximize if not exaggerate belief in the 
controllability of external nature because of the interest in achievement. On the other 
hand, a particularistic-ascriptive value-orientation will tend to lack interest in such 
controllability and may well be combined with a belief system which underrates the 
degree to which this is possible. The case is similar with the problem of “human nature” 
in the sense of the organism, e.g., as to how far its impulses or other processes are 
understandable and controllable and by what means. Modern medicine is a dramatic 
example of the maximization of belief in controllability of organic processes. 
The dimension of belief in whether nature or human nature is basically favorable to 
human interests, is “good” or “evil,” introduces the evaluative factor in the sense of the 
above discussion. Such a question is not answerable only in cognitive terms but only by 
referring a cognitive belief to an evaluative context, namely by assessing the probable 
consequences of the state of affairs formulated in the belief system for certain non-
cognitive interests, cathectic and/or evaluative. 
When we turn to beliefs about social objects a further complication is introduced, by 
the fact already noted that its beliefs are partly constitutive of the social object itself. Here 
also, however, the same fundamental discrimination must be made. There are purely 
cognitive elements in such belief systems, which are beliefs relative to the nature and 
functioning of action systems. In a social ideology there is always a system of explicit or 
implicit sociological propositions which must be assessed by standards of cognitive 
validity. In terms of the analysis in previous chapters we may say that these concern the 
adaptive problems of the social system relative to a given pattern of value-orientation. 
How far and under what conditions is it possible to institutionalize the values in question? 
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But we cannot say that the cognitive element in the concrete evaluative belief system 
is simply “determined” by or identical with the value-orientation patterns, in this case any 
more than in that of physical objects. In such a case there would be no possible basis for a 
distinction between utopian patterns of ideology and realistic patterns. Because, however, 
of the place of culture in action systems the value-orientation element may in this case 
have a more prominent part in the determination of the total orientation to social objects 
than in the case of physical objects. In fundamental theoretical principle, however, the 
relation between the independence and the interdependence of the two components of 
culture is the same in both cases.21 
Finally, a further word may be said about certain relations of selective “affinity” between 
types of evaluative belief systems and particular patterns of value-orientation. We may 
illustrate in terms of the ways in which belief systems have handled the problems of 
discrepancy between institutionalized expectations ana the actual outcome of events. In 
the first place we may say that, as argued above, the decision whether or not the 
Ausgleich can be “projected” into a transcendental sphere clearly is a function of the 
oelief system, of the status of the supernatural world in that system. However much belief 
in such a supernatural world may involve “wishful thinking,” the two phases must be 
considered interdependent, not the beliefs purely a “projection” of gratification interests 
or vice versa. Such a belief system, firmly entrenched, would, however, seem necessarily 
to lead to a lessening of incentive to the “progressive” direction of solution of the 
dilemma of discrepancy. In general we may say it will tend to lessen the emphasis on the 
value of achievement in secular social action. In fact we do find a correlation be- tween a 
firmly institutionalized belief in supernatural compensation and an ascriptive emphasis in 
the institutionalized value-system. Thus mediaeval European society elevated the 
hereditary principle to a very high level in its secular value-system. The progressivism of 
the modern Western world seems to be dependent on, as well as a determinant of, the 
“this-worldliness” of our belief systems. 
Similarly, where radical rejection of an institutionalized order is involved, we may 
suppose that value-orientations and cathectic considerations in certain cases have a 
certain primacy over the belief system itself. The circumstances in which such a 
movement arises at least strongly conduce to an element of cognitive distortion because 
of the prominent part played by ambivalent motivations. However, the strong tendency of 
such a movement is in its belief system to define an ideal state as drastically contrasting 
with the institutionalized order which has been rejected. This conception of an ideal state 
in turn, as embodied in the ideology of a revolutionary movement, strongly tends to favor 
a universalistic-ascriptive value-pattern, with all the implications for its 
institutionalization which we have reviewed above. 
Hence we must conclude that the belief system element of the cultural tradition has a 
“strain to consistency” with the value-orientation element. It is obviously impossible for 
them to vary at random relative to each other. But value-orientations are anchored in 
21 The problems just discussed are important to the position taken by Florence Kluckhohn in her 
paper, “Dominant and Variant Profiles of Cultural Orientation,” Social Forces, May, 1950. We feel 
that in certain respects Dr. Kluckhohn’s very suggestive analysis suffers from her failure to 
discriminate belief systems and value-orientation patterns and to make allowance for their 
independent variability. 
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interest complexes in a different way and on a different level from belief systems so 
that it is equally impossible to derive the belief system of a society by treating it as a 
simple “projection” of its value-orientation patterns on “reality” or vice versa to deduce 
the value-orientation patterns from the belief system without regard to the function of the 
latter in integrating the other components of the system of action.  
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IX  
EXPRESSIVE SYMBOLS AND THE 
SOCIAL SYSTEM: THE 
COMMUNICATION OF AFFECT 
 
THE field of expressive symbolism is, in a theoretical sense, one of the least developed 
parts of the theory of action. It will not, therefore, be possible to present as well worked-
out an analysis of its place in relation to the social system as has been done for belief 
systems. 
Expressive symbols constitute that part of the cultural tradition relative to which 
expressive interests in the sense defined in Chapter II have primacy. In the “purest” form 
they constitute the cultural patterning of action of the expressive type where the interest 
in immediate gratifications is primary and neither instrumental nor evaluative 
considerations have primacy. It should immediately be pointed out that this does not in 
the least imply that such expressive interests are in any sense crudely “hedonistic.” They 
consist in the primacy of the interest in immediate gratification of whatever 
needdispositions are relevant in the action context in question. These may be need-
dispositions to care for others, or to “create” highly abstract ideas or cultural forms. The 
essential point is the primacy of “acting out” the need-disposition itself rather than 
subordinating gratification to a goal outside the immediate situation or to a restrictive 
norm. The “quality” of the need-disposition is not at issue. 
Expressive action, in our central paradigm, as a type of action, occupies a place 
parallel with that of the instrumental type. Like all action it is culturally patterned or 
formed. Expressive symbols then are the symbol-systems through which expressive 
action is oriented to the situation. Again like all of culture it has a normative aspect. As 
this has been stated above, there are appreciative standards in the cultural tradition by 
which expressive interests and actions are judged. These standards constitute the essential 
ordering principles of systems of expressive symbols. 
In expressive action as such, systems of expressive symbols, including the relevant 
appreciative standards, have a place homologous to that of belief systems in 
instrumentally oriented action. They constitute the cultural element which has primacy in 
the patterning of the concrete action processes. Cognitive patterns, or beliefs, may 
themselves become the focus of a special type of instrumental activity which we have 
called investigation. Similarly, expressive symbol systems may themselves be developed 
as the goal of a type of instrumentally oriented activity, which may be called “artistic 
creation.” This must be clearly distinguished from expressive action itself, which is 
“acting out” in terms of a pattern of expressive symbolism, not the process of deliberately 
creating such a pattern. 
Of course only a small part of the expressive symbolism of a culture is the product of 
deliberate artistic creation just as very much of its cognitive orientation patterning is not 
the result of scientific or philosophical investigation, but has grown up “spontaneously” 
in the course of action processes where other interests have had primacy. 
Finally, just as cognitive and evaluative interests may be fused in ideological and 
religious belief systems, so expressive and evaluative interests may be fused in relation to 
systems of expressive symbols. Where this evaluative interest involves symbolic 
references to a supernatural order we will speak of religious symbolism. Where it does 
not, we shall speak simply of evaluative symbolism, as in the case of symbolic acts of 
solidarity with the other members of a collectivity or the symbolization of an attachment 
to a social object. 
As we have stated, expressive symbolism is the primary cultural component in any 
form or expressive action, and is involved in some way in all types of action. But in 
attempting to analyze the most important modes of relation of systems of expressive 
symbolism to the social system, it seems best to start, once more, with the paradigm 
of social interaction. In this connection we have pointed out repeatedly that specific 
actions and expectations tend to become organized and generalized around the reciprocal 
attitudes of ego and alter toward each other, and toward the common cultural patterns 
which define the situation for the interaction process. 
Expressive symbolism is that part of the cultural tradition most direcdy integrated with 
the cathectic interests of the actor. In so far as it is the reciprocity of attitude which 
becomes the primary focus of these cathectic interests, it follows that expressive 
symbolism will tend to be organized relative to these attitudes as a point of reference. 
From this point of view the concrete expressive symbols which are part of the process 
of interaction serve a threefold function, as do all elements of culture: 1) they aid in 
communication between the interacting parties, in this case the communication of 
cathectic “meanings”; 2) they organize the interaction process through normative 
regulation, through imposing appreciative standards on it; and 3) they serve as direct 
objects for the gradfication of the relevant need-dispositions, The special feature of this 
aspect of culture is the differentiation of a system of symbols with respect to all of these 
functions, from other elements of culture through the primacy of the expressive interest. 
The most important starting point of our analysis is the recognition that the 
organization of orientations within the interactive relationship about reciprocity of 
attitudes already and in itself, constitutes the development of an expressive symbol-
system. This is because the particular discrete act acquires a meaning which in some way 
involves a reference beyond the “intrinsic” significance of the particular act itself. It is 
fitted into a context of association in such a way that the whole complex of associated 
acts is invested with a cathectic significance. Once this has happened it is no longer 
possible to isolate the specific act from the complex in which it has become embedded; it 
has acquired a meaning which is added to its immediate intrinsic significance.1 Thus the 
response of the mother to tbe crying of a child comes, apparently very early, to be felt as  
1 It thus fulfills Durkheim’s main criterion of a symbol, that its meaning is “superadded” to its 
intrinsic properties. 
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“symbolic” of her attitude toward the child, not merely as an instrumental measure of 
relieving the particular distress which occasioned the crying. We may say, then, that the 
prototype of the expressive symbol, within the context of interaction, is the symbolic act. 
It also follows that in a stabilized interaction system all acts have this symbolic quality to 
some degree, all serve as expressive symbols. They are the modes of gratification of 
ego’s need-dispositions and at the same time signs to alter of what ego’s attitudes toward 
him are. 
In order to understand the significance of this it is exceedingly important to see the 
problem in the context of the reciprocal symmetry of interactive relationships. It is an 
unreal abstraction to consider only that the symbolic act is of gratificatory significance to 
ego and symbolic significance to alter, because in the nature of the interactive process it 
must acquire both types of significance for both ego and alter. We may speak of this as 
the internalization of the expressive symbolism in a sense directly parallel to that in 
which we have spoken of the internalization of moral norms. Ego’s act has an acquired 
gratificatory significance to alter, because in addition to whatever intrinsic significance it 
may possess, it has the meaning of a manifestation of ego’s attitudes toward alter, and 
hence shares the affective significance which the whole complex of these attitudes and 
their manifestation have. By a process of “association,” then, ego’s symbolic act is a 
focus of gratification, if it indicates the attitude for which alter “hopes,” and it is 
deprivational if it frustrates his hopes. Similarly such acts become the focus of anxieties. 
Thus the fact that the act is an expressive act for ego, that is that it gratifies a need 
disposition of his, and that it is also oriented toward alter, means that in a stabilized 
interaction relationship it must acquire an expressive significance for alter. It must be 
cathected and its performance on ego’s part become directly either gratifying or 
deprivational to alter. 
If we regard symbolic acts occurring within the interaction process as the focus of the 
genesis of expressive symbolism, we can then proceed to analyze the generalization of 
this symbolic significance, that is of symbolization of the relevant attitudes, to objects 
other than acts. Such objects, it is evident, come to be drawn into the associational 
complex which is organized about the reciprocal attitudes of ego and alter. Our 
classification of the objects in the situation gives us the basis for such an analysis of 
generalization. In the first place ego and alter themselves, as objects to each other, come 
to be drawn in. In so far as they are treated as actors, it is their acts which are the 
symbols. But these acts may be “interpreted” as manifestations of action-relevant 
qualities. The feeling, then, that alter is an “honest man” or a “very friendly person” may 
be generalized in this direction. 
Secondly, the bodies of ego and alter as a special class of physical objects are 
obviously so closely associated with their action that their features inevitably acquire 
symbolic significance and come to be cathected. Physical traits such as stature, body 
shape, hair color, facial features and the like are involved. Fundamental aspects of the 
significance of the anatomical differences of the sexes also fit into this context. This is in 
all probability the case with the basic erotic symbolism which has played such a 
prominent part in psychoanalytic theory. The penis, for example, is a feature of the body 
around which a whole complex of sentiments may cluster, both in relation to ego’s own 
attitudes toward himself, and to those of alter. Thus the insistence in Freudian theory that 
many other objects should be treated as symbols of the penis is correct but is only one 
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side of the picture. There is every reason to believe that the penis is itself a symbolic 
object to a high degree and that a substantial part of its psychological significance is to be 
interpreted in the light of this fact. In more general terms it may perhaps be said that “one 
way” symbolic significance, as exemplified in the case of Freudian sexual symbolism, 
constitutes a limiting case. The more general case is the symbolic or associational 
complex in which in some sense and to some degree every item symbolizes every other. 
Thus elongated objects may symbolize the penis but in turn the penis symbolizes the 
“masculinity” of its possessor and the whole complex of qualities and attitudes comprised 
under this term. 
Third, there is the whole realm of physical objects besides the organisms of ego and of 
the relevant alters. These are the physical objects which constitute the immediate physical 
environment of the interaction process and which are involved in it, instrumentally or 
otherwise. One of the most obvious examples is clothing. Because of its direct relation to 
the body, and the fact that visual impressions of the body include clothing, clothing 
becomes one of the main foci of sentiments associated with the body. In addition clothing 
is considerably more subject to manipulative modification than are rnost of the features 
of the body itseff, and hence presents a highly suitable medium for expressive purposes. 
Very similar considerations apply to the premises in whicn important activities take 
place, such as the home, and to its furnishings and utensils and the like. 
Finally cultural objects themselves are of course also drawn into the association 
complex. The type of case of particular relevance here is that of the symbolic creations 
which have no “use” beyond their expressive significance. The ideal type is that of 
“works of art.” There is always a physical aspect of a concrete work of art, but the more 
essential one is the cultural. In the pure type of the work of art the physical object, or 
even the concrete action process, e.g., in the case of “playing” a musical composition, 
would not be cathected but for its significance in the context of expressive symbolism. 
If this approach to the problem of expressive symbolism is accepted, then there should 
be two primary bases of classification of types of such symbolism which cross-cut each 
other. The first has just been reviewed, namely, the classes of objects to which such 
symbolic significance has become or may become attached. The second is in terms of the 
fundamental types of attitudinal orientation around which the interaction process itself 
comes to be organized. In so far as alters are the direct objects of orientation we have 
called these the types of attachment and classified them in terms of the two pattern 
variables of affectivity-neutrality and specificitydiffuseness. The four major types, then, 
are receptiveness-response, love, approval and esteem. 
We may, then, speak of any symbolic entity, an act, a quality of personality or of the 
organism, a physical object or a cultural pattern, as symbolic of any one of these four 
basic attitude types. This may be illustrated for two types of relationship, an erotic love 
relationship and one organized about attitudes of esteem. 
The love relationship is defined as diffuse and affective. The affectivity specifically 
includes, though in such a case it cannot be confined to, mutuality of erotic gratifications. 
Erotic gratifications here specifically involve certain types of somatic stimulations and 
processes. Hence in the erotic aspect of the relationship the bodies of the parties have 
particular significances. The first aspect, then, of the expressive symbolism is the 
organization of the erotically significant features of the body of each around the “genital” 
level of erotic gratification. This means a certain symbolic priority of genital intercourse 
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over other possibilities of mutual erotic gratification; rather generally these are standards 
of taste with respect to the expression of this relative to other elements of the total erotic 
complex. Some other practices such as kissing, and some other elements of “foreplay” 
may be allowable, but only in the proper manner and on the proper occasions. Others, 
what are usually callcd the “perversions,” tend to be tabooed. 
There is further, most emphatically a complex of expressive symbolism in terms of the 
regulation of occasions and the physical setting and associated physical objects for erotic 
activities. Privacy for all the specifically erotic activities is felt in our society to be 
extremely important. “Aesthetically” attractive surroundings are also generally involved. 
Clothing acquires high significance, including just the proper occasions and manner for 
its removal. 
But quite clearly if the relationship is a love relationship, the associated expressive 
symbolism will not be confined to acts and occasions of immediate erotic gratification. It 
will include such symbolic acts as affectionate or endearing speech, exchange of gifts of 
various sorts, sharing of gratificatory activities in other connections, such as 
entertainment, acting and dressing to “please” the other and a whole variety of other 
symbolic acts and their associated contexts. 
In its involvement in the social system in a larger way the erotic love relationship is 
universally associated with marriage, reproduction, and parenthood. The complex of 
expressive symbolism, therefore, extends beyond the context more immediately relevant 
to erotic gratification or even individual mutuality of diffuse love-gratifications. The 
erotic love relationship becomes a major nucleus of the kinship system with all that that 
implies. The erotic relationship itself is thus tied in with the acceptance of the parental 
roles and their responsibilities. 
With this step, the expressive symbolism of the particular erotic relationship merges 
into that integrated with and part of the culture of a larger collectivity, the kinship unit. 
The orientation to “romantic love” is only partially isolable. As a part of our culture its 
symbolism is thus part of the larger complex of the symbolism of the sex roles generally 
and of the kinship system. In part this attitude of romantic love constitutes a field of 
partial and sometimes radical deviance from the completeness of that integration, for 
example in the youth culture aspects, which attempt a kind of “artificial” isolation from 
the possible implications for marriage and later parenthood. This relative isolation is to be 
analyzed in the general terms used in the analysis of structured strains in the social 
system and of tendencies to deviance. 
It is not necessary to follow these problems further here. The important point is to 
show the organization of the system of expressive symbols about the attitudinal structure 
of the relationship and the cathectic interests involved in it. From this point of view the 
erotic activities themselves, in addition to their significance as direct sources of 
gratification, constitute an integral part of the system of expressive symbolism. This is 
indeed the main sense in which they must be said to be a function of something other 
than “primary drives.” Essentially the same can be said about the erotically relevant 
features of the organism. The penis, the breast, etc., are expressive symbols and a large 
part of their erotic significance derives from this fact. They can, of course, be the 
referents for further elaborations of symbolization, as is well known. But these primarily 
erotic references of the system of expressive symbolization, are continuous with a much 
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more widely ramifying complex, which extends to all aspects of the behavior relevant to 
the interaction and to all classes of objects involved in the behavior. 
Essentially similar considerations apply, with the appropriate differences, to the cases 
where an attitude of approval or esteem is the primary basis of organization of the 
interactive relationship. A good example is the relation between teacher and student, let 
us say in a technical field of professional training. In so far as the relationship is one of a 
particularized attachment, it focuses, on the stu‘dent’s part, on “admiration” for the 
teacher’s competence and perFormances in the field. The counterpart on the teacher’s 
part is “respect” for the student’s ability and “promise,” and for his performances in the 
course of training. Here, though in another context the actions may be of primarily 
instrumental significance, they also have an aspect as expressive symbols. 
This is essentially what is implied in the affectively neutral aspect of the attachment 
pattern. In other words, the expressive symbolism in this case belongs to the evaluative 
category, not the cathectic or pure-type expressive. This fusion of evaluative and 
cathectic elements is the fundamental basis of the motivational integration involved in the 
institutionalization of affectively neutral patterns, as has several times been pointed out. 
The relevant symbolization has the same fundamental characteristics. 
Given this framework, however, the essential structure of the complex of expressive 
symbolism is the same as in the case of the erotic love relationship. Particular acts 
acquire symbolic significance relative to the cathectic elements of the attachment. In the 
first instance we may say these will consist in acts of valued professional achievement. 
These acts may be directly experienced by the student, as in hearing a lecture, watching 
and participating in the conduct of a seminar discussion, or watching the actual operation 
of a bit of research technique. It may then extend to the appreciation of the symbolic 
products of such activity, notably of course reading what the teacher has written. 
Again, the complex will tend to be extended to other objects in the context of the 
teacher’s activity, to the organizational setting in which he works and his role in it, to 
premises, the buildings, rooms and their contents. How far this will extend will depend 
both on the intensity of the cathexis and on how far it is limited to approval in the 
specifically professional context, or becomes a diffuse attitude of esteem, which will 
therefore mean admiration not only for the teacher’s professional competence and 
achievement, but for him more generally as a man. In that case there is very likely to be a 
cathexis of a variety of aspects of the teacher’s general style of life, his tastes in clothing 
or in literature or hobbies, a predisposition to think well of his wife and many other 
things. 
In such a case the student will tend to become sensitized to the attitudes of the teacher 
toward him, and to interpret acts of attention to him personally as expressions of this 
attitude, or of course lack of attention where it might have occurred as expression of a 
negative attitude. This will in the first place center in acts which may be interpreted as 
direct recognition of his own achievements or qualities, such as a high grade on a paper, 
or praise for a piece of work. But it may extend to other objects not intrinsically 
connected with professional achievement, such as an act of kindness or consideration. 
The dynamic relations of the sentiments of approval and esteem and those of friendliness 
are so close that it is difficult for them not to occur together to an important degree. 
In both types of relationship context there is a process of selection of appropriate 
symbolization of the relevant attitudes from among the possibilities available in the 
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situation. This selection process ranges from the lending of symbolic significance at the 
“core” to the intrinsically strategic acts and objects, to the cathexis of more and more 
“arbitrarily” associated parts of the context. In the affectively positive case the “intrinsic” 
elements are those which, apart from special processes of symbolic association, are 
features of the object’s and of ego’s relation to them which are the focus of their capacity 
to produce direct gratifications for him. This capacity may, as is certainly true in the 
erotic case, be the consequence in important part of previous symbolic associations; this 
is what was meant by saying above that the erotically significant parts of the body and the 
acts of erotic gratification themselves constitute expressive symbols. But at any given 
stage of the development of an action system, certain gratification-opportunities will have 
particularly strategic significance in the relationship context in question, and there will be 
more and more shading off from these to the increasingly “arbitrary” fringes of the 
association complex. 
In the affectively neutral case, similarly, the core will be the endowment with 
cathectically symbolic significance, of the acts and objects which are intrinsically 
essential to the fulfillment of the relevant role-expectations. In the case discussed above, 
that consisted essentially in professional performances themselves and the objects 
instrumentally essential to them, or produced by them. From this core there is again a 
shading off into more and more remote ranges of an associational complex, until the 
cathexis, for example, of the teacher’s taste in neckties has very little intrinsically to do 
with the admiration of his professional competence, but may yet come to be of 
considerable symbolic significance. 
The status of the selectively cathected acts and objects as expressive symbols has, as 
in the case of the other elements of culture, a tendency to become institutionalized. 
Whatever the complicated balance of psychological forces involved, the confining of 
approved erotic gratification to “normal heterosexual” activities may be regarded as 
primarily a case of the institutionalization of a pattern of expressive symbolism in this 
area, which is nonetheless leamed and institutionalized for the fact that it is so nearly 
universal as the norm in human societies. Similarly the admiration of competent 
professional achievement is again in one aspect a pattern of institutionalized expressive 
symbolism where the professional role itself is institutionalized. 
Institutionalization, however, does not apply only to the core of the association 
complex. Various elements of context are also involved. A good example in the erotic 
case is the imperative of privacy for sexual activities. For the professional case, that a 
teacher should dress in accord with the “dignity” of his position is an example. 
With institutionalization there is always an evaluative element introduced into the 
orientation of the actor to and through the expressive symbolism, in addition to that 
involved in the symbolization of affectively neutral patterns. Thus a student may, through 
his previous socialization, have acquired an affectively neutral needdisposition to admire 
competent professional performance in a field. But if he enters into an institutionalized 
relationship to a teacher he assumes an additional obligation to respect his teacher’s 
professional “authority.” The respect for competence becomes an institutionalized 
common value of the collectivity to which they both belong. This should, therefore, not 
be confused with the evaluative element involved in the discipline necessary to accept an 
affectively neutral orientation at all. Institutionalization, however, is of course the 
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mechanism of stabilization of the symbol system on a cultural basis, so it can be 
transmitted as an organized entity. 
§ EXPRESSIVE SYMBOLISM AND COLLECTIVITIES 
INTERACTIVE relationships and the reciprocal roles of the parties constitute, on the 
relevant level, the units of which all social systems are composed. But certain further 
considerations come to be involved on the higher levels of organization of collectivities. 
With extension of the role system beyond the particular interactive relationship, the 
problem arises of the extent to which expressive symbolism is commonly shared within 
the wider role system. There is further the question of whether or not the symbolism is 
directly integrated with the common values which are constitutive of the collectivity and 
may, therefore, be considered to be symbols of the solidarity of the collectivity. On these 
two bases three major types of expressive symbolism extending beyond the diadic 
relationship need to be distinguished. First are those symbols which are shared by the 
different sub-units of the social system, individual actors or subcollectivities, without 
implying the existence of a bond of solidarity between them. These may be said to 
constitute the “common style” of these units within what in this respect is a common 
culture. Thus there may be common elements of style in the house furnishings of many 
different households, without this in any direct way symbolizing the solidarity of these 
households as members of the same collectivity. 
Secondly, there may be symbolism which is essentially symbolism of the collectivity 
as such, not merely the common symbolism of its sub-units. This, however, needs to be 
subdivided into two classes, according to whether it is “purely expressive” or is 
evaluative in emphasis, according that is, to the affectivity-neutrality variable. The purely 
expressive type then would constitute the “acting out” of the need-dispositions 
constitutive of the collectivity, the “feeling of solidarity” of its members, but without 
direct involvement of morally evaluative considerations, except in that, through 
institutionalization, participation, i.e., acceptance of such symbolism becomes an 
obligation of collectivity membership. Family “observances” as of Thanksgiving and 
Christmas would be a good example of this type. These occasions may have other, 
namely religious, connotations in the cultural tradition, but in contemporary society much 
of the strictly religious connotation is subordinated to this direct familial expressionalism. 
This is also a prominent aspect of birthday celebrations and other anniversaries. They are 
thus ways of affirming the solidarity of the collectivity, but belong in the category of 
“recreation” not of Durkheim’s vie sêrieuse. 
From these types of observance must be distinguished collective “rituals” where the 
attitude of moral respect is predominant, which are therefore marked by “solemnity.” 
These types of expressive symbols may be considered as manifesting and regulating the 
common moral sentiments or need-dispositions of the members of the collectivity. It is 
this type which Durkheim so clearly illuminated in his analysis of religious ritual in its 
symbolic aspects. However, from the present point of view by no means all collectively 
moral expressions of solidarity should be called religious. In order to differentiate what 
does and does not belong in the religious category it is necessary to carry the analysis of 
possible relations of expressive symbolism to the collectivity a step farther. 
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In discussing belief systems in the previous chapter the distinction was made between 
ideologies and religious belief systems, Both were, to be sure, characterized by the fusion 
of cognitive and evaluative interests, and thus distinguished from scientific and 
philosophical beliefs as such. However, religious beliefs were distinguisned from 
ideological by the non-empirical cognitive references involving relation to a supernatural 
order. This supernatural order in turn was related to the “rationalization,” that is, the 
cognitive legitimation, of those phases of human experience which did not fully fit with 
the institutionalized expectations embodying the dominant value system. 
Parallel with the cognitive problems of meaning involved in these areas of experience 
run a series of cathectic or emotional problems of “adjustment.” These experiences are 
difficult to “take” precisely because they involve the frustration of established and 
legitimized expectations. But from the expressive point of view these phenomena must be 
placed in a still wider context. 
It is inherent in the view of social action taken here that all such action involves 
tensions and the necessity of the imposition of frustrations and disciplines of the most 
various sorts. This fact underlies the occurrence of a variety of rhythmic cycles of effort 
and rest, of discipline and permissive release and the like. Sleep is clearly one of the most 
fundamental of these tension release phenomena, which though it has biological 
foundations is nevertheless profoundly influenced by interaction on socio-cultural levels. 
Affective primacy is characteristic of the above phenomena. Like all the fundamentals 
of behavior orientation, these rhythms come to be built into the structure of social 
systems, so that certain of these predominantly affective release phenomena come to be 
collectively shared, and the requisite expressive symbolism institutionalized on the bases 
discussed above. There are, however, areas where the adjustment problems are 
particularly crucial from the point of view of the stability of the social system, and where 
the emotional adjustment aspect is particularly intimately connected with the belief 
system in the area of the “supernatural.” It is this sphere of fusion of religious beliefs and 
the expressive symbolism of affective adjustment which is the religious sphere of 
expressive symbolism as such. 
This religious sphere was defined in the last chapter as involving the legitimation of 
orientations, on occasion, both within the sphere of institutionalized value-orientations 
which constitute the framework of the main social structure, and in the areas of 
discrepancy relative to the institutionalized expectations. We may, therefore, have 
religious symbolism expressive of the solidarity of the main institutionalized 
collectivities. We also have religious symbolism which serves as an institutionalized 
channel for the adjustment of emotional strains in the discrepancy areas. 
The first was what Durkheim regarded as the core type of religious ritual, the symbolic 
expression of the solidarity of the group. The second was the type especially emphasized 
by Malinowski, the type case being the funeral ceremonial. In this case it is not primarily 
an expression of the common moral sentiments of the collectivity, though that is also 
generally involved, but an expression of the adjustment of individuals under strain in 
such a way that their orientation is kept in line with an institutionalized pattern. 
Solidarity, however, as we have seen provides the element of support in this process of 
social control. The religious type of expression of group solidarity is to be distinguished 
from collective solidarity symbolism which is evaluative in emphasis, but not religious in 
that there is no reference to legitimation in terms of a supernatural order. Examples 
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would be a patriotic observance, such as that of the Fourth of July in this country, or the 
ceremonial of a university Commencement. 
In all of these cases, as in that of the diadic interactive relationship, we may regard the 
symbolic act as the core phenomenon. The essential point is that the need-dispositions 
which are being symbolically manifested are those which involve the institutionalizea 
and internalized common value-orientations which constitute the collectivity. This gives 
a strong premium on performance of these symbolic acts in common, so that the sharing 
aspect is itself directly symbolized. 
But as in the diadic case, the associational complex extends beyond the symbolic acts 
themselves. First it should, of course, be noted that cognitive orientation patterns are an 
integral part of concrete acts. Hence the beliefs in terms of which the acts are given 
meaning are themselves, in one aspect, also expressive symbols; they must be cathected 
as part of the total complex. This is particularly important in the case of many religious 
beliefs because or the prominence of what we have above called “intermediate” 
symbolism in that field.2 Indeed it is frequently the case in this field that for a particular 
belief pattern its significance as a complex of expressive symbols has primacy over the 
strictly cognitive aspect. Broadly speaking this may be said to be true of “mythology” in 
the religious field as distinguished from “dogma.” When it is said that a myth “explains” 
the meaning of a ritual, for instance, frequently the ritual activity consists in dramatic 
portrayal of certain mythological characters and their activities. The mythological 
personages themselves are to a high degree expressive symbols on which certain 
needdispositions of the members of the collectivity are “projected.” Their significance 
lies in their appropriateness in this context rather than in the strictly cognitive validity of 
any propositions. 
As in the diadic cases analyzed above, the complex of symbolic association then 
extends to other aspects of the total action complex, to places, buildings, occasions, and 
physical objects which, for instance, serve as ritual paraphernalia. The whole associated 
complex comes to be cathected and the appropriate attitudes applied to all the objects 
within it. It is essentially by this process that physical objects, vestments, edifices, etc., 
come to be treated as sacred objects in a religious sense. 
We find, then, that the collective aspect of expressive symbolism involves a whole series 
of differentiations of types. There is the uniformity of style within a collectivity. Then 
there are the modes of expression or collective sentiments, which are subdivided into the 
directly and primarily expressive, and the evaluative or moral. The latter in turn may or 
may not be primarily religious, and both may be oriented more to the expression of 
sentiments relative to established routine orientations, or to adjustment to the 
discrepancies from institutionalized expectations.  
 
2 See above, Chapter VIII, pp. 376–378. 
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§ ROLE DIFFERENTIATION WITH RESPECT TO EXPRESSIVE 
SYMBOLISM 
THE above treatment of the most general relation of expressive symbolism to 
collectivities was confined to the “common” aspects, to the respects in which symbolic 
acts and the other symbolic objects are shared by all members of a given collectivity. But 
in this as in other respects there tend to be internal differentiations of interest and hence 
of role as between different members and classes of members of any given collectivity. 
There are two types of such differentiation which will be briefly treated here. The first 
concerns the respects in which the acts and other elements of the associated symbolic 
complex, which have special symbolic significance in the collectivity in question, come 
to be allocated to specialized roles, and to the actors who perform them. With respect 
then to symbolic as well as to instrumental significance to the collectivity, there is a 
“division of labor” which underlies the structure of the system of expressive symbolism 
itself. Secondly, expressive symbolism generally is “embedded” in concrete action, anci 
is ancillary to whatever interests may be dominant in that concrete activity. But just as 
there may be a specialization of interest in cognitive problems as such, so “aesthetic” or 
appreciative problems may become the focus of a specialized interest. This interest 
becomes that in creating new patterns of expressive symbolism, and in evaluating those 
which exist or are in process of creation. Like cognitive specialization in turn the 
aesthetic interest may come to be the primary determinative focus of a class of 
specialized roles. At this point we may speak of the emergence of the “artist” as a 
specialized role type homologous with the specialists in cognitive interests, the scientist 
or the philosopher. 
To some significant degree every role which is intrinsically differentiated from other 
roles is by the same token a specialized symbolic role. This follows from the fact that the 
role is a crucial unit in the action; it and the incumbent are objects which as such acquire 
symbolic significances in the expressive “economy.” Here as elsewhere there is a 
complex relation between the symbolic significance of the role, and of the actor who 
plays it as a personality. 
Since the role is from one point of view the principal focus of expectations in the 
interaction process, the considerations about the relation of expressive symbolism 
outlined above apply directly here. From this point of view the role is an organized 
complex of particular acts, organized in such a way that reciprocal attitudes can become 
significant. Indeed the organization of particular acts relative to other actors, the 
emergence of attitudes as crucial, and the symbolic significance of roles are all part of the 
same complex, and are inseparable from one another. 
Then the analysis of symbolic roles as foci for the organization of expressive symbol 
systems, must follow the general analysis of the bases of role-differentiation within social 
systems, as these have been set forth above. Within this it is the paradigm of cathectic or 
expressive orientations which should form the focus. 
In current psychological terminology, roles, and their incumbents as persons, become 
the objects of “projection” from the needdisposition systems of other actors. The 
phenomenon has been classically demonstrated in the case of the “transference” which 
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occurs in the relation of patient to psychotherapist. In this case, however, the projected 
role of the therapist is in sharp contrast to his institutionalized role, and this duality torms 
a principal “lever” for the psychotherapeutic process. 
The projections in question may or may not be integrated with the institutionalized 
role structure, and there may fae more or less well-marked duality phenomena as in the 
case of psychotherapy. But in any case the tendency will be for the expressive symbolic 
significance of roles to follow the main lines of differentiation which are inherent in the 
differentiations of the social structure generally. 
The first type of case we may call attention to is the expressive aspect of leadership 
roles. In the ideal type the common value sentiments which constitute the collectivity are 
projected upon the leader as a symbolic embodiment of these values. In so far as this 
symbolic complex is well integrated, loyalty to these values, to the collectivity, and to the 
leader in his role become indistinguishable. 
The degrees and ways in which symbolic leadership is combined in the same role with 
instrumental executive functions can vary considerably. But even the instrumental leader 
will tend to have at least some directly expressive functions. Most generally his presence, 
and his performing of symbolic acts will be an essential part of all collective symbolic 
action, e.g., celebrations or ceremonials. In general the symbolization connected with 
these activities will be organized around a symbolic role or system of them as a focus. 
The leader will “preside,” he will say the symbolically crucial things, his physical 
position will be symbolic as, e.g., seated at the center of the “head table,” and a whole 
variety of other symbolic associations will be organized around his role. 
It is furthermore significant that this exprcssive element of leadership, as in the case of 
the instrumental aspect of the executive role, has both an internal and an external-
representative aspect. The position and the actions in his role of an expressive leader 
serve to symbolize to outsiders the nature and the solidary sentiments of the collectivity 
he represents, and to organize its relations to other collectivities. All of this is of course 
clearly evident in various aspects of international relations. Certain symbolic acts can 
only be performed by a “chief of state,” regardless of the question of who holds the “real 
power.” Protocol in international gatherings is indispensable because it is impossible to 
avoid having almost any accidental happening come to be interpreted as “significant” 
when the persons involved are playing to such a high degree symbolic representative 
roles. The only alternative to exposure to possibly deleterious consequences in such a 
situation is careful regulation of the symbolic aspects themselves, as in setting the order 
of precedence. 
It is possible for the symbolic aspect of a role to become rather highly differentiated 
from the instrumental aspects. The “toastmaster” at a dinner, which is essentially a 
demonstration of collective solidarity in the recreational context, may not be a “leader” in 
any of the other principal respects, but may be able to organize and canalize collective 
symbolism in the appropriate context very successfully—he may for example command 
certain types of humor as a technique of tension release. It is also possible for specialized 
expressive leadership roles to develop in relation to the solemn affirmation of solidarity. 
It is common for example for “elder statesmen,” who are no longer actively influential in 
instrumental ways, to be brought forward on such occasions. The British monarch is, of 
course, a stock example of this differentiation of the expressive aspect. The distinction 
between “reigning” and “governing” is essentially that between expressive leadership and 
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the executive role in the instrumental complex. Similarly religious leadership may be 
relatively segregated from the other aspects of group solidarity except for the solidarity of 
the religious collectivity itself. An extreme instance of this was the position of the 
“official” Shinto priest in Japan, for example, on the village level. He was apparently 
deprived of almost all influence in general collective affairs, his role being defined as 
almost purely “ceremonial.” In any other connection he was not even a particularly 
respected figure. 
These extreme segregations are, however, exceptional. At the very least we can say 
that executive leadership must carry with it a very significant expressive aspect. The 
strains and tensions involved in complex organization are such that the expressive aspect 
must be organized. The existence of a well-integrated system of expressive symbolism is 
a highly important mechanism of social control in that it “channels” the directly cathectic 
elements relative to action in the collectivity. 
This functional imperative, however, does not preclude that there should be a 
relatively elaborate differentiation of sub-systems of expressive symbolism, including 
several symbolically significant roles relative to the same collectivity-organization 
context. The case of the Prime Minister and the King in England is merely one case in 
point. 
Max Weber’s famous category of charismatic leadership belongs direcdy in the 
present context. The charismatic leader plays an expressive leadership role where moral 
audiority is claimed, that is, where the symbolization is evaluative and not only 
expressive. Whether this role is that of leadership in a deviant sub-culture in conscious 
opposition to the institutionalized value-system, or in a collectivity within the 
institutionalized system, is secondary. But the primacy of charisma means that the 
immediate expressive significance of the role takes precedence over its instrumental 
functions in the collective division of labor. This may be interpreted as the main 
significance of such religious maxims as “take no thought for the morrow.” To do so 
would take the orientation off the purely expressive plane and introduce instrumental 
considerations into it, considerations which are felt to be inappropriate. The 
“routinization of charisma,” then, is the process by which a primarily expressive 
orientation comes to be adjusted to the exigencies of a continuing situation which must in 
the nature of the case involve instrumental considerations. In such a case the pattern of 
charismatic leadership must give way to one in which executive aspects play a critical 
role. If a purely symbolic-role type survives, it must be segregated from the executive and 
“neutialized” as it were. This has often happened in the “ritualization” of religious 
movements. 
With respect to symbolic roles as in other contexts of expressive symbolism the 
problem of “duality” is of fundamental significance. On the one hand expressive 
symbolism constitutes the cultural pattern system around which institutionalized 
gratification interests are organized, and which gives these interests a certain stability. At 
the same time, on the other hand, the need-disposition systems of personalities are 
imperfectly integrated. The elements of these systems which are not rully in accord with 
the institutionalized patterns hence also seek expression. Sometimes they do so in 
explicitly deviant forms, sometimes interstitially to the main institutionalized system of 
expressive symbolism. But sometimes such elements come to be “superimposed” on the 
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institutionalized meanings of established symbols. This is perhaps peculiarly important in 
the case of symbolic roles. 
Insecurity in the psychological sense is one of the persistent and ubiquitous aspects or 
the malintegration of social systems. Put a little differently we may say that in most social 
systems there are incompletely gratified needs to feel that “everything will be all right.” It 
is very natural indeed that these needs should be projected on persons who occupy 
expressive leadership roles. There is, then, very generally an exaggerated trust or 
expectation that the leader will “take care of everything” in such cases. He becomes, even 
if not in a strictly religious sense, a kind of “savior.” In such a case the question of 
whether or not the leader “delivers” may become acute. As was noted in the discussion of 
ideologies in the last chapter, the strains involved in such expectations may be lessened 
by displacing the fulfillment of the expectations outside the immediate field of action, 
either into the future, as in the case of the leader of a movement for reform, or into a 
transcendental sphere, as in the case of many religious movements. 
The obverse of this romantic-utopian element3 in expressive symbolism is what may 
be called “scapegoat” symbolism. In this case it is the negative affect, which is not rully 
institutionalized, which is projected onto a symbolic object. Persons performing 
differentiated roles, particularly those carrying responsibility, are often appropriate 
targets for such projection. 
It is necessary to distinguish, relatively to any given collectivity, internal and external 
scapegoats. Solidarity is an essential common denominator of all collectivities. Hence the 
type case of internal threat is that from the member who breaks the solidarity. There is 
therefore a focus of negative affect on the “traitor,” the “disloyal” member of the 
collectivity. Sanctions against disloyalty on an institutionalized and realistic level will be 
found in all stable collectivities though their exact nature varies over a very wide range. 
But just as insecurity in the above sense tends to motivate to exaggerated trust in and 
adulation of leaders, it also motivates to the search for scapegoats on whom actual 
troubles can be blamed, and anxiety about future troubles justified and legitimized. We 
are so familiar with these phenomena as in the case of “witch-hunts” that further 
comment seems to be unnecessary. 
In the light of the analysis of compulsive ambivalent motivation in Chapter VII above, 
the mechanisms operating in these cases of romantization and scapegoating of expressive 
leaders can be generalized. For the person acting under what we have called strain, 
whether it be that directly imposed by the failure of fulfillment of his expectations or 
compounded by the internal conflict of ambivalence, expectations become “skewed” 
from the normal, which in this case we may define as the institutionalized pattern. There 
is always the dual aspect of this, the need to express the resentment or hostility which 
frustration arouses, and the need to protect by defensiveadjustive measures the cathectic 
investment in the disturbed orientation pattern and relationship. Since this orientation is 
most fundamentally organized in terms of the complementarity of expectations, ego in 
response to strain attempts to redefine his expectations of alter. There will, then, be both a 
compulsively alienative component in this definition, and a compulsively 
3 This element, it will be remembered from Chapter VII, is associated with patterns of compulsive 
motivation. 
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conformative one. In the alienative context ego will tend to express hostility toward alter 
and expect to be reciprocated, while in the conformative context he will compulsively 
skew his conformity with what he defines as alter’s expectations and expect this to be 
reciprocated by positive attitude sanctions on alter’s part. 
It seems correct to say that what is usually meant by the mechanism of “projection,”4 
as a mechanism of defense, consists essentially of such an expectation of alter’s behavior 
which, because it is inappropriate to alter’s orientation system and to the situation, is not 
in fact acted upon by alter, that is, is not reciprocated. Alter is always, in an established 
interaction system, a symbolic figure to ego. What projection in this case does is to shift 
the symbolic meaning of alter and his attitudes, to redefine the symbolism. Alter becomes 
the source of the disturbance on which ego’s resentment focuses, and/or the person who 
expects and should reward ego’s skewing of his conformative orientation. It was, in ego’s 
distorted definition of the situation, alter who, because he was angry at ego, placed the 
strain upon him and disturbed his expectations. It is because alter expects the value 
patterns to be lived up to in compulsively literal form, that ego must distort the normal 
patterning of his action in a compulsive direction. From this point of view the primary 
factor in projection is the failure of ego’s expectations to be reciprocated. Then the gap in 
meaning between the expectation and the actual behavior of alter is filled by the 
imputation of behavior to alter (including attitudes and intentions), which he does not 
actually perform or have. 
Further complications are of course introduced by the operation of the mechanisms of 
repression and displacement. The object of ego’s projection need not be the actual and 
immediate agent of the imposition of strain on him. Indeed it is almost impossible to keep 
the balance of expressing both the conformative and the alienative orientation 
components equally toward the same object. One, then, must be repressed. Repression, 
however, is seldom complete, and one of the obvious possible outcomes is the 
displacement of the repressed affect on a substituted object. Hence the tendency, as we 
noted, for symbolically prominent figures to function as “lightning rods,” catching much 
of the displaced and hence relatively free-floating affect which is present in the social 
system. 
We may add one further consideration. Though much repressed affect may be 
relatively free floating, it does not follow that just any object can function equally well as 
an object of displacement. There must be a certain symbolic appropriateness. Relatively 
little is known about the laws of symbolic association which define the various categories 
of appropriateness, that is the gradients of symbolic generalization. However, certain 
types of generalization in this field are relatively well known on a concrete level. Thus 
for example it is well known that hostility tends to be displaced from parents to authority 
figures generally. Especially relative to socialization in certain types of kinship system, in 
a projective sense it may be true that all masculine authority roles are held by “father 
figures.” But it is extremely important to distinguish the truth of such a statement as 
applying to the projective symbolic significance of such roles for large parts of a 
population, and the actual institutional structure of such roles. Thus it is quite impossible 
4 This interpretation of the concept of projection was called to my attention by Professor R.F.Bales. 
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for an executive in a modern occupational organization to have a role which is in fact 
structurally identical with the father role in the kinship system in the same society.5 
Projective symbolism in this sense is by no means confined to what can readily and 
clearly be defined as “pathological” phenomena, such as the adulation of heroes and 
scapegoating. Much of it comes to be built into the actual social structure, especially in 
those patternings of activity which are especially significant as expressions of strain in 
rituals and what we have called “secondary institutions.” The significance of family 
relationships in early socialization is such that the projective symbolization or family 
members is particularly likely to appear in such a case. 
One example in the field of secondary institutions is that of the American youth 
culture. Here it is not without significance that the most prominent class of undergraduate 
college social clubs are called fraternities and sororities. Members address each other as 
“brother” and “sister,” especially on ceremonial occasions. It is certainly significant that 
these are symbolized as groups of “siblings” without the participation of parent-symbols. 
The “old grads” are not referred to as “fathers” but are “older brothers.” There is to be 
sure, sometimes the vaguely benevolent figure of the “house mother,” but emphatically 
never a “house father.” In the light of the functions of the youth culture in the process of 
emancipation from dependence on the conjugal family, particularly the parents, this 
symbolization is clearly appropriate and significant. 
In some other cultures, familial symbolism is very much more integrally built into the 
social structure. The case of the Roman Catholic Church is a particularly noteworthy one. 
Secular prestige figures are, in Catholic societies, generally not endowed with the 
projective status of family figures; and kings are not fathers and queens are not mothers 
in general. The church, however, is organizationally separated from secular society, and 
by its own symbolization it is a family “writ large.” God of course is the Father, but the 
priest as his vicar is also explicitly called Father. The Virgin assumes the Mother role,6 
and religious orders consist of Brothers and Sisters. There is an interesting sense in which 
it may be said that Catholicism, while recognizing that in secular life the individual must 
become emancipated from his childhood role in the family and assume both non-familial 
roles and parental roles within the family permits, indeed enjoins, that, in his religious 
capacity as a member of the church, the lay Catholic symbolically remains a child. 
Closely related to this religious extension of the symbolic familial role to other 
relationships is the provision of symbolic families. This is a feature of monarchical 
regimes generally. In England a very important place is occupied, not merely by the 
King, but by the Royal Family as a whole. It is a kind of prototype of what a family 
should be, especially perhaps since the reign of Victoria. All the crucial events within the 
Royal Family are followed with the strongest interest by the general public; indeed, there 
is a vicarious participation in its life by the whole nation. It is not surprising that the 
selection of a Queen should be treated as a matter of legitimate public concern, and not 
merely the private affair of the royal suitor. 
5 In general what may loosely be called “psychoanalytic sociology” has tended to pass over this 
extremely important distinction. 
  
6 There is also the Mother Superior of a Convent. 
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§ THE ROLE OF THE ARTIST 
IN THE above treatment one type of differentiation of roles with respect to expressive 
symbolism was discussed, namely, that in which the role itself was an integral part of the 
general system of expressive symbolism of the culture. We must now turn to the second 
type noted above, that where the incumbent of a differentiated role becomes not so much 
himself a symbol, as a specialist in the creation and manipulation (application) of 
expressive symbols. We find here a direct parallel to the creation and application of 
beliefs by the scientist or philosopher and the applied scientist. The term artist is 
generally used to designate both types, but differentiated as the “creative” artist and the 
“performer.” 
As we have noted above, expressive symbolism like cognitive beliefs is “originally” 
and “normally” embedded in the ordinary processes of action. The ordinary person who 
acts, and surrounds his action with objects in accord with a definite expressive “style” is 
no more an artist in the present sense than is the peasant who possesses knowledge about 
his soil, seed, fertilizer and crop pests and uses this knowledge in a practical way, a 
scientist. In both cases the use of the cultural pattern may be very skillful and “sound,” 
but this is not the criterion. The criterion is rather specialization of role with respect to the 
relevant aspects of the cultural tradition itself. In a strict sense then the creative artist is 
the person who specializes in the production of new patterns of expressive symbolism, 
and the performing artist is the person who specializes in the skilled implementation of 
such symbolism in an action context. Both are “experts” with respect to a particular phase 
of the cultural tradition. 
As is the case with any other type of specialty, this artistic type arises through 
differentiation relative to the other components of the total action complex. Once 
differentiated, furthermore, there is the same order of problem of the relation between the 
technical function of the role and its relational context which exists with respect to other 
differentiated roles. 
Placing the problem in this frame of reference at once directs our attention to the 
problems of disposal and of remuneration, as well as to the provision of facilities. There 
are two primary aspects of the disposal-remuneration problem of exchange relations. The 
first is the question of disposal on terms which will enable the artist to acquire the means 
ror meeting his other wants, which is a condition of his being able to specialize. This 
aspect is of course to be analyzed in the same theoretical terms as apply to any other 
specialized role, though of course the concrete conditions involve many special features 
in this case. 
The second aspect is that of the appreciative or expressive side of the disposal and 
remuneration relationships. This is the problem of the relation of the artist to his “public.” 
It is a very striking fact that in spite of the notorious “individualism” of artists, at least in 
the modern Western world, there is among them a very deep concern with 
communicating, with making an impression on a public. The expressive symbolism of art 
is not a “private” matter at all but is part of a culture. When it does become purely private 
and the individual ceases to try to communicate, he is a schizophrenic, not an artist, 
which is a very different type of social role, though one may shade into the other. 
Though there are many different variations, in broad terms this is the basis of the 
institutionalization of the role of the artist. He supplies a want or meets a need in his 
Expressive symbols and the social system     275
public, and on the expressive level he receives “appreciation” and admiration in return. 
He is highly sensitive to the attitudes of the significant others among his public. He has a 
responsibility for the maintenance of the standards which have been established, both to 
other persons and to himself, because these are institutionalized standards. The same 
basic mobilization of motivational elements which applies to other institutionalized roles 
also applies to this one. There are, of course, many specific differences, but they are not 
relevant at this level. 
There is a particular combination of expressive and instrumental elements or 
orientation in the role of the artist which is important to understanding some of the 
peculiarities of the role. For nimself and for his public the artist is engaged in creating 
expressive symbols. But it is precisely the difference in one respect between sophisticated 
art and purely “spontaneous” expressive activity that there is a “technical” aspect of the 
artist’s work which is directly comparable with other techniques. This aspect of his 
activity is instrumental. It depends on knowledge and skill in exactly the same 
fundamental sense as does industrial technology, or the technology of scientific research. 
The artist must accept severe disciplines, must spend much time in study and practicing 
his skills. But his goal is to produce appropriate patterns for the expression of affect, to 
“stir up” his audience or public. There seems to be an inherent tension between these two 
aspects of the role, which is not present for the scientist, because the content of the 
latter’s goal is not of the same order of direct cathectic significance. How much certain 
aspects of the situation in the Western world are culture bound it is difficult without 
careful comparative study to say. However, the well-known association of art with 
“Bohemianism,” with the repudiation of many of the main institutionalized patterns of 
ordinary life, is clearly very much less marked in the case of science. It may at least be 
suggested that in a society where affectively neutral patterns are institutionalized to such 
a high degree, the expressive interests of the artist come more drastically into conflict 
with the main institutional structure than do the interests of the scientist. In more 
expressively oriented societies the conflict is presumably not so acute, but conversely the 
opportunity for the scientist is less well developed. 
The parallel between the role of the artist and of the scientist extends to the structure 
of the continuum between the “pure” creative artist and the corresponding types of 
application. Corresponding to the professions in which science is applied, like medicine 
or engineering, we may distinguish the performer of sophisticated works of art, who is 
himself a trained “professional.” Of course only some among the media of artistic 
expression admit of specialized performance. The principal examples in our culture are 
music, the theater and the dance whereas some forms of literature, painting, sculpture and 
architecture do not admit of a separate role of performance. In their essentials the 
specialized roles of performers in these fields are similar in structure to that of the 
creative artist himself. There are, of course, often transitional types between the two as 
well. Thus a great concert musician or conductor is certainly “creative,” but in a sense 
parallel to that in which a great surgeon is. 
“Pure” art, whether as practiced by the creative artist or the performer, is parallel to 
specialization relative to non-evaluative cognitive orientation, to belief systems. As we 
have seen evaluative symbolism, religious or not, is not “purely” expressive. We can, 
however, have specialization in the creation and performance of evaluative symbolism as 
well as of “pure art.” The core of Greek art seems in these terms to have been evaluative 
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in its original setting, to have been both civic and religious in different contexts. Similarly 
religious art has played a very prominent part in Western culture. A distinction should, 
however, be made between artistic creation which is itself an act of religious devotion, as 
in the building of cathedrals, and the use of religious symbolic content in artistic 
creations, as is the case with so much of Renaissance art. A good deal of the latter should 
not be called religious art in a full sense. It shades over into “pure” art. 
In the above sense, the actual conduct of collective ceremonials may in certain cases 
be treated as artistic performance of a special type. Much of the “embellishment” of 
religious ritual is clearly art in this sense. Thus the singing of a Bach mass as part of the 
religious service itself is an integral part of the religious expression. But the singing of 
the same mass in a secular concert hall may be an act of a quite different order. Similarly, 
Lincoln’s Gettysburg address as on’ginally delivered was not “literature,” it was an act of 
expressive symbolization of the collective need dispositions of the nation, or at least the 
North; it was part of a collectivity ceremonial. It has, however, to a certain degree 
become divorced from this context and come to be treated as “art.” 
Thus in addition to the creative artist and the artistic performer we may speak of the 
ceremonial performer, who manipulates artistic symbolism in an evaluative context, 
where its meaning in terms of explicit common values is directly symbolized. 
The distinction is paralleled by that between modes of participation of the public or 
audience. The standards of pure art in this sense are institutionalized only in “acceptance” 
terms. As we ordinarily put it, we are “pleased” or “moved” by a work of art or its 
performance. But this attitude does not have specifically binding implications for our 
action beyond this specific context. In general, attendance at performances, or paying 
attention to art as such, is treated as voluntary. 
The most essential modification of this occurs when adherence to a set of artistic 
standards becomes itself the primary symbol of belonging to a sub-cultural group. This 
tends to be true of the “coteries of the art world, the schools and the “little revues.” This 
is the elevation of what in terms of the general cultural tradition is a secondary basis of 
institutionalization into a primary basis for a special sub-culture, one which, however, in 
the nature of the case could not become a primary basis of institutionalization of a 
society. It is direcdy paralleled by the “sects” of intellectuals who share a common belief 
system differing from the diffuser general ideology of the society. 
Where, however, expressive symbols become an integral part of the primary 
orientation system of a collectivity, the mode of institutionalization is that of 
commitment, not of acceptance only. A far severer set of sanctions is mobilized for 
conformity and against deviance, and there is pressure for a far closer integration of the 
expressive symbolism with the major value-orientations of the collectivity. Thus, 
characteristically in the Soviet Union, literature, which merely tries to portray human 
beings, their feelings and conflicts, is distinctly frowned upon. Art must be “proletarian,” 
it must serve the cause of the Revolution directly. Anything which does not have such a 
direct relation to the major values of the society is “frivolous” or possibly counter 
revolutionary. 
There is a whole class of phenomena which fall in between the attribution of symbolic 
significance to roles which are not primarily expressive in their functions, and the 
primarily expressive rolesystem comprising the artist and his public. Perhaps the most 
conspicuous of these is the role of the propagandist, who is consciously using available 
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expressive symbolism or creating new symbols, in order to manipulate the attitudes of a 
public. Whenever a leadership or executive role is performed in such a way that the 
symbolic aspects of the role are not merely accepted, but explicitly arranged for and 
manipulated, the leader is in some degree in this sense a propagandist. He is appealing to 
the sentiments of his constituency by to some degree redefining the situation in symbolic 
terms. The “pure” artist on the other hand, we may say, is not oriented to the influencing 
of the attitudes of his public in other than expressive terms, but only to giving “form” to 
their expressive interests. The symbol systems with which the artist operates are, 
however, deeply involved in the equilibrium of the whole attitude system. It is an easy 
transition from pure art to their use in such a way as to attempt to influence attitudes in a 
direction favorable to particular courses of action in other than purely expressive 
contexts. 
Thus both expressive leadership and artistic roles tend to become involved in 
“propaganda” activities. Frequently the expressive leader provides the principal 
legitimation of the propaganda, it is for instance promulgated in his name, while the artist 
contributes to the “technique.” Thus the practice of a political figure, e.g., the late 
President Roosevelt, having key speeches at least partly written by a literary artist 
(Robert E.Sherwood) is a case in point. Propaganda in this sense may, of course, have the 
most varied expressive content and may serve the most varied ends. A class of great 
significance in our own society is that of advertising appeal. But of greater significance is 
the proselytization of orientations where evaluative symbolism and beliefs are involved, 
in the political and religious movements which have a strong “charismatic” tinge. 
It should be clear from the whole of the foregoing analysis that at many points a very 
intimate fusion occurs between cognitive orientation patterns, i.e., belief systems, and 
expressive symbols. Indeed there is always both a cognitive and an expressive aspect to 
any set of symbols. Only in some types of “ideas” do the cognitive interests and value-
standards have clear primacy, so that the criteria of cognitive adequacy, clarity, logical 
consistency and respect for evidence are prominently involved. In all of what have been 
called evaluative beliefs, ‘this aspect is not clearly primary, but yet it may have 
considerable significance. However, starting with evaluative beliefs, the expressive 
interest acquires great significance, and in many ideological and religious belief systems 
the specific symbols become to a very great extent expressive symbols. This is 
particularly true where intermediate symbolism in the sense discussed in the last chapter 
is prominently involved, but it may also be true of highly abstract concepts or 
generalizations, such as the concept of Divine Grace, or of the Dialectic. Where such 
abstract entities are treated as expressive symbols, however, there is almost certain to be a 
“vulgar” concretization of them so that more tangible symbolic entities enter in. Thus in 
popular Catholicism the conception of intercession by a Saint is common, the saint being 
a greatly humanized and concretized figure. Similarly in vulgar Marxism, the con-ception 
of the “imperialist circles” who are responsible for opposing the course of the revolution 
contrary to the will of the “people” is such a concretized symbol, as indeed is that of the 
“people” itself. 
Toward the pole of mythology, however, as was noted in the last chapter, cognitive 
criteria as such tend to be subordinated and the expressive elements to take precedence. 
The very common situation in hon-literate cultures wnere certain institutions are 
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“explained” by the “fact” that a certain mythological figure did so and so in the remote 
past certainly belong in this category. 
It is also, however, possible for expressive symbolism to develop certain types of 
refinement and “abstraction” so that rather than concretization taking place as in the 
creation of personal figures, certain rather abstract symbolic patterns become a primary 
orienting framework. One of the principal examples of this appears to be the traditional 
Chinese system of symbolic orientations. The “conceptions” of Tao, Yang and Yin are 
certainly not anthropomorphic or otherwise concretized. But Granet7 seems to be quite 
correct in his contention that these are not “concepts” in the sense of Western philosophy. 
We may call them highly abstract expressive symbols, and speak of the Chinese 
orientation as one in which, in the primary evaluative symbol system, the expressive 
element has primacy over the cognitive. This interpretation fits with the particularism, 
traditionalism, and “ritualization” of traditional Chinese society.  
§ EXPRESSIVE SYMBOLISM AND THE REWARD SYSTEM 
IN CHAPTER IV above the concepts of facilities and of rewards were treated, along with 
the conception of the allocation of personnel among roles, as the primary foci of the 
allocative processes of the social system. Both belong to the category of “possessions,” 
that is, of entities, rights in which are transferable from one actor to another through the 
process of “exchange.” Possessions are facilities in so far as their primary significance to 
actors lies in their instrumental uses, while possessions are rewards in so far as their 
significance is expressive, that is, so far as they constitute objects of direct gratification 
without regard to their instrumental uses. It goes without saying that the same concrete 
objects may be, and very generally are, both facilities and rewards. The distinction is 
analytical, not concretely classificatory. 
It was argued above that the “core” of the reward system in a social system is to be 
found in the attitudes of actors toward each other. These attitudes were called “relational 
possessions” in that ego can “give” or “withhold” a favorable attitude from alter, he can 
make it contingent on alter’s performance in a variety of respects and he can choose 
objects on which to bestow it. He can also control his unfavorable attitudes, he can “get 
mad” or blame alter for actions—or qualities—which he dislikes. Attitudes are thus 
contingently controllable. They are also as we have seen the core of the system of 
mutually oriented expectations in the interaction process. Hence so far as ego entertains a 
legitimized expectation of alter’s attitudes toward him we may speak of his having a 
“right” to that attitude. The conditions on which alter may legitimately change his attitude 
toward ego are institutionally defined just as are the conditions on which he may 
legitimately dispose of a physical object in his possession. Hence we may say that the 
conditions of holding and of transfer of relational possessions are institutionally 
regulated, and hence the allocation of such possessions is so regulated. 
 
7 La pensée chinoise. He uses the term emblèmes. 
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Finally, it was further argued that all other rewards must tend to become symbolically 
integrated with relational possessions. This is not in the least to say that many objects 
other than actors do not have cathectic significance which can vary independently relative 
to that of the attitudes of actors. It is only to say that the significance of other actors, and 
the cultural patterns directly integrated with their attitudes, is so great that the cathectic 
significance of these other objects, e.g., food objects, cannot be independent of the 
system of relational possessions without also being interdependent with it. The attitudes 
of persons from whom one receives food, to whom one gives food, and with whom one 
eats food, are an integral part of the symbolic complex relative to food habits, It is, for 
instance, well known to how great an extent commensality serves as a symbol of 
solidarity, and its denial as a symbol of the lack of solidarity. 
The initial treatment of expressive symbolism in the present chapter took its departure 
from essentially these considerations. It will be remembered that it was held that the 
focus of the whole system of expressive symbolism is the symbolic act relative to one or 
more alters, and that the primary symbohc reference of the symbolic act is the attitude of 
the actor performing it. Other symbols, physical or cultural, become organized into an 
associated complex relative to this attitudinal core of the symbolic system. We may say, 
then, that one major element of the value of a reward may always be traced back to the 
ways in which it symbolizes the attitudes of significant actors, alter or ego himself, 
individual or collective. 
But this is not merely one major element in the value of the reward. It is quite clearly 
that element which is most crucial to the structure of the social system. For it is elements 
of stability in the mutuality of orientation of interactive relationships which essentially 
constitute the structure of the social system. Its stability depends on the integration of the 
interests of actors with the patterning of the interaction process. If interests in objects 
other than the attitudes of actors cannot be integrated with this mutual attitude system, 
such interests must constitute threats to the stability of the social system. This is simply 
an aspect of the fundamental theorem of the institutional integration of motivation which 
was developed above in Chapter II. 
Mutually oriented attitudes in the social system are, as we have seen, extremely 
complex and varied. We have found, however, that the main types may be classified in 
terms of the two pattern variables of affectivity-neutrality and specificity-diffuseness, 
yielding the four familiar types of receptiveness-response, love, approval and esteem. We 
may, then, classify expressive symbols as patterns of the reward system according to 
which of the four attitude types they symbolize, as was developed above. 
Every social system must be characterized by some ordering of its reward system, that 
is, of allocation of the possession of expressive symbols relative to positive and negative 
attitudes. At the core, that is, with relation to the attitudes themselves, this involves 
coordination of the criteria of legitimate claim to a positive attitude, and of legitimation 
of changes in the attitudinal system. There are two main types of these changes, first, 
transfer of an attachment from one object to another, for instance, of love where the 
attitude is of such a character as to preclude it being held toward an indefinite plurality of 
objects at the same time. The second type is the shift from positive to negative attitudes 
toward the same object-through a point of balance between the positive and the negative 
components, of course. 
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Beyond the core there must be an ordering of the symbolic significances of other 
objects relative to the attitudinal focus. Since almost all objects associated with action 
acquire symbolic significance to some degree, there must be common symbolic meanings 
of these objects relative to the attitudinal system. 
This imperative may first be applied to the category of purely expressive as 
distinguished from evaluative symbolism. This in turn falls into the two sub-classes of 
attitudes of affective attachment and style pattern symbolism. 
The positively affective as distinguished from the affectively neutral attitudes toward 
actors have a strong tendency to be associated with particularism. Hence the problems of 
order in relation to them tend to be concerned with three foci. The first is the definition of 
the legitimate content of such symbolism itself, the second of the legitirnate objects of 
attachment, the processes of their selection, degrees of exclusiveness, etc., and the third 
the limits on the expressive interests and obligations thus assumed. One of the most 
conspicuous examples of this ordering is to be found in the institutionalization of kinship 
relationships, and the associated fields of the regulation of courtship and erotic 
relationships generally. The strong sanction of legitimacy on marriage, and at most 
permission of a secondary status to other bases of erotic relationship, the taboo on 
homosexuality, and the institutionalization of affectional relationships between parents 
and children, and between siblings all belong in this category. 
One of the most important facts in this field is that most societies do not permit that 
expressive symbolism in the erotic, or even the affectional sphere, should be purely 
expressive except within quite narrow limits, it becomes evaluative, and even frequently 
directly religious in reference. In other words, this is a doubly strong institutionalized 
sphere. This strongly suggests that the allocation of this class of rewards is of great 
functional significance to the social system, a suggestion which is confirmed by such 
facts as the ubiquity of sexual jealousy. 
What is true of individual actors as objects of attachment and 
the expressive symbolism focusing on such an attachment is also true of collectivities. 
Here the focal problem for the social system is the allocation of loyalties among the 
different collectivities in which the component individual actors have roles, and the 
symbolization of these loyalties. For example, a society focused on kinship solidarity to 
the extent of that of classical China, is not, without drastic reorganization of its reward 
system, able to develop strong loyalties to other types of collectivity which differ greatly 
in their structure, particularly those institutionalizing universalistic standards. So long as 
the kinship symbol system remains intact, and its expressive significance untouched, it is 
not possible to reward individuals adequately to motivate loyalty to other types of 
collectivity. 
An obverse type of situation is found in our own society. Particularly between men, 
we institutionalize a diffuse “friendliness” among occupational associates, to a markedly 
higher degree than is the case, for example, in most European countries. This is 
symbolized in such ways as the use of first names, various informal social relationships 
such as “having a drink” together, and often a “kidding” relationship. But such expressive 
orientations are not permitted to go too far in particularistic exclusiveness; there is an 
obligation to manifest them relatively impartially toward all associates or colleagues, and 
the corresponding expressive symbols and rewards are organized in this way. The 
conspicuous thing about this pattern is the limit placed on its particufarism and hence its 
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integration with the universalism of the occupational system. It readily becomes evident 
how breaking through these limits could be threatening by providing occasions ror 
“favoritism” in the instrumental aspects or the same concrete relationships. 
The allocation of the symbolism of attachment to individuals and to collectivities 
shades off into that to physical and cultural objects. Here, of course, the significance of 
the allocation problem depends very heavily on the scarcity factor. This aspect calls 
attention to a very important dimension of the reward system, namely, the differential 
distribution of valued expressive symbols. 
The case of the erotic attachment is a good point of departure for discussing this. The 
approximate equality of numbers of the sexes means that if the main basis of erotic 
rewards is institutionalized in monogamous marriage there can be a presumption of equal 
distribution of these rewards through the allocation to each person of one mate. This does 
not, of course, mean that there will not be any differentiations of desirability, but that 
with respect to the fundamental difference between having and not having access to a 
spouse there will tend not to be a major differentiation. In a society, on the other hand, 
where polygyny is institutionalized, probably universally plurality of wives tends to 
become a status symbol, and the poorer and less influential elements are excluded from 
this reward, and by a still further consequence a certain proportion of low status men are 
excluded from marriage altogether. It may also be noted that such a situation would tend 
to skew the internal structure of the kinship unit in a “patriarchal” direction, because on 
the one hand in the upper groups wives could be played off against each other while in 
the lower, the draining off of desirable women would create a tendency for men to seek 
wives from lower statuses than their own. 
It is clear that in this context, as well as those discussed in a previous section, the 
symbolic structure may become skewed as a consequence of projective needs resulting 
from strain and ambivalence. One of the most obvious cases is that of the place of 
symbolism in sexual jealousy. Here the primary focus is, of course, on the loyalty of the 
partner. Compulsiveness is manifested in the insistent demand for proof of that loyalty, 
and the demands tend to become such that unless alter is himself submissively oriented, it 
is not possible for him to satisfy them, if then. Ambivalence explains the readiness with 
which love can alternate with aggression toward the object. But the most essential point 
for the present context is that the normal expressive symbolism of the love attitude is 
shifted so that excessive acts of devotion are required to prove loyalty, and their omission 
is projectively interpreted as showing the absence of the expected loyalty. Where such 
motivation exists there may be an extra drive for some persons to attempt to control a 
larger sector of the relational reward system than by their institutionalized status they are 
entitled to. This may, as in the case of jealousy just discussed, take the form of 
monopolizing more of the devotion of a single love object than is legitimate, or it may 
take the form of attempting to establish such relations with a larger number of objects 
than the actor is legitimately entitled to. The latter type of factor is involved in “Don 
Juanism” and in the needs of the “predatory” glamor girl type to command the devotion 
of whole coteries of men. 
The second type of purely expressive symbolism with respect to which the allocative 
problem arises is composed of physical and cultural objects in their “style pattern” 
signincance, both the style of the object itself and the symbolic significance of possessing 
that object, in certain quantities and qualities, as part of the style of life of the actor in 
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question. The ordering of this aspect of the reward system involves some rather complex 
considerations. 
In the first place, as is true of relational rewards as such, access to non-relational 
expressive symbols is a function of power. The most obvious aspect of this in a society 
like our own is access through purchasing power. Hence so far as purchasing power is, 
for whatever reasons, differentially distributed, it must result in differential access to 
valued expressive symbols. The differential access in turn introduces an inevitable status-
comparative dimension into the organization of this aspect of the reward system. Other 
things being equal having greater access to the possession of expressive symbols means 
that one has a more highly valued and privileged position with respect to the reward 
system, one can acquire more and “better” things. What is true of purchasing power is 
also true with certain modifications of political power. Here the style factor appears in 
access to elements of the style of life which are differentially accessible to persons at 
different power levels. Thus the symbolization of occupying the top executive’s office 
with its better furnishings and the like would fit here. 
In both respects, by virtue of this comparative dimension, style symbolism necessarily 
becomes in one aspect status symbolism in the hierarchical sense. This is in the nature of 
the case since the person higher up in the scale, since he has command of more 
purchasing power, or more political power, is by definition in a “better” position than the 
one lower down. Hence obviously it is imperative that such style symbolism should, in 
access terms at least, be legitimatized and institutionalized. The actor in question must 
“have a right” to live the way he does. 
This hierarchical aspect of the style system is always present, but “other things” are at 
best only approximately equal, so this factor is cross cut by another set of considerations. 
Given differential access to expressively symbolic objects, how this access is used is 
subject to performance criteria and contingent sanctions in terms of appreciative 
standards, that is, in terms of canons of “taste.” So far as expressive orientation is 
concerned, the level of access through power may be treated as an ascribed base, but how 
this access is used is subject to achievement by the individual actor. Therefore there tends 
in every reward system, relative to the levels of access to style-objects, to be independent 
variability with respect to standards of taste. In this way the nouveau riche may be guilty 
of “vulgarity,” while the impoverished aristocrat, with his greatly inferior resources, 
displays “exquisite taste,” and thereby symbolizes a superiority which is not rully 
impugned by the greater power of the other. 
Style symbolism thus permeates the whole social structure. It has a pronounced 
element of desirability and its objects are inherently scarce. Hence their allocation must 
be institutionally regulated in the social system. However, regulation in terms of power of 
access is only one form of regulation. That in terms of realization of standards of taste is 
another which cross cuts the first. It can in certain respects serve to offset the prestige-
implications of differential access, and thereby serve as an independent balancing force in 
the system of social stratification. 
Both, of course, are subject to projective distortion of the main institutionalized 
values. On the one hand this projective distortion relative to well-established standards of 
taste is the main feature of the vulgarity of the parvenu. He does not yet feel secure in his 
enhanced status position and therefore tends to distort style symbols from their more 
intrinsic expressive significance in relation to disciplined appreciative norms, into 
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predominandy status symbols. Since his need to symbolize his status is compulsive, he is 
apt to be somewhat undiscriminating in his choices of ways to do it, to go in for 
“extremes” and for quantity rather than quality. Persistence of a residue of lower status 
style patterns is also common. On the other hand, especially for groups with an ascribed 
status position in a society wnere achievement criteria are strongly institutionalized, it is 
common for the projective distortion of style symbolism to operate in the obverse way. In 
this case the actor tends to compen-sate for the dubious legitimacy of his ascribed 
position by emphasizing his superiority of taste to the vulgar multitude who are engaged 
in achievement activities. Since at the top of the scale of stratification in an achievement 
system, there must be a modification of the incidence of achievement values, it is 
suggestive that patronage of the arts, which is a prominent interest of such groups, 
constitutes an important mechanism for legitimatizing the status of the elite groups. 
We may now turn to the affectively neutral components of the reward system which 
focus on the attitudes of approval and esteem. Attention has been called a number of 
times to the fact that these are more directly relevant to the institutionalization of the 
larger structures of the social system than are the affective attitudes, mainly because of 
the inherent limitations on securing immediate gratification from the cathexis of 
generalized patterns, and of the necessity for certain types of discipline in acting in 
accord with those patterns, notably but by no means exclusively perhaps universalism 
and achievement-orientations. We have also called attention to the great importance of 
the development of sensitivity to these attitudes in the course of the socialization process. 
The attitude of approval is relevant wherever the contingency element operates in 
social interaction, wherever there is a question of conformity with an expectation, where 
that is, there is a possibility of failing to conform. Then alter can reward ego for 
conformity with his expectation by his approval, and punish him for non-conformity by 
his disapproval. The place of the normative pattern comes in essentially as the 
generalization of these expectations. Clearly, then, the institutionalization of attitudes of 
approval-disapproval is in certain respects the focus of the institutionalization of the 
reward system generally. It is the sine qua non of social stability. 
In this most general sense the relevance of approval rewards applies to conformity 
with the expectations of any role in any social system. Another aspect emerges, however, 
with extension of the range within which opportunities for performance and its valuation 
open up. The crucial transition is that between living up to the norms defining specific 
traditionalized expectations of the given role in which ego happens to be placed, and 
having his status itself become contingent on his performance. Then the incidence of 
approval rewards is no longer confined to symbolizing that ego is a “good” whatever it is, 
a good boy, a good servant or peasant or what not. Approval then becomes the symbolic 
focus of reward for having achieved beyond what was ascribed to an initial status. It is 
here that the peculiar dynamics of the reward system of an achievement-oriented social 
structure open out. 
We may focus the consideration of these problems on the concept of “success.”8 
Success is, in a situation where achievement goals are paramount, the measure of the 
degree of attainment of the valued goals. These may of course be of the most varying 
content. Our concern here, however, is not with this content, but with certain generalized 
aspects of the organization of such goal-striving in social systems. Since, we are 
assuming, achievement goal-striving takes place in the context of social relationships, we 
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must first make clear that the valuation of the attainment of the goals is a common 
valuation not peculiar to ego. This is the basis of the relevance of alter’s approval, and 
indeed only this gives much of the force to ego’s own self-approval and hence his 
motivation to achievement, in that, namely, his success is measured by himself in terms 
of an internalized common value-pattern. Hence we may say that the source of 
gratification is never the attainment of the goal alone but the achievement as measured in 
terms of a value-standard, which gives both ego’s and alter’s approval its relevance as a 
reward. The striving for goal achievement and the striving for approval are thus 
inseparable in an integrated social structure. 
In the pursuit of achievement-goals and of approval there is an inherent comparative 
“better or worse” dimension. Ego can and does measure his achievement by intrinsic 
standards without reference to the achievement of an alter, but if many are striving for the 
same goals, it is inevitable that in some sense they should be judged as doing better or 
worse by the same standards, ego that is should excel alter or vice versa. Thus approval 
as a reward has an inherent dimension of differential distrioution; it cannot be distributed 
equally to all performers in an achievement system without vitiating the whole meaning 
of the system.  
Finally, if a system of approval rewards is to be integrated in a social system, this 
comparative dimension implies that it will be a source of strain if to some degree 
different lines of achievement are not reduced to a common denominator. The very fact 
that actors are sensitive to approval and disapproval means that for those in different lines 
of goal-striving it cannot be indifferent whether attainment in one line is or is not more 
highly approved than in another. It is inherent in a social system with a developed 
division of labor that there should be a wide variety of concrete goal striving activities. 
These must be ordered into some sort of a system, including an ordering of their 
precedence in the approval scale. There must be higher and lower achievements. 
Actual intrinsic achievement, or lack of it, and the approval or disapproval of actors do 
not, however, stand alone in the symbolic complex of which achievement values are the 
center. In the nature of the case other entities of possible symbolic significance are 
involved. In the type of case with which we are concerned a system of monetary 
exchange is generally involved, and, as part of it, money remuneration in occupational 
roles. It seems almost inevitable that the level of money remuneration should become a 
symbol in this complex. Money has the one particularly striking property of unambiguous 
quantitative measurability. Therefore, precisely in the hierarchical aspect of an 
achievement system, comparative level of money remuneration very readily becomes a 
major symbol of success. This symbolic association is further encouraged by the fact that 
money remuneration is a necessary common denominator as between different classes of 
concrete achievement goals. Hence, it can at least be said that where there is an at all well 
integrated system of the valuation of different achievements, it is highly important for the 
differentiation of monetary rewards to be integrated with it. In so far as money income is 
treated as a symbol of success, it is clearly a source of strain if the relation is reversed, the 
higher the achievement the less the money income, 
 
8 It will be remembered from Chapter VI that success is a “situationally generalized goal.” 
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There are other “auxiliary” symbols of success than money income. Clearly in a 
differentiated achievement system organization occupies a prominent place. Hence status 
in organizations is certain to acquire symbolic significance in this context. The 
connection between income and status in organization, which in one aspect is position in 
the power system, with power as a basis of access to symbols of the style of life, is 
obvious. Other types of “informar power status may also have a comparable significance, 
though they are generally not so highly visible, a factor of great significance for 
symbolization. 
The attitude of approval must have visible signs to which to attach itself, since in the 
nature of the case it is a contingent attitude. Often actual intrinsic achievement is difficult 
for alter to judge, because of communication difficulties, lack of technical competence, 
inaccessibility for observation and such factors. Hence especially for purposes of the 
broader comparisons, it is very easy and to some degree essential, for alter’s attitudes of 
approval—and to some degree ego’s own—to be made contingent on ego’s acquisition of 
symbols of achievement as well as achievement itself. This fact automatically makes the 
acquisition of such symbols in some sense a meaningful goal for ego. 
In an institutionally integrated system of action achievement, approval of 
achievement, and the principal symbols of achievement should be integrated together in 
an inseparable complex. Above all acquisition of the symbols of achievement should be 
possible only by the appropriate achievement. But short of this level of integration there 
is the possibility of a rift between them. It becomes realistically possible to acquire 
money without a requisite level of valued achievement, and also to acquire status in 
organizations, etc. We do not need to go into the various features of the social system 
which make the occurrence of such opportunities possible and to some degree inevitable. 
At this point there is a particularly important opening for the operation of projective 
distortions. The actor with compulsive motivations, above all when they center on the 
adequacy problem as it was called in Chapter VII, may have a compulsive need for 
approval, including self-approval. This need is not likely to be satisfied by direct 
achievement alone. The tendency is to distort the definition of the situation by making 
doubly sure that one is approved. The opportunity to accumulate more than a due 
measure of the symbols of achievement presents a very ready outlet for this compulsive 
motivation. We may surmise that in such an achievement system, the persons who are 
unduly concerned with money rewards9 and with their power position have a prominent 
component of this type of compulsive motivation. 
This would above all be true of those with active motivation to compulsive conformity 
with the success goal. Where there is a trend to passivity, it takes the form of a striving 
for undue “security” in the common-sense meaning of the term. This for instance can be 
found in trying to be over-certain of the stability of even a modest income, as well as in 
the perfectionism of detail which sacrifices the central achievement goals for assurance of 
immunity from active disapproval. 
Thus the attitude of approval and its negative constitute another primary focus of the 
expressive-symbolic reward system. It is the center of a symbolic complex which 
includes money income and power position and which has to be integrated with the 
symbolism of the style of life. The whole complex must be organized and ordered as a 
central part of the integration of the social system. In this ordering the dimension of 
differential reward relative to the value system occupies a central place. 
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Finally, the attitude of esteem differs from that of approval by its diffuseness. For this 
reason it is the paramount focus of the scale of prestige in a society which is the core of 
the system of stratification. Attitudes of approval can be segregated by context. It is 
possible to approve one act of ego and disapprove another, to consider him to be a highly 
competent technician and a bad administrator at the same time. But in the social system 
there is a functional problem comparable to that of reducing particular achievements to a 
common denominator which was just mentioned. To some degree, as measured by the 
dominant value system, there must be an over-all judgment of a human being; it is this 
which we mean by the esteem in which he is held. Far less than in any other of the cases 
of relational rewards can the bases of the attitude of esteem be left uninstitutionalized in a 
society. This fact is the main functional basis for the existence of social stratification as 
an essential feature of every social system. 
The diffuse breadth of the factors which must be integrated in a judgment of esteem is 
such that stratification is inevitably an important focus of strain in a social system. It will 
suffice to mention, for our own society, the problem of integrating the individualistic 
achievement aspects of the occupational system, and the solidarity of the kinship system, 
as that problem was discussed in Chapter V. It is this sort of functional problem which 
makes the phenomena of social class such an important field for sociological study. 
As in the case of approval rewards, those of esteem are obviously linked with a 
symbolic complex which extends well beyond the central value-foci which provide the 
direct standards of esteem. This is particularly true of style symbolism because of its 
visibility and its relative controllability by the individual or the small subcollectivity. 
It would be possible to go much farther into detail in the theory of social stratification, 
especially in analyzing the ramifications of the complex of esteem-symbolism, and in 
analyzing the types of malintegration to be found in systems of stratification, the factors 
involved in them and the adaptive structures which are for understandable reasons 
particularly prominent in this area. These problems, important as they are, will have to be 
left to the more specialized theory of stratification, which is one principal branch of the 
theory of social systems. 
More generally, the present chapter has been a sketch. As it was noted at its beginning, 
the theory of expressive symbolism is one of the least satisfactorily developed parts of the 
theory of action generally, and of social systems in particular. The reader will note, 
however, that we have been able to contribute more to the problems of the relations of 
certain known types of expressive symbolism to the social system, than to the 
systematization of the field on the cultural level itself. Indeed there is an urgent need for 
more work, which is only very partially the province of the sociologist, on the laws and 
types of symbolic patterning and association. The contrast with the cognitive field is 
striking. We have a very well-developed knowledge of the structure of belief systems as 
such, but a very fragmentary one of the structure of systems of expressive symbols. It 
may be safely predicted that advances in this field will contribute very greatly to the 
advance of the sciences of action.  
 
9 It is, we may surmise, essentially this phenomenon to which Elton Mayo referred when he spoke 
of “the acquisitiveness of a sick society.” Cf. Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization. 
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X 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND DYNAMIC 
PROCESS: THE CASE OF MODERN 
MEDICAL PRACTICE1 
 
WE HAVE followed a long and complicated course in working through the derivation of 
the major structural outlines of the social system from the action frame of reference, in 
the analysis of the central place of patterns of value-orientation in this structure, in the 
analysis of the motivational mechanisms of social process, and that of the involvement of 
cultural patterns other than those of value-orientation in the social system. It will perhaps 
help the reader to appreciate the empirical relevance of the abstract analysis we have 
developed if, in addition to the illustrative material which has been introduced bearing on 
many particular points, we attempt to bring together many if not most of the threads of 
the foregoing discussion in a more extensive analysis of some strategic features of an 
important sub-system of modern Western society. 
For this purpose we have chosen modern medical practice. This field has been a 
subject of long-standing interest2 on the author’s part as a result of which he has a greater 
command of the empirical material in this field than in most others. But it also provides 
an excellent opportunity to illustrate some of the interrelations of the principal elements 
of the social system which have been reviewed in more abstract terms. A highly 
distinctive cultural tradition, certain parts of modern science, provides a central focus for 
the activities of the medical profession. We have already seen that there are important 
problems of the modes of institutionalization of such a cultural tradition. This 
institutionalization fits into the functional context of a ubiquitous practical problem in all 
societies, that of health, and is specially organized relative to 
1 For general comparison with this chapter the reader may be referred to L.J.Henderson, “Physician 
and Patient as a Social System,” New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 212, May 2, 1935, 819–
23. 
2 The most important phase of this interest was concerned with a field study of medical practice 
which was carried out mainly in the Boston area several years ago. A variety of circumstances 
prevented the completion of that study and its publication in the intended form. Hence the 
opportunity has been taken for the rormulation of some of the most important of the results in the 
context of their relevance to the present work. Of course the earlier interpretations have been 
considerably modified by subsequent theoretical development and by other ex 
distinctive role patterns and value-orientations in our own society. Finally, as has already 
been brought out briefly, the bearing of the therapeutic process on the problems of 
deviance and social control is such that adequate analysis of the motivational processes 
involved has implications reaching far beyond the particular field to throw a great deal of 
light on the general motivational balance of the social system.  
§ THE FUNCTIONAL SETTING OF MEDICAL PRACTICE AND THE 
CULTURAL TRADITION 
IN THE most general terms medical practice may be said to be oriented to coping with 
disturbances to the “health” of the individual, with “illness” or “sickness.” Traditionally 
the principal emphasis has been on “treatment” or “therapy,” that is, on dealing with 
cases which have already developed a pathological state, and attempting to restore them 
to health or normality. Recently there has been increasing emphasis on “preventive 
medicine,” that is, controlling the conditions which produce illness. For our purposes, 
however, the therapeutic functional context will present sufficient problems. 
A little reflection will show immediately that the problem of health is intimately 
involved in the functional prerequisites of the social system as defined above. Certainly 
by almost any definition health is included in the functional needs of the individual 
member of the society so that from the point of view of functioning of the social system, 
too low a general level of health, too high an incidence of illness, is dysfunctional. This is 
in the first instance because illness incapacitates for the effective performance of social 
roles. It could of course be that this incidence was completely uncontrollable by social 
action, an independently given condition of social life. But in so far as it is controllable, 
through rational action or otherwise, it is clear that there is a functional interest of the 
society in its control, broadly in the minimization of illness. As one special aspect of this, 
attention may be called to premature death. From a variety of points of view, the birth 
and rearing of a child constitute a “cost” to the society, through pregnancy, child care, 
socialization, formal training and many other channels. Premature death, before the 
individual has had the opportunity to play out his full quota of social roles, means that 
only a partial “retum” for this cost has been received. 
All this would be true were illness purely a “natural phenomenon” in the sense that, 
like the vagaries of the weather, it was not, to our knowledge, reciprocally involved in the 
motivated interactions of human beings. In this case illness would be something which 
merely “happened to” people, which involved consequences which had to be dealt with 
and conditions which might or might not be controllable but was in no way an expression 
of motivated behavior. 
perience, notably training in psychoanalysis. It is, however, of considerable interest that it was in 
connection with the earlier study of medical practice that the beginnings of the pattern variable 
scheme’were first worked out. 
There has been fragmentary previous publication of results in three places, the paoers “The 
Professions and Social Structure” and “Propaganda and Social Control,” Essays, Chapters VIII and 
XIII, and “Education and the Professions,” Ethics, Vol. 47, 365–369. 
The original study was assisted financially by a grant from the Harvard Committee on Research in 
the Social Sciences. This assistance is hereby gratefully acknowledged. 
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This is in fact the case for a very important part of illness, but it has become 
increasingly clear, by no means for all. In a variety of ways motivational factors 
accessible to analysis in action terms are involved in the etiology of many illnesses, and 
conversely, though without exact correspondence, many conditions are open to 
therapeutic influence through motivational channels. To take the simplest kind of case, 
differential exposure, to injuries or to infection, is certainly motivated, and the role of 
unconscious wishes to be injured or to fall ill in such cases has been clearly 
demonstrated. Then there is the whole range of “psycho-somatic” illness about which 
knowledge has been rapidly accumulating in recent years. Finally, there is the field of 
“mental disease,” the symptoms of which occur mainly on the behavioral level. Of course 
somatic states which are not motivationally determined may play a larger or smaller part 
in any or all of them, in some like syphilitic paresis they may be overwhelmingly 
predominant, but over the field as a whole there can be no douot of the relevance of 
illness to the functional needs of the social system, in the further sense of its involvement 
in the motivated processes of interaction. At one time most medical opinion inclined to 
the “reduction” of all illness to a physiological and biological level in both the sense that 
etiology was always to be found on that level, and that only through such channels was 
effective therapy possible. This is certainly not the predominant medical view today. If it 
ever becomes possible to remove the hyphen from the term “psycho-somatic” and 
subsume all of “medical science” under a single conceptual scheme, it can be regarded as 
certain that it will not be the conceptual scheme of the biological science of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is also certain that this conceptual scheme will 
prove applicable to a great deal of the range of social action in areas which extend well 
beyond what has conventionally been defined as the sphere of medical interests. 
The fact that the relevance of illness is not confined to the non-motivated purely 
situational aspect of social action greatly increases its significance for the social system. 
It becomes not merely an “external” danger to be “warded off” but an integral part of the 
social equilibrium itself. Illness may be treated as one mode of response to social 
pressures, among other things, as one way of evading social responsibilities. But it may 
also, as will appear, have some possible positive functional significance. 
Summing up, we may say that illness is a state of disturbance in the “normal” 
functioning of the total huipan individual, including both the state of the organism as a 
biological system and of his personal and social adjustments. It is thus partly biologically 
and partly socially defined. Participation in the social system is always potentially 
relevant to the state of illness, to its etiology and to the conditions of successful therapy, 
as well as to other things.  
Medical practice as above defined is a “mechanism” in the social system for coping 
with the illnesses of its members. It involves a set of institutionalized roles which will be 
analyzed later. But this also involves a specialized relation to certain aspects of the 
general cultural tradition of modern society. Modern medical practice is organized about 
the application of scientific knowledge to the problems of illness and health, to the 
control of “disease.” Science is of course a very special type of cultural phenomenon and 
a really highly developed scientific level in any field is rare among known cultures, with 
the modern West in a completely unique position. It may also be noted that scientific 
advance beyond the level to which the Greeks brought it is, in the medical field, a recent 
phenomenon, as a broad cultural stream not much more than a century old. 
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We have dealt at some length in Chapter VIII with science as a general feature of the 
cultural tradition, and with some of the conditions of its application to practical affairs. 
This need not be repeated here. We need only note a few points particularly relevant to 
the medical field. First, it should be quite clear that the treatment of illness as a problem 
for applied science must be considered problematical and not taken for granted as 
“common sense.” The comparative evidence is overwhelming that illness, even a very 
large part of what to us is obviously somatic illness, has been interpreted in supernatural 
terms, and magical treatment has been considered to be the appropriate method of coping 
with it. In non-literate societies there is an element of empirical lore which may be 
regarded as proto-scientific, with respect to the treatment of fractures for instance. But 
the prominence of magic in this field is overwhelmingly great. 
This, however, is by no means confined to non-literate cultures. The examples of 
traditional China and our own Middle Ages will suffice. Where other features of the 
cultural tradition are not favorable to the traditionalized stereotyping which we think of 
as characteristic of magic in the full sense, we find a great deal, and sometimes 
predominance, of health “superstition” in the sense of pseudo rational or pseudo scientific 
beliefs and practices. 
In the light of these considerations it is not surprising that in a society in which 
scientific medicine has come to be highly institutionalized, popular orientations toward 
the health problem are by no means confined to the scientific level. There is much 
popular health superstition, as evidenced by such things as the “patent medicines,” for 
example the widely advertised “Dr. Pierce’s Golden Medical Discovery,” and many 
traditional “home remedies.” Furthermore in the health field there is a considerable fringe 
of what are sometimes called “cults.” Some religious denominations, of which Christian 
Science is perhaps the most conspicuous example, include a religious approach to health 
as an integral part of their general doctrine. Then there is a variety of groups which offer 
health treatments outside the medical profession and the professions auxiliary to it like 
dentistry and nursing. These are apt to include complex and bewildering mixtures of 
scientifically verifiable elements and various grades and varieties of pseudo-science.3 
Finally the institutionalization of science is, as the analysis of Chapter VIII would lead 
us to expect, far from complete within the profession itself. There are many kinds of 
evidence of this, but for present purposes it is sufficient to cite the strong, often bitter 
resistance from within the profession itself to the acceptance of what have turned out to 
be critically important scientific advances in their own field. One of the classic cases is 
the opposition of the French Academy of Medicine to Pasteur, and for some time the 
complete failure to appreciate the importance of his discoveries. A closely related one is 
the opposition of the majority of the surgeons of the day to Lister’s introduction of 
surgical asepsis. The conception of “laudable pus” is an excellent example of a medical 
“superstition.” 
It goes without saying that there is also an important involvement of expressive 
symbolism in medical practice. Rather, however, than attempting to review it at this point 
it will be better to call attention to certain aspects of it as we go along.  
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§ THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
THE immediately relevant social structures consist in the patterning of the role of the 
medical practitioner himself and, though to common sense it may seem superfluous to 
analyze it, that of the “sick person” himself. There is also a range of important 
impingements of both roles on other aspects of the total structure of the social system 
which will have to be mentioned at the appropriate points. 
The role of the medical practitioner belongs to the general class of “professional” 
roles, a sub-class of the larger group of occupational roles. Caring for the sick is thus not 
an incidental activity of other roles—though for example mothers do a good deal of it—
but has become functionally specialized as a full-time “job.” This, of course, is by no 
means true of all societies. As an occupational role it is institutionalized about the 
technical content of the function which is given a high degree of primacy relative to other 
statusdeterminants. It is thus inevitable both that incumbency of the role should be 
achieved and that performance criteria by standards of technical competence should be 
prominent. Selection for it and the context of its performance are to a high degree 
segregated from other bases of social status and solidarities. In common with the 
predominant patterns of occupational roles generally in our society it is therefore in 
addition to its incorporation of achievement values, universalistic, functionally specific, 
and affectively neutral. Unlike the role of the businessman, however, it is collectivity-
oriented not self-oriented. 
The importance of this patterning is, in one context, strongly emphasized by its 
relation to the cultural tradition. One basis for the division of labor is the specialization of 
technical competence. The role of physician is far along the continuum of increasingly 
high levels of technical competence required for performance. Because of the complexity 
and subtlety of the knowledge and skill required and the consequent length and intensity 
of training, it is difficult to see how the functions could, under modern conditions, be 
ascribed to people occupying a prior status as one of their activities in that status, 
following the pattern by which, to a degree, responsibility for the health of her cnildren is 
ascribed to the motherstatus. There is an intrinsic connection between achieved statuses 
and the requirements of high technical competence, as well as universalism and 
competence. In addition, of course, there is pres-sure in the society to assimilate the 
medical role to others of similar character in the total occupational system. 
High technical competence also implies specificity of function. Such intensive 
devotion to expertness in matters of health and disease precludes comparable expertness 
in other fields. The physician is not, by virtue of his modern role, a generalized “wise 
man” or sage—though there is considerable folklore to that effect—but a specialist whose 
superiority to his fellows is confined to the specific sphere of his technical training and 
experience. For example one does not expect the physician as such to have better  
3 An excellent and very detailcd analysis of one of thesc border-line groups is given in the study by 
Walter I.Wardwell, Social Strain and Social Adjustment in the Marginal Role of the Chiropractor, 
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1951. 
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judgment about foreign policy or tax legislation than any other comparably intelligent 
and well-educated citizen. There are of course elaborate subdivisions of specialization 
within the profession. 
Affective neutrality is also involved in the physician’s role as an applied scientist. The 
physician is expected to treat an objective problem in objective, scientifically justifiable 
terms. For example whether he likes or dislikes the particular patient as a person is 
supposed to be irrelevant, as indeed it is to most purely objective problems of how to 
handle a particular disease. 
With regard to the pattern variable, self vs. collectivity-orientation, the physician’s 
role clearly belongs to what, in our occupational system, is the “minority” group, strongly 
insisting on collectivity-orientation. The “ideology” of the profession lays great emphasis 
on the obligation of the physician to put the “welfare of the patient” above his personal 
interests, and regards “commercialism” as the most serious and insidious evil with which 
it has to contend. The line, therefore, is drawn primarily vis-à-vis “business.” The “profit 
motive” is supposed to be drastically excluded from the medical world. This attitude is, 
of course, shared with the other professions, but it is perhaps more pronounced in the 
medical case than in any single one except perhaps the clergy. 
In terms of the relation of the physician’s occupational role to the total instrumental 
complex there is an important distinction between two types of physicians. One of the 
“private practitioner,” the other the one who works within the context of organization. 
The important thing about the former is that he must not only care for sick people in a 
technical sense, but must take responsibility for settlement of the terms of exchange with 
them because of his direct dependence on them for payment for his services, and must to 
a high degree also provide his own facilities for carrying on his function. It is a crucially 
important fact that expertness in caring for the sick does not imply any special 
competence one way or another in the settlement of terms of exchange. It may or may not 
be a good social policy to have the costs of medical care, the means of payment for it and 
so on settled by the members of the medical profession, as individuals or through 
organizations, but such a policy cannot be justified on the ground that their special 
training gives them as physicians a technical competence in these matters which others 
do not have. 
An increasing proportion of medical practice is now taking place in the context of 
organization. To a large extent this is necessitated by the technological development of 
medicine itself, above all the need for technical facilities beyond the reach of the 
individual practitioner, and the fact that treating the same case often involves the complex 
cooperation of several different kinds of physicians as well as of auxiliary personnel. This 
greatly alters the relation of the physician to the rest of the instrumental complex. He 
tends to be relieved of much responsibility and hence necessarily of freedom, in relation 
to his patients other than in his technical role. Even if a hospital executive is a physician 
himself he is not in the usual sense engaged in the “practice of medicine” in performing 
his functions any more than the president of the Miners’ Union is engaged in mining coal. 
As was noted, for common sense there may be some question of whether “being sick” 
constitutes a social role at all—isn’t it simply a state of fact, a “condition”? Things are 
not quite so simple as this. The test is the existence of a set of institutionalized 
expectations and the corresponding sentiments and sanctions. 
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There seem to be four aspects of the institutionalized expectation system relative to the 
sick role. First, is the exemption from normal social role responsibilties, which of course 
is relative to the nature and severity of the illness. This exemption requires legitimation 
by and to the various alters involved and the physician often serves as a court of appeal as 
well as a direct legitimatizing agent. It is noteworthy that like all institutionalized patterns 
the legitimation of being sick enough to avoid obligations can not only be a right of the 
sick person but an obligation upon him. People are often resistant to admitting they are 
sick and it is not uncommon for others to tell them that they ought to stay in bed. The 
word generally has a moral connotation. It goes almost without saying that this 
legitimation has the social function of protection against “malingering.” 
The second closely related aspect is the institutionalized definition that the sick person 
cannot be expected by “pulling himself together” to get well by an act of decision or will. 
In this sense also he is exempted from responsibility—he is in a condition that must “be 
taken care of.” His “condition” must be changed, not merely his “attitude.” Of course the 
process of recovery may be spontaneous but while the illness lasts he can’t “help it.” This 
element in the definition of the state of illness is obviously crucial as a bridge to the 
acceptance of “help.” 
The third element is the definition of the state of being ill as itself undesirable with its 
obligation to want to “get well.” The first two elements of legitimation of the sick role 
thus are conditional in a highly important sense. It is a relative legitimation so long as he 
is in this unfortunate state which both he and alter hope he can get out of as expeditiously 
as possible. 
Finally, the fourth closely related element is the obligation—in proportion to the 
severity of the condition, of course—to seek technically competent help, namely, in the 
most usual case, that of a physician and to cooperate with him in the process of trying to 
get well. It is here, of course, that the role of the sick person as patient becomes 
articulated with that of the physician in a complementary role structure. 
It is evident from the above that the role of motivational factors in illness immensely 
broadens the scope and increases the importance of the institutionalized role aspect of 
being sick. For then the problem of social control becomes much more than one of 
ascertaining facts and drawing lines. The privileges and exemptions of the sick role may 
become objects of a “secondary gain” which the patient is positively motivated, usually 
unconsciously, to secure or to retain. The problem, therefore, of the balance of 
motivations to recover, becomes of first importance. In general motivational balances of 
great functional significance to the social system are institutionally controlled, and it 
should, therefore, not be surprising that this is no exception. 
A few further points may be made about the specific patterning of the sick role and its 
relation to social structure. It is, in the first place, a “contingent” role into which anyone, 
regardless of his status in other respects, may come. It is, furthermore, in the type case 
temporary. One may say that it is in a certain sense a “negatively achieved” role, through 
failure to “keep well,” though, of course, positive motivations also operate, which by that 
very token must be motivations to deviance. 
It is inherently universalistic, in that generalized objective criteria determine whether 
one is or is not sick, how sick, and with what kind of sickness; its focus is thus 
classificatory not relational. It is also functionally specific, confined to the sphere of 
health, and particular “complaints” and disabilities within that sphere. It is furthermore 
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affectively neutral in orientation in that the expected behavior, “trying to get well,” is 
focused on an objective problem not on the cathectic significance of persons,4 or 
orientations to an emotionally disturbing problem, though this may be instrumentally and 
otherwise involved. 
The orientation of the sick role vis-à-vis the physician is also defined as collectively-
oriented. It is true that the patient has a very obvious self-interest in getting well in most 
cases, though this point may not always be so simple. But once he has called in a 
physician the attitude is clearly marked, that he has assumed the obligation to cooperate 
with that physician in what is regarded as a common task. The obverse of the physician’s 
obligation to be guided by the welfare of the patient is the latter’s obligation to “do his 
part” to the best of his ability. This point is clearly brought out, for example, in the 
attitudes of the profession toward what is called “shopping around.” By that is meant the 
practice of a patient “checking” the advice of one physician against that of another 
without telling physician A that he intends to consult physician B, or if he comes back to 
A that he has done so or who B is. The medical view is that if the patient is not satisfied 
with the advice his physician gives him he may properly do one of two things, first he 
may request a consultation, even naming the physician he wishes called in, but in that 
case it is physician A not the patient who must call B in, the patient may not see B 
independently, and above all not without A’s knowledge. The other proper recourse is to 
terminate the relation with A and become “B’s patient.” The notable fact here is that a 
pattern of behavior on the part not only of the physician, but also of the patient, is 
expected which is in sharp contrast to perfectly legitimate behavior in a commercial 
relationsnip. If he is buying a car there is no objection to the customer going to a number 
of dealers before making up his mind, and there is no obligation for him to inform any 
one dealer what others he is consulting, to say nothing of approacning the Chevrolet 
dealer only through the Ford dealer. 
The doctor-patient relationship is thus focused on these pattern elements. The patient 
has a need for technical services because he doesn’t—nor do his lay associates, family 
members, etc.—“know” what is the matter or what to do about it, nor does he control the 
necessary facilities. The physician is a technical expert who by special trainine and 
experience, and by an institutionally validated status, is qualihed to “help” the patient in a 
situation institutionally defined as legitimate in a relative sense but as needing help. The 
intricacy of the social forces operating on this superficially simple sub-system of social 
relations will be brought out in the following analysis.  
 
4 This it will appear later is particularly important to the therapeutic process. It is not to be 
interpreted either that the cathectic significance of persons has no part in the etiology of illness or 
that cathexis of the physician as an object does not occur—but it is controlled. 
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§ THE SITUATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 
A. The Situation of the Patient 
THE first step is to go more in detail into the analysis of relevant aspects of the situation 
in which the doctor and the patient find themselves. This will provide the setting in which 
the importance of the broad patterning of both physician’s and patient’s role can be 
interpreted, and will enable us to identify a series of mechanisms which, in addition to the 
physician’s deliberate application of his technical knowledge, operate to facilitate his 
manirest functions in the control of disease, and to promote other, latent functions which 
are important to the social system.  
First, it must be remembered that there is an enormous range of different types of 
illness, and of degrees of severity. Hence a certain abstraction is inevitable in any such 
general account as the present one. There is also a range or different types of physician. It 
will, therefore, be necessary to concentrate on what can be considered certain strategic 
and typical features of the situation of both. 
It will be convenient first to take up the salient features of the situation of the patient 
and his “lay” associates, particularly members of his family. These may be classified 
under the three headings of helplessness and need of help, technical incompetence, and 
emotional involvement. 
By institutional definition of the sick role the sick person is helpless and therefore in 
need of help. If being sick is to be regarded as “deviant” as certainly in important respects 
it must, it is as we have noted distinguished from other deviant roles precisely by the fact 
that the sick person is not regarded as “responsible” for his condition, “he can’t help it.” 
He may, of course, have carelessly exposed himself to danger of accident, but then once 
injured he cannot, for instance, mend a fractured leg by “will power.” The exhortation to 
“try” has importance at many peripheral points in the handling of illness, but the core 
definition is mat of a “condition” that either has to “right itself” or to be “acted upon,” 
and usually the patient got into that condition through processes which are socially 
defined as “nothisfault.” 
The urgency of the need of help will vary with the severity of the disability, suffering, 
and risk of death or serious, lengthy or permanent disablement. It will also vary inversely 
with the prospect, as defined in the culture, of spontaneous recovery in terms of certainty 
and duration. But a sufficient proportion of cases is severe in one or more of these senses, 
and unlikely to recover spontaneously, at least soon enough, so that the feeling of 
helplessness and the need of help are very real. 
The sick person is, therefore, in a state where he is suffering or disabled or both, and 
possibly facing risks of worsening, which is socially defined as either “not his fault” or 
something from which he cannot be expected to extricate himself by his own effort, or 
generally both. He is also likely to be anxious about his state and the future. This is a very 
different kind of “need” from that of a person who merely “wants” something that he can 
be permitted to have if he can “swing” it independently, such as a new car, or even if he 
“needs something,” sucn as adequate food, if he can reasonably be expected to procure it 
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by his own efforts, as by working for it, and not being lazy or shifdess. In a special sense, 
the sick person is “entitled” to help. 
By the same institutional definition the sick person is not, of course competent to help 
himself, or what he can do is, except for trivial illness, not adequate. But in our culture 
there is a special definition of the kind of help he needs, namely, professional, technically 
competent help. The nature of this help imposes a further disability or handicap upon 
him. He is not only generally not in a position to do what needs to be done, but he does 
not “know” what needs to be done or how to do it. It is not merely that he, being 
bedridden, cannot go down to the driig store to get what is needed, but that he would, 
even if well, not be qualified to do what is needed, and to judge what needs to be done. 
There is, that is to say, a “communication gap.” 
Only a technically trained person has that qualification. And one of the most serious 
disabilities of the layman is that he is not qualified to judge technical qualifications, in 
general or in detail. Two physicians may very well give conflicting diagnoses of the same 
case, indeed often do. In general the layman is not qualified to choose between them. Nor 
is he qualified to choose the “best” physician among a panel. If he were fully rational he 
would have to rely on professional authority, on the advice of the professionally qualified 
or on institutional validation. 
This disqualification is, of course, not absolute. Laymen do know something in the 
field, and have some objective bases of judgment. But the evidence is overwhelming that 
this knowledge is highly limited and that most laymen think they know more, and have 
better bases of judgment than is actually the case. For example the great majority of 
laymen think that their physician is either the best or one of the few best in his field in the 
community. It is manifesdy impossible for the majority of such judgments to be 
objectively correct. Another type of evidence is the patterning of choice of physician. A 
very large proportion of peopie choose their physicians on the basis of the 
recommendations of rriends or neighbors who “like Dr. X so much,” without any sort of 
inquiry beyond that as to technical qualifications, even as to the medical school from 
which he holds a degree or the hospital at which he interned.5 There must be some 
mechanisms to bridge this “gap.” There must be some way of defining the situation to the 
patient and his family, as to what is “the matter with him” and why, what his prognosis is, 
what burdens will have to be assumed in recovery. There must be some mechanism for 
validating the “authority” of the physician, who only in special cases like the military 
services has any coercive sanctions at his command. 
In this connection it should be noted that the burdens the physician asks his patients 
and their f amilies to assume on his advice are often very severe. They include 
suffering—you “have tb get worse before you can get better” as for instance in the case 
of a major surgical operation. They include risk of death, permanent or lengthy 
disablement, severe financial costs and various others. In terms of common sense it can 
always be said that the patient has the obvious interest in getting well and hence sfyould 
be ready to accept any measures which may prove necessary. But there is always the 
question, implicit or explicit, “How do I know this will do any good?” The one thing 
certain seems to be that the layman’s answer to this cannot, in the majority of severe and 
complex cases, i.e., the “strategic” ones, be based primarily on his own rational 
understanding of the factors involved and a fully rational weighing of them. The 
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difference from the physician in this respect is often a matter of degree, but it is a 
crucially important difference of degree. 
Finally, third, the situation of illness very generally presents the patient and those close to 
him with complex problems of emotional adjustment. It is, that is to say, a situation of 
strain. Even if there is no question of a “physic” factor in his condition, suffering, 
helplessness, disablement and the risk of death, or sometimes its certainty, constitute 
fundamental disturbances of the expectations by which men live. They cannot in general 
be emotionally “accepted” without the accompaniments of strain with which we are 
familiar and hence without difficult adjustments unless the patient happens to find 
positive satisfactions in them, in which case there is also a social problem. The 
significance of this emotional factor is magnified and complicated in so tar as delensive 
and adjustive mechanisms are deeply involved in the pathological condition itself. 
The range of possible complexities in this sphere is very great. The problems are, 
however, structured by the nature of the situation in certain relatively definite ways. 
Perhaps the most definite point is that for the “normal” person illness, the more so the 
greater its severity, constitutes a frustration of expectancies of his normal life pattern. He 
is cut off from his normal spheres of activity, and many of his normal enjoyments. He is 
often humiliated by his incapacity to function normally. His social relationships are 
disrupted to a greater or a less degree. He may have to bear discomfort or pain which is 
hard to bear, and he may have to face serious alterations of his prospects for the future, in 
the extreme but by no means uncommon case the termination of his life. 
For the normal person the direction of these alterations is undesirable, they are 
frustrations. Therefore it is to be expected that two types of reaction should be prominent, 
a kind of emotional “shock” at the beginning of illness, and anxiety about the future. In 
both cases there is reason to believe that most normal persons have an unrealistic bias in 
the direction of confidence that “everything will be all right,” that is they are motivated to 
underestimate the chances of their falling ill, especially seriously ill (the minority of 
hypochondriacs is the obverse), and if they do they tend to over-estimate the chances of a 
quick and complete recovery. Therefore even the necessary degree of emotional 
acceptance of the reality is difficult. One very possible reaction is to attempt to deny 
illness or various aspects of it, to refuse to “give in” to it. Another may be exaggerted 
self-pity and whining, a complaining demand for more help than is necessary or feasible, 
especially for incessant personal attention. In any case this factor reinforces the others. It 
makes it doubly difficult for the patient to have an objective judgment about his situation 
and what is needed. Whether they pay explicit attention to it in any technical sense or not, 
what physicians do inevitably influences the emotional states of their patients, and often 
this may have a most important influence on the state of their cases. 
In this connection perhaps a few words may be said about the relation of the medical 
situation to death. As was noted in Chapter VIII death, and particularly premature death, 
is one of the most important situations in all societies, demanding complex emotional 
adjustments on the part of the dying person, if the probability is known to him in 
advance, and on the part of the survivors, This is so important that in no society is there 
5 One physician, a suburban general practitioner, told that in several years of practice only one 
patient had asked him from what medical school he had graduated. 
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an absence of bath cultural and social structuring of ideas about death, attitudes toward it, 
or behavior in the presence of imminent death or its recent occurrence. Moreover the 
“death complex” is never purely instrumental in its patterning. It is a central focusing 
point for expressive symbolism. 
American culture in general seems to have a strong “optimistic bias,” one aspect of 
which is the “playing down” of death, the avoidance of too much concern with its 
prospect or its implications, and, when it must be faced, “getting it over with” as rapidly 
as possible. For example, we have relatively slight and probably decreasing emphasis on 
mourning. Our tendency is to “get on with living” as nearly in the usual pattern as 
possible. In the light of psychological knowledge and the evidence from comparative 
cultures it seems highly likely that this attitude is maintained only by virtue of strong 
disciplines which repress preoccupation with and anxiety about death. It may also mean 
that “grief reactions” are more frequently repressed than in other societies. 
In a society normally at peace, death in most cases is preceded by illness, which links 
it very closely with the sick role. This is hence a point at which more or less free-floating 
anxieties about death have an opportunity to focus. Moreover, the physician is brought 
very closely into contact with death. He is often present at a death bea, and he is the first 
one to whom people look for structuring the situation in relation to their anxieties about 
the possibility or death; if the clergyman comes in it is usually later than the physician. It 
is striking that the medical is one of the few occupational groups which in our society 
have regular, expected contact with death in the course of their occupational roles, the 
clergyman, the undertaker, and in certain ways the police, being the other principal ones. 
The military in our society are a special, though sociologically extremely interesting case, 
because for us war is an exceptional “crisis” situation, not part of the normal life of the 
society. 
It is to be presumed that this association with death is a very important factor in the 
emotional toning of the role of the physician. If he is not in general tending in our society 
to take the place formerly occupied by the clergy, an assertion often made, but subject to 
considerable qualifications, he at least has very important associations with the realm of 
the sacrcd. In this connection it is interesting to note that the dissection of a cadaver is 
included in the very first stage of formal medical training, and that it tends to be made 
both something of a solemn ritual, especiallv the first day, on the part of the medical 
school authorities, and meaical students often have quite violent emotional reactions to 
the experience. It may hence be concluded that dissection is not only an instrumental 
means to the learning of anatomy, but is a symbolic act, highly charged with affective 
significance. It is in a sense the initiatory rite of the physician-to-be into his intimate 
association with death and the dead. 
Indeed, this is confirmed by the fact that historically the medical profession had to 
wage a long and sometimes bitter struggle to secure the right to dissect cadavers as a 
regular part of medical training—at one time they secretly raided cemeteries for the 
purpose.6 Even today some religious bodies strongly oppose autopsies except when they 
are required by the law of the state where there is suspicion of foul play. 
To come back to the main theme. There are two particularly important broad 
consequences of the features of the situation of the sick person for the problem of the  
6 Cf. Shryock, Richard Harrison, The Development of Modern Medicine. 
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institutional structuring of medical practice. One is that the combination of helplessness, 
lack of technical competence, and emotional disturbance make him a peculiarly 
vulnerable object for exploitation. It may be said that the exploitation of the helpless sick 
is “unthinkable.” That happens to be a very strong sentiment in our society, but for the 
sociologist the existence of this sentiment or that of other mechanisms for the prevention 
of exploitation must not be taken for granted. There is in fact a very real problem of how, 
in such a situation, the very possible exploitation is at least minimized.7 The other general 
point is the related one that the situation of the patient is such as to make a high level of 
rationality of judgment peculiarly difficult. He is therefore open to, and peculiarly liable 
to, a whole series of irr- and non-rational beliefs and practices. The world over the 
rational approach to health through applied science is, as we have noted, the exception 
rather than the rule, and in our society there is, even today, a very large volume of 
“superstition” and other non- or irrational beliefs and practices in the health field. This is 
not to say that the medical profession either has a monopoly of rational knowledge and 
techniques, or is free of the other type of elements, but the volume of such phenomena 
outside the framework of regular medical practice is a rough measure of this factor. This 
set of facts then makes problematical the degree to which the treatment of health 
problems by applied science has in fact come to be possible. It can by no means be taken 
for granted as the course which “reasonable men,” i.e., the normal citizen of our society 
will “naturally” adopt. 
The above discussion has been concerned primarily with the sick person himself. But 
in some cases, e.g., when he is an infant or is in a coma, the patient himself has nothing 
whatever to say about what is done to him. But short of this, the patient tends to be 
buttressed by tamily members and sometimes friends who are not sick. Does this not 
vitiate the whole argument of the above discussion? Definitely not. It may mitigate the 
severity of the impact of some of the features of the patient’s situation, in fact, it often 
does. But in the first place laymen, sick or well, are no more technically competent in 
medical matters in one case than the other. The need of help is also just as strong because 
the solidarity of the family imposes a very strong pressure on the healthy members to see 
that the sick one gets the best possible care. It is, indeed, very common if not usual tor the 
pressure of family members to tip the balance in the admission of being sick enough to go 
to bed or call a doctor, when the patient himself would tend to stand out longer. 
Furthermore the emotional relationships within the family are of such a character that the 
illness of one of its members creates somewhat different emotional problems from the 
patient’s own to be sure, but nevertheless often very severe ones, and sometimes more 
severe, or more difficult for the physician to cope with. It is not, for instance, for nothing 
that pediatricians habitually mean the mother, not the sick child, when they say “my 
patient.” To anyone schooled in modern psychology the emotional significance of a 
child’s illness for the mother in our society scarcely needs further comment. Hence we 
may conclude that the basic problems of the role of the patient himself are shared by the  
 
7 It is interesting to note that even leftist propaganda against the evils of our capitalistic society, in 
which exploitation is a major keynote, tends to spare the physician. The American Medical 
Association tends to be attacked, but in general not the ideal-typical physician. This is sienificant of 
the gcneral public reputation for collectivity-orientation of the medical profession. 
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others in his personal circle with whom the physician comes into contact in his practice. 
Sometimes the role of these others is to facilitate the work of the physician very 
significantly. But it would be rash to assert that this was true very much more often than 
the reverse. In any case it is quite clear that the role of family members does not 
invalidate the significance of the situation of the patient for the character of medical 
practice, as outlined above. 
B. The Situation of the Physician 
THE role of the physician centers on his responsibility for the welfare of the patient in the 
sense of facilitating his recovery from illness to the best of the physician’s ability. In 
meeting this responsibility he is expected to acquire and use high technical competence in 
“medical science” and the techniques based upon it. The first question to ask about his 
situation, therefore, concerns the relation of these technical tools to the tasks he is called 
upon to perform and the responsibilities he is expected to live up to. 
In a certain proportion of cases the doctor has what may be called a perfectly 
straightforward technological job. His knowledge and skill give him quite adequate tools 
for accomplishment of his ends, it is only necessary to exercise sufficient patience, and to 
work steadily and competently at the task. This would, it is true, leave the “penumbra” of 
emotional reactions of patients and -their families for him to deal with, and his own 
emotional reactions to such things as severe suffering and imminence of death might well 
pose certain problems of emotional adjustment to him. But with these qualifications it 
would be much like any other high level technical job. 
But in common with some and not other technical jobs there is in th’is case a shading 
off into cases with respect to which knowledge, skill and resources are not adequate, with 
hard, competent work, to solve the problem. There are two main aspects to this 
inadequacy. On the one hand there are cases, a good many of them, where the upshot of a 
competent diagnosis is to expose a condition which is known, in the given state of 
medical knowledge and technique, to be essentially uncontrollable. This is true both in 
the individual case and generally. Though there is a fundamental relationship between 
knowledge and control, this is a general and not a point-for-point relationship. Optimistic 
biases are very general and fundamental in human social orientations, perhaps 
particularly in our society and certainly in relation to healtn. It is, therefore, very common 
that the initial effect of a given advance in knowledge is to demonstrate the impossibility 
of controlling things which were thought to be readily controllable, to expose unfavorable 
factors in the situation which were not previously appreciated, and to show the 
fruidessness of control measures in which people had previously had faith. 
This has been the case with many advances of medical science. For example, about in 
the 1870’s many people, both in the medical profession and outside it, had a strong faith 
in the efficacy of various drugs in the treatment of pneumonia. Sir William Osler, one of 
the most eminent physicians of his day, undertook against strong opposition in the 
profession to show that this faith was not well founded. He claimed, and his claim has 
been scientifically validated, that there was not a single case of the use of drugs in this 
connection which was—apart from psychological considerations, we would now add—
not either useless or positively harmful. It must of course be remembered that serum 
treatment, sulfa drugs and penicillin had not been discovered at that time. Hence the net 
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effect of Osler’s “campaign” was to reduce what had been thought to be the area of 
rational control of disease, yet it represented definite scientific advance.8 
The same can be true in the individual case. The patient and his family may know only 
that he has abdominal discomfort, has been losing weight and lacks energy. Diagnostic 
procedure reveals an advanced, inoperable cancer of the stomach with a hopeless 
prognosis. “More” is definitely known than before, but hope has been destroyed. The 
remarkable advances of medicine in the past two generations have significantly narrowed 
the range of cases of this sort. But they are very far from having eliminated them, and it 
seems quite definite that there is no early prospect of their elimination. 
These inherent frustrations of the technical expert acquire special significance because 
of the magnitude and character of the interests at stake. The patient and his family have 
the deepest emotional involvements in what the physician can and cannot do, and in the 
way his diagnosis and prognosis will define the situation for them. He himself, carrying 
as he does responsibility for the outcome, cannot help but be exposed to important 
emotional strains by these facts. 
The absolute limits of the physician’s control—which of course are relative to the state 
of medical science at the time and his own assimilation of it—are not the only source of 
frustration and strain. Within these limits there is a very important area of uncertainty. As 
in so many practical situations, some of the factors bearing on this one may be well 
understood, but others are not. The exact relation of the known to the unknown elements 
cannot be determined; the unknown may operate at any time to invalidate expectations 
built up on analysis of the known. Sometimes it may be known that certain factors 
operate significantly, but it is unpredictable whether, when and how they will operate in 
the particular case. Sometimes virtually nothing is known of these factors, only that the 
best laid plans mysteriously go wrong. In general the line between the spontaneous forces 
tending to recovery—what used to be called the vis medicatrix naturae—and the effects 
of the physician’s “intervention” is impossible to draw with precision in a very large 
proportion of cases. 
The great importance of the uncertainty element is evident even if attention is confined 
to the physiological-biochemical levels of analysis of medical problems. In the first great 
era of modern scientific medicine explicit attention was almost in principle confined to 
this level. In the light of subsequently acquired knowledge of the psychic factor in 
disease, a very substantial proportion of the uncertainty factor when attention was thus 
narrowedmust have consisted in the impingement of psychological elements on the 
disease process, which at that stage were not understood at all. Taking explicit account of 
these, to the extent that this has so far become possible, helps to reduce the range, but 
again by no means eliminates it. One 
of its effects, like that of all scientific advance, is to increase awareness of the vast 
extent of human ignorance, even in the most sophisticated fields of applied science. 
The primary definition of the physician’s responsibility is to “do everything possible” 
to forward the complete, early and painless recovery of his patients. The general effect of 
the existence of large factors of known impossibility and of uncertainty in the situation 
with which he has to cope is to impose strain upon him, to make it more difficult for him 
8 Cf. Harvey Cushing, The Life of Sir William Osler. 
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to have a “purely rational” orientation to his job than if his orientation were such as to 
guarantee success with competent work. This is true of his own orientation without taking 
account of reciprocal interactions with his patients and their intimates. 
But the function of “doing everything possible” is institutionalized in terms of 
expectations, and these expectations are most vividly and immediately embodied, besides 
in the physician’s own attitude system, in the attitudes of precisely this group of people. 
But compared to most such groups their involvement is, because of the considerations 
analyzed atove, peculiarly intensive, immediate, and likely to contain elements of 
emotional disturbance which are by definition, tendencies to deviant behavior. Hence the 
elements of strain on the physician by virtue of these impossibility and uncertainty 
components of his situation are particularly great Non- and irrational mechanisms were 
noted as prominent in the reactions of sick people to their situations, and those of their 
families. In spite of the discipline of his scientific training and competence, it would be 
strange if, in view of the situation, physicians as a group were altogether exempted from 
corresponding tendencies. In fact that magic frequently appears in situations of 
uncertainty is suggestive. In a later section the problem of the functional equivalents of 
magic in actual medical practice will be taken up briefly. However, it is clear from the 
above that quite apart from the operation of so-called psychic factors in the disease 
process itself, the strains existing on both sides of doctor-patient relationship are such that 
we must expect to find, not merely institutionalization of the roles, but special 
mechanisms of social control in operation. 
Factors of impossibility, and uncertainty in situations where there is a strong 
emotional interest in success, are common in many other fields of applied science—the 
military field is an outstandingly important example. There are, however, certain other 
features of the situation of the physician which are not common to many other fields 
which share those so far discussed. The engineer, for example, deals primarily with non-
human impersonal materials which do not have “emotional” reactions to what he does 
with them. But the physician deals with human beings, and does so in situations wnich 
often involve “intimacies,” that is, in contexts which are strongly charged with emotional 
and expressively symbolic significance, and which are often considered peculiarly 
“private” to the individual himself, or to especially intimate relations with others. 
One whole class of these concerns the body. For reasons which undoubtedly go very 
deep psychologically, certain of the sentiments relative to what Pareto called the 
“integrity of the individual” are focused on the “inviolability” of the body. Their 
structuring will vary greatly according to the society and culture. But the amounts and 
occasions of bodily exposure and of bodily contact are carefully regulated in all societies, 
and very much so in ours. To see a person naked in a context where this is not usual, and 
to touch and manipulate their body, is a “privilege” which calls for explanation in view of 
these considerations. The case of exposure and contact when the patient is of opposite sex 
is, it should be clearly kept in mind, only one case in a wider category, though it is a 
peculiany dramatic one. In our society there is no doubt that there are also very strong 
sentiments regulating physical contact between men, and between women as well. 
Furthermore, as to exposure, it may not, for instance, be “shameful” for a man to appear 
in public without his trousers, as it might be for a woman without either skirt or slacks, 
but it would certainly expose him to ridicule, and this also is certainly an expression of 
important sentiments. It is clear, in the light of the discussion in the last chapter, that both 
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the parts of the body themselves, and acts of exposure and of bodily contact are 
expressive symbols of highly strategic significance. 
It is essential for the physician to have access to the body of his patient in order to 
perform his function. Indeed, some of his contacts, as in the case of a rectal or a vaginal 
examination, would not be permitted to any other person by most normal individuals, 
even to a sexual partner. Various others would be permitted only to special indmates. 
Along with all this goes the problem of sentiments toward “injury” of the body. 
Certainly many complex anxieties center about this in many respects. It is, for example, 
noteworthy how many people have really severe anxieties about the insertion of a 
hypodermic needle even when this has become such a commonplace in our society. 
Obviously the problem of securing consent to surgical procedures and many types of 
diagnostic procedures—such as the use of a gastroscope or a bronchoscope—is not to be 
too easily taken for granted. The essential point in all this is that these are no simple 
matters of weighing a rationally understood “need” against an equally rationally assessed 
“cost” in the form of discomfort or inconvenience, but very complex non-and irrational 
reactions are inevitably involved with the typical, not only the “abnormal” patient. The 
fact that these elements are organized and controlled does not make them 
unproblematical. On the contrary, in the light of the potentialities or disturbance, the fact 
of successful control presents peculiarly important sociological problems. 
Similar considerations apply to the physician’s need of access to confidential 
information about his patient’s private life. For reasons among which their place in the 
system of expressive symbolism is prominent, many facts which are relevant to people’s 
problems of health fall into the realm of the private or confidential about which people 
are unwilling to talk to the ordinary friend or acquaintance. Some of these concern only 
“reticences” about himself which are not specially bound up with intimate relations to 
others. A man will often, ror example, hesitate to tell even his wife—even if he is on 
excellent terms with her—about many things which might well be of symptomatic 
significance to a pnysician. Others concern the privacies of intimate personal 
relationships, not only, but perhaps particularly those with sexual partners. Such 
information, however, is often essential to the performance of the physician’s function. 
His access to it presents the same order of problems as does access to the body. 
Modern developments in psychology, particularly psychoanalysis, have made us 
aware that in addition to resistances to access to the body, and to confidential 
information, anyone taking a role like that of the physician toward his patients is exposed 
to another sort of situational adjustment problem. That is, through processes which are 
mostly unconscious the physician tends to acquire various types of projective 
significance as a person which may not be direcdy relevant to his specifically technical 
functions, though they may become of the first importance in connection with 
psychotherapy. The generally accepted name for this phenomenon in psychiatric circles is 
“transference,” the attribution to the physician of significances to the patient which are 
not “appropriate” in the realistic situation, but which derive from the psychological needs 
of the patient. For understandable reasons a particularly important dass of these involves 
the attributes of parental roles as experienced by the patient in childhood. Transference is 
most conspicuous in “psychiatric” cases, but there is every reason to believe that it is 
always a factor in doctor-patient relationships, the more so the longer their duration and 
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the greater the emotional importance of the health problem and hence the relation to the 
physician. 
If all these factors be taken together it becomes clear that, in ways which are not true 
of most other professiosnal functions, the situation of medical practice is such as 
inevitably to “involve” the physician in the psychologically significant “private” affairs 
of his patients. Some of these may not otherwise be accessible to others in any ordinary 
situation, others only in the context of specifically intimate and personal relationships. 
What the relation or the physician’s role to these other relationships is to be, is one of the 
principal functional problems which underly the structuring of his professional role. 
If the features of the situation of the patient, the sick person, his intimates, and the 
physician, which have been reviewed, are taken together, they seem to present a very 
considerable set of complications of the functioning of medical practice on the level of 
human adjustment. These complications are not ordinarily taken account of in the simple 
common-sense view of the obviousness of the expectation that knowledge of how to cope 
with situations which are distressing to human beings will be applied to the limit of the 
availability of trained personnel and other necessary resources. They present another 
order of functional problems to the social system. The severity of these functional 
problems is such that it can confidently be expected that a whole series of specific 
mechanisms has developed which can be understood as “ways” of meeting the strains and 
overcoming the obstacles to the effective practice of scientific medicine which would 
exist if these mechanisms did not operate. We must now turn to the analysis of a variety 
of these mechanisms. 
§ THE FUNCTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INSTITUTIONAL 
PATTERN OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 
THE analysis of this problem may be centered about the pattern variables and the 
particular combination of their values which characterizes the “professional” pattern in 
our society, namely, achievement, universalism, functional specificity, affective 
neutrality and collectivity-orientation, in that order. 
The most fundamental basis for the necessity of a universalisticachievement and not a 
particularistic-ascribed structuring of the physician’s role lies in the fact that modern 
medical practice is organized about the application of scientific knowledge by technically 
competent, trained personnel. A whole range of sociologically validated knowledge tends 
to show that the high levels of technical training and competence which this requires 
would not be possible in a relationship system which was structured primarily in etc.9 It is 
furthermore of the first importance  
9 This is not to say that relatively high levels of technical competence cannot ever be attained or 
maintained in a context of particularistically ascribed role patterns. A notable example is that none 
of the Roman Generals who won her empire was a professional soldier in our sense. All were 
aristocrats to whom military activity was ascribed, and who held military command as part of a 
largely ascribed political career. But even Roman conquest was not applied science in quite the 
sense or degree that modern medicine is. Certainly no society is known with the high general level 
of institutionalization of very high technical competences of the applied science type in which tbey 
were usually structured in particularistic-ascnbed patterns. 
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particularistic terms or which was ascribed to incumbents of a status without the 
possibility of selection by performance criteria. This would drastically alter the bases of 
selection for the personnel of the profession, the focusing of their ambitions and loyalties 
and many other things. The tendency would be toward nepotism, the hereditary 
principle,that only this patterning is congruent with the structuring of the rest of the 
occupational world in modern Western society, particularly with the general world of 
science in the universities, and its application in other professional roles. 
This last is a particularly important point. The tendency of particularistic structuring is 
to develop solidarities which, through contributing to the integration of the social 
situation within the solidary group, tend to do so at the cost of deepening the separations 
between such groups, even generating, or contributing to, antagonism and conflict. 
A basic fact about science is that the structure of “pure” scientific disciplines cuts 
across the structure of the fields of application of science to practical affairs. The term 
“medical science” is thus a somewhat equivocal one, it is not the designation of a single 
theoretically integrated discipline, but of a field of application. Many different sciences 
find applications in the medical or health field, physics, chemistry, the whole gamut of 
biological sciences, psychology and, we can now see, sociology, though the latter is little 
recognized as yet. A particularistic structuring of the medical profession would almost 
certainly operate to emphasize and institutionalize the distinction between the medical 
and the non-medical even more than has actually been the case. Pasteur was initially 
repudiated by the medical profession in considerable part because he was not a physician 
but “only” a chemist—how could anything medically important come from anyone who 
was not a member of the “fraternity”? This repudiation of Pasteur is rightly regarded by 
modern physicians as a very unfortunate aberration, a refusal to recognize the “intrinsic” 
merits of a contribution regardless of its source. But particularistic bases of status-
ascription, of solidarity, etc., inherently cut across the intrinsic structure of science. If 
they were the predominant institutional focus of the physician’s role it is hard to see how 
the Pasteur case could fail to become the rule, which would come to be ideologically 
glorified in the profession as a proper protection of its “purity” against gratuitous 
interference by “outsiders.” 
The universalism of the medical role has, however, also another type of functional 
significance. In the light of the considerations brought forward in the last section it is 
clear that there is strong pressure to assimilate the physician to the nexus of personal 
relationships in which the patient is placed, quite apart from the specific technical content 
of the job he is called upon to perform. In so far as his role can be defined in 
unequivocally universalistic terms, this serves as a protection against such assimilation, 
because personal friendships, love relationships and family relationships are 
overwhelmingly particularistic. However, this aspect of the functional significance of 
universalism is closely bound up with that of functional specificity and affective 
neutrality. Its significance will be more advantageously discussed when the bearing of 
these two pattern elements has been made clear. 
In its relation to technical competence, universalism is, as has been noted, linked to 
functional specificity. A generalized “wisdom” which is genuinely universalistic but not 
specialized for any particular context is conceivable, but it is certainly not the basis of the 
competence of the physician who is a specialized expert in a specifically defined, if broad 
and complicated field. But the definition of the physician’s role in this respect is not 
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relevant only with relation to the specificity of his competence, but also of his legitimate 
scope of concern. Specificity of competence has primarily the function of delimiting a 
field so that it is relatively manageable, so that competence will not be destroyed by 
“spreading too thin.” Specificity of the scope of concern, on the other hand, has the 
function of defining the relationship to patients so that it can be regulated in certain ways 
and certain potential alternatives of definition, which might be disruptive, can be 
excluded or adequately controlled. 
In terms of the features of the situation discussed above, functional specificity is an 
important element in overcoming potential resistances to the physician, in that through it 
the limits of his legitimate claims on the patient are defined, and thereby anxieties about 
the consequences of the special privileges accorded to him are allayed. The role conforms 
strictly to the criterion of the burden of proof being on the side of exclusion. If the patient 
asks why he should answer a question his doctor puts to him, or vvhy he should submit to 
a given procedure, the answer is in terms of the relevance of his health problem—“if you 
want to get well, you have to give me the information I need to do my job,” etc. If it 
cannot be justified by the relevance to the health problem it is “none of the doctor’s 
business.”  
The obverse of permissions on the basis of positive relevance to the health problem is 
some sort of assurance that information or other privileges will not be used for other 
purposes, or that access to the body will not be used to exploit the patient, or to distort the 
relation in another direction, e.g., in the direction of mutual sexual attraction. 
One of the most prominent mechanisms by which this is brought about is the 
segregation of the context of professional practice from other contexts. The doctrine of 
privileged communications is one of the best examples. That what the doctor learns about 
his patient’s private affairs in the course of his duties is confidential and not to be 
divulged is not only one of the strongest tenets of professional ethics, but is protected by 
law against the claim to testify in court. Another significant example is the rule that 
physicians do not care for members of their own families except in essentially trivial 
illnesses. Not only might their emotional involvements distort their judgment, but they 
might well come to know things about which it is just as well for them not to know. 
Even where there is both a professional and a non-professional aspect of the 
relationship of the physician to the same persons, there is a definite tendency to segregate 
the two aspects. For example one physician expressed a strong dislike of being asked for 
professional advice on social occasions, e.g., the lady sitting next to him at dinner asking 
what she should do about some illness of her child. His usual response was to ask her to 
come to his office and discuss it. It might be argued that his interest was in the fee, but 
the same thing is to be observed where no fee is involved. 
One of the most conspicuous cases of the operation of segregation is where a potential 
sexual element enters in. For example a general practitioner whose office was in his 
home, and who had no office nurse or dressing room, reported that he habitually stepped 
out of the office to allow a female patient to get ready for a physical examination. When, 
as occasionally happened, the patient started to disrobe before he had time to get out of 
the room, he found it definitely embarrassing, though the same patient disrobed on the 
examining table did not embarrass him at all. The essential point is that for most men 
“woman in the same room undressing” usually means potential sexual relations, for the 
physician “woman on the examining table” means a professional job to do. Naturally, 
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ensuring the right behavior in each context requires a learning process and a system of 
control mechanisms.10 
These examples show that segregation operates not only to maintain functional 
specificity, but also affective neutrality by defining situations which might potentially 
arouse various emotional reactions as “professional” and thereby mobilizing a system of 
sanctions against “inappropriate” reactions. The importance of functional specificity is to 
define, in situations where potential illegitimate involvements might develop, the limits 
of the “privileges” in the “dangerous” area which the physician may claim. The pattern of 
affective neutrality then defines his expected attitudes within those limits. 
The case of situations which might easily arouse sexual attractions is a particularly 
vivid one in our society. It should be noted that breakdown of the controls insuring 
affective neutrality in that connection is important not only to the doctor and the patient, 
but would often also involve the interests of a variety of tnird parties, since each tends to 
be involved in erotic relations with others whose interests would in turn be affected. In 
other words the toleration by a husband of his wife privately seeing a doctor and the lack 
of jealousy of their husband’s female patients on the part of the doctors’ wives are 
important conditions of medical practice. Occasionally disturbances in this area do occur, 
but their relative infrequency and the quickness with which they are stigmatized as 
“pathological” is indicative of the effectiveness of the control system.11  
This problem of emotional involvements is not, however, confined to the sexual 
aspect. It also includes likes and dislikes on another level. An eminent surgeon, for 
instance, was acutely aware of the emotional reaction provoked in himself by seeing a 
patient through a long and difficult convalescence from a severe and dangerous 
operation—one case was a nine-year-old boy. He said he would distrust his own 
judgment if he had to decide to operate a second time on such a case: He was afraid he 
would lean over backwards to spare the patient the suffering he knew would be involved, 
even in a case where he also knew the operation would probably be best for the patient in 
the long run. It is also important that doctors should not let their personal dislikes of 
particular patients be expressed in a poorer level of treatment or even positive 
“punishment.” And doctors would scarcely be human if they did not take a dislike to 
some of their patients. 
 
10 The testimony of a considerable number of physicians interviewed is that in the early stages of 
medical education sexual arousal to some degree is not uncommon, but that the relevant occasions 
soon become “part of the day’s work.” Also by no means the only problem of control is the 
“protection” of the woman patient from the physician’s “taking advantage” of her. Quite frequently 
it is the other way around, including the possibility of his susceptibility being used for blackmail. 
One of the prominent hospitals justified the policv of having a nurse present on such occasions by 
saying it is at least as much for the protection ol the doctor as of the patient.” This nurse is 
graphically referred to as a “nurse-chaperone.” 
11 One particular case has been reported to the author of a husband who would not allow his wife to 
go to a male obstetrician. The physician repordng it assumed this attitude to be pathological. But it 
is pertinent to note that it was not very long ago when attendance at childbirth by a male physician 
was not tolerated in most of Western society. 
There is a good deal of folklore current in such places as the pulp magazine literatuie and burlesque 
stage humor about the special opportunities of the 
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The argument of the last few pages may be summed up in the proposition that one 
principal set of functional significances of the combination universalism, functional 
specificity, and affective neutrality, is to enable the physician to “penetrate” sufficiently 
into the private affairs, or the “particular nexus” of his patients to perform his function. 
By defining his role in this way it is possible to overcome or minimize resistances which 
might well otherwise prove fatal to the possibility of doing the job at all.12 
This importance is not, however, confined to the overcoming of potential resistances. It is 
also evident that these pattern elements are “for the protection of the physician” in a 
broader sense than in the case of the “nurse-chaperone” as she is sometimes actually 
called. The obverse functional danger to that of refusal to admit to the sphere of private 
affairs is that this admission should be too thorough, that the role of the doctor should be 
assimilated to that of other “significant persons” in the situation of the patient, that he 
really should become a personal intimate, a lover, a parent, or a per- sonal enemy. All 
these roles are, it will be noted, defined in terms of the opposite combination of the 
values of the pattern-variables being discussed from that which characterizes the 
professional pattern. 
A good many instances were collected by the author in which physicians had been put 
in positions where there was a “pull” to assimilate their roles to patterns of this type, 
particularly that of a “personal friend” of the patient. There are various complicating 
factors but in general it can be said that there was a marked tendency for the physician to 
feel uncomfortable. Asked why it was undesirable to allovv the assimilation to take place, 
the usual answer ran in terms of the difficulty of maintaining “objectivity” and “good 
judgment” in relation to the job. There is every reason to believe that there was an 
element of correct insight in the testimony of these doctors, none of whom incidentally 
was a psychiatrist or psychiatrically trained. It is, however, difficult to judge how far this 
is a rational appraisal of the situation and how far a rationalization of other factors of 
which the respondent was not explicitly aware. 
The enormous recent development of psychotherapy, and increase of our knowledge 
of the psychological aspects or human relations relative to it, calls attention to another 
most important aspect of this whole situation. Through the mechanisms or transference 
the patient, usually without knowing what he is doing, not only has certain resistances, 
but he actively attempts by projection to assimilate his physician to a pattern of 
particularistic personal relationship to himself. He attempts to elicit the reaction which is 
appropriate to his own need-dispositions. Though this is most conspicuous in psychiatric 
cases, as noted, there can be no doubt that it is also of the greatest importance throughout 
the field of doctorpatient relationships. 
In the first place it is necessary for the physician to be protected against this emotional 
pressure, because for a variety of reasons inherent in his own situation it is not possible 
for him to “enter in” to the kind of relationship the patient, usually unconsciously, wants. 
doctor for sexual gratification. It might be that “where there is smoke there is fire.” But the 
available evidence points to the probability that this expresses a wish-fulfillment projected on the 
physician’s role, rather than a shrewd guess as to what actually happens. 
12 It is interesting to note that the social or psychological research worker faces similar problems in 
his relations to people he wishes to interview or observe. The cognate features of his role have the 
same order of functional significance. 
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Above all this functional specificity which permits the physician to confine the 
relationship to a certain content field, indeed enjoins it on him, and affective neutrality 
which permits him to avoid entering into reciprocities on the emotional level, serve to 
bring about this protection. The upshot is that he refuses to be “drawn in” and has 
institutional backing in his refusals of reciprocity.13 
But, in addition to this, our knowledge of the processes of psychotherapy reveals 
another important dimension of the situation. That is, the same features of the physician’s 
role, which are so important as protection of the physician himself, are also crucially 
important conditions of successful psychotherapy. Psychotherapy, as we have seen, 
becomes necessary when the control mechanisms inherent in the reciprocities of ordinary 
human relationships break down. One of the most important features of neurotic behavior 
in this sense is of course the involvement in vicious circles, so that the social pressures 
which ordinarily serve to keep people “in line” and bring them back if they start to 
deviate, serve only to intensify the recalcitrant reaction and to drive the individual farther 
from satisfactory behavior. If these vicious circles are to be dealt with there must be an 
“Archimedean place to stand” outside the reciprocities of ordinary social intercourse. 
This is precisely what the patterning of the physician’s role provides. Whether it is love 
or hate which the patient projects upon him, he fails to reciprocate in the expected terms. 
He remains objective and affectively neutral.14 The patient tries to involve him in his 
personal affairs outside the health field and he refuses to see his patient except at the 
stated hours in his office, he keeps out of his sight so as to avoid opportunities for 
reciprocal reactions.15 Finally, the discrepancy between the transference reactions and the 
realistic role of the physician provides one of the most important occasions for 
interpretations which can bring the patient to new levels of insight as part of the process 
of emotional readjustment. 
An essential part of what the psychiatrist does is to apply direct knowledge of the 
mechanisms of neurotic behavior to the manipula- tion of his patient. Increasingly, 
however, psychiatrists are becoming aware of the importance of the structuring of their 
own roles as part of the therapeutic process. But it is quite clear that the basic structuring 
of the physician’s role in our society did not come about through the application of 
theories of the ideal situation for psychotherapy. It was a spontaneous, unplanned 
development of social structure which psychiatry has been able to utilize and develop, but 
which originated independendy of its irifluence. 
There is a most important implication of all this. Psychiatry is much more recent than 
organic medicine, and today constitutes only a fraction of the total of medical practice. 
But the continuity between them in function must be, artd historically has been, much 
13 The fact that his role is collectively-oriented, on the other hand, tends to draw him in and has to 
be counteracted by these other factors. 
14 “Countertransference” of course occurs, but the therapist is expected to minixnize and control it, 
not just “let himself go.” 
15 Many specific points in the details of psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytic technique are 
controversial within the relevant professional groups. The present discussion is not meant to take a 
position on such questions as to whether it might or might not under certain circumstances be better 
to get the patient off the couch into a face-to-face posidon. It is meant only to call attention to 
certain general features of the psychotherapeutic situation. 
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greater than the usual explicit interpretations allow for. If the structure of the physician’s 
role has the kind of functional significance for deliberate psychotherapy which has been 
outlined here, it must have some effect on the mental state of the patient whether it is 
used for deliberate psychotherapy or not. And there is every evidence that it does. 
Psychotherapy to the militantly anti-psychiatric organic physician is like theory to the 
militandy anti-theoretical empirical scientist. In both cases he practices it whether he 
knows it or wants to or not. He may indeed do it very effectively just as one can use a 
language well without even knowing it has a grammatical structure.16 But the general 
conclusion is that a very important part of non—and prepsychiatric medical practice is in 
fact “unconscious psychotherapy” and that this could not be true if the institutional 
structure of the physician’s role were not approximately what it has here been shown to 
be.17  
     This brings us to the last pattern element, collectivity-orientation. It is this which is 
distinctive of professional roles within the upper reaches of our occupational system, 
especially in the contrast with business. Indeed one of the author’s principal motivations 
in embarking on a study of the medical profession lay in the desire to understand a high-
level occupational role which deviated from that of the businessman who, according to 
certain theorists, represented the one strategically crucial type of such role in modern 
“capitalistic” society.18 
It was noted above that the sick person is peculiarly vulnerable to exploitation and at 
the same time peculiarly handicapped in arriving at a rationally objective appraisal of his 
situation. In addition, the physician is a technically competent person whose competence 
and specific judgments and measures cannot be competently judged by the layman. The 
latter must therefore take these judgments and measures “on authority.” But in the type 
case there is no system of coercive sanctions to back up this authority. All the physician 
can say to the patient who refuses to heed his advice is “well, it’s your own funeral”—
which it may be literally. All this of course is true of a situation which includes the 
potential resistances which have been discussed above. 
16 This has sometimes been called the “art of medicine.” 
17 Two formulae are more or less current among physicians which show an inadequate 
understanding of the situation. One is that the doctor is the patient’s “best friend.” He is, in terms of 
willingness to help him. But a relationship of fxiendship is not confined to a functionally specific 
context, nor is it affectively neutral. A friend does not have the “place to stand” outside certain 
reciprocities. The other is current among certain psychoanalysts, “the doctor is the father.” It is true 
that the father xole is perhara the most immediately appropriate transference role to a male analyst, 
especially if there is a considerable age differential. But when a son misbehaves a father reacts with 
anger and punishment, not affectively neutral “understanding.” A father can also be called upon to 
help where a physician can legitimately refuse. It is precisely the differences from friendship and 
familial roles which are the most important levers for the psycho therapeutic process. 
18 See “the Professions and Social Structure,” Essays in Sociological Theory, Chapter VIII, for a 
general analysis of the relations between business and the professions in our social structure. 
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These different factors seem to indicate that the situation is such that it would be 
particularlv difficult to implement the pattern of the business world, where eacn party to 
the situation is expected to be oriented to the rational pursuit of his own self-interests, and 
where there is an approach to the idea of “caveat emptor.” In a broad sense it is surely 
clear that society would not tolerate the privileges which have been vested in the medical 
profession on such terms. The protection of the patient against the exploitation of his 
helplessness, his technical incompetence and his irrationality thus constitutes the most 
obvious functional significance of the pattern. In this whole connection it is noteworthy 
how strongly the main reliance for control is placed on “informal” mechanisms. The law 
of the state includes severe penalties for “malpractice” and medical associations have 
relatively elaborate disciplinary procedures, but these quite dennitely are not the principal 
mechanisms which operate to ensure the control of self-orientation tendencies. The 
significance of this will be discussed below. 
Here it may be noted that the collectivity-orientation of the physician is protected by a 
series of symbolically significant practices which serve to differentiate him sharply from 
the businessman. He cannot advertise-he can only moaestly announce by his “shingle” 
and the use of his M.D. in telephone directories and classified sections, that he is 
available to provide medical service. He cannot bargain over fees with his patients-a 
“take it or leave it” attitude is enjoined upon him. He cannot refuse patients on the ground 
that they are poor “credit risks.” He is given the privilege of charging according to the 
“sliding scale,” that is, in proportion to the income of the patient or his family—a drastic 
difference from the usual pricing mechanism of the business world. The general picture is 
one of sharp segregation from the market and price practices of the business world, in 
ways which for the most part cut off the physician from many immediate opportunities 
for financial gain which are treated as legitimately open to the businessman. The 
motivational significance of this difference will have to be discussed below. 
It is also interesting to note, following up the earlier remarks about “shopping around,” 
that the definition in terms of collectivityorientation is expected to be reciprocal. The 
most usual formulation for this is that the patient is expected to “have confidence” in his 
physician, and if this confidence breaks down, to seek another physician. 
This may be interpreted to mean that the relationship is expected to be one of mutual 
“trust,” of the belief that the physician is trying his best to help the patient and that 
conversely the patient is “cooperating” with him to the best of his ability. It is significant 
for instance that this constitutes a reinforcement of one of the principal institutional 
features of the sick role, the expectation of a desire to gct well. It makes the patient, in a 
special sense, responsible to his physician. But more generally, it has been pointed out 
before that collectivity-orientation is involved in all cases of institutionalized authority, 
that is authority is an attribute of a status in a collectivity. In a very special and informal 
sense the doctor-patient relationship has to be one involving an element of authority—we 
often speak of “doctor’s orders.” This authority cannot be legitimized without reciprocal 
collectivity-orientation in the relationship. To the doctor’s obligation to use his authority 
“responsibly” in the interest of the patient, corresponds the patient’s obligation faithfully 
to accept the implications of the fact that he is “Dr. X’s patient” and so long as he 
remains in that status must “do his part” in the common enterprise. He is free, of course, 
to terminate the relationship at any time. But the essential point is the sharp line which 
tends to be drawn between being X’s patient, and no longer being in that position. In the 
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ideal type of commercial relationship one is not A’s customer to the exclusion of other 
sources of supply for the same needs. 
Finally, there is a most important relationship between collectivity-orientation and 
psychotherapy, conscious or unconscious. There are differences of opinion among 
psychiatrists on many subjects, but so far as the author knows, none on this point—that 
therapeutic success is not possible unless the patient can be brought to trust his physician. 
This is particularly important because it can safely be said that there is no important class 
of psychological disturbances which do not have, as one important component, an 
impairment of the capacity to trust others, essentially what, in Chapter VII, we called a 
sense of insecurity. This element of distrust then tends to be projected onto the physician 
in the transference relationship. If the role of the physician were defined in self-
orientation terms it could hardly fail to invite deepening of the vicious circle, because the 
patient would tend to see his own neurotic definition of the situation confirmed by the 
institutional expectation that the physician was “out to get everything he could for 
himself.” In this as in other contexts it is of the first importance that the institutionalized 
definition of the role is such as to counteract these transference tendencies of the patient, 
thus to set up a discrepancy between his neurotic expectations and reality which is as 
difficult as possible for him to avoid understanding. In view of the immense importance 
of what has here been called the element of unconscious psychotherapy in non-
psychiatric medical practice, the element of collectivity-orientation is certainly one of the 
keystones of the institutional arch in this respect.  
§ SOME SPECIAL PROBLEMS 
A FEW special problems may now be taken up which illustrate in still other contexts 
connected with medical practice the usef ulness of the type of analysis which is here 
being employed. The ones which will each be briefly discussed here are, the part played 
by certain pseudo-scientific elements even within the profession itself, the predominance 
of informal internal controls and the resistance to outside and to formal control, and the 
problem of the comparative motivational patterns of the medical and business world. 
We may go back to the discussion of the element of uncertainty which looms so large 
in medical practice. This element, and that of impossibility, the border lines between 
them often being indistinct, places serious strains on a well-integrated balance of need, 
skill, effort, and expectations of result.19 Within this situation there is a variety of 
motivational factors operating to drive action in one direction, namely, “success” of the 
therapeutic enterprise. The physician himself is trained and expected to act, not merely to 
be a passive observer of what goes on. The patient and his family are also under strong 
emotional pressures to “get something done.” There is on both sides, in Pareto’s terms, a 
“need to manifest sentiments by external acts.” 
19 Durkheim, in his classic interpretation of the nature of anomie in Suicide, was one of the first to 
analyze correctly the nature of the strains involved in upsetting a normal balance in the relation 
between effort, skill, and expectation of result. His analysis is further generalized by our treatment 
of the complementarity of expectations in interactive relationships and the motivational 
consequences of disturbances of this complementarity. 
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One of the best types of examples of this situation is that where a decision to perform 
a surgical operation is in the balance, and where, from a technical point of view, there is a 
genuine uncertainty element involved. The surgeon must weigh the risks of operation 
against the risks of delaying operation or deciding not to operate at all. In general it is 
clear that there tends to be a bias in favor of operating. After all the surgeon is trained to 
operate, he feels active, usclul, effective when he is operating. For the patient and his 
family, in their state of anxiety and tension also, inactivity, just waiting to see how things 
develop is particularly hard to bear. A decision to operate will, in such a situation, almost 
certainly “clear the air” and make everybody “feel better.” At least “something is being 
done.” It is also probable that American culture predisposes more to this pattern of 
activity than most others, and that this has much to do with our tendency to glorify the 
surgeon, who is indeed a kind of culture hero. 
This problem of the bias in favor of active intervention, of giving the benefit of the 
doubt to operating in surgical cases, underlies the problem of “unnecessary operations” 
about which there has been a good deal of discussion in medical circles. It is true that, in 
the situation of individual fee-for-service practice, the surgeon has a direct financial 
incentive to be biased in favor of operating. In the folklore of the subject, however, 
whatever tendency to unnecessary operations there may be, tends too immediately to be 
ascribed to this financial incentive. It is forgotten that there are other powerful motives 
operating in the same direction. In such a situation it would take far more refined research 
methods than have yet been applied to the problem to discriminate the effects of the two 
factors. One may thus be warned against glib, easy interpretations of the “obvious” 
motivation of a pattern of action, where it can be shown that one motivational factor 
operates in the right direction. 
It is suggested that the situation of surgical practice, where the uncertainty factor is 
almost inevitably great, predisposes to a bias in favor of active intervention. Since the 
motivation for this bias tends to be strongly shared by patients and their families, its 
existence is obscured since there is no conspicuous group whose conscious interests are 
injured by it to protest But this particular version of the bias is by no means isolated. A 
second conspicuous phenomenon is the existence of a pattern of “fashion change,” even 
within the medical profession as such, which, however, is far less conspicuous than the 
related health “faddism” current among the general public.20 
This phenomenon is easy to observe only in temporal perspec- tive. A technical 
innovation in the medical field will for a time be slow in “catching on.” When, however, 
it begins to be accepted, it will spread very rapidly and be utilized on almost 
everypossible occasion where an at all plausible case for it can be made. This continues 
until the point is reached where i’t becomes “oversold” and a reaction sets in. Its use will 
then fall off, probably to a level below its intrinsic merits, and after a series of narrowing 
fluctuations it will tend to settle down to a well-established place in the professional 
“repertoire.” 
The phenomenon was perfectly described, without the slightest awareness of its 
sociological implications, by two surgeons writing in a medical journal, discussing a new 
20 An excellent place to study the latter is in the field of health advertising. For an analysis of one 
such. “fad,” cf. L.J.Henderson, “Aphorisms on the Advertising of Alkalis,” Harvard Business 
Review, Autumn, 1937, Vol. 16, pp. 17–23. 
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operative technique for the removal of the prostate gland. But the same tendency can be 
observed in many cases, e.g., “focal infection,” the use of the sulfa drugs recently, 
psycho-somatic interpretations in many fields. The important point is that the “irrationar 
element in the belief in the efficacy of any one technique or diagnostic idea, which we 
see must be interpreted as a reaction to strain, is only temporary, but at any given time, 
there is always a group of such ideas current in the profession. By the time that rational 
criticism and experience have succeeded in “finding the proper level” for one, another 
has arisen to take its place. 
The general phenomenon then is an “optimistic bias” in favor of the soundness of 
ideas or efficacy of procedures. Since the basic normative pattern by which such ideas are 
measured is that of science, there are strong pressures toward the elimination of the bias 
in any particular case. But as a general phenomenon it persists—it is a pseudo-scientific 
element in the technical competence of the medical profession which is more than simply 
an expression of the relative lack of scientific development of the field; it is positively 
motivated. 
The question arises of whether it has positive functions, or as the “rationalistic” 
tendency of thought goes, is simply an “imperfection” to be eliminated. Comparative 
perspective is very helpful in answering this question. Malinowski among others has 
shown that magical beliefs and practices tend to cluster about situations where there is an 
important uncertainty factor and where there are strong emotional interests in the success 
of action.21 Gardening and deepsea fishing are examples he analyzes. It is suggestive that 
pseudoscience is the functional equivalent of magic in the modern medical field. The 
health situation is a classic one of the combination of uncertainty and strong emotional 
interests which produce a situation of strain and is very frequently a prominent focus of 
magic. But the fact that the basic cultural tradition of modern medicine is science 
precludes outright magic, which is explicitly non-scientific, The result is a “bias.” 
It may be safely inferred that there is an important element of positive hmctional 
significance in this. The basic function of magic, according to Malinowski, is to bolster 
the self-confidence of actors in situations vvhere energy and skill do make a difference 
but where because of uncertainty factors, outcomes cannot be guaranteed. This fits the 
situation of the doctor, but in addition on the side of the patient it may be argued that 
belief in the possibility of recovery is an important factor in it. If from purely a technical 
point of view both the individual doctor and the general tradition are optimistically biased 
it ought to help, through a “ritual” demonstration of the will to recover and that there is a 
chance.22 Of course this argument must not be pressed too far. Too many conspicuous 
failures of optimism to be justified by events could have a shattering effect on just this 
confidence. The functional needs of society call for a delicate balance in this as in many 
other fields. 
21 See B.Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion. Kroeber, Anthropology, 1948 Ed., pp. 604, 
questions fhe universality of this relationship, but not that it exists in many cases. 
22 It may be suggested that reference to this context constitutes a significant, if not well understood 
undertone, in the physician’s so frequent insistence that his patients should have “confidence” in 
him. 
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Modern medical practice is, as has so frequently been pointed out, overwhelmingly 
oriented to science. Science in turm attempts to make the state of its knowledge as clear 
and rationally explicit as possible. One would think that this type of pattern would run 
through the whole social complex of medical practice. There is a certain formal precision 
and clarity about the existence of a system of formal rules of behavior and formal 
mechanisms for their enforcement which seems to bear a certain relationship to scientific 
precision, so that on the basis of “cultural congruence” one might expect  
a system of bureaucratic-legalistic social organization to be particularly congenial to a 
scientifically trained protession. 
Broadly the facts do not bear out this expectation. A certain jealous guarding of their 
independence from outsiders might be expected from such a professional group, indeed 
they do tena to do so vis-à-vis the state and, ideologically at least, vis-k-vis any other 
potential source of “lay control.”23 But perhaps the most conspicuous fact is that even 
their own professional associations do not play a really important part in the control of 
medical practice and its potential abuses through formal channels. It is true that medical 
associations do have committees on ethics and disciplinary pro cedures. But it is 
exceedingly rare for cases to be brought into that formal disciplinary procedure. Thus the 
well-known reluctance of physicians to testify against other physicians in cases of 
malpractice, in the courts, has its parallel in the reluctance of physicians to resort to the 
formal disciplinary procedures of their own associations, which do not involve “wasning 
their dirty linen” before laymen. 
It is suggested that behind this conspicuous tendency lie factors which are common 
throughout the occupational world, but perhaps in certain respects especially prominent 
here. The general tendency is to fall considerably short of living up to the full “logical” 
implications of the dominant culture pattern in certain crucial respects. It is suggested that 
this derives from the fact that it is not possible to “apply” the dominant cultural pattern 
literally and without restriction and not generate strains which in turn would produce 
responses which would be more disruptive than certain “mitigations” of the rigorous 
applications of the pattern itself. This deviation from the dominant pattern is what we 
have called an adaptive structure. 
The physician is expected to act responsibly in a situation where the interests of others 
are very vitally affected, and in ways where it is not by any means always probable that 
the reaction of these others to things going wrong will be “reasonable.” The resources he 
has available to do his job are by no means fully adequate. He inevitably makes mistakes, 
and his mistakes may on occasion have very serious consequences. Moreover, it may be 
peculiarly difficult to explain many situations where things go wrong to people not 
technically competent or familiar with the peculiar circumstances of medical work and 
whose emotions are wrought up. Even 
23 The qualification “ideologically” is necessary here. Almost all medical education, by explicit 
sanction of the organized profession, is now in the hands of Universities. Ultimate legal control of 
the university is usually in the hands of boards of trustees, not one of which is composed of a 
majority of medical men. Much the same is true of the government of hospitals. Yet many medical 
men, who never think of protesting against this situation, roundly assert that any change which will 
subject medical men to the authority of laymen in any respect is “in principle” intolerable. 
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within a medical society formal procedures necessarily abstract from the subtleties of the 
particular situation. 
It may therefore be suggested that reliance on informal controls, even though greater 
formalization would be more “logical,” may have its functional significance. As one 
physician put it, “Who is going to throw the first stone? We are all vulnefable. We have 
all been in situations where what we did could be made to look very bad.” Formalization 
inevitably gives a prominent role to “technicalities” of definition. It always opens the 
door for the “clever lawyer” whether he be a District Attorney or merely the “prosecutor” 
of the medical society’s own Committee on Ethics. Undoubtedly a certain amount of 
abuse does “get by” in the present situation which “ought not to” and would not in a well-
run formal system of control. But it is at least possible that the strong reliance on 
informal controls helps to give the physician confidence, and a certain daring in using 
risky though well-advised procedures, which he would not be so ready to do in a more 
thoroughly bureaucratized situation.24 
Finally, a brief discussion may be devoted to the problem of the sociological 
interpretations of the motivation of the physician in his professional role which can 
supplement the discussion of the “profit motive” in Chapter VI. Because of the 
prominence in their own ideology of the difference between “professionalism” and 
“commercialism,” and the general popular tendency to think of all businessmen as 
“heartless egoists” and medical men as “altruists,” the discussion may center on this 
issue. This tendency is deeply grounded in the total “ideology” of our society with its 
roots in the utilitarian pattern of thought. It can be shown to be quite definitely wrong in 
this case. 
It is quite true, as has been pointed out in the discussion of the pattern of collectivity-
opentation above, that the medical man is expected to place the welfare of the patient 
above his own selfinterest, financial or otherwise. He is also explicitly debarred, in the 
code of medical ethics, from a whole series of practices which are taken for granted as 
quite legitimate for the honest and upright businessman, such as advertising, price-
competition, refusing to take patients on the ground that they are not good “credit risks,” 
etc. Thus the physician is both debarred from a variety of immediate opportunities for 
financial gain which are open to the businessman, and is positively enjoined to promote 
the welfare of his patients, It is not these facts which are at issue, but the interpretation of 
their meaning for motivation and the mechanisms of social control. 
It is quite possible that a selective process operates so that a career in medicine appeals 
to a more “service oriented” type of personality than does a career in business. But even 
24 In this connection it should be noted that some branches of medicine show a willingness to have 
their work exposed to professional criticism which is rarely matchedin other professions. The 
practice of surgery is, within the profession, essentially public, and has the further check of the 
pathological laboratory and the autopsy. But it is interesting that it is only professionally public, 
laymen are generally excluded from the operadng room. The author’s observations suggest one 
possible factor in this. The families of padents undergoing an operation are generally emotionally 
“wrought up” to a high degree. The atmosphere of the operating room, on the other hand, is in 
generaf a “work-a-day” atmosphere, with calm technical comment and discussion, and often a good 
deal of joking. Much of this could not fail to appear to the emotionally disturbed relative as 
frivolity or callousness—the doctors don’t care what happens to my wife.” 
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if this is a factor of considerable significance it is certainly not the only or even the 
principal one. For the question arises, would it really be to the selfinterest of the normal 
physician to ignore the code of his profession and to gamer the financial rewards from 
advertising, from increasing his practice by undercutting the rates of his colleagues, and 
from excluding the bad credit risks. In general, assuming that the situation is 
institutionally well integrated, this would not be to his interest. For such action would 
impinge on both the interests and the sentiments of others in the situation. The 
consequences would take the form of a loss of professional standing which in turn would, 
if it went far enough, begin to show in quite tangible forms. Desirable connections from 
financial, as well as other points of view, would become more difficult to form, or be 
endangered, such as hospital staff appointments or referrals of patients from other phy-
sicians. A staff appointment might be terminated, or not renewed. In the extreme case 
there might be the threat of disciplinary action on the part of the medical society. All 
along there would be a jeopardizing of the easy informal “belongingness” to a group who 
understand each other as to proper conduct. 
In other words, the collectivity-orientation of the professional pattern has become built 
into a set of institutionalized expectations of behavior and attitude. In conformity with tbe 
basic theorem of the institutional integration of motivation discussed in Chapter II, both 
self-interested and “altruistic” elements of motivation have thereby become channeled 
into the path of conformity with these expectations. Therefore the seeming paradox is 
realized that it is to a physician’s self-interest to act contrary to his own self-interest—in 
an immediate situation, of course, not “in the long run.” 
The difference between the professional pattern and that of the business world in this 
respect, which tums primarily on the variable of self- vs. collectivity-orientation, is thus 
in the first instance institutional and not motivational. Whatever differences there may be 
from a psychological point of view between the typical motives of physicians and of 
businessmen, must be analyzed with this in mind, taking it as a starting point. It is a 
particularly vivid example of the importance of the sociological analysis of the social 
system f or formulation of the problem of the analysis of motivation when the 
generalization of the implications of that analysis is to be extended beyond the single 
individual to problems of significance to the social system.25  
§ SOME THEORETICAL CONCLUSIONS 
IN THE foregoing discussion we have not attempted to give anything like a full coverage 
of the facts relevant to the analysis of medical practice as a social system, and its place in 
the larger social system. We have, for example, not dealt with the processes of 
recruitment and training of the profession. We have not more than hinted at its very 
complex internal differentiations, or the large field of professional organization. Above 
all we have dealt only with a  
25 This problexn is somewhat further discussed in the two papers, “The Professions and Social 
Structure” and “The Motivation of Economic Activities,” Essays in Sociological Theory, Chapters 
VIII and IX. 
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kind of ideal type of the situation in a way which has ignored a whole range of what, 
relative to the technical and ethical standards of the best of the profession, are sub-
standard and deviant practices. We have, however, presented enough material to justify 
certain conclusions which are of central significance to the present work. Our object was 
not to give a complete empirical review but only the facts most directly relevant to some 
of our main theoretical interests. 
The case selected for presentation was that of an occupational role. We are 
accustomed in the common sense of our culture to think of such a role in terms of the 
instrumental division of labor, a view which is correct and sound enough. We are 
accustomed to think of the incumbent of the role as “having something to sell,” in this 
case a service, to people who have a need and know how to go about meeting that need. 
The place of technical competence based on scientific training is also in a broad way 
understood on a commonsense basis. 
In common-sense terms, however, it is far from possible to give an adequate account 
of how these functions of purveying a service to those who need it can in fact be 
effectively carried out under the actual conditions of the concrete social system. We have 
seen that with respect to the problems of health, as to many others, the treatment of 
practical problems in terms of applied science is not to be taken for granted, but is subject 
to special conditions in the cultural and social systems. We have seen that medical 
practice must be a part of the general institutionalization of scientific investigation and of 
the application of science to practical problems, which is a characteristic feature of 
modern Western society. 
In general in the instrumental division of labor, on the grounds we have adduced 
throughout this work, the institutionalization of all the roles in ways of which common 
sense is not at all or only very vaguely aware, is a functional requirement of the effective 
performance of the role. We have not taken space to demonstrate that the role of 
physician, simply as one of the general class of occupational roles, is institutionalized, 
and what this institutionalization consists in; that can be taken for granted. 
We have, rather, concentrated on certain special features of the roles of both parties to 
the doctor-patient relationship, and their relation to certain special features of the 
conditions in which the per-formance of medical service takes place. There are perhaps 
two most general conclusions from consideration of these special features in terms of the 
conceptual scheme of this work. The first of these is that successful performance of those 
functions of medical practice, which are obvious to common sense, depends on a whole 
series of conditions, the necessity for which is not obvious. The second conclusion is that 
the ways in which both roles are institutionalized are related to aspects of the 
motivational balances of the social system, both in direct relation to health and in broader 
respects, in ways which are altogether inaccessible to common sense, and which 
admirably illustrate the general analysis of that motivational balance of social processes 
which was presented in Chapters VI and VII above. 
With respect to the first context, the role of being sick as an institutionalized role may 
be said to constitute a set of conditions necessary to enable the physician to bring his 
competence to bear on the situation. It is not only that the patient has a need to be helped, 
but that this need is institutionally categorized, that the nature and implications of this 
need are socially recognized, and the kind of help, the appropriate general pattern of 
action in relation to the source of help, are defined. It is not only the sick person’s own 
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condition and personal reactions to what should be done about it which are involved, but 
he is placed in an institutionally defined framework which mobilizes others in his 
situation in support of the same patterns which are imputed to him, which is such an 
important feature of his role. The fact that others than the patient himself eften define that 
he is sick, or sick enough for certain measures to be taken, is significant. 
On the other side of the relationship, the collectivity-orientation of the physician, and 
its universalism, neutrality and specificity, make it possible for the things he has to do to 
perform his function to be made acceptable to the patient and his family. These include 
validation of his professiohal authority and justification of the “privileges” he must be 
accorded. 
A central aspect of this phase of the problem is that certain of the features of the role 
structure on both sides of the relationship are essential to bringing together the cultural 
and the situational elements of the action complex. It is possible to have a sick role, and 
to have treatment of illness institutionalized, where the role of therapist is not of the 
modern professional type. Treatment by kinsmen is a common example. But if, as in our 
society, the primary cultural tradition defined as relevant to health is science, it is not 
possible to have the role of therapist institutionalized in the same pattern terms as those 
of kinship. Hence in addition to the sick role we may distinguish the role of yatient as the 
recipient of the services of a scientifically trained professional physician. The definition 
of the sick role as that of potential patient is one of its principal characteristics in our 
society. 
Finally, on this level we have shown that certain deviations from the ideal type of 
institutionalization of science and of rational action are found in the field of medical 
practice. These deviadons are of two types: first, a deviation from the ideal type of the 
institutionalized belief system in the form of the prevalence of an element of pseudo-
scientific belief in the efficacy of measures, a deviation which is continuous with the 
wider deviations to be found among the lay public. The second type of deviation is on the 
level of social organization, and was illustrated by the case of the conspicuous reliance 
within the profession bn informal sanction systems where from a “rational” point of view 
formal disciplinary machinery would be more appropriate. Both of these are to be 
regarded as adaptive phenomena of the general type we have often spoken of. 
We may express the second main conclusion by saying that the sick role, incluaing its 
aspect as patient, and the role of physician, both have latent functions with respect to the 
motivational balance of the social system which are of considerable significance. Some 
of the most important keys to the understanding of these latent functions are to be found 
in the psychiatrist’s own analyses of the processes of psychotherapy, but the significance 
even of these for the social system is only brought out when they are seen in their more 
general setting in the theory of the social system. Other elements necessary to the 
understanding of these functions are derived from the analysis of institutional structure, 
in its application to these roles and their interaction, and from bringing out the common 
elements as between the processes of the interaction of physician and patient, and those 
operating in a variety of other types of situation. 
The essential assumption in tbis connection is that illness is, in one of its major 
aspects, to be defined as a form of deviant behavior, and that the elements of motivation 
to deviance which are expressed in the sick role are continuous with those expressed in a 
variety of other channels, including types of compulsive cohformity which are not 
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socially defined as deviant. Because of the element of fluidity in so much of the 
motivation to deviance, or more generally the reactions to strain, it is possible to regard 
illness as belonging to a system of alternative channels for the “acting out” of such 
motivational elements, hence as an integral part of a larger dynamic system of 
motivational balance. 
Seen in this perspective, both the sick role and that of the physician assume 
significance as mechanisms of social control, not only within the bounds of the common-
sense definition of the traditional functions of the physician, but much more broadly, 
including intimate relations to many phenomena which are not ordinarily thought to have 
any connection with health. 
The sick role is, as we have seen, in these terms a mechanism which in the first 
instance channels deviance so that the two most dangerous potentialities, namely, group 
formation and successful establishment of the claim to legitimacy, are avoided. The sick 
are tied up, not with other deviants to form a “sub-culture” of the sick, but each with a 
group of non-sick, his personal circle and, above all, physicians. The sick thus become a 
statistical status class and are deprived of the possibility of forming a solidary 
collectivity. Furthermore, to be sick is by definition to be in an undesirable state, so that it 
simply does not “make sense” to assert a claim that the way to deal with the frustrating 
aspects of the social system is “for everybody to get sick.” 
These two functions of the sick role operate even if no therapeutic influence is exerted, 
and their importance to the social system should not be underestimated. On this ground 
alone it is legitimate to question the adequacy of the common assertion that the increase 
in the proportion of mental illness is necessarily an index of increasing social 
disorganization. The fact may be provisionally granted, though because of shortcomings 
of the statistical information and of the fact that many conditions are now diagnosed as 
mental illness, which would not have been a generation ago, it might be questioned. In 
any case such an increase need not, as is very commonly asserted, be a direct index of 
increasing general social disorganization. It is quite possible that it constitutes the 
diversion into the sick role of elements of deviant motivation which might have been 
expressed in alternative roles. From the point of view of the stability of the social system 
the sick role may be less dangerous than some of the alternatives. 
However, obviously in addition to this insulating function of the sick role, there is its 
reintegrative influence. The significance of this is greatly enhanced by two factors. The 
first is that deliberate psychotherapy is, even within the role of the physician, not an 
isolated phenomenon, but may be regarded as the specialization of features of that role 
which are present in what has sometimes been called the “art of medicine.” All good 
medical practice therefore, we have maintained, has been and is to some degree 
psychotherapy. Psychotherapy as a mechanism of social control, therefore, builds on and 
extends what must be regarded as an “automatic” or latent set of mechanisms which have 
been built into the role of physician independent of an application of theories as to what 
psychotherapy, or social control processes, should be. Deliberate psycnotherapy is, to use 
a graphic metaphor, only the part of the iceberg whicn extends above the water. The 
considerably larger part is that below the surface of the water. Even its existence has been 
largely unknown to most psychiatrists, to say nothing of laymen. It consists in certain 
institutional features of the physician’s role in its particular form of meshing with the sick 
role. 
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But even more important is the second fact, the continuity of the fundamental 
processes of psychotherapy with the general processes of “coping” successfully with the 
psychological consequences of the exposure of people to strain in social relationships. 
This means not only that, as just stated, the motivational materials which enter into illness 
are continuous with those expressed in many other forms of deviance, but also that the 
mechanism of control of psychotherapy is one of a much larger class of such 
mechanisms. In turn, a clue to what these are is provided by the element of unconscious 
psychotherapy we have shown to be present in the doctor-patient role relationsnip. The 
elements involved have been discussed with examples in the latter part of Chapter VII 
and need not be repeated here. 
A very important set of problems arises, however, with respect to the generality of that 
analysis. The modern physician’s role constitutes a very distinctive type of social 
structure. It is far too distinctive alone to form the basis for the generalizations about the 
relations between motivation to deviance and the mechanisms of social control which we 
have set forth. But we have shown that it is possible to modify our analysis of the factors 
involved in the motivational processes to take account of variations of role structure. In 
other types of roles some of the things which happen in psychotherapy are clearly not 
possible; thus in general parental roles are not capable of reintegrating the deviant once 
the vicious circle of alienation has reached the neurotic stage of elaboration. But in spite 
of this fact the fundamental processes involved in normal socialization and those 
involved in psychotherapy have crucially important elements in common, along with the 
obvious differences. Focusing attention on these common elements thus makes it possible 
to pose in a sharply meaningful way such questions as that of the significance of the 
existence of two parents, whereas there is normally only one psychotherapist. Similarly 
we have tried to show that in much magical and religious ritual, in secondary institutions, 
and in much of the wider institutional patterning of the social system, there are latent 
functions of social control, the operation of which must be understood to an important 
degree in the same fundamental terms as are involved in the operation of psychotherapy. 
Thus the analysis of modern medical practice has not only given us a “case study” of a 
type of social structure which is interesting and significant in itself, and as a way of 
applying a theoretical paradigm for the analysis of social structure. More tnan that it has 
opened a “window” which can be used for the observation of balancing processes within 
the social system, which have generalized significance far beyond the “room” within the 
larger edifice of society into which this particular window opens.  
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XI 
THE PROCESSES OF CHANGE OF 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
 
IN THE foregoing chapters of this work we have been concerned with two fundamental 
areas of theoretical problems. The first of these has been the attempt to work out a 
conceptual scheme in which the major structural components of the social system could 
be identified, described and their interrelations in systems, both as internally 
differentiated and as variable from case to case, worked out. The second major problem 
area of our concern has been the analysis of motivational processes within the system. In 
order to make our treatment logically complete, we must now turn briefly to a third set of 
problems, those concerned with processes of change of the system itself, that is, 
processes resulting in changes in the structure of the system. 
For reasons which we must now try to make clear, the treatment of this third set of 
problems comes in the present scheme logically last, and presupposes some level of 
theoretical solution of the other two. This is true so far as the central point of reference is, 
as we have consistendy attempted to make it, the concept of system. It is, of course, 
entirely possible and appropriate to theorize about many particular processes of change 
within social systems, without attempting to build up a theory of the processes of change 
of social systems as systems. It is this latter task which logically presupposes a theory of 
social structure and a theory of motivational process within the system.  
§ THE PROBLEM OF THE THEORY OF CHANGE 
BEFORE clarifying this statement further it is necessary to distinguish clearly between 
the processes within the system and processes of change of the system. It is very common 
to confuse these two things under the term “dynamic.” For the purposes of our conceptual 
scheme the distinction derives from the concept of equilibrium and the way in which this 
has been used in the present work. Beyond the most general meaning of the concept of 
equilibrium, the meaning which is most directly applicable here is that applying to what 
we have called a “boundary-maintaining” system. 
It has been clearly and repeatedly brought out that it is essential to the conception of 
the interaction process put forward in this work, and of the theorem of the institutional 
integration of motivation which was directly derived from that conception, that the 
stabilization of the processes of mutual orientation within complementary roles is a 
fundamental “tendency” of interaction. We have used the conception of such a stabilized 
interaction process throughout as the major point of reference for the analysis of 
motivational process. This is another way of stating that we have treated the continuation 
of such a stabilized process without change in the structure of the roles, as not 
problematical for the theory or social systems. It was clearly recognized in Chapter VI, 
where this proposition was first stated, that this was a theoretical assumption, not an 
empirical generalization. But as such it is one of the central strategic elements of the 
present conceptual scheme. It was, however, also recognized that the equilibrium 
formulated in these terms could be a moving equilibrium where certain orderly processes 
of empirical change were going on. 
Seen from this point of view, the theory of motivational process within the system is 
built about the processes of maintenance of equilibrium. Besides the unproblematical 
continuance of interaction which was assumed to go on, this maintenance of equilibrium, 
as we have seen, revolves about two fundamental types of process. The first of these are 
the processes of socialization by which actors acquire the orientations necessary to the 
performance of their roles in the social system, when they have not previously possessed 
them; the second type are the processes involved in the balance between the  
generation of motivations to deviant behavior and the counterbalancing motivations to 
restoration of the stabilized interactive process which we have called the mechanisms of 
social control. 
The special methodological significance of this approach to the analysis of 
motivational process, i.e., of “dynamics,” lies in two interrelated sets of considerations. 
The first of these is the implication of the fact that we are dealing with the boundary-
maintaining type of system. The definition of a system as boundary-maintaining is a way 
of saying that, relative to its environment, that is to fluctuations in the factors of the 
environment, it maintains certain constancies of pattern, whether this constancy be static 
or moving. These elements of the constancy of pattern must constitute a fundamental 
point of reference for the analysis of process in the system. From a certain point of view 
these processes are to be defined as the processes of maintenance of the constant patterns. 
But of course these are empirical constancies, so we do not assume any inherent reason 
why they have to be maintained. It is simply a fact that, as described in terms of a given 
frame of reference, these constancies are often found to exist, and theory can thus be 
focused on the problems presented by their existence. They may cease to exist, by the 
dissolution of the distinctive boundary-maintaining system and its assimilation to the 
environment, or by transformation into other patterns. But the fact that they do exist, at 
given times and places, still serves as the theoretical focus for analysis. 
Theory, relative to such systems, is directed to the analysis of the conditions under 
which such a given constant system pattern will be maintained and conversely, the 
conditions under which it will be altered in determinate ways. This, we may surmise, is 
the fundamental basis of the assumption of our “law of inertia” of social process.1 What 
this theorem does is to state the fundamental point of reference for the theoretical analysis 
of process in the social system. The analysis of the conditions or factors affecting 
motivational process is always stated in terms relative to this point of reference. The 
problem is always some version of the problem why, given a certain change in the  
1 This conception is similar to that of homeostasis in physiology. 
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relevant conditions, the constant pattern which is the point of reference is altered in a 
certain way or, conversely, why it fails to be altered in the face of certain alterations in 
the conditions. The latter question is always implicit in the problem structure, the 
problems of theory, that is, revolve about the conditions of maintenance and alteration of 
equilibria which are defined as the empirically observed pattern-constancies of a 
boundary-maintaining system. The essential point is that for there to be a theory of 
change of pattern, under these methodological assumptions, there must be an initial and a 
terminal pattern to be used as points of reference. We have given an example of processes 
of change in this sense in our analysis of the socialization of the child. Clear definition of 
the patterns into which he is being socialized is, within our conceptual scheme, a logical 
prerequisite of successful analysis of the process by which the necessary conditions of 
action within that pattern come to be established. 
The second set of considerations constitute implications of the fact that we are 
operating on the level of theory which we have called “structural-functional.” The two 
are interdependent in that for such theory to have relevance it must apply to a boundary-
maintaining type of system, because only in this way can the system to which such a 
theory is applied be delimited. But, in addition to this fact, the crucial characteristic of 
structural-functional theory is its use of the concept system without a complete knowledge 
of the laws which determine processes within the system. 
The gap produced by our fragmentary knowledge of laws is filled, or better, bridged, 
in two ways. The first is the use of structural categories. By their use we are enabled to 
achieve a systematic and precise description of the states of systems, of the variations in 
the state of the same system through time and of the similarities and differences between 
different systems. Such description is couched in terms which we have excellent reason 
to believe will connect directly with, if not incorporate, the values of the most significant 
variables of the theory of action. This, along with the possibility of taxonomic 
systemization, is the fundamental reason why it has been so important to derive our 
categories of the structure of the social system from the essential features of the frame of 
reference of action itself. As the case of the classical mechanics so clearly shows, it is in 
terms of the logical requirements of the frame of reference that the fundamental variables 
of the theoretical system are defined. 
Structural categories can, however, in combination with certain other things, carry us 
beyond description as such. If they describe the structure of an empirical system in 
generalized terms, we can, by going back to the relevant aspects of the frame of 
reference, say something about what we have called the “functional prerequisites” of 
empirical systems, and developing further from there, about what, in Chapter V we have 
called the “imperatives” of the particular type of empirical system. If, then, we can regard 
certain structural features of the system as empirically given, the relevant facts are not 
merely of descriptive significance. We can make inferences from them, at least to the 
extent of saying that if these facts are given the range of variation of other facts about the 
same system must be limited in certain respects. It is this type of reasoning which we 
employed in Chapter V to approach the orderly analysis of types of social system. It 
should be clear that when we say that a structure in the social system is empirically given, 
e.g., the “conjugal” type of kinship structure, we mean that the processes within the 
relevant sub-system of the society may be assumed to be in a sufficiently stable state of 
equilibrium so that within a defined range of variation in other respects this structure, i.e., 
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this “system pattern,” can be assumed to be constant. Obviously the use of structural 
categories for explanatory purposes in this way is dependent on the assumption that the 
constancy of pattern to which we have referred has some empirical significance, But if 
this were not true we clearly would not be deaiing with a boundary-maintaining type of 
system at all. 
In our two chapters dealing with motivational process we were able to go an important 
step beyond reliance on structural imperatives alone for explanatory generalization. We 
used the analysis of structure in the interactive process, notably the structure of roles, and 
the institutionalization and internalization of patterns of value-orientation in the definition 
of role-expectations, to define the problems of motivational process in interactive 
relationships in such ways that the orientation variables of the theory of action enter both 
into the motivational process in the personalities of individual actors and into the social 
structure in definable ways. Above all, using these patterns of value-orientation as our 
major point of reference, their acquisition for the analysis of socialization, and 
conformity with them as the major axis of variation for that of deviance and social 
control, we were able to work out a substantially complete paradigm of motivational 
process within the social system. 
It is extremely important to be clear that what we have presented in these two chapters 
is a paradigm and not a theory, in the usual sense of the latter term as a system of laws. 
This is almost another way of saying that we have had to formulate the concepts of 
motivational process as mechanisms, not as laws. 
It is indeed the use of the concept of mechanism with its consistent reference to 
relevance to the system, which has enabled us to achieve systematization in this field on 
the paradigmatic level. 
To say that we have achieved a paradigm and not a theory is not to say that no 
knowledge of laws is involved. For example, the statements to the effect that strain, 
defined as some combination of one or more of the factors of withdrawal of support, 
interference with permissiveness, contravention of internalized norms and refusal of 
approval for valued performance, results in such reactions as anxiety, phantasy, hostile 
impulses and resort to the defensive-adjustive mechanisms, are definitely statements of 
laws of motivational process. Without a good deal of such knowledge the paradigm 
would not be possible. But this knowledge is, relative to the empirical problems to be 
solved, fragmentary and incomplete. The paradigm primarily accomplishes two things. 
First, it serves to mobilize such knowledge of laws as we have in terms of its relevance to 
the problems of the explanation of processes in the social system. Secondly, it gives us 
canons for the significant statement of problems for research so that knowledge of laws 
can be extended. Thus for a complete account of the processes of socialization of the 
child we need to know much more of the relations between certain variations in the 
character of the parental roles, and the processes of determination of alternative outcomes 
in the personality structure of the child. To state the problem in terms of specific 
characteristics of the roles of the parents as conceptualized in the terms set forth in this 
work is a very different thing from merely inquiring, “what kinds of influences of parents 
are important?” as so much of psychiatric theory has done. In so far as it does not directly 
incorporate knowledge of laws, then, a paradigm is a set of canons for the statement of 
problems, in such terms as to ensure that the answers to the questions asked will prove to 
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be of generalized significance, because they will state or imply definite relations between 
the fundamental variables of a system. 
It is of the greatest importance to note that the paradigm of motivational process we 
have set forth is independent of the particular structure of roles in an interaction process. 
It is a generalized paradigm which can be used to analyze any motivational process in 
any role system. It is this generality which makes it possible to incorporate what 
knowledge of laws in the field of motivational process we have, and to state problems of 
research—the answers to which should be capable of incorporation into a general body of 
laws. At the same time, however, the system of structural categories in terms of which the 
particular roles are analyzed has a comparable order of generality and the two elements of 
theory are parts of the same more general system, the theory of action. It is this which 
makes it possible to think that the present work constitutes a step toward the development 
of a generalized theoretical system. 
It is a necessary inference from the above considerations that a general theory of the 
processes of change of social systems is not possible in the present state of knowledge. 
The reason is very simply that such a theory would imply complete knowledge of the 
laws of process of the system and this knowledge we do not possess. The theory of 
change in the structure of social systems must, therefore, be a theory of particular sub-
processes of change within such systems, not of the over-all processes of change of the 
systems as systems. 
But by the same token it should be clear, that so far as our knowledge goes beyond 
description and sheer empirical generalization it is always to some degree knowledge of 
processes of change. It is not possible to segregate theoretical knowledge of the laws of 
the processes within systems, and of their processes of change. They are both different 
contexts of application of our knowledge of the relations between variations of 
conditions and the outcomes of processes going forward under the conditions in question. 
When, therefore, we combine our knowledge of structural imperatives in the above sense, 
our paradigmatic knowledge of motivational process, and our fragmentary knowledge of 
laws, we do in fact have considerable knowledge of many processes of change, and the 
progress of research will steadily increase it. 
We have been speaking of theoretical knowledge of processes of change within the 
theory of social systems in the sense of this work. There are two other types of 
knowledge which have a bearing on the empirical understanding of such processes in the 
concrete which must be mentioned to avoia possible confusion. 
The first of these is sheer empirical generalization. It is quite possible, indeed 
common, to know that certain processes of change do in fact typically take place under 
certain conditions without being able to deduce the pattern of the processes and of their 
outcome from knowledge of the laws of a system. It is also possible to have considerable 
knowledge about variations in conditions and a variety of specific consequences of such 
variations for the system. A familiar example of this type of knowledge is knowledge of 
the outline of the biological life cycle. There is, in biological science, no general theory 
of the life cycle, by which growth, its cessation at maturity, senescence and finally death 
can be systematically explained in terms of general laws. But it is known that organisms 
go through this typical cycle, and its broad division into phases is established on the level 
of empirical generalization. There is much theoretical knowledge of various processes 
within the organism, some of which bears on the shift from one phase of the cycle to 
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another, for instance regarding the effects of sex hormones on the organism, following 
the maturation of the gonads. There is also considerable knowledge of the consequences 
of disturbances of the normal cycle, as through various kinds of malnutrition. But a 
general theory of the life cycle is still lacking. 
Though it has frequently been claimed by such authors as Spengler, or the older 
evolutionists, to exist, the present evidence indicates that there is no over-all simple 
empirical pattern of the development of social systems generally through a series of 
phases which is comparable to the biological life cycle. At least one major reason for this 
would seem to be the part played in social systems by culture, and the facts, first, that 
culture does not develop in a single linear pattern, and, second, that it can be acquired by 
diffusion so that any internal developmental process can be profoundly influenced from 
outside in ways to which organisms are not susceptible of influence. 
There are, however, typical processes of change from given starting points in social 
systems which can be identified by empirical generalization. We have made use of these 
in our discussion of the empirical clusterings of the elements of social structure in 
Chapter V, and will comment on some of them further below. 
The second type of knowledge, and hence of explanatory hypotheses which can bear 
on the concrete problems of change in social systems, derives from the analysis of the 
empirical significance of variables which are not part of the theoretical system with 
which we have been working. There are two classes of such variables. These are the 
variables which concern the constitution of the organism so far as it is independent of the 
factors of orientation of action, and those which concern the physical environment. It is 
clear that they are logically independent of the theory of action, but equally clear that 
their impingement on concrete systems of action is of the first order of empirical 
significance. A third set of variables, those involved in the cultural factor, is in a different 
status, The theory of culture is an integral part of the theory of action. But there are 
phases of it which should not be regarded as parts of the theory of the social system, but 
as data for that theory. This concerns the existence and possible influence of inherent 
“configurations” of the development of culture pattern systems, as this process has been 
analyzed by Kroeber.2 
It should be quite clear that throughout this work we have deliberately refrained from 
attempting to deal with the influence on concrete social phenomena of the variables of 
genetics or physiology or of the variables of the physical aspects of the situation. We 
have been exceedingly careful to keep the place for dealing with their empirical influence 
open, and at many points have clearly delineated this place. Above all various 
fundamental aspects of these two categories have found a place in our system of points of 
reference for the analysis of the orientation of action. But quite clearly we have advanced 
no theory of the interdependence of social action processes and the biological and 
physical factors of their determination. This would be an exceedingly important task for 
social science, and the failure to attempt it here is in no way meant to imply a suggestion 
that it is not important. The only remark in order is that it is much more likely to be done 
successfully if the theory of  
2 Cf. Configurations of Culture Growth. 
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action itself is well developed, so that the nature of articulation can be precisely 
formulated, tnan if, as has been the rule in the past, such theories are motivated largely by 
a conviction that these non-action variables are “very important” and therefore the person 
interested in them chooses to deal exclusively with them without explicit reference to the 
categories of the theory of action. 
It should be made very clear, then, that the theory of action, so far as it is in any sense 
a logically closed system, which is an open question, can be so only on an analytical 
level, most definitely not as a system of empirical generalizations. 
It is a notable fact, which may be mentioned here, that where attempts have been made 
to formulate generalized theories of the processes of change in concrete social systems, 
they have very frequently laid the primary emphasis on these variables outside the system 
of action orientation. It is inevitable in view of the logical structure of these outside 
variables that these theories should be built about the variables included in the two 
categories of heredity and environment in the biological sense. In this class should above 
all be placed the whole class of theories sometimes called those of “Social Darwinism,” 
which attempted to treat the development of societies in terms of the application of the 
law of natural selection. The difficulties which these theories as general theories of social 
process have encountered are so well known that they need not detain us further here.3 
The environmental emphasis is found, for example, in the case of the climatological 
explanations of social change. 
Quite clearly, unless the analysis of social systems in terms of the theory of action is 
fundamentally wrong or purely epiphenomenal so as to be of no independent empirical 
relevance, such theories of social process, exclusively formulated in terms of biological 
variables or tnose of the physical environment, could not be empirically satisfactory. But 
this fact should not blind us to the importance of the variables themselves. Particularly 
the field of population is undoubtedly of great significance as a field of articulation of the 
theory of action and that of the genetic constitution of human organisms, and the 
variations and distribution of variations of this constitution in terms of interdependence 
with the processes of the social system as formulated in action terms. Somewhat similarly 
the field of human geography may be conceived as the primary field for the formulation 
of the interdependences between social action and the physical environment. 
The case of cultural factors is, as we have noted, somewhat different. Culture is an 
integral part of action as here conceived. The essential point here, however, is that the 
theory of the social system, as a branch of the theory of action, is not directly concerned 
with the dynamics of culture any more than it is with the theory of personality as such. It 
assumes certain facts about culture as given and investigates the significance of these 
facts for the processes of the social system. It is not a theory of culture in the sense in 
which that will be discussed in the next chapter. But we have given ample proof of the 
importance of very detailed and explicit concern with many of the problems of culture for 
the theory of the social system. 
There is a certain parallel with respect to generalization about social change in the 
concrete sense between heredity and environment theories on the one hand and cultural 
3 The problem is analyzed in The Structure of Social Action, Chapter III and passim. 
The processes of change of social systems     329
theories on the other. It is logically possible, that is, to escape certain implications of 
our imperfect knowledge of the laws of social process, if one assumes explicitly or 
implicitly, that, subject to certain pre-action conditions in the environment and the 
organism, process of change in the social system is exclusively determined by its culture 
and the configurational processes of culture development. This was indeed the primary 
logical basis of the seeming adequacy of most evolutionary theories of social 
development, in that the essential factor was held to be the cumulative development of 
empirical knowledge. Somewhat similar tendencies with emphasis on other elements of 
the cultural tradition have appeared, differing greafly among themselves, in the theories 
of such diverse authors as Leslie White, Sorokin and Ruth Benedict. 
§ THE GENERAL NATURE OF CHANGE IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
WE MAY take for granted, then, that when we discuss the theory of change in social 
systems, for our purposes we are abstracting from the influence of variability in 
biological constitution or in the physical environment. Though in a strict sense even 
within these limitations we have asserted that a general theory of the change of social 
systems is not possible, we can still say a number of empirically relevant things about the 
general nature of such processes, which derive from the fact that they are processes 
occurring within the social system. These general considerations can serve as a 
background for the discussion of a few selected empirical processes in the latter part of 
the chapter. 
The first consideration involves what we may call the phenomenon of vested interests. 
This derives from the nature of the processes of equilibrium in a boundary-maintaining 
type of system. The specific application of the idea of equilibrium which is of concern to 
us is one aspect of the phenomenon of institutionalization. Institutionalization produces, 
as we have seen, a form of the integration of the need-dispositions of the relevant actors 
with a set of culture patterns which always include in one sense patterns of value-
orientation. We have defined strain in the technical sense of our discussion as disturbance 
of the expectation system which is an essential part of this integration. Strain in this sense 
always, i.e., by definition, sets up re-equilibrating processes. In terms of personality as a 
system this is precisely what is meant by the mechanisms of defense and of adjustment. It 
is thus in the nature of this type of integration of the action system that it should be 
resistant to change in certain respects. So far as it impinges on institutionalized patterns 
of action and relationship, therefore, change is never just “alteration of pattern” but 
alteration by the overcoming of resistance. 
There is one apparent exception to this. Certain processes of empirical change are 
themselves institutionalized. There are in turn two types of cases of this. One of these is 
exemplified by the institutionalization of scientific investigation as this has already been 
analyzed and will be further below. Here the institutionalized value patterns will allow 
for and directly promote change in the cognitive content of the relevant part of the 
culture. Hence the resistance to change of which we are speaking would in this case focus 
on any attempt to stop the equilibrated process of change by stabilizing not the action 
process but the cultural content. We shall discuss some further implications of this case in 
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a later section. It is one we pri-marily had in mind in saying that the equilibration of 
social processes could take the form of a moving, not a static equilibrium. 
Though it is not as such a process of change in the structure of the larger social 
system, the second type can be exemplified by socialization. We have assumed, that at 
various stages the child does reach a relatively stabilized pattern of interaction with the 
parents, for example, in the early love-attachment to the mother. For the process of 
socialization to proceed further, however, this equilibrium must be upset. Strain, that is, 
must be imposed, and a new equilibrium signifying the internalization of new value 
patterns, attained. Here we find in the social system specific mechanisms which first 
impose the strain, that is, “pry” the child loose from his equilibrated orientation, and 
secondly, provide ways of “coping” with the strain so that neurotic motivational 
structures are not built up—in the “normal” case, of course. In the sub-system of the 
family this is, of course, a process of social change, and similar processes operate in the 
wider system. 
The term vested interests seems appropriate to designate this general resistance to 
change which is inherent in the institutionalization of roles in the social system. The term 
interest in this usage must, of course, be interpreted in the broad sense in which we used 
it in Chapter II. It is not confined to “economic” or “materiar interests though it may 
include them. It is fundamentally the interest in maintaining the gratifications involved in 
an established system of role-expectations, which are, be it noted, gratifications of 
needdispositions, not of “drives” in the simple hedonistic sense. It clearly includes the 
interest in conformity with institutionalized expectations, of the affectively neutral and 
often the moral type. Of course it also includes the interest in the relational rewards of 
love, approval and esteem. The phenomenon of vested interests, then, may be treated as 
always lying in the background of the problem of social change. With the exception of 
processes of institutionalized change, change in the social system is possible only by the 
operation of mechanisms which overcome the resistance of vested interests. It is, 
therefore, always essential explicitly to analyze the structure of the relevant vested 
interest complex before coming to any judgment of the probable outcome of the 
incidence of forces making for change. These considerations will often yield the answer 
to the questions of why processes of change either fail to occur altogether or fail to have 
the outcomes which would be predicted on a commonsense basis. 
The next main consideration is that on general grounds we are able to say that there 
are no one or two inherently primary sources of impetus to change in social systems. This 
is true both in general and with reference to particular types of social system. The 
“dominant factor” theories, which were so popular a generation ago, that is, with 
reference to the priority of economic factors, of the genetic constitution, of organisms or 
of “ideas,” have no generalized basis in the theory of the social system. 
The impetus to a process of change may perfectly well originate in the development of 
a cultural configuration, such as a development of science, or of religious ideas. It may 
also perfectly well originate in a change in the genetic constitution of the population, or a 
shift in the physical environment such as the exhaustion of a strategic resource. If a 
primary origin lies in the field of technological applications of scientific knowledge there 
is likely to be a development of science itself in the background, though certainly the 
process of invention is in important respects independent of that of science. Another very 
important possibility lies in the progressive increase of strains in one strategic area of the 
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social structure which are finally resolved by a structural reorganization of the system. 
The conception of strain developed in this study is such that strain is not itself a “prime-
mover,” it is a mode of the impingement of other factors on an interaction system. But a 
structured strain may well be the point at which the balance between forces tending 
toward reequilibration of the previous structure and toward transition to a new structure 
may be most evident. 
As our knowledge of the laws of social process develops we will be able to say more 
and more about the conditions under which certain types of states of affairs in various 
parts of social systems, and in the external variables impinging on them, tend to lead to 
various types of change. But the view that there is no simple intrinsic priority in the 
factors of the initiation of change is inherent in the conception of the social system which 
we have advanced here. The central methodological principle of our theory is that of the 
interdependence of a plurality of variables. At a variety of points empirical relationships 
between these variables can be demonstrated which, as in the case of the empirical 
clusterings we have reviewed, limit the range of logically possible variability. But these 
limitations must be empirically demonstrated. To lay down a general theory of the 
priority of factors in social change is, in the present state of knowledge, to beg the 
question of the empirical interdependences which have yet to be demonstrated. We, 
therefore, put forward what we may call the conception of the plurality of possible 
origins of change with the understanding that change may originate in any part of the 
social system described in structural terms or in terms of variables, and that restrictions 
on the generality of this statement may be introduced only as the outcome of empirical 
demonstration that relations of interdependence are such that certain parts cannot be 
independent sources of the impetus to change. 
Probably considerably more important than the problems of the initiating factors of 
processes of social change, are those concerned with tracing the repercussions of a 
change once initiated throughout the social system, including the “backwash” of 
modification of the original direction of change. It is here above all that the conception of 
the social system as a system is crucial. The combination of our scheme for the analysis 
of the structure of the system with the paradigm of motivational process gives us a 
genuinely technical basis for tackling such a problem, for asserting some propositions 
about such repercussions and for locating the problems which cannot be solved without 
further empirical investigation. 
In addition to the arbitrariness of the assumptions as to what were the most important 
prime movers of change made in so many of the early generalized theories of social 
change, such theories have almost uniformly committed the error of postulating the 
continuance of a trend without taking account of the interdependence of the factors 
involved in the trend with the other variables in the social system. This has been 
particularly conspicuous in the case of the theories which have placed primary emphasis 
on the development of empirical knowledge as a linear evolutionary process. 
It is, of course, evident and important that such general theories of social change have 
had a strong ideological character and that the motivations for their acceptance have not 
been organized ac-cording to the highest levels of the discipline of scientific 
investigation. It is further true that the theorists at the time did not have at their disposal 
anything like the resources for analysis of social systems which we now have, so that 
many features of such theories which are unacceptable to the contemporary social 
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scientist are quite understandable in the light of the historical circumstances at the time. 
But these facts do not alter the great importance of making the fullest possible use of our 
own available resources for refinement of the analysis of such processes.4 Rather than 
attempting to develop this very fundamental point further in abstract terms, we shall 
presently analyze a few examples of types of process of change which can illustrate how 
the analysis of repercussions can be carried out. 
For such an analysis we have certain resources which we can utilize. First, we can 
describe the initial state of the system, into which the process of change enters, in precise 
and technical terms, which among other things can clearly reveal whether the empirical 
evidence is adequate. Secondly, in the same terms, those describing the structure of a 
social system, we can specify what has changed into what and through what intermediate 
stages. If the process has only begun we can specify its direction relative to the various 
parts of the system. 
Third, we can invoke our knowledge of the two classes of structural imperatives of 
social systems, the general ones and those peculiar to the specific type of system. In these 
terms we can ask whether the change tends to violate any of these imperatives, to 
jeopardize the motivational needs of important groups in the population, to weaken the 
controls over important parts of the power system, to upset the balance in the reward 
system in specific ways, or to introduce a structure which is incompatible in certain 
respects with other concrete structures in the system. When any of these “problems” can 
be precisely identified and stated we can then proceed to analyze the processes of 
adaptation and adjustment which ensue from the introduction of a change. 
For this purpose the paradigm of motivational process is fundamental. Because of the 
pnenomenon of vested interests, as we have called it, we may assume that the 
introduction of the change in the relevant part of the system imposes strains on the actors 
in those other parts on which the change impinges. The reactions to these strains 
constitute the tendencies to re-equilibration of the system, that is, to the elimination of the 
change and the restoration of the state of the system before its introduction. But these 
forces may be “coped with” so that the change becomes consolidated and perhaps 
extended. But unless the system is in the relevant respects exceedingly loosely integrated, 
this consolidation will mean that the other parts of the system than the original area of 
change have also been changed, so that eventually what is reached is a new state of the 
system as a whole. It may also, of course, mean that the strains are only partially coped 
with so that chronic states of tension come to be institutionalized and more or less 
stabilized.  
 
4 Of course shift in the character of ideologies, which in turn is in part, though only in part, a 
function of the development of scientific knowledge, has played an important part in shifting the 
climate of opinion of social science in the past two generations. On the technical side the statement 
of Pareto in The Mind and Society is probably still the best statement in general methodoloeical 
terms of the significance of interdependence of variables in a system for analysis of the problems of 
change. Pareto’s views on these subjects are summarized in the Structure of Social Action, Chapters 
V–VIII, especially VII. 
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§ THE DIRECTION OF CHANGE IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS 
BEFORE going on to the analysis of a few concrete types of process of change, we may 
discuss briefly the problem of whether on general theoretical grounds we can say 
anything at all about directions of change in social systems. Though obviously this 
subject must be treated with great caution, there are certain implications of the general 
nature of action and of social systems which can be brought to bear on it. In so far as the 
theory of action is able to demonstrate its empirical validity at all, these considerations 
must be of some empirical significance. 
Action is, as we have seen, a set of oriented processes. The concept of orientation is 
inherently a directional concept. There are furthermore, it seems, two fundamental 
aspects of the orientation of action, two major vectors of its directionality, namely, that of 
gratification and that of patterning, or organization, of value-realization as we might put 
it. 
The first of these we have conceptualized as the trend to the optimization of 
gratification.5 By definition, in the theory of action it does not make sense for an actor to 
seek deprivation and avoid gratification. What in common-sense terms is interpreted to 
be action not oriented to gratification or positively seeking deprivations must be 
interpreted in one of two ways. It may be simply a matter of terminology, as when in 
certain religious patterns of thought “spiritual” needs are set over against worldly 
gratifications. But in action terms we have no hesitation in speaking of the gratification 
of “spiritual” need-dispositions, provided we are able to give a satisfactory account of the 
sense in which these are need-dispositions. The second interpretation is that in terms of 
strains and conflicts within a system of action. In this sense an act of suicide would not be 
interpreted as motivated by a simple wish to the, but as what was felt by the actor to be 
the least intolerable resolution of an intolerable conflict situation, therefore, as in some 
sense a minimization of relative deprivation. We may presume that most such conflicts 
are internal to the personality, but in principle the action of the suicide is similar to that of 
the man who would face certain death or bring it on himself rather than face the certainty 
of prolonged torture. The situation of the suicide is in that sense to him desperate. 
There is one fundamental reason, however, why the trend to the optimization of 
gratification cannot serve as a canon for defining a fundamental directionality of change 
for social systems generally.6 This reason is that the social system transcends the life 
span of the individual actor and is in certain other respects independent of particular 
individual actors, whereas gratification is inherently a state of the individual actor, of his 
personality as a system. This is in fact the old dilemma of hedonism. There is literally no 
way of making the transition in gratification-deprivation terms from the individual actor 
to the social system. There is such a thing as integration of a social system, but most 
specifically and definitely there is no such thing as a state of gratification of social  
5 Most fully discussed in Values, Motives and Systems of Action, Chapter II. 
6 This reason was clearly understood by Durkheim, probably for the first time within what may 
broadly be called the “utilitarian” and biological orientations of modern social thought. He stated it 
in the Division of Labor in his analyses of the reasons why the desire to increase “happiness” coidd 
not account for the development of the division of labor. 
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systems. If there is no such thing as such a state, obviously there can be no trend to 
quantitative increase in it. The state of gratification of individuals on the other hand is a 
function of their integration in a particular social system, hence this cannot be made a 
canon of the direction of change of social systems generally, of the transition from one 
type to another. 
There is, however, one important inference from this position which should be 
explicitly stated. This is that the point of reference for the analysis of “cultural relativity” 
must be the institutionally integrated social system as an ideal type, not any empirical 
social system. Where the actual social system deviates from this ideal type of integration, 
the trend to the optimization of gratification can and does operate as a factor of change, 
because of the discrepancy between what, in that particular social system, are the ideal 
patterns for given groups in the population, and the actuality. Analysis of this aspect of 
the process must, of course, take full account of the immense complications of the 
motivational process with which modern psychopathology among other things has made 
us familiar. But the general principle is clear. The drive toward the optimization of 
gratification is, because of its significance to motivational process, a fundamental aspect 
of the tendencies to change from one particular type of social system to another. But it 
cannot be the source of the general directions involved in the succession of patterns of 
change over a series of type changes. For the understanding of this latter aspect it is 
necessary to turn to other features of the total system of action. 
The only alternative lies in the cultural component of orientation. It is after all one of 
the critical properties of culture that it is transmissible without loss. Whereas the state of 
gratification of an individual actor cannot be transmitted to his successors, his culture, his 
knowledge, his moral standards and his expressive symbols can be transmitted. Thus a 
change in the cultural tradition can be perpetuated and can serve as a base for further 
changes. There is, as has long been recognized, in culture the possibility of indefinite 
cumulative development. 
We have classified the content of the cultural tradition under the three headings of 
belief systems, systems of expressive symbols and systems of value-orientation. Of these 
three, in cultural terms as siich it is clear that systems of value-orientation are the least 
independent, because they are the patterns of articulation between the cultural orientation 
system and the other components of action. This is particularly true of moral value-
patterns on the social level because of their special involvement in the structure of social 
systems. It is often for this reason convenient for the sociologist to take moral value-
patterns as his primary point of reference in the cultural tradition for many purposes, but 
in terms of the longer run perspectives of change it seems more important to consider the 
significance of the possibilities of cumulative development of belief systems and systems 
of expressive symbols. It will, of course, be understood that the implications of these 
developments cannot be fully institutionalized in social systems without articulation with 
the exigencies of social systems through the appropriate patterns of moral value-
orientation. 
Of the two, by far the more obvious case is that of belief systems. Here there seems to 
be no doubt that there is an inherent factor of the directionality of change in social 
systems, a directionality which was classically formulated by Max Weber in what he 
called the “process of rationalization.” In Chapter VIII above we have shown the 
principal ingredients which must be taken into account in formulating such a conception. 
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The older evolutionary theories erred in confining their attention to empirical science, 
and in failing to take account of the complex interdependences of the development of 
science itself with the rest of the social system. But there was undoubtedly an element of 
substantial truth in their views. 
In addition to science itself, however, the non-empirical elements of cognitive 
orientation must be taken into account. There is indeed an ultimate strain to consistency 
in the total system of cognitive orientation in a society, and developments in science will 
have their long-run repercusions on philosophy, ideologies, and religious beliefs as well 
as vice versa. But this does not mean that science is the only significant reference point 
for the analysis of cognitive orientations and that it is safe to treat the other components 
of a total system of cognitive orientation simply as dependent variables relative to 
science. 
Making allowance for this factor, however, we may speak of the process of 
rationalization with considerable confidence as a general directional factor in the change 
of social systems. We have repeatedly shown that there can be no simple general linearity 
of the empirical developmental process in these terms. Above all the vested interest 
phenomena in this field are very powerful and seriously inhibit the development of belief 
systems. But this does not invalidate the very great importance of this directional 
principle. 
The question of the significance of systems of expressive symbols as a source of 
directionality of change must be answered very much more tentatively. As elements of 
the cultural tradition expressive symbols share the fundamental property of 
transmissibility. There are, however, reasons for believing that the empirical obstacles to 
cumulative development are more serious than in the case of belief systems. This is 
essentially because of their fundamental functions in shaping the expressive interests of 
actors, and therefore their intimate connection with the specific cathectic orientations of 
actors. We have several times called attention to the connection between expressive 
primacy and particularism, hence involvement in a particular relational system. It would 
seem that there was connected with this, a whole complex of factors making for 
stabilizadon through traditionalization, which did not operate so strongly in the case of 
beliefs. 
This empirical aspect of the question is not, however, the main one. That concerns, 
rather, the question of whether and how far in the inherent cultural character of 
expressive symbolism there is a basis for cumulative development. The answer would 
seem to be that there must be. But we know too little about the principles of symbolic 
organization to be able to say with any confidence just what the pattern of such 
cumulation may be. 
Two questions may be raised. The first is that of whether and/ or how far cognitive 
processes of rationalization themselves operate within the complex of expressive 
symbolism, so that in certain respects the fundamental processes of cumulation in this 
field are an aspect of those in the cognitive field. Such studies as that of Max Weber in 
the sociology of music7 would suggest that there is something in this possibility. The 
second question is whether, independently of cognitive rationalization, there is any 
unitary process in the expressive field, or whether it must be understood to be in- 
7 Printed in the second German edition of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
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herently pluralistic. To this question there does not seem to be a satisfactory answer 
available in the present state of knowledge. It may very well be, however, that the recent 
emphasis on the pluralism of expressive orientations is related to a phase of development 
of our own culture and of the social sciences within it, and will prove in the long run to 
be untenable. Such attempts as that of Northrop8 suggest the possibility of working 
toward the introduction of a more coherent order into this field. 
We have, then, the virtual certainty that there is an inherent factor of the general 
directionality of change in the process of rationalization, and the probability that there is 
an at least partially independent one involved in the processes of development of systems 
of expressive symbolism. One of the most important questions about the latter is whether 
the higher developments in that direction are in conflict with the higher reaches of 
rationalization or can in certain respects be fused with them. This, along with the 
questions of internal differentiation of each type of trend, must be left to much further 
analytical and empirical work. 
Finally, we should be quite clear that when we speak of such a directional trend of 
change in social systems, we are not directly stating an empirical generalization. Perhaps 
the best model we have is that of entropy in classical mechanics. Entropy, like 
rationalization, is an inherent trend of change, so far as the system is isolated and so far 
as certain obstacles to development of the process do not operate. We have seen 
repeatedly that in social systems a very large class of obstacles may operate to block the 
process of rationalization. Directly in the field of beliefs themselves we have spoken of 
traditionalization and authoritarian enforcement. More indirectly we are aware of the 
operation of the mechanism of rationalization in the psychological sense and the 
analogous mechanisms involved in the formation of ideologies on the social system level. 
In other words, the statement of such a trend in itself says nothing about the empirical 
process by which it may work out, or fail to do so. 
It not only says nothing directly about the empirical process, but it in no way says that the 
trend may not under certain circumstances be reversed. In physics it is by no means 
impossible for the entropy of a system to be reduced instead of being increased. But this 
reduction of entropy must be accounted for by the introduction of new energy into the 
system from outside. Similarly if the level of rationalization of a social system is reduced, 
which is empirically entirely possible, a problem is posed. It is necessary, we may say, 
that new, relatively unrationalized orientation “material” should be introduced into the 
system from outside.9 By thus reducing the general level of rationalization of the system, 
the process of rationalization could, as it were, get a new start. Indeed in Weber’s view 
this was the primary reason why, in spite of the place he gave to the process of 
rationalization, a generally linear conception of the evolution of social systems could not 
be upheld. Of course similar considerations will apply to an independent directional trend 
in the field of expressive symbolism, so far as this can be demonstrated. 
 
8 The Meeting of East and West. 
9 In Max Weber’s scheme this, we may infer, was one of the theoretical functions of the concept of 
charisma, to serve as the conceptualization of the source of new orientations on which the process 
of rationalization was then conceived to operate. 
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In spite of the fact that such directional trends cannot be interpreted as simple 
empirical generalizations, their theoretical significance should not be underrated. They 
give to the theory of change in social systems a logical framework which would not 
otherwise be present Indeed, some such logical construct as this seems to be essential to a 
conceptual scheme which points toward the development of a theoretical system. Process, 
as conceived in such a system, cannot be simply random change from one state of the 
system to another. It must, through time, have direction, and what we are attempting to 
do is to say something about that direction. The fact that we have had to look on the 
cultural level and not in the narrower sense the motivational level for that direction for 
the social system is a fact of the first importance. That personalities are above all oriented 
to the optimization of gratification as their fundamental directional principle, while social 
systems are oriented to cultural change, is an inference from, and a way of stating, the 
mutual independence of the two classes of system. It is a further validation of the 
importance of the symmetrical asymmetry of the pattern variable scheme on which we 
have laid so much stress from time to time. The difference goes to the deepest roots of the 
theory of action.  
§ SOME SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF PROCESSES OF SOCIAL 
CHANGE 
THE main part of this final section will be concerned with a sketch of the analysis of 
three types of process of large scale change in societies as a whole, in order to illustrate 
the nature of the problems faced by the sociologist in attempting to carry out such an 
analysis. Before entering upon these, however, it will be useful to call attention to the fact 
that even in a relatively stabilized society, processes of structural change are continually 
going on in many sub-systems of the society, many of which are institutionalized. In 
other words stabilization and change are relative to the problems on which the observer 
focuses his attention; a complex social system is not either stabilized or changing as a 
whole, but in different parts and different respects, always both. 
A good example of a changing sub-system within a larger system is the conjugal 
family. A fundamental part of this process of change is imposed by non-action variables, 
through the unfolding of the biological life cycle, thus though biological factors do not 
alone account for the birth of children, once born and accepted, their biological 
maturation proceeds inexorably. Thus because the parents are continually growing older 
and children are growing up, the family cannot be a statically stabilized system. 
The feature of the family as a changing system on which we have focused attention is 
the process of socialization. This process must quite strictly be considered as orderly 
process of change, one which is largely institutionalized, in the family as a system, not 
only in the personality of the child. As the child grows older and becomes more 
socialized, obviously his roles in the family change. It is further an obvious inference 
from the complementarity of role-expectations that if the child’s role changes, that of the 
parents must also change in complementary fashion, if the family as a system is not to be 
disorganized. 
All the fundamental ingredients of the theory of change in social systems are thus 
involved in the analysis of what is now sometimes called the family cycle. In the 
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discussion of the socialization of the child in Chapter VI above we focused attention on 
the process as one of changing the role of the child. We saw that there are resistances to 
this change on his part, that is, he develops a vested interest in a given stabilized pattern 
of interaction and has to be “pried” out or it. We saw that this involved strain, and that the 
child tended to react to this strain with anxiety, with phantasies, with hostility and with 
defensive-adjustive mechanisms. We saw that a certain combination of treatment, 
deliberate and otherwise, on the part of the parents could overcome these resistances and 
create a situation favorable for identification and thus for the acquisition of the requisite 
value-patterns. The main ingredients of this treatment were support, permissiveness, 
denial of certain reciprocities and manipulation of sanctions through conditional approval 
and disapproval for performance. 
In its fundamentals the same set of considerations also applies to the parents. They too 
acquire vested interests in the maintenance of their own roles in the early stages of 
socialization; the parent who is reluctant to let his or her child “grow up” is a well-known 
phenomenon. Growing up of the child thus imposes strains on the parents too, with the 
typical manifestations or strain. There must be mechanisms of social control operating on 
the parents as well as on the child. Misfiring of the process of socialization may very well 
be accounted for by compulsive motivation on the part of the parents which accentuates 
their vested interests and makes them insensitive to the normal mechanisms of control. 
Thus we see that the normal conjugal family should be regarded as undergoing a 
process of institutionalized change as a system, not, except for certain limited 
perspectives, as a statically equilibrated system. This is, of course, true of many other 
sub-systems in larger societies. A society like our own is, for example, full of continually 
rising and declining organizations. Such organizations are, independently of larger 
processes of change in the society as a whole, often involved in processes of growth or 
decline. The same fundamental considerations which apply to the family as a changing 
system also apply to such organizations. Rather than developing further examples on this 
level, however, it seems best to turn to the problems presented by change in the society as 
a whole considered as a social system.  
I. Institutionalized Rationalization and “Cultural Lag” 
In Chapter VIII above we discussed at some length the institutionalization of scientific 
investigation itself and of the application of scientific knowledge in technical fields. This 
was more fully elaborated in Chapter X for the particular field of medical practice. 
Obviously one fundamental feature of the institutionalization of science and its 
application is the introduction of a continual stream of factors of change into the social 
system. The present problem is how this stream of innovation affects parts of the social 
system which are not directly involved in the process of its introduction. 
In the above discussions we have stressed the fact that the institutionalization of both 
types of process creates strains in their immediate environments. It is by no means to be 
taken for granted that because in terms of our dominant value system, scientific advance 
is a “good thing,” either the processes by which this is accomplished or the application of 
the results will be easily and “automatically” accepted. On the contrary there are many 
strains and resistances. Some of these are associated with the communication gap 
between the specialist and the “laity,” some with the special “privileges” required by the 
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investigator or the applied scientist, some with his interference with established ways of 
doing things or thinking, and some with the fact that he introduces changes which if 
adopted require the abandonment of established ways in which there is a vested interest. 
All of this is compounded by the fact that what this type of specialist does is very 
generally associated with situations in which the non-specialists are themselves under 
strains which predispose them even less to “rational” acceptance than would otherwise be 
the case. This was particularly vivioly illustrated in the case of illness. 
The repercussions of the changes introduced by scientific and technological advance 
can be followed through two principal channels. The first of these starts with the structure 
of the economy of instrumental orientations within which the role in which the changes 
originate and receive their first applications is located. The second concerns the cultural 
aspects, the belief systems and the systems of expressive symbolism, and hence the 
rewards, with which the earlier phases of the process of rationalization were integrated. 
We shall discuss each one of these in turn. 
We may distinguish three principal types of repercussion in the instrumental complex. 
The first is the restructuring of occupational roles themselves. This has a positive aspect 
in that by virtue of the new knowledge and techniques new roles are created, or old roles 
are redefined with respect to technical content. For example in the scientific field, only in 
fairly recent years did such a thing as a “nuclear physicist” exist. William Welch was the 
first professional “pathologist” in the history of American medicine, and only about the 
turn of tbe last century did the role of “sociologist” emerge. Similarly in technological 
fields the role of I.B.M. operator had to await the invention and production of the 
machines he operates and obviously before the days of the typewriter there was no such 
thing as a typist. 
The tendency, of course, is for these new technical roles to develop by extension of 
familiar roles. The role of professor, of course, existed long before there were any 
professors of sociology, and the latter was assimilated to the wider role category. But the 
interdependence between the technical function of a role and the definition of role-
expectations in value-orientation terms is sufficiently close so that very considerable 
adaptations and adjustments are necessary with changes in technical content. There are 
many different respects in which the role of a professor of sociology must differ from that 
of a professor of classics even in the same university with the same basic social structure 
and cultural traditions. Both his teaching and his research must be different. 
The obverse of the creation of new roles is the rendering of old roles and role-content 
obsolete, This is obviously the well-known phenomenon of technological unemployment. 
For a variety of reasons it is difficult for the same personnel to take over the new 
knowledge and techniques, and very frequently they are superseded before the normal 
turnover througn superannuation solves the problem. Obviously they have a strong vested 
interest in their ways of doing things, in their status and in its remuneration, so that there 
is a strong tendency for the incumbents of the roles which are super-seded, or are 
threatened with supersession, to resist the introduction of such changes. A society where 
rapid technological change is going on would be expected to show many signs of strain 
centering about this process, and of defensive behavior on the part of groups which are 
threatened with supersession or less drastic upsetting of their established ways. This may 
indeed be interpreted as one of the primary sources of the “security mindedness” which is 
so prominent in certain sectors of our society.10 
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Of course it follows from our general analysis that these reactions to the threat of 
change will vary greatly, both as a function of the impact of the change, and of the ways 
in which it is handled. Where care is taken that communication is adequate, where 
support is given in the form of reassurance that fundamental securities are not threatened, 
and where alternatives are opened, the resistance can often be successfully overcome. But 
in any case such change imposes strains on important groups in the population which 
may have more or less serious consequences. 
The second type of repercussion in the instrumental complex consists in the impact of 
technological change on the character of organizations rather than of particular roles. 
There are many possible phases of such impact, but one particularly important one may 
be singled out. This is the fact that, though with many individual exceptions, 
technological advance almost always leads to increasingly elaborate division of labor and 
the concomitant requirement of increasingly elaborate organization.11 
The fundamental reason for this is, of course, that with elaborate differentiation of 
functions the need for minute coordination of the different functions develops at the same 
time. An excellent example is the minuteness of specifications which must be followed in 
the production of complicated machinery, such as an airplane engine.  
Quite clearly adherence to such minute specifications cannot in general be left to the 
unregulated and voluntary “self-interest” of the incumbents of the various roles. There 
must be a complex organization of supervision to make quite sure that exactly the right 
thing is done. Almost as important is the temporal coordination of the many functions. 
Feeding the various parts into the process in such a way that a modern assembly line can 
operate smoothly requires very complex organization to see that they are available in just 
the right quantities at the right times and places. 
Change in the structure of organizations, like change in the content of particular roles, 
imposes strains. There are complex vested interests in the maintenance of an organization 
as it is which must be overcome. One of the most important phases of this process of 
change is concerned with the necessity of formalization when certain points of 
complexity are reached. Smaller and simpler organizations are typically managed with a 
high degree of particularism in the relations of persons in authority to their subordinates. 
But when the “distance” between points of decision and of operation increases, and the 
number of operating units affected by decisions with it, uniformity and coordination can 
be attained only by a high degree of formalization which requires profound changes in 
the structure of the organization itself, that is, of the roles within it. Again there is the 
problem of the processes by which these changes are introduced and the attendant strains 
10 An excellent analysis in detail of the repercussions of technological change in stimulating 
restricdon of production and the consolidation of informal organization resisting change is given in 
Roethlisberger and Dickson, Management and the Worker, especially the study of the “bank-
wiring” room. 
11 In this as in other respects Durkheim’s insight was far in advance of that of the utilitarian 
individualists. For example, he correctly argued that far from the growth in the functions of the 
state being in some sense in conflict with an increasine “individualistic” division of labor, it was a 
necessary concomitant of this development. We may merely add that what is true of the state is also 
true of the development of organization in the sphere of private enterprise. 
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coped with. Failure of the mechanisms of control to operate properly may mean that the 
process of development itself comes to be blocked. 
Finally, the third type of repercussion of technological change on the instrumental 
economy is that on the composition of the system of facilities and through it on the power 
structure. The introduction of new physical facilities, in the form of equipment and 
machinery and the like, is obvious. Another phase is cnange in the physical resources 
which are strategic. Thus the internal combustion engine made liquid fuels, especially oil, 
of a strategic significance which they had altogether lacked before, and today uranium 
deposits have become a strategic resource whereas quite recently they were of no 
significance except to a very few scientists. 
But for the social system still more important is the shift in the significance of types of 
skill and competence, and in the control of certain types of organization. It is probably 
not too much to say that one of the most fundamental social changes in the United States 
in the past two generations concerns the repercussions of this process on the power 
system and through it the system of social stratification. In what might be called the 
“independent business” era of our national development, which roughly closed with 
World War I, the individual owner-manager entrepreneur was perhaps the most strategic 
figure in the instrumental economy. Capital and enterprise were more important than high 
technical competence, and organizations were simple enough to be created and managed 
almost ad hoc by the entrepreneur himself. 
The development of technology and its repercussions have, however, led to a great 
change in this situation, which has two primary aspects. The first of these is the fact that 
the highly trained and specialized technician has acquired a strategic place in the 
structure of industry, which is far different from that of the ad hoc “inventor” of earlier 
days whose invention was more or less complete at one stroke. Not the least important 
aspect of this is the fact that the pure scientist has more and more been drawn into the 
sphere of practical affairs. In this sense we may say that the instrumental system has 
become “professionalized” to a degree which was not foreseen by the businessmen of the 
turn of the century. 
Secondly, organization itself has become enormously elaborated and formalized, with 
the “executive” or “manager” taking the place of the earlier “entrepreneur.” The latter 
was the classical “capitalist” not the former. In this sense, then, we may say that the 
instrumental system has tended to become “bureaucratized.” 
These two processes mean that the center of gravity of power has shifted drastically. 
This shift has a great deal to do with the fact that the “business elite” of the great era of 
capitalistic expansion during the period following the Civil War failed to become 
consolidated as anything closely approaching a “ruling class” in American society. 
We see, then, that the institutionalization of science and technological change has led 
to a complex series of repercussions within the instrumental complex itself which have 
fundamentally altered its structure; however much other processes may have been 
concretely involved in the historical changes, these certainly were. We may now speak 
briefly of the repercussions on the adaptive structures outside the instrumental complex. 
The most important of these probably is kinship. Here the broad lines of the process of 
repercussion are well known. 
Only a few highlights can, however, be mentioned. In the broadest terms it would 
seem that the development has strongly accentuated the general trend to isolation of the 
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conjugal family, above all because professionalization and bureaucratization have both 
operated to accentuate the universalistic-specific-achievement patterning of an 
increasingly large proportion of occupational roles. The mere decline of the proportion of 
the gainfully employed engaged in agriculture to well below 20% (compared with India’s 
85% or more) is sufficient indication of this, but it has also operated in many other 
occupational fields. This obviously means that family and occupational unit must be 
sharply segregated, and that the processes of allocation of personnel within the 
occupational system must be relatively independent of kinship solidarities. 
This segregation and isolation of the conjugal family in turn has had repercussions on 
the feminine role; on the whole, at least temporarily, probably increasing the sharpness of 
sex role segregation and having much to do with the emergence of such phenomena as 
the glamor pattern. It has increased strains on the feminine role and hence produced or 
accentuated certain strain-reaction patterns. It certainly had much to do with the 
precipitate decline of birth rates until quite recently. These factors in turn have 
presumably had further repercussions on the processes of socialization of children which 
cannot be very well followed out in the present state of knowledge. 
Another well-known aspect, of course, isthe alteration in household technology, 
through the utilization of technological innovations to make operation of the household 
easier. With respect to the higher income groups this partly at least balances the decline 
in the availability and quality and the greatly increased cost of domestic service, which is 
probably itself to an important degree a consequence of the changes in the labor role 
which have resulted largely from the technological revolution. 
Repercussions of technological change on religious organization or other non-
instrumental features of the social structure are more difficult to trace and we shall not 
attempt to do so here. It may merely be mentioned that with greatly increased spatial 
mobility the structure of communities has greatly altered. Furthermore it would seem 
probable that the maintenance of relative ethnic separateness is becoming more difficult. 
We may now turn to a few of the cultural aspects of the process of repercussion. We 
may start with the style of life aspects of the system of expressive symbolism. The very 
mechanical gadgets which the development of technology has made available in quantity 
of course become expressive symbols and play their part in the prestige system. The 
family car or cars, the refrigerator, the washing machine, and now the television set of 
course all have this aspect to their significance. Associated with this is the fact that, 
except perhaps at the very top, numbers of domestic servants have lost their significance 
as symbols of status. 
In certain respects, however, there are interesting phenomena which are associated 
with the strain incident to change. A social system undergoing such change is presumably 
subject to considerable mobility so that the upper groups contain a considerable number 
of parvenus who do not have well settled standards of taste. There appears to be an 
interesting dichotomy in this field in that on the one hand there is a strong demand for 
“antiques,” that is, for style-objects the acceptability of which is unequivocally validated 
in traditional terms, and on the other hand, a demand to be “up to the minute” in 
following the latest new styles, for example, in house furnishings. Such a dichotomy is 
suggestive of insecurity. 
Another interesting phenomenon is the clinging to expressive symbols in a prestige 
context which once had an instrumental use but no longer do so. The cult of the horse is 
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an outstanding example. While the horse has been almost eliminated from our 
technology, interest in horses, in racing and even in fox hunting is still a symbol of 
considerable importance in certain circles. Fox hunting is particularly interesting in the 
United States because of its association with British aristocracy, which as a social 
structure can have no place in the American system of stratification, but can as it were 
serve only as a wish-fulfillment symbol for those who have certain dissatisfactions with 
their place in the system, perhaps because having reached what is in a certain sense the 
top there is nowhere further to go. 
Expressive symbolism of this type really includes the patterns of entertainment in the 
society. Here technological change has made many things possible whicn earlier were 
not, such as the movies, radio and television. But there are other orders of repercussions 
as well. Here it may merely be suggested that a certain trend toward “hedonistic” forms 
of entertainment, especially perhaps in the spectator role, have something to do with the 
impact of the severe disciplines of a highly technological and bureaucratic occupational 
system where above all affective neutrality is rigorously enforced. Also, we have noted, 
such entertainments may be less threatening to the system than would be affective outlets 
which entail the formation of diffuse attachments. 
Another exceedingly important aspect of the expressive symbolism of the 
entertainment field lies in the ways in which entertainment provides outlets for the 
phantasy life or the population. It is well known that phantasy is one of the most 
important features of psychological reaction to strain. Certainly much of the outlet that 
children find in the “comics,” and in radio programs especially designed for them, 
concerns vicarious gratification of the phantasies produced in the process of socialization. 
But fundamentally the same considerations apply in the adult world. The movies and a 
good deal of magazine literature and the novel, as well as the notorious soap opera, are 
cases in point. A substantial part of the strain, which is expressed in this sometimes 
bizarre phantasy life, is presumably the product of the processes of change which are 
necessitated by technological development. 
The discussion of deviance and social control above should make it clear that it is 
dangerous to pass a functional judgment on these phenomena without giving 
consideration to their relations to strain. The essential problem probably is that of how far 
they fall within the range of permissiveness which should be considered normal to people 
under certain strains, and how far they lead into a vicious circle of gratification of deviant 
wishes, and hence to undermining of the main value system. The judgment of the “view 
with alarm” school is almost certainly not to be accepted literally without discount. 
It is also clear that such phenomena as the scapegoating involved in much of “group 
prejudice” and in the tendencies to “witch-hunting” for “disloyal” elements are related to 
the strains produced by such processes of change. Problems of the determination of the 
incidence of such phenomena, of just how threatening they are to the stability of the 
system, and of what mechanisms of control operate and how effective they are, are 
obviously very complex and cannot be gone into here. 
Turning to the relational reward aspect of expressive symbolism it is clear that the 
process of technological change inevitably results in a continual reorganization of this 
system. The changes in the instrumental complex which have been outlined themselves 
constitute, in one aspect, changes in the fundamental reward system of the society. New 
types of technical role-content and of role patterns acquire strategic significance in the 
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system, and old ones become obsolete or are lowered in relative significance. 
Organizations are continually restructured, old ones the out or decline while new ones 
rise, and the role structure within those which continue is altered. Finally, new types of 
facilities acquire significance and hence their possessors power and prestige. The fact of 
the integration of all these things in the reward system constitutes one major facet of the 
vested interests structure and hence of the strain occasioned by the processes of change. 
It is probable that the strains imposed by these processes much more than any inherent 
“conflict of interest” is the primary factor in the genesis of so-called “class-conflicts” in 
modern Western society. In England it was the agricultural laborers who felt their 
livelihood threatened by machinery who constituted the spearhead of radical movements 
rather than the “proletariat” as such. 
These phenomena are, however, exceedingly complex and above all are relative to the 
particular social structure in which the process of change occurs. Frustration, we must 
remember, is always relative to expectations. It is this circumstance which serves to 
explain why movements for radical change have so often centered in relatively privileged 
groups who by common sense standards are “well off.” 
They have become accustomed to rising levels of expectation, and certain features of 
the established order have seemed to stand in the way. Thus the French Bourgeoisie in 
the Revolution had not been in a declining situation with respect either to standard of 
living or to power before 1789, on the contrary. The continuance of the old regime 
interfered with the projections of the line of their rise rather than with their current status. 
Similarly, labor organization has ordinarily been spear-headed by the “aristocracy” of 
labor, not by the most “exploited” groups. The pattern is essentially, “since so much has 
already proved possible, why can we not go farther?”12 
It is a striking fact that in the United States the reactions to the strains of technological 
development have not tended to become organized about class conflict, contrary to the 
Marxist predictions. The first factor in the explanation of this fact is the relative weakness 
of a pre-industrial status elite—except in the South—which could identify its interests 
with resistance to any further change. In Europe the tendency has been for the threatened 
elements of the “capitalist” class to form an alliance with the pre-industrial elite groups 
which stood over against the “people.” In this country the threatened elements have not 
had this group to ally with, and this circumstance has left the door open to a successful 
transition within the industrial elite. In very schematic terms we may say that the 
“technicians” and the “managers” have taken over from the entrepreneurs without the 
struggle erupting into violence. 
At the other end of the scale there have also been factors which prevented the 
consolidation of the “proletarian” elements into a solid opposition to the “interests.” The 
open frontier, the scarcity of human as opposed to natural resources, etc., have been very 
important. In addition the influx of immigrants at the bottom of the scale has, by giving 
ethnic differences a certain priority over class solidarity, served to prevent such a 
structure of conflict These circumstances, combined with the very rapidity of 
technological de- 
12 This phenomenon may be interpreted as a case of “relative deprivation” as that concept was 
developed by Stouffer and his colleagues in The American Soldier and further refined by Merton in 
his paper in Continuities in Social Research (Edited by Merton and Lazarsfeld). For example, 
Stouffer et al. found that there was more dissatisfaction about promotion opportunities in the Air 
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Force than any other branch of the armed services, but at the same time the Air Force had by tar the 
highest actual rate of promotion. 
velopment itself and the fact that there was not the same structure of “interests” to 
combine against, have served to maintain American labor as essentially part of the 
relatively integrated system rather than having it become a tightly organized “interest 
group” standing over against “the system.” 
If this interpretation has any validity, the supreme importance of this situation for the 
position of the United States in world affairs scarcely needs further comment. 
To bring up these considerations, however, is to run somewhat ahead of the more 
rigorous analysis. Whatever the outcome in these specific respects, it is clear that 
technological change of the sort just sketched must have considerable repercussions on 
the structure of the reward system, and thus on the system of stratification of the society. 
It would above all appear to be extremely clear that if the United States is to remain a 
highly dynamic technologically changing society, as it has been for several generations, it 
must retain a “loose” system of social stratification. It seems to be a justified conclusion 
that a “tightening” of this system very far in either a “conservative” direction which 
would deny the opportunity for newly rising elements to “take their place” in the reward 
system, or in the “radical” direction which would drastically cut down the rewards open 
to any elite elements, would be likely to have a seriously disturbing effect. Similarly the 
extreme rigidities of Soviet society would seem, if long combined with rapid 
technological development, to be likely to develop very high tensions which might result 
in a “blow-up,” or in a suppression of the technological development itself. 
We may now turn to the repercussions of the processes of change we are considering 
through the channels of the belief system. In the first place technological development 
and science are, particularly in the present phase of their development, inherently linked 
together. In earlier times there has been a great deal of technological development which 
was essentially independent of science, but for present purposes we may confine our 
attention to the integrated complex. It is the “ideas” of science which constitute the 
primary source of initiation of change in the more general belief system of the society. 
There are in turn two primary directions in which their repercussions may be traced, that 
of religious ideas and of ideologies. 
It is hardly too much to say that the “warfare of science and religion” has been the 
dominant note of the relevant part of the intellectual history of the Western world since 
the emergence of theoretical science to high maturity in the seventeenth century. The 
relations between them have of course been by no means simple. But the combination of 
the fact that religion belongs to the vie sèrieuse, that it is, that is to say, evaluative, and 
that what we have called intermediate symbolism has played such a prominent part in 
religious orientations, has made it inevitable that a really large scale development of 
science and the diffusion of its orientations into popular thinking, should have profound 
repercussions on religious belief and should encounter formidable resistances in religious 
quarters. 
Analyzed in terms of the theory of action, the relationships have been far from simple. 
There has inevitably been much strain on both sides, with the typical manifestations of 
strain in the form of compulsive attachment to certain symbols. Thus “fundamentalism” 
has been a persistent feature of one major wing of religious opinion, and militant 
“positivism” the complementary feature of one wing of scientifically oriented opinion. 
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There has in these terms been both much “pseudo-religion” and much “pseudo-science” 
promulgated in the name of each body of cultural belief. 
Though by no means all of the cognitive justification can be found on one side, the 
profundity of the contributions of modern science to man’s cognitive orientation to his 
world in general is such that it can scarcely be entertained as a serious possibility that 
religious belief systems formulated in the first three centuries A.D., or even in the 
thirteenth century, could be cognitively tenable without the slightest modification in the 
twentieth. The attempt to maintain them unchanged must, therefore, in an important 
measure be a phenomenon of “fundamentalism” that is of the defensive primacy of 
vested interests, in this case expressive-evaluative in primary content, over the 
institutionalized cognitive standards of the society. In simpler words, anxiety about the 
consequences of altering religious belief prevents unbiased consideration of the 
arguments for any particular current formula which purports to “reconcile” science and 
religion, including that of declaring religious belief in general to be “tender-minded 
nonsense.” 
The consequence of this process of repercussion along with the others has necessarily 
been to alter the position of religious orientations, and of the cognate collectivity 
organizations in the society. It is, for example, extremely difficult to see how the dynamic 
of technological-scientific development of our society could possibly be reconciled with 
the dominance of a religious ethic and organization which was, like the Catholic or 
Lutheran churches, oriented to safe-guarding the spiritual interests of the population 
according to a completely stabilized system of religious belief. Cases where such a 
situation approximately prevailed, as in rural Ireland or French Canada, or in rural 
Prussia, could only subsist by virtue of elaborate insulation from the main currents of 
social change in the Western world. Broadly, even in these islands, the maintenance of 
such insulation has proved in the long run impossible. 
It may be noted that the vulnerability of traditional religious belief systems to the 
repercussions of the development of science has been a major factor in setting the stage 
for the major ideological structuring of Western society, the polarization of the 
“progressive” or “rationalistic” wing and the “conservative” or “traditionalistic” wing. 
This polarization has had a different incidence within the different sub-societies within 
the Western world. It has been less pronounced in the United States than in most of 
Europe, to an important degree because American sectarian Protestantism has relative to 
both Lutheranism and Catholicism carried many of the seeds of the process of 
rationalization within itself, and because its organization relatively to the rest of the social 
structure has made it impossible, as for instance in Catholic countries, for “religion” to 
present a united front against the “progressive” forces. We have no counterpart, for 
instance, of the inherent assumption of most continental Europeans that, to be in any 
sense “on the left” must mean to be anti-religious on principle. 
Finally, the repercussions of the process of rationalization on ideology have certainly 
been profound in the Western world. It would seem in the first place that the 
differentiation of secular ideology from religious belief systems, which had barely begun 
by the sixteenth century and really gathered force only in the eight-eenth, should be 
regarded as part of the fundamental process we are concerned with. 
The general tendency to line “science” and its implications, real or alleged, up with the 
“progressive” cause, is perhaps the most important broad generalization which can be 
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made. In general this has been associated with espousal of the groups in the social system 
which were struggling for enhancement of their positions in the prestige and power 
systems, the bourgeoisie at one phase, the “proletariat” at another, and not least important 
perhaps the scientists and technologists themselves. 
The linking with the interests of various groups within the social system and the 
strains which they were under has, of course, meant that reactions to strain have played a 
prominent part in the progressive as well as the conservative ideologies. This fact has had 
much to do with the prominence of utopian elements in these ideologies, and with the 
part played by varying degrees and modes of alienation from the institutionalized system 
itself. They have of course ranged from mild progressivism to radical revolutionism with 
a definite gradualness of transition between the various gradations. 
A word may be said about one particularly interesting phase of this development which 
was briefly mentioned in Chapter VIII, namely, its association with the development of 
social science. In a very schematic sense, it may be said that the secularization of social 
thought made some cognitive stabilization of ideological beliefs from other than religious 
sources urgent, and we have seen that philosophy has played a very important part in this 
respect. But the general prestige of science in secular thought has been such that the 
attempt to extend it to the field of human behavior was inevitable.13 The fact of its being 
rooted in ideological interests to this extent, to the sociologists of knowledge, explains 
many of the complex vicissitudes to which social science has been subjected in the course 
of its development It is both needed and demanded as an inevitable extension of an 
established cognitive orientation pattern, but at the same time it encounters serious 
resistances. Some of these are par- ticularly frustrating because they come from the 
“friends” of social science who have acquired a vested interest in ideological pseudo-
science. It is not surprising that these difficulties have not been confined to the 
acceptance of social science by those outside the profession but have, for reasons with 
which we are familiar, deeply penetrated the profession itself. A certain proportion of 
these difficulties have, however, been overcome. So far as this is the case, the definite 
establishment of results of social science is bound to have complex further repercussions 
on the social system in other respects. One set of these repercussions concerns the 
implementation of social science knowledge in its appropriate technology through the 
type of channels which were analyzed above. But perhaps not less important is the effect 
on the structure of the belief systems of the society as such, particularly through “taking 
the wind out of the sails” of an important part of the ideological pseudo-science which is 
inevitably current. The case of medical knowledge in its organic aspects should serve to 
warn us that it is highly improbable that pseudo-scientific beliefs in the fields of 
competence of the social sciences will quickly or completely disappear irom the society, 
even where much genuinely validated social science knowledge exists. But by the same 
token, it is equally highly improbable that this development will be without significant 
effect on ideological belief systems. 
 
13 The common German methodological doctrine of a generation and more ago, that human 
behavior and culture were not subject to “laws” in the sense of the natural sciences, but were 
uniquely individuated phenomena may, in part, be regarded as a defensive rationalization against 
this pressure. It was drastically disposed of by Max Weber. 
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The foregoing is an exceedingly sketchy outline of a very complex subject. It makes 
no pretense to completeness or technical precision. It is introduced merely to illustrate 
that the conceptual scheme of the present volume, which has been developed primarily in 
terms of its bearing on the equilibrating processes of the social system, can readily be 
applied to the analysis of the processes of change. Because a system is encompassed in a 
process of institutionalized change, it does not cease to be a system. The scientific-
technological “core” of the process of change we have attempted to trace is 
interdependent with all the other parts of the society in which it takes place. If any 
approach to solution of the problem of how it will affect the total society over a long 
period is to be attained, the only way to proceed outside of sheer “intuition” is to attempt 
to trace meticulously the repercussions of the changes through the various parts of the 
system, and back again to the locus of the original changes. We are in a position to do 
that only in the most fragmentary fashion in the present state of knowledge. But at least 
we have a theoretical canon of what needs to be done and some fairly detailed standards 
for a judgment of how far what we can do falls short of these needs. 
If one broad generalization about the type of process which we have attempted to trace 
can be hazarded, it is that the society in which it has become institutionalized is in a 
relatively precarious state of moving equilibrium with respect to the process. This 
equilibrium can break down in either of two main directions, both of which if they occur 
should be interpreted as consequences of the fact that strain in certain parts of the system 
has mounted to points which cannot be coped with short of major alterations of the 
moving equilibrium state. One of these centers on the mounting resistance of the “vested 
interest” elements to further change, so that the essential process itself is finally choked 
off and the society stabilized on a traditionalistic basis. This, fundamentally, seems to be 
what happened in the society of later Mediterranean Antiquity partly at least under the 
influence of Christianity. The other direction is that of mounting strain in “progressive” 
sectors so that a radically alienated revolutionary movement develops. Though 
proclaimed and threatened for a long time this has not yet happened in any major 
industrialized country of the Western world, least of all in the most highly industrialized, 
the United States. But what some of the processes involved in that alternative are and 
what some of their consequences might be will be developed in the final sections of this 
chapter. However, both types of deviation are continually occurring in sub-sectors of our 
society. The question is whether they are likely to come to dominate the society as a 
whole. 
2. The Ascendancy of the Charismatic Revolutionary Movement 
The other two types of “process of change which we intend to discuss can be treated 
considerably more briefly. The first is the sudden alteration in the major balance of 
equilibrium of the social system by the ascendancy of a “revolutionary” movement which 
organizes a set of alienative motivational orientations relative to the main 
institutionalized order. The second is the process by which such a movement, once in the 
ascendancy, comes to be adapted to the exigencies of long-run continuance as “setting the 
tone” for the society. These are, of course, fundamentally phases of the same process. 
Furthermore certain of the main outlines of the process in both phases are the same 
whether the movement in question be a “political” movement to reorganize secular 
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society, as in the cases of the Nazi and Communist movements in our own time, or a 
movement for religious salvation in terms of a transcendental religious value system, as 
in the case of early Christianity. 
We may lay down four major broad sets of conditions which must be present if such a 
movement is to spread widely and gain ascendancy in the social system, and then 
illustrate briefly by the case of the Nazi movement in Germany. All of the conditions are 
familiar from our previous analysis and we need only to bring them together in their 
relevance to the present context. 
The first condition is the presence in the population of sufficiently intense, widely 
spread and properly distributed alienative motivational elements. These will, as we have 
seen, be manifestations of strain, the possible origins of which are various and cannot 
concern us here. Such strain and its manifestations will, however, we have made clear, 
not be random relative to the structure of the social system in which they occur, but will 
constitute alienation from particular institutionalized patterns, and from symbols 
associated with those patterns. It will, therefore, not be randomly distributed in the social 
system, but the alienative motivation will cluster about particular points of strain. The 
implications of its existence for the stability of the social system will depend on this 
distribution. It will specifically depend on how significant withdrawal of support from 
institutionalized values at these particular points will be. 
Such alienative motivation is a prerequisite of the development of a revolutionary 
movement. But as such it is only a potentiality for change and its “force” may be 
dissipated in a variety of ways, through phantasies, through crime, mental disease and 
psychosomatic illness to mention only a few possibilities. Obviously “coping” with it is a 
primary function of the mechanisms of social control. But if these fail the second 
prerequisite of such a movement may develop, namely, the organization of a deviant sub-
cultural group or movement. Such a development greatly strengthens such a tendency and 
may make it possible to exploit latent alienative motivation of the requisite types in other 
sectors of the population. Combining in a solidary group, we will remember, enables the 
deviantly motivated to evade a large proportion of the sanctions of normal social 
interaction, since they associate so largely with each other. They reinforce each other’s 
deviance by providing an alter for ego’s expectations, who will reciprocate them in the 
positive direction. Moreover, they make it possible to split the ambivalent motivational 
structure, expressing the negative, alienative side vis-à-vis the institutionalized structure, 
and the positive within the sub-cultural group in the form of compulsive conformity with 
the claims of the group. Solidarity will be further enhanced if expressive leadership can 
be developed so that the solidarity is directly symbolized and organized. The frequency 
with which the comput sive conformist element includes dependency and hence probably 
submissiveness to authority facilitates this. 
If, however, the culture of the deviant group, like that of the delinquent gang, remains 
merely a “counter-culture” it is difficult to find the bridges by which it can acquire 
influence over wider circles. This bridge is above all furnished by the third element, the 
development of an ideology—or set of religious beliefs—which can successfully put 
forward a claim to legitimacy in terms of at least some of the symbols of the main 
institutionalized ideology. The features of the ideologies of complex societies which 
present an opening for this have already been discussed. Ideological formulae are often 
highly general and susceptible to “appropriation” by a not too drastically deviant 
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movement. There are serious strains and inconsistencies in the value-implementation of 
any complex social system; therefore, it is always possible to take advantage of the 
inevitable phenomena which do not square with the dominant values. Sentiments in favor 
of “social justice” thus have a hard time to defend the treatment of the Negro in the 
United States, or the “exploitation” of colonial territories by “imperialist” powers. The 
derivation of the ideologies of the revolutionary left from that of “democratic liberalism” 
in the Western world is obvious, and can be followed out in detail. The possession of 
such an ideology which incorporates symbols of wide appeal in the population, and with 
respect to which the going system is vulnerable, is an essential condition of the deviant 
sub-culture becoming a movement which can hope to attain ascendancy in the society as 
a whole. 
The fourth set of conditions concerns the stability of the aspects of the social system 
on which the movement impinges, and their relation to the equilibrium balance of the 
society. For obvious reasons the focal point here is the organization of the power system, 
with particular reference to the state. One suspects that the fundamental reasons why the 
revolution of the left has not yet succeeded in any highly industrialized country lies in 
this set of circumstances more than any of the other three. For example, in pre-
revolutionary Russia, and in China there was a very small governing group set over 
against an enormous mass of politically “inert” peasants, inert, that is, except for their 
susceptibility to being swept up in a protest movement against the existing state of 
affairs. In such a state the power structure is peculiarly unstable, and can be “pushed 
over” by what is virtually a coup d’etat, especially when it is under such strains as result 
from defeat in war and hence shaken loyalty of the masses of an armed force. 
The political case is not, however, the only one. The “conquest” of the Roman Empire 
by Christianity was by a quite different process where it may be held the primary part 
was played by the need of a dictatorial regime for legitimation in a situation of general 
disorganization. 
To turn to the case of Germany. To account for the existence of widespread alienative 
motivation is scarcely a problem in any society which has been undergoing a very rapid 
process of industrialization. Probably it was more intense and widespread in Germany 
than elsewhere because of the relatively rigid status-structure of German society which 
had greater difficulties in adapting to change. At any rate because there had been no 
“bourgeois revolution” in Germany and the pre-industrial elites were in a particularly 
strong position there, they were a focus of strain, as witnessed by their susceptibility to 
“anti-capitalistic” symbolic appeals. Because of the presence of these upper groups the 
“industrialists” were in a far more equivocal position than in the United States, and 
tended to “team up,” e.g., the common German formula of the “feudalization of the 
bourgeoisie.” Another focus of strain was certainly in the lower middle class which had 
had traditionalized status and vested interests unknown to us. Of course there were 
obvious complementary strains in the labor groups, which were expressed in the 
formation of a political labor movement which could be exploited as a “threat” by the 
conservative groups under strain. 
The German soil after the first world vvar was highly receptive to the organization of 
“patriotic” agitational groups with a nationalistic orientation. The defeat, the militaristic 
tradition, and the possibility of serving as a patriotic underground vis-à-vis the occupying 
powers gave them their opening. There were in the beginning many of these semi-
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underground groups, some engaged in political assassination. Because of the 
displacement of the older ruling groups from power their activities had partial 
legitimation in internal politics as well as in the context of defiance of the enemy. The 
Nazi movement then spread especially by bringing in all sorts of idle and dissidcnt 
groups. 
Resting partly on German military and authoritarian traditions, the movement 
developed a very tight internal organization and soon there emerged a highly efficacious 
expressive leadcr in the person of Hitler, who was a “little man,” a war veteran and in 
other respects a suitable spokesman, not excepting his great capacity for propaganda 
activity and for organization on certain levels. 
The ideological basis was provided by a highly ingenious combination of the appeals 
of nationalism and of “socialism,” which had hitherto been defined as antithetical, the 
former belonging to the “right” the latter to the “left.” At the very least we may say that 
the inclusion of socialism in the ideological formula served to neutralize the left and to 
mobilize the immense reservior of anti-capitalistic sentiment from the right and large 
parts of the left behind the single movement. For a variety of reasons “liberalism” had 
been considerably weaker in Germany than in the rest of the Western world, and this, 
plus the existence of a strong Communist movement as a foil, created a highly favorable 
situation from the propaganda point of view. 
Finally, the power structure in post-war Germany was certainly highly unstable. Not 
only was there the presumption against the elements in power because they had 
collaborated with the enemy and even more had adopted his formula for government, but 
the class system was out of balance with government. This is because the top elements 
had been excluded trom government, but their position in society left essentially 
unshaken. 
Severe economic depression, especially because it came after substantial economic 
recovery from the chaos of post-war inflation, added to thc general strain. Finally, the 
treatment of Germany by the victorious allies was notably indecisive and vacillating. It is 
highly probable that this was more important than either severity or generosity; it created 
a situation where agitation for revisionism had an excellent chance in Germany, and the 
elements in power were highly vulnerable to such agitation. 
In any case we all know the outcome, the accession of Hitler to power in 1933 and his 
consolidation of that power until the Party had complete control. The process we wish to 
try to trace in the next section had no opportunity to go far in Germany because its 
extreme of military expansionism led to the blowup and extinction of the movement by 
military defeat. Whatever new combination of the ingredients which went into the Nazi 
movement may come about in the future, it is unlikely that just the same kind of 
movement will arise in Germany again. 
The above has been an exceedingly bare sketch, but it is sufficient to indicate some of 
the principal ways in which the factors abstractly dealt with in this work operated to 
make the ascendancy of the Nazi movement possible.14 
14 The analysis of this process is carried into somewhat further empirical detail in Talcott Parsons, 
“Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany,” Journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 
Vol. I, 96–114. 
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3. The Adaptive Transformation of a Revolutionary Movement15 
We will follow the same procedure used under (2) above and first lay down a series of 
conditions which generally must operate in the course of such a process, and then 
illustrate it briefly from one case. Since the revelant development in Nazi Germany was 
cut off short, we shall take the case of Soviet Russia since in the thirty-fours years since 
the Revolution it has gone far enough for certain things to emerge clearly. 
The first set of conditions concerns the fact that, since the revolutionary (or religious) 
belief system always to an important degree contains utopian elements, there must, in 
general, be a process of “concession” to the development of “adaptive structures.” 
Exactly what these will be, in what order and through what processes, will vary a great 
deal, as a function of the content of the ideology, and of the degree to which it is utopian. 
Even where that degree is not extreme, however, the tendency is strongly, because the 
dominant motivational pattern of a revolutionary movement is compulsive, for its leaders 
to be oriented to “principles” and thus to be reluctant to make the “normal” concessions 
to the exigencies of an operating social system, which are always necessary. For a 
religious movement which has not gained ascendancy in the society as a whole, and for a 
revolutionary movement out of power this problem can, of course, be postponed. Thus in 
early Christianity it was possible for St. Paul to counsel simply “remain in that state in 
which you were called” because Christians as such had no control over the larger affairs 
of the society. In the middle ages the Church, however, could not avoid responsibility for 
those affairs, it was a “power” whether it liked it or not. 
The points at which we are most certain that such adaptive processes must take place 
are those of the principal empirical clusterings of social structure which we discussed in 
Chapter V. We were careful not to exaggerate the degree of rigidity within such spheres 
but it is still true that probably most if not all radical movements in the Western world 
have contained a strong utopian element relative to some of them as their limits can be 
judged by the available evidence. Certainly the equivalent of the Marxist treatment of the 
family as a “bourgeois prejudice” has appeared many times. So also has radical 
egalitarianism which denies the legitimacy of any differential reward, and often also of 
institutionalization of property at all. Similarly organization of the power system, 
especially relative to the use of force, has often been declared to be radically evil and 
acquiescence in any kind of authority backed by coercive sanctions radically 
unacceptable. The problem of the paramount focus of value-integration raises special 
difficulties which will be mentioned presently, This involves what happens to the 
ideology itself in the long run. 
 
15 Much the most sophisticated treatment of this problem in generalized terms in thc sociological 
literature is still Max Weber’s discussion of the “routinization of charisma” at various places in his 
works, but especially Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Part III, Chapter X. Only a brief résumé is 
included in the part translated as The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Chapter 3, 
Sects 10–12. 
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A second set of conditions is closely related but should be distinguished. It concerns 
the consequences of the fact that the motivational composition of a revolutionary 
movement is always to an important degree ambivalent in structure. We have seen that 
participation in the movement itself permits a certain easing of the conflict by splitting of 
the components. But this is clearly only a partial resolution and is generally attended by 
clear evidence of operation of the mechanisms of defense and adjustment, for example in 
the compulsive cognitive distortion of the reality of the institutionalized order against 
which the movement is in revolt, which we have discussed. Thus to the early Christians 
the “world” was as such radically evil. 
Ascendancy of the movement necessitates, for the participants who come over from 
the “opposition” phase to that of control, a reorganization. The “system” is no longer 
“theirs” but “ours.” It has to be made to work, but above all in the present context, the 
pressure of not giving way to certain older established conformative needs, because of 
their incompatibility with uncompromising hostility to the established order, is relaxed. 
The sparse conformityopportunities of the opposition movement are now broadened out 
to include the possibilities of a whole society which, since it is controlled by the 
movement, is to a degree legitimized. In a sense, then, the basic conflict comes to be 
transferred from the form, the movement vs. the society, to that between the “principles” 
of the movement and the temptation of its members to use their control of the society to 
gratify their repressed need-dispositions some of which are precisely needs of conformity 
with the patterns of the old society which they have tried to abolish. This process of the 
re-emergence of needs to reinstate elements of the old order under the guise of the 
revolutionary regime is one of the main sources of the tendency to “mitigate” the 
radicality of the revolution. It is particularly facilitated by another very common feature 
of the situation of a revolutionary regime, namely, that of finding itself in conflict with 
the outside world, so that the old dissociation between movement and patriotism is 
reversed, and often “restoration” can occur under the guise of patriotism. It may be that 
this transformation will be sufficient to destroy the ascendancy of the revolutionary 
ideology, at least partially, but more often it is not if there is continuity of regime. 
There is a problem complementary to that of the re-emergence of repressed 
conformity needs in the revolutionary group, namely, that of the “disciplining,” in terms 
of the revolutionary values, of the population over which the movement has gained 
ascendancy but which did not participate in the movement. This accounts in large part for 
the extreme concern of revolutionary regimes with “education.” 
But it also is very much involved with the reasons why one phase of utopian belief is 
almost always bound to be abandoned in the very early stages of a revolutionary regime, 
namely, the belief in the illegitimacy of coercion. Sometimes, as in the case of 
Communism, this belief is projected into the indefinitely future state of “communism” 
itself and a great show made of legitimizing coercion in order to reach this goal, with the 
allegation that it will no longer be necessary when the goal is reached, but it is hardly to 
be supposed that this attitude can be maintained without considerable strain. At any rate 
both in the interests of controlling its own following in their tendency to “backslide” and 
in the interest of “domesticating” the non-revolutionary population, it is typical of such 
regimes that they resort to coercive measures to a far higher degree than in most normally 
stabilized societies. 
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The necessity of coping with these aspects of the situation, plus the fact that the main 
problem of the movement is no longer “propaganda” to secure voluntary support, 
probably has much to do with the well-known fact that the old leaders of the movement 
tend to be supplanted during the phase of consolidation of the movement and altogether 
different types to emerge. Parallels can be only very approximate, of course, but perhaps 
it is not merely sacrilegious to suggest a parallel between Marx and Jesus, Lenin and St. 
Paul and Stalin and Constantine. The same doubts as to how far Constantine was “really a 
Christian” may be and have been voiced as to whether Stalin is “really a communist.” 
This whole set of circumstances may be summed up by saying that there is a sense in 
which gaining ascendancy over a society has the effect of “turning the tables” on the 
revolutionary movement. The process of its consolidation as a regime is indeed in a sense 
the obverse of its genesis as a movement; it is a process of reequilibration of the society; 
very likely to a state greatly different from what it would have been had the movement 
not arisen, but not so greatly as literal interpretation of the movement’s ideology would 
suggest.16 
There is one final phase of the process which may briefly be mentioned. The type of 
motivational structure which is involved in attraction to and participation in a 
revolutionary movement over against an institutionalized system, obviously cannot be 
that which the “new society” tends to develop in its members through socialization. The 
revolutionary values necessarily become those of an “orthodoxy,” and the tendency will 
be to socialize to conformity with them in the same fundamental sense as is true of any 
stabilized society. Thus to be a Christian in the first century A.D. and in Mediaeval 
France meant two quite different things, just as to be a communist in the United States 
and in Soviet Russia today are different things. Quite clearly it would be utterly 
impossible for a society to become stabilized on the basis that a fundamentally 
ambivalent motivational structure toward its central values, and ideology became the 
norm. Just how the founders become role models for identification on the new basis and 
how other phases of the process work out are highly problematical. But in this case as in 
many other respects a revolutionary movement must pay the price of success. It cannot 
both have the cake of the motivational advantages of revolt, and eat it by being the focus 
of institutionalization of an orthodoxy too. In sum, it ceases to be a revolutionary 
movement. 
Stress on these re-equilibrating aspects of the process of course in no sense means to 
imply that no fundamental changes are ever introduced by revolutionary movements. But 
it does mean that these movements are subject to a dynamic of developmental process 
which involves certain fairly precisely definable exigencies. It very clearly means that no 
revolutionary movement can reconstruct society according to the values formulated in its 
ideology without restriction. 
Just as a revolutionary movement can and does result in the introduction of permanent 
change, so also in its residue it often leaves certain unresolved strains which may be the 
starting points for further dynamic processes. One of these is concerned with the tensions 
involved in maintaining the ideology intact, including its 
16 Perhaps the best available general statement of this point is to be found in Pareto’s The Mind and 
Society. 
The processes of change of social systems     355
utopiau elements, and yet making the indispensable concessions to the exigencies of 
operating as a society. As noted in Chapter VIII, in this respect a transcendental system 
of religious beliefs has an advantage over a secular ideology in that it can project the 
Ausgleich of discrepancies into the transcental sphere while for the secular ideology the 
future is the only recourse. Without this resource the really radically utopian ideologies 
may well have to give way to pressure after a struggle. Early Christianity had a firm 
belief in the eschatological Second Coming and the realistic Day of Judgment. This belief 
survived through a long series of postponements, the last major one being that to the 
millennial year. Since then, except for a few splinter sects, the belief has disappeared 
from Christianity. It seems probable that the final state of “communism” will suffer a 
similar fate, and very likely much more rapidly. 
The central facts about the Soviet Union which are relevant to this process have 
already been cited at various points, particularly in Chapter V, and need only to be briefly 
recapitulated. The abandonment of the immediate abolition of coercion came very early, 
indeed, the semi-military organization of the party and its discipline was carried over 
more or less intact into the new regime. But in the early part of the Revolution there was 
certainly a widespread expectation that men now at last were “free” and could quite 
literally do what they pleased. Perhaps the most crucial step came after the attempt on 
Lenin’s life, which became the occasion for the institution of the Terror as a deliberate 
policy which has never been relaxed since. It may perhaps be held that the tension 
between the drastic evaluative repudiation of coercion in the ideal state and the drastic 
way in which the regime has employed it for its own ends is in certain ways the deepest 
source of long-run tension in Russian Communism. Its importance is easily overlooked in 
the short run view, especially by persons inclined to a certain popular type of 
“debunking” cynicism to the effect that what men profess to believe is not important, it is 
only their “interests” which determine their action. This view can definitely be shown to 
be unsound in the light of sociological theory and empirical evidence. 
The revival of fundamental institutions, which in the ideology have been declared to 
be “bourgeois prejudices,” is in some respects the most striking single feature of Soviet 
development. This process culminated in the mid 1930’s, that is, close to twenty years 
after the original revolution. The most conspicuous cases are the family, differential 
rewards in the occupational system, the new system of stratification, and the revival of a 
system of law.17 It will be noted that private enterprise in the economy has not been 
mentioned among these. The N.E.P. phase came considerably earlier than the other 
revivals and was liquidated before these were well under way. But we have consistently 
argued that this aspect of the organization of the instrumental complex is not a 
fundamental institution in the same sense that coercive govemmental authority, the 
family, differential rewards and stratification are. The revival of formalism in education, 
especially the use of disciplines and sanctions, is another phenomenon which deserves 
important emphasis. 
This process should be regarded as involving a combination of the first two general 
trends mentioned above, the need for adaptive structures in the light of fundamental 
functional requirements of the social system, and the re-emergence of conformity needs 
associated with the old society as such. It may be suggested that the peculiarly rigid 
authoritarianism of the Soviet regime involves a good deal of the latter, and is not merely 
a matter of the exigencies of survival in a world which both internally and externally is 
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troubled. Very obviously the fusion of the Soviet Regime with Russian nationalism and 
many things associated with this is a very conspicuous phenomenon. To take one small 
detail, the conspicuous role of the military and the tendency to extension of the military 
pattern of visible symbolization of rank, would seem to be very much an old regime trait 
which could not be readily derived from the exigencies of implementing revolutionary 
communism in any complex society. 
The case of religion is a complex one. Though certainly important concessions to 
traditional religion have been made, these do not apparently constitute invasions of the 
revolutionary program in the same sense or to the same degree as the others. The 
compromise has been greatly facilitated by the traditional Russian pattern of state control 
of the church and there seems to be general agreement that the Orthodox Church in 
Russia does not as an organization have any greater degree of independence than other 
organizations. 
It is obvious that this is a sphere in which there are very drastic inherent limits to 
concession. The regime in the nature of the case cannot simply abandon its adherence to 
the Marxist ideology, however much the latter may be bent and twisted. The whole 
historic relation of Marxism and Christianity is such that it is impossible for the regime to 
say that “religion is the pillar of the Soviet State,” as has actually officially been said of 
the family. What can be done is only to “concede” a certain place to traditional religion. 
That this concession has proved necessary is, however, a fact of the first importance. It is 
not impossible that this might prove to be a very important focus for the organization of 
opposition. 
It is very clear that such a society as that of Soviet Russia is shot through with 
exceedingly severe internal tensions. Indeed, it is highly probable that both the external 
expansionism which is of course legitimated by the ideology, and the drastic pace of 
internal industrialization are, in an important part, expressions of these tensions. Letting 
things “settle down” in either of these respects might become higniy dangerous to the 
stability of the regime simply because emergency does produce a kind of integration, and 
probably a state of continuing emergency is less threatening than its relaxation would be. 
The longer run prospect is, of course, obscure. It is altogether possible that some 
internal fissure in the unity of the regime might develop, particularly but by no means 
exclusively over the problem of succession to Stalin. If the regime itself does not fall 
apart it is certain that a very complex process of adjustment will have to occur in the next 
generation or two in the relation between the ideology and the realities of the social 
system. This particular sociologist’s prediction is that “communism” will not be realized 
and that the increasing realization that there is no prospect of its realization will force far-
reaching modifications in the ideology. Indeed, it is difficult to see how once the phase of 
dynamic expansionism, internally and externally-and no matter how far it extends it 
cannot last forever-is over, the belief system can hold up. Again, let us note, the Christian 
recourse of projection of the reconciliation of discrepancies into the transcendental world 
is closed. 
This problem is connected with another. Industrialization itself, by its very success, 
probably generates another order of very important strains. We may put this in formal 
17 Cf. Harold J.Berman, Justice in Russia. 
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terms by saying that industrialization shifts the emphasis from the universalistic-
ascriptive to the universalistic-achievement pattern. As we have seen this implies a kind 
of “individualism” which it will be exceedingly difficult to reconcile with the present 
character of the regime. It may be expected that the problems implicit in this tension will 
become acute particularly in connection with the status of the “intelligentsia.” But greater 
freedom for the intelligentsia must include freedom to criticize the official version of the 
ideology. The intrinsic vulnerability of the official ideology is, however, so great, that in 
turn it is difficult to see how this freedom can be granted. What the outcome of this 
dilemma is likely to be will have to be left for future analysis -or the event-to decide. 
The illustrative material presented in the latter part of this chapter has deliberately 
been confined to the analysis of processes of change on the largest scale in highly 
complex societies. In general the problem of the status of theoretical analysis of change 
in partial social systems is not a source of difficulty. We have stated before, and repeat, 
that so far as we have sound knowledge of the interdependence of variables, this 
knowledge is applicable to the understanding of processes of change as well as or process 
within equilibrated systems. The difference is not a theoretical difference at all, but 
depends on the empirical problems which are at issue, and the scientific resources 
available to solve them. These resources are obviously classifiable as (1) prior available 
knowledge of empirical fact, (2) theoretical resources for organizing description, stating 
problems and hypotheses, and analyzing implications and, finally, (3) techniques of 
empirical research for ascertaining the relevant facts where they are not already available. 
It is processes of change in social systems as a whole, that is, of societies, which are 
problematical. The above treatment has been designed to illustrate two things, First, it 
brings home the fact that, as was stated at the beginning of the chapter, we do not in the 
present state of knowledge possess a general theory of the processes of change in 
societies as a wnole. Therefore what we have been able to outline is not an “explanation” 
of such processes in a complete sense, but only a partial explanation in terms of certain 
elements. But, secondly, we nope we have been able to show that the theory of social 
systems in its present state is by no means devoid of relevance to the analysis of such 
processes of change, processes which pose precisely the most difficult empirical 
problems we have in our held. We very definitely have something to say about these 
problems. We can distinguish elements in them which we know to be of strategic 
importance, and we are by no means completely in the dark about many quite specific 
propositions about many of these elements. For example, whether or not it is possible 
completely to abolish coercive power from a society, or to do without any inequality in 
social stratification in an industrial society, is not simply a matter of opinion, in which the 
social scientist who takes the position stated here is merely “stating one view.” The 
question of what elements in an ideology are utopian is, with a certain margin of error, a 
scientifically answerable question, and with it the question of the probable consequences 
of attempting to institutionalize such values literally in a large-scale society. 
Above all, the treatment of the society deliberately and systematically as a social 
system, taking care to consider every problem indicated by the conceptual scheme as 
being germane to the functioning of a complete social system, constitutes an extremely 
powerful instrument of analysis in this connection as in so many others. It permits us to 
mobilize and apply, in the proper place and order, the empirical and theoretical 
knowledge we possess. But just as important, it forces us to recognize the gaps in our 
The social system     358
knowledge, to locate the unsolved problems, and to attempt to state accurately just what 
these problems are, and what we need to know in order to solve them. Thus, while we 
repeat we do not have a complete theory of the processes of change in social systems, we 
do have a canon of approach to the problems of constructing such a theory. When such a 
theory is available the millennium for social science will have arrived. This will not come 
in our time and most probably never. But progress toward it is much more likely to be 
assured and rapid if we know what we want and need. We submit that, without 
conceiving the problems in terms of the social system as a conceptual scheme, it is not 
possible to know what you want and thus even to measure progress toward the goal of 
attaining such a theory. 
Perhaps one final word may be permitted. It has persistently been alleged that the 
“structural-functional” approach to the problems of theory in the sociological field suffers 
from a “static” bias. It has been held that the problems of change were outside its purview 
and since, the argument runs, these are obviously the really important problems, such a 
theory only succeeds in cutting itself off from genuine empirical relevance. Perhaps the 
first major example of large-scale processes of change introduced above, that of the 
processes of change arising from the institutionalization of science and technology, will 
serve to convince the reader that the author is aware of the fact that we live in what is 
sometimes called a “dynamic” society. Perhaps, even, it is not too much to hope that this 
chapter as a whole will convince him that there is a certain falsity in the dilemma 
between “static” and “dynamic” emphases. If theory is good theory, whichever type of 
problem it tackles most directly, there is no reason whatever to believe that it will not be 
equally applicable to the problems of change and to those of process within a stabilized 
system.  
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XII  
CONCLUSION: THE PLACE OF 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY AMONG THE 
ANALYTICAL SCIENCES OF ACTION 
 
THE substantive task of the present volume has been accomplished as far as it will be 
until the preparation of a revised edition is undertaken. It remains only to point up a very 
few main considerations which are relevant to the interpretation of what has been 
attempted, and hence of the relative success which the attempt has achieved, and then to 
discuss briefly the problem of classification of the sciences of action. 
First a few final words may be said about what order of theoretical task has in fact 
been undertaken. The volume is unequivocally meant as an essay in systematic theory. It 
is not an attempt to formulate a theory of any particular concrete phenomenon, but is the 
attempt to present a logically articulated conceptual scheme. The title of the book, The 
Social System, is meant to emphasize this systematic reference. Social systems are 
empirical systems, but it is by virtue of their relevance to an articulated conceptual 
scheme that such empirical systems are classed together and made subject to a uniform 
analytical procedure within an explicitly defined frame of reference. Furthermore, the 
status of the book as an essay in theory construction justifies the two facts that, first, it 
has not attempted systematic codification of available empirical knowledge and, second, 
it has not tried to present a critical evaluation of the literature of theory itself in the field. 
The book is thus an essay in systematic theory but the suggestion is quite explicitly 
repudiated that it attempts in one sense to present a system of theory, since it has been 
consistently maintained that in the present state of knowledge, such a system cannot be 
formulated. Put a little differently, it is a theory of systems rather than a system of theory. 
It attempts to represent the best attainable in the present state of knowledge with respect 
to the theoretical analysis of a carefully defined class of empirical systems. It is fully 
recognized that this theory is fragmentary and incomplete. But at the same time, the 
concept of system as a guiding conceptual scheme is of the first importance as an 
organizing principle and a guide to research. It may thus be said that the concept of a 
theory of systems is the most strategic tool for working toward the attainment of a system 
of theory. The general character of this particular theory of systems has been quite 
sufficiently discussed so that further elucidation is unnecessary. The general relations 
between structural categories, the general and special imperatives of social systems, the 
paradigm of motivational process and the “growing points” of research relative to these 
elements of theory have been repeatedly stated. 
§ THE PLACE OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS IN THE GENERAL THEORY 
OF ACTION 
IT HAS further been made quite clear that the theory of social systems is, in the sense of 
the present work, an integral part of the larger conceptual scheme whicn we have called 
the theory of action. As such, it is one of the three main differentiated sub-systems of the 
larger conceptual scheme, the other two being the theory of personality and the theory of 
culture. 
The interdependence of the three has constituted a major theme of the whole present 
analysis. This has been fully and systematically set forth in Values, Motives and Systems 
of Action as well, and need not be recapitulated in detail here. It should, however, be 
quite clear to the reader that without a fundamental clarification or the relation of social 
systems to these other branches of the theory of action, the level of clarity in the analysis 
of social systems which has been attained in the present work would not have been 
possible. 
By this is meant a clarification going well beyond what is now current in even the best 
literature of the subject. In this connection the experience of the author in connection 
with the development of the present volume, which was cited in the preface, may 
appropriately be recalled. A draft of about three-fourths of what had been planned had 
already been written when, in connection with the work going on in the general theory of 
action in collaboration with Professors Shils, Tolman and others in the fall of 1949, 
certain fundamental new insights concerning the relations between cultural and 
motivational elements in action generally developed. The work which was done in 
following up these insights, the results of which are documented in Values, Motives and 
Systems of Action, was not primarily and directly concerned with the theory of the social 
system as such, but with the general frame of reference of action. Theoretical 
developments from these starting points touched the fields of personality and of culture 
just as much as they did that of the social system. Yet the implications of that work for 
the theory of the social system were so far-reaching that, when work on the present book 
was resumed, it became necessary to start entirely a new, and it turned out that only a 
small proportion of the old manuscript, most of it consisting of illustrative material, could 
be made use of without complete re-writing, In other words, work on the general frame of 
reference of action necessitated a radical reorganization of thinking about the theory of 
the social system. Nothing could illustrate more vividly the fact that the theory of the 
social system is not a wholly independent conceptual scheme. 
It will hence be clear to the reader why the implications of this situation have had to be 
so consistently followed through in the present work. We cannot speak of the structure of 
the social system in theoretical terms at all without speaking of the institutionalization of 
cultural patterns, notably of course patterns of value-orientation. If we are to do so 
sensibly we, of course, must know whereof we speak with respect to what the patterns 
which are institutionalized in fact are, in some sense also how they can be classified and 
otherwise analyzed. Similarly we have consistently maintained that the motivational 
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processes of the social system are always processes within the personalities of the 
component individual actors. If the implications of such a statement are to be carried 
through it is obvious that we must know quite definitely what we are talking about when 
we speak of a personality system and its motivational processes. We cannot rely on 
common-sense levels of insight for this purpose; the problems become definitely 
technical. 
It is fundamentally because, for the theory of the social system, the solution of these 
problems goes back to the general frame of reference of action that the anchorage of the 
present book in that general frame of reference is of such fundamental importance, and 
that important developments on the general level have proved to have such profound 
repercussions on the subject-matter of this volume. 
If the ultimate unity of the theory of action as a conceptual scheme has been strongly 
emphasized by these theoretical developments, it is perhaps almost equally important that 
the mutual independence of personality, culture and social systems as sub-systems of 
action has been strongly confirmed. The insight of what is here considered the best 
tradition of sociological theory, that as a conceptual scheme it cannot legitimately be 
“reduced” in either direction is thus justified, and its grounds immensely clarified. On the 
one hand, the treatment of social systems only as “resultants” of the functioning of 
personalities in the sense common to writers with a “psychological” point of view, is 
clearly inadequate most fundamentally because it ignores the organization of action about 
the exigencies of social systems as systems.1 On the other hand, to treat social systems as 
only “embodiments” of patterns of culture, as a certain trend of thought common among 
anthropologists has tended to do,2 is equally unacceptable to the theory of the social 
system. 
The mere assertion of the theoretical independence of the social system in both these 
directions has served an important function in the development of social science in that it 
has enabled sociologists to focus their attention on problems which would not have had 
justice done to them either in terms of psychology or of cultural anthropology. But, even 
in the thought of Durkheim, whose insight was probably the deepest in this respect, many 
aspects of the theoretical relationships involved in the combination of this aspect of 
independence with the equally important interdependence of these three system concepts, 
remained unclarified. The present work and that on which it rests in the more general 
theory of action may be said to have gone considerably farther in the clarification of these 
relationships. We are now in a position not merely to assert that a combination of 
independence and interdependence must be recognized, but to state on a certain level 
precisely in what this consists. We know just what we mean by the institutionalization of 
patterns of culture, and by the sense in which the structure of the social system is and is 
not an embodiment of a set of such patterns. We know certain of the most fundamental 
elements of personality as a system of action and its interrelations with the social system. 
We know 
1 Though perhaps generally now considered to be out of date, the book of Floyd H.Allport, 
Institutional Behavior, is one of the most vivid illustrations in the literature of what, in these terms, 
is the wrong way of conceiving the relations between the psychological and the sociological levels 
of the analysis of action. 
2 This trend is commonly associated in particular with the name of Ruth Benedict. 
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that they both go back to the fundamental processes of interaction between actors, that in 
this one sense personality is just as much a “social” phenomenon as is the social system. 
We know certain fundamental relations between the institutionalization and the 
internalization of culture. Above all, perhaps, we know that the fundamental common 
sector of personalities and social systems consists in the value-patterns which define role-
expectations. The motivational structures thus organized are units both of personality as a 
system and of the social system in which the actor participates; they are need-dispositions 
of the personality and they are role-expectations of the social system. This is the key to 
the “transformation formula” between the two systems of personality and social system. 
It is maintained that, in spite of the many brilliant insights bearing this relationship, 
especially in the works of Durkheim and of Freud, in terms which are both precise and 
highly generalized this set of relationships has never been so clearly understood before. 
This fundamental relationship between need-dispositions of the personality, role-
expectations of the social system and internalized-institutionalized value-patterns of the 
culture, is the fundamental nodal point of the organization of systems of action. It is the 
point at which both the interdependence and the independence from each other of 
personality, social system and culture focus. If the nature of this organization is not 
clearly understood and formulated with theoretical precision, confusion on this 
fundamental subject will inevitably spread in all three directions and poison the whole 
theory of action. It is a new level of clarity about this fundamental phenomenon, which 
more than any other factor has made the present level of analytical refinement of the 
theory of the social system possible.  
§ THE THEORY OF ACTION AND THE NATURAL SCIENCES 
THE clarification of the general theory of action and of the place of the theory of the 
social system in it, which has just been discussed, makes it possible to say something 
relatively systematic about the field of action generally.3 
We may start with the general relation between action and “nature.” It does not need 
to be emphasized that human action is in the most various ways profoundly influenced by 
the physical, chemical and biological properties both of the environment and of the 
organism itself. The question is that of the theoretical relevance and adequacy of the 
conceptual schemes of what, in this sense, are the “natural sciences” for full analysis of 
the phenomena of action. There is ample evidence of the inadequacy or inconvenience or 
both of these conceptual schemes for this purpose and thus of the independent 
justification of the action frame of reference. 
The relevance of the action frame of reference is anchored in three fundamental 
considerations. The first is that the concern of the sciences of action is with the relations 
on a certain level of the concrete entities, which in their biological relevance are called 
organisms, to their environments. The conceptual scheme is, that is, wholly and 
fundamentally relational. The individual “actor” is a name for the same concrete entity as 
the organism, but seen as a unit in this relational context. 
3 The following discussion may be considered to be a revision of the scheme presented in Chapter 
XIX of The Structure of Social Action. It will be evident that it constitutes a revision rather than a 
drastic repudiation of that scheme. 
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However, only a certain aspect of the concrete relations of the organism-actor to the 
environment is abstracted as being of interest to the theory of action; this is the aspect we 
call “action” or “behavior.” There is, obviously, as of central concern to the biological 
sciences, a continual physico-chemical interchange between organism and environment, 
with reference, for example, to heat, and to the chemical interchange involved in food-
intake and elimination of waste products and in respiration. This, however, is not action, 
or behavior, however much it may be empirically dependent on action. Action involves 
not a biochemical conceptual scheme but an “orientational” scheme as this conception 
has been developed here and elsewhere. Its units are conceived in terms of a specifically 
relational frame of reference which is peculiar to organisms as units, and not one which 
is common to organisms and all other physico-chemical systems. In this sense behavior is 
a phenomenon of higher-order organization in the world of nature than is the 
“functioning” of organisms. Or, put somewhat differently, the physico-chemical 
interchange of organism and environment is change over the boundaries of the organism 
as itself a system, the internal processes and equilibrium of which are of primary interest 
to the scientist. Physiology, as the most fundamental biological sub-science, is, we may 
suggest, essentially the science focused on the boundary-maintaining properties of the 
organism as a physico-chemical system. 
But for the theory of action the organism is not a system, lout a unit point of reference. 
The focus of interest for the theory of action is not in the internal equilibrating processes 
of the organism as a system, but in the equilibrating processes involved in its relations to 
an environment or situation in which other organisms are of crucial significance. It is this 
relational system which is the system of action, not the organism as a system. It is 
particularly important here to avoid an insidious version of the fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness which has been particularly common among psychologists. This is the 
conception that “the organism” is a concrete ontologically real entity and that somehow 
its internal physico-chemical processes, and their interchange with the environment are 
the “real thing” whereas behavior is a kind of resultant or epiphenomenon. It is 
exceedingly difficult for persons who think in this way to become aware that biological 
theory is abstract in exactly the same sense as any other scientific theory. Therefore, the 
organism in this sense is no more an ontological reality than is the famous particle of 
Newtonian physics. Pari passu the organism, as the boundary-maintaining physico-
chemical system, is in absolutely no sense more or less real than the system of action. 
Both stand on fundamentally the same footing. Both are systems conceived in terms of a 
conceptual scheme. Both are subject to empirical verification in the same senses. 
Underlying much of the psychological bias referred to above within the theory of action 
has been this biological bias, the tendency to think that only the internal system of the 
organism is somehow “real” while its relational system is not. 
A system of action, then, is a system of the relations of organisms in interdependence 
with each other and with non-social objects in the environment or situation. It is in order 
to keep this system distinct from the organism as a physico-chemical system that we 
prefer, instead of referring to the “behavior of the organism,” to speak of the “action of 
the actor,” and instead of using the term environment, to speak of the “situation of 
action.” We do not wish to quarrel about words, but we do submit that use of the 
biological terminology is frequently associated with genuine confusion of the frames of 
referehce. 
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The second fundamental feature of systems of action is that as relational systems, they 
are boundary-maintaining systems. We have given ample justification for this statement 
earlier in this work and elsewhere. It is this property of systems of action which states the 
analytical independence of the frame of reference of action from that of biological theory. 
If this were not the case, there would be no point in complicating matters by using this 
additional frame of reference for the analysis of concrete organisms as behaving entities. 
The lack of empirical success of attempts to “reduce” most action phenomena to 
biological terms is well known and need not be further discussed here. Suffice it to say 
that this statement that systems of action are boundary-maintaining systems has the same 
justification that any fundamental methodological assumption about a scientific 
conceptual scheme has. It is not as such an empirical generalization, but is logically prior 
to all empirical generalizations which are stated in terms of the theory of action. 
Finally, the third fundamental consideration touches the much discussed “subjective 
point of view,” namely, the study of action “from the point of view of the actor.” 
Contrary to the view held by the author in the Structure of Social Action it now appears 
that this postulate is not essential to the frame of reference or action in its most 
elementary form. It is, however, necessarily involved at the levels of elaboration of 
systems of action at which culture, that is shared symbolic patterns, becomes involved. It 
is, that is, a conse-quence of the fact that action comes to be oriented in terms of symbols 
which also serve to communicate with other actors. 
Another way of looking at the postulate is to consider the implications of the fact that 
scientific investigation is itself a process of action. Precisely, in terms of our present 
conceptual scheme, if the object of investigation is a physical object—which includes 
organisms—there is no process of social interaction between ego and the object. The 
object, that is, does not react to ego’s action in terms analyzable in terms of the theory of 
action. But if the object is a social object, the process of investigation is itself a process of 
social interaction, and must be understood in the appropriate terms. Such interaction, 
however, in terms of the present conceptual scheme clearly involves communication. It is 
not possible in these terms to interpret alter’s behavior in terms of the action frame of 
reference without communicating with him, without “understanding his motives” in the 
full sense of the theory of action as we have developed such a conception. This is 
essentially what is meant by the subjective reference or the subjective point of view of 
the theory of action.4 
4 It might well be argued that social scientists often do not interact with their subjects, but only 
objective courses of behavior or their results are studied. For the bistorian or archaeologist, indeed, 
since the subjects are generally dead, direct interaction is impossible. But this is not a valid 
objection. Inscriptions, historical documents and artifacts are dearly interpreted in teims of what 
they were supposed to have “meant” to the authors and users. The question asked is of the order of 
“if he were available to be interviewed about tbis wbat would he probably tell me?” Since he is not 
available for interview, the scientist resorts to tbe next best, tbe reconstruction from tbe available 
data of wbat he probably would say. The case of statistical and other data about “objective” 
behavior is not fundamentally different. The frame of reference in which such data are placed and 
interpreted is in general that of action which includes implicit if not explicit reference to wbat the 
actors in questiori “meant by it” when they did what the observations record as having happened. 
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It is, of course, possible to remain a behavioristic purist and avoid this subjective 
reference, but only in one of two ways. The first is to repudiate the action frame of 
reference altogether and attempt to maintain a biological frame of reference. The other is 
to use the action frame of reference, but to keep the elaboration of the theory of action to 
pre-symbolic, that is pre-cultural levels.5 The issue of “behaviorism” then really boils 
down to that of whether it is possible to handle the more differentiated levels of the frame 
of reference of action with the precision and care which the scientist attempts to attain. 
As in other branches of science “the proof of the pudding is in the eating.”  
§ THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES OF ACTION 
WE MAY now turn to the problem of the internal division of labor between the sciences 
of action. We shall consider only those which have a claim to the status of analytical 
sciences in the sense that, whatever their specialization of interests in relation to classes 
of empirical phenomena, their primary claim to independent status as sciences rests on 
their concern with and responsibility for a relatively independent and distinctive 
conceptual scheme. Such a conceptual scheme need not be a closed system, but we will 
set up as a criterion that it must not simply be an “application” of a more generalized 
scheme. 
In these terms the theory of action clearly differentiates most broadly into the theory 
of personality as a system, the theory of social systems and the theory of culture. There 
are, however, certain problems concerning the implications of this differentiation which 
need to be taken up. 
The theory of personality as a system seems to coincide, with one exception which 
will be taken up presently, with the field of psychology as a discipline. Perhaps, it would 
be better to say it coincides with what psychology from our point of view ought to be, 
and it seems on the whole is tending toward. There are two primary strictures on the 
suggestion that this formula is descriptive of the present focus of psychology. The first is 
the persistence of the tendency to regard psychology as essentially a biological science. 
The problem this raises can, it would seem, be satisfactorily handled by analogy with the 
physical sciences. There is, of course, no question whatever of the ovenvhelmingly great 
importance of the interdependence between the organism as a biological system and the 
personality as a system of action. But for the reasons we have just reviewed, this 
interdependence does not justify treating personality as simply an “extension” of the 
 
5 This is essentially what Professor Skinner does (Skinner, B.F. The Behavior of Organisms) and is 
also perhaps the major trend in the thinking of Hull and his more rigid disciples. There is no 
possible objection to this if all that is sought is the explanation of animal behavior—and tbe 
corresponding components of human behavior—on levels wheie symbolism and culture are not 
involved. Indeed careful attention to the phenomena on this level can make very important 
contributions. The position becomes objectionable only when it is efevated into the dogma that the 
introduction of tbe symbolic-cultural levels, and with them the “subjective reference,” is 
“unscientific,” and should properly condemn those who venture into these, admittedly difficult, 
fields to the category of the “tenderminded” with the implication that their findings are almost 
certainly their own “wish fulfillments.” 
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organism. The fruitful analogy is that with the status of bio-chemistry relative to the 
biological sciences. There is obviously room for specialization in the field of “psycho-
biology,” and in fact much of it of the most fruitful kind exists both in “physiological 
psychology” and in the field of “psychosomatic” medicine. But we must insist that the 
legitimacy, promise and importance of this field does not justify treating the theory of 
personality as a branch of biological science, or putting the center of gravity of the 
theoretical interests of psychology into the biological sciences. This is a problem which 
the members of the psychological profession must ultimately face more squarely than 
they have nitherto done. 
The second stricture consists simply in the fact that genuinely systematic treatment of 
personality as a system on the action level or any other for that matter, has not as yet been 
common among even the most eminent theorists in the field. The situation is parallel to 
that in the social system field, where Pareto stands almost alone in his clear and explicit 
conception of the social system. Even Freud, though it may be said that the conception of 
personality as a system was definitely emergent from his work, did not use it as a definite 
guiding conception, and he never fully disentangled the action aspects of personality 
from the biological. Furthermore, adequate treatment of personality as a system has had 
to await clarification of its relations to the social system and to culture. We may hope for 
rapid advance in this direction from psychologists, but what may be called bio-
psychological eclecticism remains more typical of psychologists who are not either 
behaviorists or biologists than does systematic personality theory. 
The exception referred to above, to the appropriateness of the definition of 
psychological theory as the theory of personality as a system, concerns the problem of 
where the study or certain fundamentals of action process which underlie all organization 
of action in systems belongs, the field that is of what is sometimes called “behavior 
psychology,” which includes the field of “simple learning.” The present view is that this 
belongs more appropriately in psychology than in any other of the theoretical sciences of 
action. This is essentially because the processes in question are prior to and underlie the 
organization of action in more complex systems, either personality or social. This is 
precisely the kind of thing which can be most fruitfully studied on pre-symbolic levels. 
Usually this implies that the experimental situation is one in which social interaction and 
its variability are not crucial—as is obviously true of mpst animal learning study, though 
such studies of animal imitation as those of Miller and Dollard raise other questions. But 
even on this level variability on both the social system levels and the cultural level are not 
likely to be problematical. The focus of interest is in the underlying action process itself. 
As an analytical discipline, then, we would here define psychology as the science 
concerned with the elementary processes of action and their organization in personalities 
as systems. The status of social psychology raises special problems which can best be 
taken up after the problem of the theory of the social system has been discussed. 
The theory of the social system is, as we have seen, in a certain fundamental sense, 
directly parallel to that of personality, though the relation of personality to the organism 
means that the relations of the two systems are only partly symmetrical. It would, 
therefore, seem logical that there should be an analytical science of social systems which 
was correlative with psychology as that of personality systems. This is in a broad sense 
an acceptable view, but there are complications touching the problems of the status of 
economics and political science which we must take up. 
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The advances in the theory of the social system which have been documented in the 
present work make it possible to clarify further a view of the proper status of sociological 
theory with which the author has been concerned for a number of years. It was first 
tentatively stated in the final chapter of the Structure of Social Action, and a further 
revision of it was stated in the paper on The Position of Sociological Theory (Essays, 
Chapter I). The focus of this view has been on the importance of institutions and 
institutionalization as the primary concern of sociology as a science. In the earlier ver-
sion also the property of “common value-integration” was strongly emphasized. 
If a sphere for sociological theory as a distinctive conceptual scheme is to be 
delineated, it must be either the theory of the social system as a whole, or some special 
aspect of the theory of the social system rather than the whole of it. First, we may suggest 
that the former formula might or might not be interpreted to include a “theory of culture.” 
The problem of the status of such a theory will be taken up presently. Let it be said here 
only that the treatment of the involvement of culture in the social system is not in diis 
sense a “theory of culture” any more than that of the involvement of personality and 
motivational process has to be psychology in the sense just stated. 
The choice between the broader and the narrower views of the scope of sociological 
theory just stated does not involve this question, but tums essentially on that of the status 
of economic theory. The broader view would treat economic theory as “applied 
sociology” while the narrower would not. The narrower is the view taken here. It is 
consistent with the view that the central concern of sociological theory is with the 
phenomena of institutionalization. 
It has been brought out in Chapter IV above that within the institutionalized 
framework of a social system where the instrumental division of labor was sufficiently 
elaborated, there could be a peculiar quantification of control of facilities through the 
processes of exchange, by means of what was called “purchasing power.” This peculiar 
quantification is an emergent phenomenon appearing at certain levels of differentiation of 
social systems, and coming to be of high significance only within a relatively limited, 
though very important, class of social systems. It is the processes of equilibration of a 
system of such exchange-oriented actions which constitute the focus of economic theory 
as a conceptual scheme. 
As a theory of process, economic theory depends on the relevance of the processes of 
decision-making to the determination of prices and quantities in the system of exchange. 
Hence within an economy where freedom for decision to operate is sufficiently broad this 
decision-making process is at least one primary process by which the allocation of 
resources, i.e., in our terms of facilities, comes about. This economic process may be the 
resultant of large numbers of discrete decisions by participants in the market. But it may 
also be a centralized decision process carried out by a government planning body. The 
functional significance of the economic process for the social system in either case is a 
matter of its relevance to the allocation of facilities. 
The combination of study of the functional significance of the process and its analysis 
in terms of a given conceptual scheme, however, depends on its analysis in terms of the 
famous “postulate of economic rationality.” This can only be inteipreted to mean that the 
science of economics has little explanatory relevance to the processes of allocation of 
resources in a “traditionalistic” economy where only “drift” leads to alteration of the 
allocation system. At most it can serve only a “criterion” function by measuring the 
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actual allocation against a standard of what in some sense would be an “economically 
rational allocation.” 
The postulate of rationality, however, occupies a somewhat curious status in the 
theory of action. It is a clear implication of the theory of action on both the personality 
and the social system levels, that “rational action” is a type which presupposes a certain 
mode of the organizatian of all the elements of action. It is something which is possible 
within the limits imposed by value-orientation patterns and by the situation, and by a 
certain mode of integration of motivational elements. On the personality level, that is, 
rational action is a type which exists within certain limits of the organization of 
personality. On the social system level, correspondingly, there is scope for rational 
adjustments within certain limits imposed by the institutionalized role-system. 
Three levels of the organization of rational action in action systems may be 
distinguished. The first of these, the most elementary, is that involving the mobilization 
of resources for the attainment of a single given goal, by an individual actor or a 
collectivity. This is essentially what, in the Structure of Social Action was called a 
“technology,” the analysis of the patternings of action relative to such a single given goal. 
Technology always involves two aspects or sets of factors, those pertaining to the 
conditions of success, and those concerning the “cost,” which is ultimately the sacrifice 
of alternative goals involved in the expenditure of resources for the one in question. 
“Efficiency” is the measure of the effectiveness of a technological process relative to its 
cost. 
The second level of organization introduces considerations of “economy,” which 
consists in the process of the allocation of resources relative to a plurality of alternative 
goals. Here cost is not a constant but a variable in that there is explicit consideration not 
merely of the minimization of expenditure compatible with effectiveness, but of 
allocation of resources between alternative goals. This is what the decision-making 
process does with the facilities of the social system. 
The third level of organization of rational action is concerned not with economy but 
with the maximization of power in the political sense. Here the orientation is to the 
maximization of total command of facilities in the social system held by one actor, 
individual or collective, relative to others. There is hence, as we pointed out in Chapter 
IV, no inherent limitation of scope, but anything, especially in the sphere of relational 
possessions, which can have significance as a facility, may become involved in the 
political power system. 
Technology and economy on the basis of the individual personality can be said to 
constitute psychological problem areas, whereas the relational character of political 
power makes it impossible to consider it wholly from a psychological point of view. On 
the social system level, on the other hand, technology can be the analysis of the goal-
orientation of a collectivity as an organization, which involves its role structure, and 
hence involves problems of institutionalization, whereas economy involves the 
interrelations of a plurality of actors individual and/or collective. This perspective, 
however, involves a specific institutionalized limitation of scope. 
Hence we may say that the implications of the postulate of rationality are within 
certain limits psychological, that is, they rest in the theory of personality, but that 
economics as a social science is concerned with the phenomena of rational decision-
making and the consequences of these decisions within an institutionalized system of 
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exchange relationships. This is, within the theory of action, such a highly distinctive 
complex that the claim of economic theory to autonomy with respect to it seems quite 
justified. 
The case of political science is a wholly different one. Variant definitions of its scope 
are current within the profession itself. Here we are concerned only with the claim that it 
should be organized about an analytical theoretical scheme of a scope and character 
parallel to that of economic theory. The only current formula for this claim is that it 
should be treated as the theory of power. In this connection one fact will strike the reader 
immediately, namely, that in technical elaboration as a conceptual scheme, there is no 
such thing as a theory of power which is remotely comparable with economic theory. We 
believe that the above analysis (Chapter IV) has given the fundamental reason for this 
fact, namely, that power in the political sense is inherently diffuse as contrasted with the 
specificity of economic power. This means that a theory of political power must in the 
nature of the case take into account as variables, most of the variables of the social 
system. 
In view of this fact it is in fact appropriate to treat political science as the discipline 
concerned with political power and its use and control, but because of the diffuseness of 
political power this makes it a synthetic science in the social system field, not one built 
about a distinctive analytical conceptual scheme, that is, a strictly limited set of variables. 
The common designation as the field of “government” comes relatively close to this 
conception. 
In the light of these considerations we may come back to the question of the scope of 
sociological theory. Institutionalization of cultural patterns means, as we have often 
emphasized, in the integrated sense internalization of the same patterns in the personality. 
Psychologically an internalized pattern is no longer an object of the situation. It is not 
possible to treat it as an instrumental means or condition. There is a specific mode of 
cathectic integration of the actor’s need-dispositions with an internalized pattern. This 
fact has a fundamental methodological significance. It means that the orientation of 
“instrumental rationality” cannot be the attitude defining the actor’s orientation to 
internalized patterns. 
We derive, then, a most significant complex of relationships. The value-integration of 
the social system is defined by the system of patterns of value-orientation which have 
become institutionalizea to constitute the definitions of its constituent role-expectation 
patterns. The institutionalization of these patterns in turn means that typically they have 
become internalized in the personality systems of the actors in the social system and this 
fact in turn means that their relevance to the determination of behavior cannot be 
primarily through the “mechanisms” of instrumental rationality but must be through what 
are sometimes called the non- and irrational mechanisms of the functioning of 
personality. 
This is the fundamental reason why the sociologist cannot follow the lead of 
economics or indeed of the whole of utilitarian theory in his fundamental account of the 
motivational forces in institutional behavior, and why the concepts of modern “dynamic 
psychology” have come to be of such critical importance to him. This again is why a 
sociological theory which can get beyond structural description and the classifications of 
“formal sociology” must be adequately integrated with the theory of personality precisely 
in the modern psychological sense. 
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Sociological theory, then, is for us that aspect of the theory of social systems which is 
concerned with the phenomena of the institutionalization of yatterns of value-orientation 
in the social system, with the conditions of that institutionalization, and of changes in the 
patterns, with conditions of conformity with and deviance from a set of such patterns and 
with motivational processes in so far as they are involved in all of these. As motivational 
processes these cannot be the processes of rational action in the economic sense, but 
involve the processes of value-acquisition through identification and of deviance and 
social control as these have been analyzed above. Since we have only indicated where 
economics and political science fit in, the present volume can, in these terms, be regarded 
rather stricdy as a contribution to sociological theory. 
It is hoped that it will be entirely clear to the reader that this view does not constitute 
the “reduction” of sociological theory to psychological terms, but the extension of the 
structural aspect of that theory to an explicit statement of its concern with motivational 
process within the context of the functioning of the social system as a system. The 
processes are, as has been repeatedly stated, exactly the same concrete processes which 
are involved in the functioning of personalities as systems. But their context of theoretical 
relevance is that of the social system as a system and not of the personality as a system. 
Now we are in a position to say somediing about social psychology as a discipline. We 
would interpret its place as that of an interstitial mediating field between sociology and 
psychology in a sense directly analogous to that of biochemistry or of psychobiology or 
physiological psychology. We could say, then, that the social psychologist is not directly 
concerned with the analysis of the structure of social systems, but with motivational 
processes and personalities in their specific relations to and interdependence with the 
structure of social systems, notably, that is, their bearing on the explanation of socially 
structured and “mass” phenomena. 
It follows, however, that social psychology as a theoretical discipline should not have 
the same order of independent theoretical significance as does either psychological 
theory or sociological theory. Above all there can be no such thing as good social 
psychology without explicit and systematic reference to the sociological aspects of the 
theory of social systems. Without that it becomes merely a cover for a “psychological 
bias” in the interpretation of social phenomena, The only alternative to this view is to 
hold that since all action is “process of the mind” or “behavior” there is no place for a 
distinct theory of the social system at all. The unacceptability of such a position is, in the 
light of the whole above discussion, abundantly clear. 
Finally, we may say a word about the implications of the relations between culture and 
social systems for the classification of the sciences of action. There is, in our opinion, an 
important place for a “theory of culture” as part of the theory of action, which is quite 
definitely not sociological theory in the sense in which this has just been defined. This is 
what, according to the present trend, anthropological theory is tending to become. 
According to this view culture, as an empirical phenomenon, is not more independent of 
personalities and social systems than are social systems of personalities, As part of the 
theory of action, then, the theory of culture must be the theory concerned not only with 
the properties of culture as such but with the interdependence of patterns of culture with 
the other components of systems of action. It is, of course, concerned with the structure 
of systems of culture patterns, with the different types of such systems and their 
classification. But it is also concerned with their involvement in social systems and 
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personalities, and with the implications of this involvement for their maintenance as 
“living” cultures in action systems, and for their tendencies of change. The focus, 
however, is always on the culture pattern system as such, and neither on the social system 
in which it is involved, nor on the personalities as systems.  
Only by some such definition of its scope can anthropology become an analytical 
empirical science which is independent both of sociology and of psychology. This view 
gives it a scope which partly justifies the breadth of the term Anthropology, because of 
the involvement of culture both in personalities and in social systems. The alternative is 
to take the name literally and make it the “science of man.” As a theoretical science this 
is scarcely to be seriously considered, for surely physical anthropology as human biology 
is not theoretically a distinctive science. And surely the anthropologist is not going to try 
to absorb all of humanly significant biology, including all the medical sciences, all of 
psychology and all of sociology, to say nothing of history, economics and political 
science. It might be possible to make it a synthetic empirical science of man, drawing on 
these many theoretical sciences, but not itself an independent theoretical science. But as 
an alternative to this the above offers a definition of the possible theoretical scope of 
anthropology which is compatible with those of the other sciences of action which have 
been advanced here. Furthermore it is clear that such a theoretical science is needed in 
order to complete the roster of the theoretical sciences of the field of action. The place of 
culture is of such fundamental importance that we cannot afford to have it omitted. 
One other point needs to be made, Anthropological theory defined in this way should 
be clearly distinguished from what in Germany have been called the 
Geisteswissenchaften, or are sometimes called the “formal” disciplines. These deal with 
analysis of the content of cultural pattern systems for its own sake without regard to their 
involvement in systems of action. Thus, logic or mathematics, the methodology of 
scientific theory, or the analysis of art forms fall in this category. Clearly the 
anthropological theorist must lean on these disciplines just as the psychologist must lean 
on the biologist. But anthropological theory as here conceived clearly belongs to the 
sciences of action, not to these formal disciplines. 
The above has been a highly schematic classification of the theoretical sciences of 
action. Naturally it is not expected that the actual fields of empirical interest and research 
activity of persons belonging to the various disciplines will follow such a scheme with 
neat precision. Indeed this would be altogether incompatible with the nature of a vital 
growing scientific tradition. But this fact does not in the least diminish the importance of 
clarity about these fundamental points of reference around which the theoretical content 
of the sciences of action is organized. The disappearance of the relevance of the major 
distinctions of such a scheme will mean that theory itself has evolved to an altogether 
new level. 
Also we have confined our attention to the sciences which are primarily organized 
about a distinctive theoretical scheme on an analytical level. This clearly precludes the 
inclusion of history as standing on the same level. In so far as history is a social science 
and not one of the humanities, it clearly is not organized about any one of these 
distinctive schcmes unless it be that of the social system as a whole. It seems better to 
conceive history as a synthetic empirical science which is concerned with the 
mobilization of all the theoretical knowledge which is relevant in the explanation of 
processes in social systems and in cultural change in the past. There are, besides political 
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science, according to the view of it as stated above, several others of these synthetic 
disciplines dealing mainly with contemporary phenomena such as population studies, 
“regional studies” -if it be a discipline at all—or “international relations.” 
We have now reached the end of our long analysis of the complexities of the social 
system. In conclusion, it may be appropriate to quote part of the closing paragraph of the 
Structure of Social Action written fourteen years ago in 1937. 
“It is not, therefore, possible to concur in the prevailing pessimistic judgment of the 
social sciences, particularly sociology…. Notable progress on both empirical and 
theoretical levels has been made in the short space of a generation. We have sound 
theoretical foundations on which to build.” 
This statement seems to have been amply justified by the event. Further empirical 
progress has certainly been made in the intervening years with many students 
contributing to it. Similarly on the theoretical side, which has been our concern in the 
present book. The Structure of Social Action proved, as it was hoped that it would be, 
only a beginning. If the theory of the social system had not advanced notably since it was 
written, the present book would not have been possible. By the same token, the present 
effort is only a link in a much longer chain. We can have fufl confidence that many 
further links will be forged, and soon.  
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IN THE Preface and at various points throughout this book it has been noted that many of 
the background concepts important to the book are more fully discussed in the 
monograph of Parsons and Shils’ Values, Motives and Systems of Action in Toward a 
General Theory of Action (Parsons and Shils, editors, Harvard University Press, 1951). 
For the convenience of the reader who wishes to follow up some of the problems 
involved in the definition and use of these concepts this note is inserted. 
In the nature of the present work, only limited attention could be given to many of the 
psychological concepts most relevant to it. Fuller discussion of these will be found above 
all in Chapter II of the monograph, “Personality as a System of Action,” and in briefer 
form, in the “General Statement,” Part I, Chapter I of the volume. The strategic concept 
need-disposition will be found defined and analyzed in both these places, and its relation 
to other motivational concepts like “drive” discussed. In the same chapter the reader will 
find a considerably fuller discussion of the mecnanisms of personality, with an attempt at 
their systematic classification, than has been possible here. Further, the concept 
optimization of gratification is defined and elucidated in that chapter. 
Also, the very central concepts or interaction, the “paradigm” of interaction, and the 
related concept of double contingency are discussed at several places in the other volume, 
notably in a separate section of the “General Statement” and in a section near the end of 
Chapter I of the monograph. The application of this analysis to the theory of personality 
is discussed particularly in the sections of Chapter II on “The Articulation of Personality 
and Social Systems” and “Need-Dispositions and Role-Expectations.” 
The reader who may be concerned about the use of the concept system, on both the 
theoretical and the empirical levels, will find a discussion of the meaning of systems of 
theory in the Introduction to the monograph (not the Preface to the volume) and one of 
the nature of empirical systems, and the classification of types of them, as the last section 
of Chapter I of the monograph. 
Finally, the “pattern variable” scheme, its derivation from the frame of reference of 
action, and the way in which it is involved in personalides as well as in social systems, is 
more fully discussed in Chapter I of the monograph than in the present volume. The 
attention of the reader is particularly invited to the section “The Interrelations of the 
Pattern Variables” where the concept of symmetrical asymmetry is discussed. 
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